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T here are few film and television genres that capture the hearts of audiences like the western. While not always 
true to the past, westerns are tied to, and 
expressive of, the history of the United States. 
As such, they serve to both reflect and inform 
the American psyche. Indeed, the western is 
arguably the most iconic and influential genre 
in American cinema. Through characters like 
Shane, William Munny, and Al Swearengen, 
western films and TV shows continue to 
captivate viewers.
The Philosophy of the Western features 
a variety of essays that consider the 
philosophical significance of westerns. From 
classic films such as Fort Apache (1948) and 
The Wild Bunch (1969) to contemporary 
films and TV shows such as 3:10 to Yuma 
(2007), No Country for Old Men (2007), and 
Deadwood (2004–2006), The Philosophy 
of the Western uses ancient and modern 
philosophical frameworks to analyze the 
underlying themes of the genre. Editors 
Jennifer L. McMahon and B. Steve Csaki 
have assembled a group of noted scholars to 
investigate questions of identity, ethics, 
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gender, animal rights, and other topics 
depicted in western narratives.
Drawing from philosophers as varied as 
Aristotle, Spinoza, William James, and Jean-
Paul Sartre, The Philosophy of the Western 
examines themes that are central to the genre: 
individual freedom versus community; the 
encroachment of industry and development 
on the natural world; and the epistemological 
and ethical implications of the classic “lone 
rider” of the West. The philosophies of John 
Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau figure prominently in discussions 
of human relationships and of the necessary 
conditions for social and political order in 
the West. The result is a wide-reaching study 
of fundamental questions about morality, 
identity, and social organization.
The Philosophy of the Western offers a detailed 
analysis of the origins and continuing 
influence of a quintessentially American form 
of art and entertainment.
Jennifer L. McMahon, associate professor 
and chair of the English and Languages 
Department at East Central University, is 
a contributor to The Philosophy of TV Noir, 
The Philosophy of Martin Scorsese, and The 
Philosophy of Science Fiction Film.
b. Steve CSaki was most recently a visiting 
professor at Centre College, where he taught 
courses in philosophy, the humanities, and 
Japanese.
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“The writing is accessible to nonspecialists  
and should be of interest to general  
readers who enjoy thinking about  
philosophy, film, or westerns.”
—karen d. hoffMan, 
Hood College
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1INTRODUCTION
Philosophy and the Western
Jennifer L. McMahon and B. Steve Csaki
What is it that compels people’s fascination with the American West? What 
motivated (and still motivates) individuals to pull up stakes and head west? 
Why do the travails of the cowboy remain so captivating when cowboy cul-
ture is virtually extinct? Arguably, the perennial appeal of the American West 
is anchored in myth, a myth whose power persists in large part because it 
fi nds expression, among other places, in the literary and cinematic genre 
known as the western.
Th e myth that westerns convey is both anchored in the history of the 
West and itself helped shape the historical settlement of the American fron-
tier.1 It emerged from the stories of westward expansion: stories of those who 
moved west made their way back east as quickly as their subjects moved in 
the opposite direction. Th ey came in the written forms of letters, chronicles, 
newspaper articles, serials, comics, and dime novels, as well as in perfor-
mances such as Buff alo Bill’s Wild West Show.2 Whatever form they took, 
stories of life on the American frontier settled in the minds of all who heard, 
saw, or read them. Th us, as new Americans laid claim to native lands of the 
West, stories of the western territories staked their own claim on the popu-
lar imagination. Th ese stories motivated a cultural fascination with western 
fi gures, famous and infamous, and catalyzed interest in the prospect of a 
western life. Not only were stories of the American West anchored in west-
ward expansion; insofar as they captivated the popular imagination, they 
encouraged it. However, to the extent that they typically refashioned the 
reality upon which they were based, these stories blurred the line between 
fact and fi ction. As a consequence, most who migrated to the West had little 
idea what truly awaited them. Th ey were drawn west by the myth, by the 
vague yet inexorable allure of a wild, untouched land, of terrain laden with 
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golden opportunities; however, this is rarely what they found. While rooted 
in history, the myth of the American West quickly took on a life of its own. 
And while the historical reality to which it refers is all but lost, the myth of 
the American West is alive and well, and continues to command an abiding 
interest in the western genre.
Th ere are few genres that capture the hearts of their audience like the 
western. Th ough many westerns have simple plots and stock characters, 
they also have an unwavering appeal. Th is collection of essays is focused 
principally on western fi lm, specifi cally the American western.3 As those 
familiar with the western genre are well aware, it is nearly as vast as the West 
itself. Th ere are thousands of westerns, and an abundance of literature exists 
on the western genre.4 Th ough there is ample historical and literary criti-
cism of the genre, little scholarship exists on the relationship between the 
western and philosophy. Th is volume addresses this lack by focusing on the 
philosophy of the western.
At fi rst glance, westerns and philosophy may seem to have little to do 
with one another. Whereas philosophers epitomize the contemplative life, 
western heroes exemplify the active one. Indeed, the characters in westerns 
typically eschew the intellectualism associated with philosophy. Nonetheless, 
as the essays in this collection show, the relationship between philosophy 
and the western is signifi cant because philosophy not only infl uenced the 
history of the American West, it also infl uenced the western genre. Indeed, 
as several chapters in this volume attest, some of the canonical features of 
western fi lms trace their history back to the early days of western philoso-
phy, days when individuals like Plato and Aristotle were the new sheriff s in 
town, and logic and rhetoric were used to cut down the opposition rather 
than a Winchester or a Colt. Examining the relationship between westerns 
and philosophy is also important because philosophy can help us under-
stand the western and its appeal. Because philosophers aim to understand 
human nature, they frequently examine commonplace attitudes and desires, 
perspectives that oft en fi nd expression in westerns, and desires that they 
oft en fulfi ll. Furthermore, philosophic analysis of western fi lms is signifi cant 
because it sheds light on various aspects of American culture and values, 
helping us come to a clearer understanding of the American mind. Finally, 
to the extent that westerns illustrate a number of well-known philosophies, 
examining the link between westerns and philosophy is worthwhile because 
westerns can help us obtain a fi rmer grasp on philosophic theories and con-
cepts that might otherwise seem intractably abstract.
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One of the obvious interests that philosophy shares with the western has 
already been mentioned: history. One of the earliest philosophic theories of 
art issued from the ancient Greeks. It held that art is imitation, or mimesis, 
and this theory retains adherents today.5 Th e mimetic theory of art maintains 
that art is a representation of reality: namely, that it refl ects, or mirrors, life. 
Perhaps more than any other cinematic genre, the western is grounded in, 
and refl ects, the historical phenomenon of western settlement. As various 
authors in this collection discuss, westerns command philosophic interest 
not merely because they refl ect aspects of a defi nitive period in American 
history, but also because they transcend that frontier, representing either 
the period in which they were produced or more enduring aspects of the 
human condition.
Philosophers are also interested in the aesthetic qualities of westerns. 
Aesthetics refers to the branch of philosophy that studies art. Philosophers 
who specialize in aesthetics consider the formal features of westerns, features 
such as character and setting, as well as the rhetorical strategies employed 
in individual works. To be sure, parallels exist between these sorts of criti-
cal analyses and those off ered by literary theorists. At the same time, the 
interpretations off ered by these philosophers tend to go beyond literary 
analysis to consider issues of philosophic interest. Th ese issues include the 
individual, cultural, and moral aspects of western fi lms.
Th ese interests correspond to the major subdivisions of this volume. 
Part 1 of this collection, “Th e Cowboy Way: Th e Essence of the Western 
Hero,” contains essays that consider the relationship that westerns have to 
identity. Philosophers analyze identity from a variety of diff erent perspec-
tives, including personal identity, gender identity, and cultural identity. Th e 
essays in the fi rst section of this volume consider the way in which west-
erns have established—and continue to establish—powerful ideals with 
respect to identity. Shai Biderman’s essay, “ ‘Do Not Forsake Me, Oh, My 
Darling’: Loneliness and Solitude in Westerns,” explores the essence of the 
western hero, particularly one of the hero’s perennial features: solitude. As 
fans of the western will attest, western heroes are, with rare exception, lone 
fi gures. Th ough they are fi gures upon whom others depend, they remain 
estranged from society. Drawing primarily from the works of Aristotle 
(384–322 BCE) and Descartes (1596–1650), Biderman examines a range 
of fi lms including High Noon (1952), Shane (1953), Th e Searchers (1956), 
and Unforgiven (1992), and makes a case for the epistemic and ethical ben-
efi ts of solitude.
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Douglas J. Den Uyl takes another look at the loneliness of the western 
hero in his chapter, “Civilization and Its Discontents: Th e Self-Suffi  cient 
Western Hero.” Like Biderman, Den Uyl asserts that the western hero is 
usually a lone fi gure and that westerns both express and reinforce our cul-
tural preoccupation with individualism. Distinguishing solitude from self-
suffi  ciency, Den Uyl applies Aristotle and Spinoza’s (1632–77) notions of 
self-suffi  ciency to the fi lms of John Ford and argues that Ford’s fi lms both 
elevate this trait and at the same time suggest that it is on the decline.
B. Steve Csaki’s essay, “Mommas, Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to 
Be Pragmatists,” examines another integral feature of the western hero: his 
propensity for action. Focusing specifi cally on the quintessential western 
hero, John Wayne, Csaki argues that Wayne achieved his iconic status as 
a western hero in large part because he embodied the ideals of American 
pragmatism. Drawing primarily from William James (1842–1910) and 
John Dewey (1859–1952) and focusing principally on Th e Cowboys (1971) 
and Rooster Cogburn (1975), Csaki argues that the defi ning feature of the 
pragmatic individual is his or her ability to perceive the salient features of 
his or her environment, adapt to circumstances, and act to achieve spe-
cifi c ends.
Stephen J. Mexal’s “Two Ways to Yuma: Locke, Liberalism, and Western 
Masculinity in 3:10 to Yuma,” uses the philosophy of John Locke (1632–1704) 
to explain how the western both sets a standard for individual identity and 
also serves to refl ect the prevailing view of particular historical periods. 
Comparing the original 1957 version of 3:10 to Yuma to the 2007 remake, 
Mexal argues that the diff erences between the two fi lms refl ect the chang-
ing ideal of masculinity from one that emphasizes civic-mindedness and 
fi lial duty to one that associates masculine identity with property. Moving 
us toward the issue of community that will become the focus of the next 
section, Mexal relates this shift  to the diff erent contexts in which the two 
fi lms were produced: namely, the transition from a cold war mentality and 
a nation preoccupied with defense to post–cold war politics and a nation 
defi ned by an unbridled commitment to capitalism.
Like Mexal, Lindsey Collins focuses on 3:10 to Yuma and argues that 
it, like most westerns, promotes an ideal of masculinity associated with the 
appropriation and control of property. In her essay, “Landscapes of Gen-
dered Violence: Male Love and Anxiety on the Railroad,” she analyzes the 
symbolism of the railroad in western fi lms. According to Collins, while the 
incursion of railroads into the frontier landscape symbolizes the domestica-
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tion of space by male force, fi lms such as 3:10 to Yuma and Tycoon (1947) 
that foreground railroads also articulate the anxieties associated with the 
transformation of landscape and life that such technologies entail.
Part 2 of this volume, “Th e Code of the West: Th e Cowboy and Society,” 
extends the analysis of community introduced in the section on identity to 
consider how western fi lms explore the nature of human relationships and 
social organization. Of particular interest is how westerns illustrate compet-
ing philosophic theories regarding the nature of community, including theo-
ries proposed by well-known social and political philosophers such as John 
Locke, Th omas Hobbes (1588–1679), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). 
In his essay, “Order Out of the Mud: Deadwood and the State of Nature,” Paul 
A. Cantor examines David Milch’s popular series Deadwood, particularly 
how the series illustrates the relationship between order and law. In fact, 
Cantor argues that Deadwood can help us arrive at a positive answer to the 
question: Is there order without law? Cantor examines the philosophies of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, all of which informed popular perceptions 
of the conquest of the American frontier during the nineteenth century, and 
argues they also fi nd contemporary expression in Deadwood.
Continuing the discussion of the relation between order and law initi-
ated in the previous chapter by Cantor, as well as the discussion of the rela-
tionship between power and space introduced in part 1 by Collins, Aeon 
J. Skoble explores the parallels that exist between Th e Magnifi cent Seven 
(1960) and Kurosawa’s Seven Samurai (1954). In his chapter, titled “Order 
without Law: Th e Magnifi cent Seven, East and West,” Skoble explores not 
merely the similarities between the Japanese samurai, particularly the mas-
terless ronin, and the western hero, but also the way in which the two fi lms 
illustrate how grassroots social order can arise spontaneously with the aid 
of individuals with integrity.
Th e next two chapters in the volume continue to examine the social 
and moral impact of individuals with integrity. In his essay, “From Dollars 
to Iron: Th e Currency of Clint Eastwood’s Westerns,” David L. McNaron 
argues that individuals with uncompromising integrity are necessary condi-
tions for the possibility of community and justice. He focuses specifi cally on 
Clint Eastwood’s fi lms, arguing that Eastwood repeatedly portrays characters 
who, though oft en violent, epitomize strength of character.
Similarly, in his chapter, titled “Th e Duty of Reason: Kantian Ethics in 
High Noon,” Daw-Nay Evans examines the classic High Noon, particularly 
its main character, Marshal Will Kane. According to Evans, Kane embodies 
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the absolute dedication to duty that Kant argued was necessary in order for 
our actions to have moral worth, while at the same time illustrating how 
diffi  cult it is to adhere to such a strict moral code.
Part 3 of the volume, “Outlaws: Challenging Conventions of the West-
ern,” contains essays that take a critical look at the code of the West that 
westerns promote by examining westerns that defy that code. In the aptly 
titled “Th e Cost of the Code: Ethical Consequences in High Noon and Th e 
Ox-Bow Incident,” Ken Hada challenges the moral absolutism that is char-
acteristic of many westerns. Bridging the gap between the last essay in part 
2 and the fi rst in part 3, Hada focuses at length on the classic High Noon; 
however, rather than celebrate the moral absolutism of Marshal Will Kane 
as Evans did in the previous chapter, Hada gives us cause to question his 
unfl inching ethics. Drawing primarily from the work of Martha Nussbaum, 
Hada argues that while fi lms like High Noon and Th e Ox-Bow Incident (1943) 
present us with characters for whom ethics are absolute, they at the same 
time undercut the codes their characters embody by illustrating the oft en 
fatal consequences that follow from moral infl exibility.
In his essay, “ ‘Back Off  to What?’ Th e Search for Meaning in Th e Wild 
Bunch,” Richard Gaughran examines a fi lm that challenges audience expec-
tation by undercutting the assumption of morality altogether. Focusing on 
Sam Peckinpah’s Th e Wild Bunch (1969), Gaughran examines moral relativ-
ism as it is illustrated by the fi lm, relating it not only to changing political 
and economic conditions of the twentieth century, but also to prominent 
literary and philosophic movements of the period, such as existentialism. 
Th ough Gaughran recognizes that audiences might be troubled by the fi lm’s 
questioning of traditional values, he employs the work of Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1905–80) to argue that Th e Wild Bunch can be interpreted as an empower-
ing fi lm, to the extent that it emphasizes human freedom.
William J. Devlin continues the discussion of westerns that challenge our 
expectations in his essay, “No Country for Old Men: Th e Decline of Ethics 
and the West(ern).” In this chapter, Devlin examines an increasingly com-
mon characteristic of contemporary westerns: moral cynicism. As Devlin 
notes, whereas classic westerns tend to have easily recognizable heroes and 
villains, the moral situation depicted in contemporary westerns is rarely so 
clear. Infl uenced by fi gures like Peckinpah, Devlin argues, contemporary 
westerns not only incorporate moral ambiguity, they are also consider-
ably more cynical than their classic predecessors. Devlin argues that this is 
nowhere more evident than in No Country for Old Men, a dystopic western 
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that not only off ers contemporary audiences a new sort of villain, but utterly 
confounds audience expectation by failing to have the hero rescue the com-
munity from the risk personifi ed by the villain.
In their essay, titled “Th e Northwestern: McCabe and Mrs. Miller,” Deb-
orah Knight and George McKnight examine a fi lm that defi es not only the 
moral but also the aesthetic conventions of the genre. Rather than command 
audience interest with familiar panoramas and an uplift ing conclusion, they 
argue, Robert Altman reverses familiar conventions such as the shoot-out 
to produce an end-of-genre western suffi  cient to inspire critique of several 
of the ideals upon which many early westerns are based.
Finally, part 4 of the volume, “On the Fringe: Th e Encounter with the 
Other,” contains essays that consider the tendency westerns have to empha-
size particular values and exclude, marginalize, or misrepresent fi gures 
who are nonetheless integral to the history of the American West, such 
as Native Americans, African Americans, Chinese, Hispanics, women, 
children, and animals. Studies in otherness, the essays in this fi nal sec-
tion look at the code of the western from the perspective of what it dis-
torts or excludes and assess the ethical consequences of those omissions 
and obfuscations.
Th ough archetypal fi gures in the western, Native Americans are cer-
tainly one of the most seriously misrepresented groups in the genre. In his 
chapter, “Savage Nations: Native Americans and the Western,” Michael Val-
dez Moses relies upon the philosophic discussion of indigenous peoples in 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Ferguson, and Tzvetan Todorov to analyze the 
representation of Native American people and culture from the early fi lms 
of John Ford, such as Fort Apache (1948), and Arthur Penn’s Little Big Man 
(1970) to Kevin Costner’s Dances with Wolves (1990) and Jim Jarmusch’s 
Dead Man (1995), among others. While Moses sees a positive trend toward 
less caricatured and more sympathetic portrayals of Native Americans, he 
notes that with the exception of fi lms written and produced by indigenous 
Americans, representations of Native Americans are less concerned with 
an honest depiction of their subject than with a polemical representation 
of the changing landscape of American political life.
Richard Gilmore’s “Regeneration through Stories and Song: Th e View 
from the Other Side of the West in Smoke Signals” also analyzes the repre-
sentation of Native Americans in western fi lms. However, its focus is one of 
the few fi lms produced by and told from the perspective of Native Ameri-
cans. Linking back to Csaki’s pragmatist interpretation of John Wayne in 
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part 1, Gilmore places a similar emphasis on American pragmatism, even 
though the characters in Sherman Alexie’s Smoke Signals (1998) are more 
suspicious of the Duke. As Gilmore notes, though Smoke Signals is about 
the distress that arises from failed relationships, it is also about resilience, 
reconciliation, and growth. With its symbolism and humor, Gilmore sug-
gests that Smoke Signals illustrates important principles of Native American 
philosophy, principles it shares with American pragmatism, particularly 
their mutual emphasis on holism and process.
In their chapter, “Go West, Young Woman! Hegel’s Dialectic and Wom-
en’s Identities in Western Films,” Gary Heba and Robin Murphy shift  the 
focus to the representation of women in western fi lms. Using Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel’s (1770–1831) dialectic to frame their discussion, Heba and 
Murphy trace the portrayal of women through three distinct but related 
phases. Analyzing not only the visual depictions of women but also their 
linguistic and structural functions, Heba and Murphy assess many of the 
classic westerns treated previously in the volume, including Th e Searchers 
and Shane. However, rather than focus on how those fi lms promulgate and 
elevate masculine ideals, they discuss how these fi lms also set defi nitive and 
typically restrictive standards for women.
Finally, the last essay in the collection considers another marginalized 
fi gure in westerns: the horse. In “Beating a Live Horse: Th e Elevation and 
Degradation of Horses in Westerns,” Jennifer L. McMahon off ers an exis-
tential explanation for the polarized treatment of horses in western fi lms: 
namely, their simultaneous celebration and subjugation. Drawing from 
philosophers such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1844–1900), Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Michel 
Foucault (1926–1984), McMahon analyzes the desire to dominate horses 
that westerns illustrate and promote. She speculates that by overcoming this 
desire, we can improve our relationships not only with horses and other 
animals, but also with one another.
Given the scope of the western genre and the vast array of subjects it 
encompasses that are suitable for philosophic examination, this collection 
aims to off er an intriguing glimpse into a new area of exploration, rather 
than an exhaustive mapping of it. Whereas ample scholarship exists on the 
history of the western, and the domain of western literary and fi lm criticism 
is likewise heavily populated, the philosophy of the western is an open and 
promising frontier. Th ough the territory is not uncharted,6 there is much 
yet to be explored. Th e terrain is promising because it can off er audiences 
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not only a greater understanding of the discipline of philosophy, but also 
a fuller appreciation of the origins and continuing infl uence of the ever-
popular genre we know as the western.
Notes
1. Here, with the term settlement, we are referring to the incursion of nonnative 
peoples into the western territories of the United States beginning in the early nine-
teenth century. In truth, these territories were already settled, insofar as they had 
been occupied for thousands of years by the indigenous peoples of North America. 
A wealth of scholarship exists on this nonnative settlement of the American West. 
Historical sources include William C. Davis, Th e American Frontier: Pioneers, Settlers, 
and Cowboys, 1800–1899 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); William 
Deverell, A Companion to the American West (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004); and 
Clyde Milner, A New Signifi cance: Re-envisioning the History of the American West 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Studies that consider the relation between 
that history and the western genre include Scott Simmon, Th e Invention of the West-
ern Film: A Cultural History of the Genre’s First Half-Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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“DO NOT FORSAKE ME, 
OH, MY DARLING”
Loneliness and Solitude in Westerns
Shai Biderman
Shouldering your loneliness 
like a gun that you will not learn to aim, 
you stumble into this movie house, 
then you climb, you climb into the frame.
—Leonard Cohen, “Love Calls You by Your Name”
“Solitary Man”
One of the common attributes of western fi lms is the “lone hero.” Whether 
it’s in the fi nal scene, where he takes that inevitable “lone ride” off  into the 
sunset or in his heroic acts throughout the fi lm, where he saves the town 
folk from danger, the lone hero keeps to himself. He is the quintessential 
“strong silent type” traditionally prized in the American psyche. He is strong 
in the sense that he is powerful in his physical, intellectual, and moral capaci-
ties. He is silent in the sense that, despite the social benefi ts earned by his 
outward actions, he remains secluded and keeps to himself. He appears to 
outwardly and inwardly manifest the notion of loneliness. Many famous 
Western protagonists manifest this characteristic. Ethan Edwards (John 
Wayne) in Th e Searchers (1956) must rescue his niece aft er he fi nds that 
nearly all of his family members have been massacred in a Comanche raid. 
While he ultimately saves her, he nonetheless must take the lone ride to do 
so. “Th e Man with No Name” (Clint Eastwood) in the Dollars trilogy (1964, 
1965, 1966) is a gunslinger who represents the notion that the lone rider is 
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one without a signifi cant identity, one who acts for money, makes superfi -
cial friendships, and then rides off  alone. Shane (Alan Ladd) in the movie of 
the same name (1953) is introduced as a lone rider, a gunslinger who saves 
the homesteaders of a small town from a cattle baron and then leaves, just 
as he came, alone in solitude (possibly riding to his death). Finally, Marshal 
Will Kane (Gary Cooper) in High Noon (1952) tries to give up the lone life 
of the town’s marshal in order to marry his Quaker sweetheart, only to fi nd 
out that loneliness goes with the territory and cannot be overcome. Other 
instances in many other fi lms support the claim that this characteristic of 
loneliness is not a random feature of the western hero; rather, it is the hero’s 
trademark.
But why must the hero ride alone? How does he benefi t (if at all) from 
a life of loneliness and solitude? Is it purely accidental or does it imply an 
intrinsic quality of the western protagonist? In this chapter, I will examine 
the condition of loneliness and solitude in the western hero, asking such 
questions as, “What is the condition of loneliness?” and “How is it diff erent 
from solitude, if at all?” I will analyze the nature of these predicaments, as 
both a state of mind and a state of aff airs, using and echoing related terms 
and distinctions like isolation, privacy, seclusion, alienation, disengagement, 
and the diff erence between being alone and being lonely.
In order to fi nd out why it is crucial for the western hero to be all (or 
some) of the above, I will pursue the philosophical nature of this condition. 
I will argue that loneliness and solitude have a philosophical signifi cance, 
in the sense that those who are subject to the condition of loneliness might 
have a “philosophical benefi t” over others who are not. I will discuss this 
philosophical benefi t by analyzing how the hero’s lonely road of solitude is 
the most conspicuous trademark of his character. Th is analysis will help to 
show why this trait has been so infl uential in other cinematic genres. Char-
acters like the modern cowboy, including Travis Bickel (Robert De Niro) 
as the angry lone rider in Taxi Driver (1976), and Clint Eastwood’s urban 
mutation of his early western roles as Harry Callahan in the Dirty Harry 
fi lm series, pay homage to the western hero by applying the characteristics 
of loneliness and alienation to the modern area, thereby moving the sense 
of estrangement from the country to the city.1
As I follow the lone hero on his journey, I will examine solitude and iso-
lation from two philosophical perspectives. First, I will examine the hero’s 
loneliness from the point of view of epistemology. As the fi eld of philoso-
phy that concerns knowledge (in terms of analysis, application, and limita-
“Do Not Forsake Me, Oh, My Darling” 15
tion), epistemology applies to loneliness as an issue concerning the limits 
of knowledge. I will examine the hero in terms of both what he knows and 
what he doesn’t know, as well as what he reveals and doesn’t reveal to others. 
Second, I will examine the hero’s loneliness from the point of view of eth-
ics, or the fi eld of philosophy that concerns what we ought to do. Here, the 
ethical examination of loneliness focuses on whether or not the hero’s ten-
dency toward isolation inhibits or advances his moral character. As we will 
see, the western hero is a man motivated by his will to “do the right thing”: 
save the western lawless frontiers from stray gunmen, from acts of injustice, 
and from evildoers. His loneliness has ethical relevance, I will argue, and as 
such is a philosophically signifi cant aspect of his character.
“Are You Lonesome Tonight?”
In the fi lm Heat (1995), the elusive robber Neil McCauley (Robert De Niro) 
breaks his professional oath—“Don’t let yourself get attached to any-
thing you are not willing to walk out on in thirty seconds fl at if you feel 
the heat around the corner”—when he befriends a shy girl, Eady (Amy 
Brenneman). Eady, noticing Neil’s soft er side behind his tough guy’s mask, 
admits that life in LA has left  her feeling “very lonely” and she wonders if 
Neil feels the same way. Neil, however, retorts: “I’m alone—I’m not lonely.” 
Th is distinction, which Neil expresses as he and Eady stand on a balcony 
observing the night falling on LA, the crown of the West, is a distinction 
between a subjective, inner, self-proclaimed depiction of one’s state of 
mind, and an objective, outer, public and universal depiction of a state of 
aff airs. In order to begin our journey with the lone hero, it is important 
to fl esh out this distinction carefully so that we can understand the epis-
temic and ethical issues of loneliness, as well as how these distinctions are 
portrayed in westerns.
As suggested in the scene from Heat, there are two sides to loneliness. 
On the one hand, there is the subjective, personal, inner feeling of isolation 
and estrangement from other people, in the sense of feeling lonely. On the 
other hand, there is the objective, public, outer view of one being physically 
away from others, in the sense of being alone. Th ough we can conceptu-
ally separate the two sides of loneliness, they can relate to one another in 
various ways. First, both the internal and external conditions can be absent 
from a single individual. For instance, when I am at work, I can be nei-
ther estranged nor alone, as I have my colleagues around me, and I feel a 
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strong bond with them. Second, both conditions can be presented together. 
I may end up working late, while my colleagues fi nd it best to have dinner 
together. Desiring to be part of their companionship, I wind up not only 
being alone but feeling alone. Th at is, upon realizing that I am (objectively) 
alone in the building, I feel (subjectively) lonely. Here, my feeling of loneli-
ness may take on the face of self-pity and envy. Th ird, these two conditions 
can be separated from each other. McCauley represents this separation, 
as he objectively remains alone, in solitude from others, but this isolation 
does not make him feel as if he is lonely, in the sense that he has a desire 
or need to be with others. Th us, for McCauley, the objective state of being 
alone does not entail the subjective feeling of loneliness. Th ese conditions 
can be separated in another way. For example, in Th e Th in Red Line (1998), 
First Private Witt (Jim Caviezel) asks Sergeant Welsh (Sean Penn), “Do you 
ever feel lonely?” Welsh responds, “Only around people.” Welsh’s response 
helps to crystallize the categorical diff erences between being alone and feel-
ing lonely but, at the same time, undermines this diff erence by blending the 
two together. One can, accordingly, “feel” alone (despite obvious objective 
data that proves otherwise), and one can thus “be” lonely (despite being 
surrounded by loved ones).
As we investigate the western hero with this conceptual distinction of 
loneliness in mind, we immediately run into a problem. Namely, we have 
no access to the character’s state of mind, unless he tells us how he feels. 
But it is important to note that, as the “silent type,” the hero is not the kind 
of individual to relate his feelings to other people. Still, we can deduce his 
state of mind from his actions, and from the way he handles himself in front 
of the camera. When we follow this procedure, we fi nd that the lone hero 
oft en illustrates the two sides of loneliness. In Th e Searchers, when Uncle 
Ethan fi rst comes back from the war, he is surrounded by his family. Th us, 
objectively, he is not alone. However, his body language and mannerisms 
refl ect deep uneasiness about being around people. He doesn’t feel at home 
with his family; rather, he acts as if he’d rather be left  alone. In other words, 
like Welsh, Ethan is feeling lonely around other people. Even though these 
people are his family, Ethan carries himself as if he were a stranger in a 
strange land, unable to identify and work with others. Th is image of Ethan 
as the lone rider who feels lonely only around others is encapsulated in the 
fi nal scene of the fi lm. Th ere, aft er spending years (and most of the fi lm) 
searching for his kidnapped niece, Ethan literally carries her to the doorstep 
of friends. As the family walks his niece into their home, Ethan hesitates at 
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the doorstep, and the camera views him from the inside of the home. Th is 
revealing shot conveys a sudden and unpleasant feeling of loneliness. We 
feel lonely because we believe Ethan feels lonely. Abandoned by family and 
victimized by his ragged (and somewhat brutish) nature, Ethan cannot help 
but feel lonely. And the camera makes a noticed eff ort to convey this mes-
sage. He stands there, lonely (and alone in the frame), holding his elbow in 
a somewhat exhausted way. His life goal is completed; he is depleted and 
tired. More importantly, nobody needs him anymore. Th e camera refl ects 
all that by showing him at the doorstep, framed by the door, against the 
background of the wilderness.2
In Unforgiven (1992), the question of loneliness (in both its subjective 
and objective senses) is discussed on several occasions. William Munny 
(Clint Eastwood) used to be the western hero’s archnemesis: a vicious out-
law who “killed women and children,” as his reputation goes. Now he is a 
born-again pig farmer, still devoted to his dead wife, who reformed him 
from the bad ways of his youth as he cares for his two children. But since 
the wife is no longer there to keep him straight, Munny conjoins with his old 
partner in crime, Ned Logan (Morgan Freeman), and with a new admirer, 
the Schofi eld Kid (Jaimz Woolvett), to avenge the unjust abuse of a whore 
by two local cowboys. Now old and pathetic, Munny makes a very poor 
excuse for a spokesman for justice. While on the road, Munny and his 
friends discuss the absence of female companionship. Logan has a wife at 
home whom he misses. Th ough he is with two companions (and so is not 
objectively alone), he feels lonely: he misses his bed and his wife, longing 
to be with her. Later, he tries to fend off  his feeling of loneliness by cashing 
in an advance on the bounty off ered by the bordello for the death of the 
two cowboys. Th e Schofi eld Kid, on the contrary, doesn’t feel lonely. He is 
pumped up with stories of wild gunfi ghts and heroism, and cannot wait to 
add his share to the ongoing myth of the Wild West. However, by the end of 
the fi lm we see him on the ground, miserable and remorseful, both lonely 
and alone, as he realizes that his dream to be an outlaw is something that 
he cannot and does not want to strive for anymore. Munny, much like Neil 
McCauley, is objectively alone. But though he may not feel lonely when 
alone, he is concerned about being trapped forever in physical isolation: 
as he tells the Kid, “I won’t kill you; you are the only friend I’ve got.” Ironi-
cally, this sentence means that Munny has no friends. He might not feel 
lonely—but he is alone.
Th ere are two paradigmatic examples of loneliness and solitude in the 
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westerns. First, the hero rides alone. Second, the hero faces his enemy 
in the fi nal duel alone. And in between these two narrative scenes, he is 
usually on his own. Take, for example, Shane in Shane. Th e fi lm’s opening 
scene is of Shane riding in the mountainous countryside of Wyoming. 
Th ough he befriends homesteader Joe Starrett (Van Hefl in) and his fam-
ily, in several crucial scenes, he acts alone. In his fi rst fi ght he is alone, and 
more importantly, he is alone in his fi nal showdown. In that case, Shane 
wants to enter the fi nal showdown alone so strongly that he beats up Joe 
(the man whom he is helping through the showdown) so he can do this 
alone. Shane is thus strongly compelled to fi ght objectively alone, with-
out companions.
Fighting alone is also exemplifi ed by Marshal Kane in High Noon. 
Th ere, following his duty as marshal (that is, his duty to protect everyone 
else), Kane fi ghts four gunmen. But ironically, though he accepts his duty 
to protect others, no one protects him—he must enter the fi nal showdown 
alone. Similarly, in Unforgiven, aft er learning of Logan’s death, Munny 
seeks revenge all alone. Th ough, with respect to the fi nal showdown, Shane 
desires to be alone, Kane is forced to be alone, and Munny is too raveled in 
his drunken desire for revenge to care one way or the other, all three lone 
riders are similar in at least one respect: they are subjectively comfortable 
in their objective solitude.
In conclusion, I have shown the dual nature of loneliness. On the one 
hand, loneliness is a state of mind, a self-inspection of one’s feelings and 
self-perception. Th is is the subjective condition of being lonely. On the 
other hand, there is the objective perception of being alone. We can use 
this distinction to expound on related terms that designate descriptions of 
these two conditions. For example, isolation (or seclusion) is the condition 
of being hidden and shunned from the company of others. Seemingly an 
objective term (“Th e patient was isolated for fear of contamination”), it can 
also refl ect a subjective inner state of mind, much like the feeling of loneli-
ness. “Privacy” has a positive connotation to it (in some legal systems it is a 
sacred right); “alienation” has a negative connotation, and it usually refers 
to either the condition or the feeling of being cast out from society. “Disen-
gagement” is a neutrally sound term, which has the hint of reciprocity. All 
these terms have to do with the conditions of loneliness and solitude. And 
they all play supporting roles in the construction of the western protago-
nist. Now, having clarifi ed the notion of loneliness, we can turn to discuss 
its philosophical nature.
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“One Is the Loneliest Number”
What are the philosophical applications of loneliness? What might be phil-
osophically gained from a lonely or a solo fi gure’s point of view? Th e con-
ditions of loneliness and solitude appear in philosophy in many diff erent 
contexts. One major context concerns the epistemic quest for certainty and 
true knowledge. Th e epistemic quest is encapsulated best by Socrates (469–
399 BCE), who maintained that “the unexamined life is not worth living.” 
Aristotle (384–322 BCE), meanwhile, added that philosophy begins with a 
sense of wonder. Th e wonder is to be pursued by a life of examination and 
investigation. Th e desire to know achieves its greatest fulfi llment in the phi-
losopher who understands the principles and causes of the world.3
Solitude is a primary position for such an epistemic quest, as it is the 
context that isolates and manifests the wondering voice who seeks for 
knowledge and truths. Following contemporary philosopher Philip Koch, 
we can say that “the more given to refl ection a person is, the more a phi-
losopher; and when, in addition, the objective of refl ection is a connected 
vision of the whole reality, we have a philosopher in the strongest sense of 
the term.” In order to follow these two declarations about human life and 
goals, the individual is better off  on his or her own, encountering the world 
and him- or herself in an unmediated and uninterrupted way. Th e ability to 
retreat from the immediacy of the world, of other people, and to examine 
the world “from a distance” (the distance of solitude) is, as Michel de Mon-
taigne (1533–92) notes, a clear philosophical advantage: “We must reserve 
a little back-shop, all our own, entirely free, wherein to establish our true 
liberty and principal retreat and solitude.”4
French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650) understood that this 
individualistic state of mind is required for the true soul searching for, and 
gaining of, true knowledge and an understanding of the world. In his Medi-
tations on First Philosophy (1641), he springs from “a little back-shop” of 
solitude into the most skeptical of epistemic searches. His solitude quickly 
evolves into the disposition of solipsism, the extreme epistemic position that 
states that, lacking contrary evidence, the only thing that I can be certain 
of is my own individual, and isolated, existence. He begins his search by 
isolating himself, in the objective sense, by withdrawing to the seclusion of 
his room. Th ere, in isolation, he turns his attention to the epistemic quest 
for knowledge and certainty. He opens the fi rst meditation with a very per-
sonal standpoint about himself: “Several years have now elapsed since I fi rst 
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became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions 
for true, and that consequently what I aft erward based on such principles 
was highly doubtful.” In other words, Descartes begins his epistemic quest 
by employing methodological doubt, or the method under which nothing is 
certain unless proven to be so, and whatever isn’t certain is systematically 
abandoned as a falsehood.5
Th ose dubitable knowledge-claims multiply when he recalls that “I must 
nevertheless here consider that I am a man, and that, consequently, I am 
in the habit of sleeping, and representing to myself in dreams those same 
things, or even sometimes others less probable, which the insane think are 
presented to them in their waking moments.” Here, Descartes asks, “How 
oft en have I dreamt that I was in these familiar circumstances, that I was 
dressed, and occupied this place by the fi re, when I was lying undressed in 
bed?” Descartes is deluded and misguided. He cannot trust his senses, nor 
can he trust that he’s not dreaming. As Descartes points out, nothing is known 
for certain, and this is a very lonely, subjective disposition: “Just as if I had 
fallen all of a sudden into very deep water, I am so greatly disconcerted as 
to be unable either to plant my feet fi rmly on the bottom or sustain myself 
by swimming on the surface.” In other words, life and the world have sub-
jectively become very lonely places for Descartes.6
Th e only certainty Descartes fi nds is that he, himself, exists. His rea-
soning for such a conclusion is as follows. Even if one assumes that there is 
a deceiver, from the very fact that one is deceived it follows that one exists. 
In general, it will follow from any state of thinking (for example, imagining, 
sensing, feeling, or reasoning) that one exists. While one can be deceived 
about the objective content of any thought, one cannot be deceived about 
the fact that one exists and that one seems to perceive objects with certain 
characteristics. Since one can be certain only of the existence of one’s self 
insofar as one is thinking, one has knowledge or certainty of one’s existence 
only as a thinking thing (res cogitans). Whereas this certainty rescues Des-
cartes from his “feeling” of loneliness, it leaves him, strictly speaking, alone 
in the epistemic sense of solipsism. For Descartes, at this point, his own exis-
tence, as a thinking thing, is the only verifi able reality. In this sense, then, 
solitude, in its epistemic form, becomes the methodological preference for 
developing one’s knowledge of the world.7
Loneliness thus has an epistemic value. It is both the primary and pre-
ferred condition for philosophical investigation and examination and a 
possible end result of such a quest. Th is is why many writers and philoso-
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phers, such as the poet Octavio Paz Lozano (1914–98), have insisted upon 
our “essential loneliness.” Loneliness, then, is not merely the aberrant state 
of a person or culture, but rather “the profoundest fact of the human con-
dition.”8
Th e loneliness of the western hero reveals itself in two epistemic con-
texts. First, as already suggested, he is, aft er all, “the silent type.” Language 
is not his strong side—he doesn’t speak much, and he hardly ever asks for 
advice or shares his thoughts (and hence his contemplation) with others. 
As opposed to refl ecting publicly, at  a town meeting, perhaps, or in a group 
conversation, the hero refl ects largely in private. Th e philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1889–1951), who builds on the linguistic characteristic of 
Cartesian solipsism, notes, “Th e limits of my language means the limits of 
the world.” Th at is, since we cannot say what we cannot think, it follows 
that one’s world is limited by one’s language so that “the world is my world” 
(my emphasis).9And, since the lone rider is one who, more oft en than not, 
remains silent, he embraces this epistemic notion of linguistic solipsism. 
Second, the western hero keeps to himself. He doesn’t seek information 
from others, and he doesn’t share information with anyone, either. We rarely 
know his thoughts, his feelings, or even his name. He makes decisions and 
acts on them without sharing with others (and us) his deliberation process. 
Whenever he contemplates and assesses the knowledge he has, he does so 
in private. He never asks others what he can fi nd out himself, on his own, 
by himself. Th is “alone,” or private, aspect of the epistemic loneliness makes 
the western hero rather mysterious.
We can see this lonesome and mysterious characteristic in Marshal 
Kane of High Noon. Kane decides that his duty as sheriff  is above every-
thing else. He gains this knowledge of himself, his duties, and his correlate 
plans without (and even against) the advice of anyone else. His wife, his 
former mistress, his deputy, the town’s assembly—all tell him, in one way 
or another, to fl ee town. But he has already made up his mind. We would 
say nowadays that he “looked into himself ” and found out what he ought to 
do. In epistemic terms, we can say that he gained certain knowledge about 
what he should be doing next. And, again, this knowledge was gained with-
out the help of others.
Likewise, Shane in Shane is the quiet type. He rarely speaks, he hides his 
past as a gunslinger, he reveals but very few details about himself, even hid-
ing his full name. Th e same goes for William Munny in Unforgiven—there, 
even when the Schofi eld Kid gets his facts wrong about Munny’s past, he 
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remains quiet, refusing to reveal the truth. Finally, in Th e Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly, Blondie (Clint Eastwood) holds a rare piece of knowledge: 
the name on the gravestone where the treasure is buried. Th is knowledge is 
of no use if it is shared, especially with his shady companions, the vicious 
Angel Eyes (Lee Van Cleef) and the crooked Tuko (Eli Wallach). When he 
fi nally shares the info with Tuko, the knowledge is not relevant anymore, 
since Angel Eyes is lying dead in an open grave and Tuko is hanging from the 
rope of his own doing. In short, whether it is Kane, Shane, Munny, Blondie, 
or many other western heroes, all of them are similar insofar as each lone 
rider remains, more or less, silent, fi nding comfort in his subjective epis-
temic and solipsistic solitude.
“All the Lonely People”
Th e most important philosophical aspect of the western hero’s loneliness 
focuses more on what he does than on what he knows. Th e western hero 
is, aft er all, a man of action. Whether he is a sheriff  or a bandit, a keeper 
of the law or an outlaw, a member of conventional society or a vigilante, 
the lone hero is not a man of words. He is a man of deeds. Ethan Edwards 
in Th e Searchers is a man of few words. So is Marshal Will Kane in High 
Noon. Blondie in Th e Good, the Bad and the Ugly rarely opens his mouth (as 
opposed to the chatty Tuko).10 And the shy Shane fi nds it hard to make ver-
bal connections. But all of them are men of action: they go on an expedition 
for years to fi nd a lost niece, they save the town from evildoers, and they go 
on a treasure hunt (and briefl y join the Union army in the Civil War). As a 
man of action, the lone hero must be able to justify his actions as morally 
sound because of, or in spite of, his solitude. And so we must investigate 
whether or not the condition of loneliness interferes with the hero’s eff ort 
to do the right thing.
When considering ethics and loneliness as two character traits that 
might contradict each other, one may wish to refer to Aristotle. Aristotle’s 
ethics revolves around the state of happiness (eudaimonia) as the goal of 
humankind (and, as such, as the justifi cation of ethics) and around the con-
cept of excellence (aretē) as the prerequisite of character needed in order to 
lead the virtuous life of happiness and fl ourishing. Being ethical, according 
to Aristotle, involves leading a harmonious and balanced life of fl ourishing 
and excellence. What is excellence and how does one become excellent? 
Aristotle presents the golden mean, or the mean between two extremes of 
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vices, which crystallizes the excellent, and thus virtuous, behavior (or trait). 
Th e most common example, used by Aristotle to expand on the nature of 
the golden mean, is the condition and character trait of bravery. Bravery is 
the character disposition that is the mean between cowardice (defi ciency) 
and recklessness (excess). In order to be excellent (virtuous), one has to act 
in moderation.11
Aristotle designates many external goods that can help, to various 
degrees, in the process of habituating virtuousness. Such goods include 
proper education, nourishing, and upbringing, having inspiring role mod-
els, and the acquisition of habits, practicing those habits, and developing 
them into skills (what Aristotle calls “practical knowledge”). One external 
good that is necessary for acquiring excellence is having friends and social 
relations. As Aristotle points out, “Man by nature is a political [social] ani-
mal.” Th us, for Aristotle, one cannot be fully virtuous and excellent if one 
has no friends and is estranged from society. Aristotle compares this lonely, 
friendless condition to sleeping or being in a coma: one cannot be said to 
be “virtuous” or “excellent” (or “moral”) when one is asleep or in a lifelong 
coma. Similarly, one cannot be said to be ethical if one keeps to oneself, is 
alone and alienated from society, has no friends or family, and does not 
nourish and cultivate one’s social skills.12
Following Aristotle’s ethical standards, the western hero cannot act on 
his full potential as an ethical fi gure as long as he is a lone rider. His lack of 
social skills, while proven to have some possible epistemic benefi ts, is dev-
astating as an ethical disposition. Th e lone hero cannot fully acquire the 
moral and noble roles of pursuing justice, fi ghting evil, saving towns, and 
amending wrongs unless he opens up and abandons his loneliness for a life 
that essentially embodies social interactions.
“I’m Lonesome but Happy”
Aristotle’s virtue ethics cherishes the virtue of friendship and social interac-
tion. To that extent, it presents a problem for the lone rider. Th is approach 
rests on the Aristotelian presupposition that human nature entails solidarity 
and camaraderie (as “man is a social animal”) and so ethics should refl ect 
this disposition as a necessary condition of the moral being. However, this 
premise can be debated. British philosopher Th omas Hobbes (1588–1679), 
author of the political manifesto the Leviathan, still scarred by his fi rsthand 
experience of the British civil war, believed human life to be “nasty, brutish, 
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and short” and human interaction to be a constant and self-defeating war 
of all against all. We have thus to acknowledge the possibility of a diff erent 
premise of the motivating force of human nature, and, accordingly, a diff er-
ent system of ethics, which cherishes other qualities and character traits.13 
Such systems, or, better yet, such premises, are adopted by two philosophi-
cal movements, one ancient and one modern: namely, the Greco-Roman 
system of Stoicism and the nineteenth- to twentieth-century movement of 
existentialism. Th e common grounds of both Stoic ethics and existential eth-
ics can be harnessed to our purposes and pinned to the condition of lone-
liness. According to the Stoic doctrine, loneliness is, in fact, the better way 
to approach human existence. Life has no meaning. It is short, full of disap-
pointments and mishaps, and then we die. Th e only thing left  to be done is 
to accept that, and then detach ourselves from the terror and anguish of this 
realization. Th at is, we must accept the fact that our existence is characterized 
by suff ering, but ignore the consequences and implications that follow. Th e 
Stoic aim is to live a life of “freedom from disturbance” (ataraxia) by elimi-
nating the two main sources of human anguish, the fear of god and the fear 
of death. Stoicism teaches us that cosmic phenomena do not convey divine 
threats, and that death is merely the disintegration of the soul, with hell an 
illusion. Being dead will be no worse than not having yet been born.
In short, Stoicism makes basic distinctions between that which is up to 
us and that which is outside our control, aiming to attain a state of detach-
ment (apatheia). Th ose things that are in our control include our thoughts, 
impulses, and the will to get and to avoid. Th ose things outside our con-
trol include material things, property, reputation, our station in life, and so 
on. For Stoicism, the key to happiness, as it were, is to attend only to those 
things in our control. Th e Stoic Epictetus (55–135), a freed slave, writes: 
“Never say about anything ‘I have lost it,’ but instead, ‘I have given it back.’ 
. . . [Treat life] just as travellers treat an inn.” Here, Epictetus is endorsing 
a sense of detachment toward those things beyond our control. Th is sense 
of detachment applies to how one should treat not only material items and 
goals in life, but also other people: “If you kiss your child or your wife, say 
to yourself that you are kissing a human being, for then if death strikes it 
you will not be disturbed.” In this sense, for Epictetus, human existence is 
similar to the lives of actors in a play: “Remember that you are an actor in 
a play, which is as the playwright wants it to be; short if he wants it short, 
long if he wants it long. If he wants [you] to play a beggar, play even this part 
skilfully, or a cripple, or a public offi  cial, or a private citizen. What is yours 
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is to play the assigned part well. But to choose it belongs to someone else.” 
Finally, he suggests that by embracing our mortality, we shape our morality: 
“Let death and exile and everything that is terrible appear before your eyes 
every day, especially death; and you will never have anything contemptible 
in your thoughts or crave anything excessively.”14
Th e Stoical emphasis on detachment toward and around others can 
thus be seen as a way to endorse the internal sense of solitude. Here, the 
lone rider embodies the Stoical view that one should focus only on what 
is in one’s control. For instance, in Th e Searchers, once Ethan learns while 
traveling that his family is in danger of being killed by a Comanche raid, 
he does not let his emotions get the best of him. Th ough his companions 
attempt to race back to the homestead, Ethan calmly decides to give his 
horse a rest, realizing that his horse will never make it back, otherwise. In 
this sense, Ethan, like a Stoic, realizes that the prevention of his family’s 
death is beyond his control; what he and his horse need right now is sleep, 
so that he can do what he can tomorrow. Likewise, in Shane, once Shane 
is victorious in his showdown, he chooses to leave town. As he explains to 
young Joey (Brandon DeWilde), he cannot stay: “A man has to be what he 
is, Joey. Can’t break the mold. I tried it and it didn’t work for me. Right or 
wrong, it’s a brand . . . a brand sticks.” In other words, Shane views his life as 
that of an actor in a play—his role, a role determined by the playwright, is 
to be the lone rider. Hence, he cannot settle down and embody a complete 
social identity in the Aristotelian sense. According to Stoicism, because the 
lone rider accepts this role, he is able to be happy.
A similarly profound approach to life, death, and human nature can be 
found in the eclectic movement called existentialism. Th e basic existential 
belief is similar to the Stoical viewpoint in that human life has no innate 
purpose or meaning. Rather, as the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) 
maintains, our “existence precedes [our] essence.” Th at is, our own nature, 
and the meaning, or purpose of our lives, is not preconditioned or prede-
termined. Instead, existentialism emphasizes that each individual has the 
power and the personal freedom to create his or her own meaning in life. 
And, since in existentialism there is no necessary set of rational laws to fol-
low, the individual can allow a central role for his or her passions—so that 
for the existentialist, to live is to live passionately.15 Th e call to create one’s 
essence and so one’s happiness is thus a call for us to be individuals, or to live 
authentically. Authenticity can be understood as the attitude an individual 
has toward his or her life insofar as it is acknowledged as his or her own 
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project. Th at is, to live authentically entails that the individual acknowledge 
his or her own life not just as any life; rather, one lives in such a way so that 
one creates or makes one’s self as one intends. Th e existential call for authen-
ticity advises us to not simply fall in with the crowd, as it were. Rather, our 
individuality and freedom are truly expressed when we can escape from 
the groupthink and labels of a social identity. In fact, one’s social identity 
can be so detrimental to our freedom that Sartre maintains, “Hell is other 
people.” Similarly, Søren Kierkegaard (1813–55) maintains that the human 
life is best understood as fi nding oneself: “Th e thing is to understand myself 
. . . the thing is to fi nd a truth which is true for me, to fi nd the idea for which 
I can live and die.” In this sense, for Kierkegaard, the human being should 
live not according to what is objectively true, but rather according to what is 
personally and individually meaningful, even if this meaning is discovered 
within, and expressed through, the subjective feeling of loneliness. Likewise, 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) maintains that one of the central tasks in 
human existence is to determine the meaning of one’s life by creating one’s 
own self: “What does your conscience say?—You shall become the person 
you are.” For Nietzsche, then, an individual’s true existence is understood to 
include the manifestation of one’s passions, talents, and virtues.16
Perhaps the clearest example of the lone rider who embodies the exis-
tentialist response to the Aristotelian challenge is William Munny from 
Unforgiven. In his youth, Munny was a notorious outlaw, said to have killed 
women and children. But he changed his life aft er meeting his wife and 
raising two children on a very small, impoverished ranch. As such, Munny 
lives out the Aristotelian ideal as a social animal with his family, and even 
seemingly buries all acknowledgement of his sordid past, as he oft en tells 
people, such as Ned, “I ain’t like that no more. I ain’t the same.” Ultimately, 
however, his existential calling to “become the person you are” takes hold. 
By the end of the fi lm, Munny embraces his past, acknowledging who he 
was, and once again turns to his outlaw-ish (yet still heroic) ways, as he 
announces to a saloon full of his enemies: “I’ve killed women and children. 
I’ve killed just about everything that walks or crawls at one time or another; 
and I’m here to kill you.” Munny, then, comes to realize who he is—the real 
life that he has created for himself. He is someone who can neither com-
pletely bury his past nor hide what is true for him as his created essence, and 
therefore cannot live comfortably according to the Aristotelian depiction 
of the human being as essentially a social animal. Instead, Munny’s essence 
is that of a lone rider.
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Th us, overall, the western hero tends to keep to himself, sometimes in 
both senses—of loneliness and of being alone—and otherwise in one or the 
other. Th is predicament, as I have shown, can serve to help him carry out 
his job and tasks, both as an epistemic stand (I am the only reliable source 
of knowledge) and as an ethical stand (I am what I do; my deeds and actions 
defi ne who I am as a moral person). However so, both philosophical advan-
tages are really two-edged swords: epistemic solipsism might end up being a 
very limited perspective and a very narrow source of knowledge; moreover, 
the ethics of loneliness consistently ignores the embedment of ethics in the 
social domain, which, according to Aristotle and many others, is what ethics 
is primarily all about. One is therefore left  to wonder why the western hero 
is portrayed in this fashion. Is it because he is usually created in the image 
of real historical fi gures (who were, supposedly, lonely characters)? Even if 
this is partially the case, it does not explain such a portrayal of totally fi cti-
tious characters. It is my idea, therefore, that the lone hero is indeed “a lone” 
hero because he must be so. In order to be a “hero”—he must be “lone.” Th e 
lonesome predicament is integral to the idea of a western hero fi gure: the 
pioneer who wanders the wilderness, who has no steady home or domestic 
affi  liations, who does what he does and says what he says only for the sake 
of his mythological heroism. He is authentic, detached, and in harmony with 
himself, living his life as he chose freely to live, and positions himself as a 
hero, a myth, a mystery, and the totem of generations to come.
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CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Th e Self-Suffi  cient Western Hero
Douglas J. Den Uyl
Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string.
—Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance”
Perhaps no image is more symptomatic of the American western than the 
lone hero, abandoned by all, skillfully performing some act of courage in 
the cause of justice.1 In this respect, a movie like High Noon (1952) comes 
immediately to mind: Marshal Will Kane (Gary Cooper) is forsaken even 
by his fi ancée as he faces a deadly opponent. However allegorical the fi lm 
may be, it is perhaps paradigmatic of the majority of western fi lms—namely, 
it showcases a hero possessed of extraordinary self-suffi  ciency facing prob-
lems that ordinary men would be either unable or too fearful to handle.2 
Th e western hero has been described as “mythic” and compared to the 
great mythic heroes of Western civilization.3 Th ose earlier heroes, whether 
Homeric warriors or Norse avengers, possess awe-inspiring strength, skills, 
and courage that stand out so signifi cantly that the contributions of all oth-
ers recede completely into the background. Heroes of the American western 
also evoke this sense of standing apart from, and above, ordinary men and 
women; yet they simultaneously seem more human and closer to us than 
those other mythic heroes. No doubt the cultural context plays a role as to 
which heroic traits are emphasized and resonate.4 American westerns are 
certainly no diff erent in this respect, for they represent narratives central 
to the American consciousness, particularly those connected to foundings 
and democracy. Th e western hero, for example, compared to heroes of other 
cultures, seems more “democratic,” seldom wanting to stand out in the end, 
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but more comfortable melding back into the community or fl oating off  into 
the sunset as one equal among others.
But the legacy of Western civilization off ers up other “heroes” likewise 
admired for their self-suffi  ciency, virtue, and skills. Th ese heroes are ones 
touted by philosophy. How does the philosophic ideal of self-suffi  ciency com-
pare with the picture of self-suffi  ciency found in the American western hero? 
With thousands of western movies available, there are potentially thousands 
of possible heroes to consider. Similarly, philosophy is fi lled with a myriad 
of thinkers and interpretations. Th ere are simply too many westerns and 
too many thinkers to give any one of them a full hearing here. Fortunately, 
our goal is more modest than any pretense at completeness. We shall limit 
ourselves primarily to a couple of philosophers and a few examples from 
western fi lms. Our purpose is to evoke, rather than to conclude, a conversa-
tion about the dimensions of self-suffi  ciency and the contribution that can 
be made to that concept by the American western.
Th e two philosophers we shall use to guide us are Aristotle (384–322) 
and Spinoza (1632–77). Th ey both give self-suffi  ciency central importance 
in their theories of human action, while at the same time they represent 
rather diff erent periods and ways of “doing” philosophy. We shall look at 
both with the idea of arriving at a composite picture of self-suffi  ciency to 
use when considering the heroes of western fi lms. For our westerns, we shall 
draw upon the fi lms of John Ford, in particular Th e Man Who Shot Liberty 
Valance (1962). Th ere are some important reasons for doing so. First, John 
Ford is arguably the person who defi ned the nature of the western fi lm for 
the modern talking cinema.5 Second, Ford’s heroes are oft en more complex 
than the typical “B movie” type of western hero, which thereby has the ben-
efi t of encouraging more subtle and probing analysis. Finally, Ford’s heroes 
seem especially human, which should help us in our refl ections upon an 
idea of self-suffi  ciency that can actually be practiced. Mythic heroes may 
be awe-inspiring, but the heroes of western fi lms oft en serve as exemplars 
of the kind of persons we should ourselves try to become.
Philosophers on Self-Suffi  ciency
Aristotle is the philosopher most usually connected with the notion of self-
suffi  ciency (autarkeia). For this reason we should begin by citing in some 
detail the most well-known passages from his Nicomachean Ethics on this 
subject:
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We call that which is pursued as an end in itself more fi nal than 
an end which is pursued for the sake of something else; and what 
is never chosen as a means to something else we call more fi nal 
than that which is chosen both as an end in itself and as a means to 
something else. What is always chosen as an end in itself and never 
as a means to something else is called fi nal in an unqualifi ed sense.6 
Th is description seems to apply to happiness above all else. Honor, 
pleasure, intelligence, and all virtue we choose partly for themselves 
. . . but we also choose them partly for the sake of happiness, because 
we assume it is through them that we will be happy. . . .
We arrive at the same conclusion if we approach the question 
from the standpoint of self-suffi  ciency. For the fi nal and perfect 
good seems to be self-suffi  cient. However, we defi ne something as 
self-suffi  cient not by relevance to the “self ” alone. We do not mean 
a man who lives his life in isolation, but a man who also lives with 
parents, children, a wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, 
since man is by nature a social and political being. . . . For the pres-
ent we defi ne as “self-suffi  cient” that which taken by itself makes 
life something desirable and defi cient in nothing. It is happiness, 
in our opinion, which fi ts this description.7
Much later in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle adds the following: “What 
is usually called ‘self-suffi  ciency’ will be found in the highest degree in the 
activity which is concerned with theoretical knowledge. Like a just man 
and any other virtuous man, a wise man requires the necessities of life; once 
these have been adequately provided, a just man still needs people toward 
whom and in company with whom to act justly. . . . But a wise man is able 
to study even by himself, and the wiser he is the more is he able to do it.”8 
Th ese passages seem simple enough but actually connect a number of diff er-
ent and complicated concepts to the notion of self-suffi  ciency. First among 
them is “happiness,” which is itself tied to “fi nal ends” or ends pursued for 
their own sake. We learn from these passages of the connection between 
happiness and virtue and that self-suffi  ciency is not to be thought of in the 
absence of other persons. We learn too in the second passage cited that self-
suffi  ciency is tied to theoretical reasoning and that the philosophical life is 
the most self-suffi  cient life of them all. Aristotle supports this last notion by 
saying that “what is by nature proper to each thing will be at once the best 
and the most pleasant for it. In other words, a life guided by intelligence is 
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the best and most pleasant for man, inasmuch as intelligence, above all else, 
is man. Consequently, this kind of life is happiest.”9
Aristotle is well known, as a result of the points made in passages like 
these, for holding that the best and happiest life is the philosophical one, 
with a practical life of virtue being happiest in “the secondary sense.”10 It 
is clear that if the life of the contemplative philosopher must be our model 
of self-suffi  ciency, then our western heroes seem quite distant from that 
ideal; however, there is a controversy about how intellectualistic one should 
make Aristotle when reading these passages.11 If we were to look strictly at 
the last passage cited, however, we can see that a life guided by intelligence 
(sometimes translated as “reason”) is not exactly the same as the life of the 
philosopher as we would normally understand it. Since our subject is the 
western hero and not interpreting Aristotle, we need not fi nally decide cer-
tain matters of interpretation here. What is both clear and of value to us in 
the present case is that the self-suffi  cient life, however interpreted, is one that 
is guided by reason or intelligence. We shall make this a central component 
of our understanding of self-suffi  ciency in what follows.
We cannot proceed without some comment on the words happiness and 
virtue, because their connotations in English are diff erent from those Aris-
totle meant to convey. Happiness in English, for example, connotes the idea 
of a passive mental state of feeling untroubled. For that reason the Greek 
eudaimonia is oft en translated as “human fl ourishing” rather than “happi-
ness” to suggest a more active understanding. Indeed, for Aristotle happiness 
is a form of activity, whether that activity be thinking or performing some 
virtuous act.12 When Aristotle considers happiness he thinks of someone 
doing something. Th e virtues themselves—some of which are mentioned 
in the passages above—are also forms of activity. Any happiness associated 
with them comes from their exercise, not from their being possessed by us 
as dispositions. In addition, the term virtue sometimes has a static ring to it 
in English, not to mention a strictly moral one. Yet “virtue” in Aristotle can 
refer more broadly to simply excellence. Th e virtuous man, then, is some-
one who demonstrates excellence in action. Excellence can be connected to 
skills, and no doubt a virtuous person possesses skills. But virtue and skill 
are diff erentiated because virtues are concerned with doing or acting well, 
while skills are concerned with making or producing something.13 Both the 
western hero and the western villain are highly skilled, and thus both have 
a kind of excellence. But the sort of excellence in action that Aristotle wants 
to capture with his notion of virtue requires excellence of action in the ser-
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vice of some worthy end.14 Th e villain’s defi cient moral character prevents 
us from saying that he exhibits more than just skill, because the central 
question of what those skills are for, and what good they might produce, is 
either ignored or perverted. Th e hero, by contrast, acts well, and his skills 
are in the service of the excellent doings in which he engages.
For an action to count as virtuous for Aristotle it must meet three crite-
ria: fi rst, the agent must have knowledge, which means minimally knowing 
what he is doing and why; second, he must choose the actions for their own 
sakes; and third, he must choose them out of a fi xed disposition to do so.15 
We shall be considering aspects of all three of these elements in our discus-
sion to come, but the fi rst and third are especially important. A steady fi xed 
disposition seems to be a trademark of the western hero and the reason for 
part of our admiration of him.16 Th ose heroes oft en seem, in this respect, 
oblivious to the normal distractions to which the rest of us might succumb, 
such as money or sexual pleasure; they do not waver in pursuit of the end 
they know they must pursue.
Aristotle thinks that although we habituate ourselves to virtue by prac-
tice, that habituation process is thoroughly mediated by intelligence.17 Virtues 
do become a “second nature” to us, indicating that although virtues must 
be developed by us, they oft en seem to exhibit themselves as if they were a 
“fi rst nature”—that is, like a natural, untrained disposition.18 Nevertheless, 
we train and habituate ourselves to virtue in order to encapsulate disposi-
tions that can transcend particular circumstances. Th e virtue of courage is 
not just for gunfi ghting but for any situation for which that virtue would 
be appropriate. It would be strange to regard as “self-suffi  cient” someone 
who was able to function well only in one situation but not others. More-
over, functioning well is not something that can be done for somebody but 
something that must be done for and by oneself.19
In the opening passage we cited from Aristotle he mentions that self-
suffi  ciency means “defi cient in nothing.” But as Julia Annas points out, this 
cannot require the possession of every conceivable good, but rather those 
goods that are “required by the deliberated projects that life contains.”20 Notice 
that in this interpretation the virtues assist a life fi lled with “deliberated” proj-
ects, plans, and activities. Th rough the use of our intelligence we must weave 
together the particular projects and activities we undertake, using the virtues 
to help arrive at consistent actions and a unifi ed life plan.
Th e standards of excellence in Aristotle’s theory of happiness, virtue, 
and self-suffi  ciency are not, however, subjectively determined. Rather, the 
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standard of excellence for him is “nature,” and not whatever desires, feel-
ings, or wishes one may happen to have. “For those things are natural which, 
by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at 
some completion: the same completion is not reached from every principle; 
nor any chance completion, but always the tendency in each is towards the 
same end, if there is no impediment.”21 We complete ourselves when we live 
according to human nature. Th is amounts to integrated excellence of activ-
ity in the company of others directed by reason or intelligence. A life guided 
by something other than reason or intelligence (for example, by authority 
or pleasure) is not a human life or an excellent one. Th e movement toward 
“happiness” is thus our “internal principle” that draws upon resources both 
internal and external to ourselves: “We may defi ne happiness as prosper-
ity combined with virtue; or as independence of life. . . . A man cannot fail 
to be completely independent if he possesses . . . internal and . . . external 
goods.”22 Th ere has been controversy throughout history as to how many 
external goods and of what kind a person needs to be happy.23 Aristotle 
includes among the external goods such things as wealth, friendship, and 
children. He mentions the need for bodily goods as well, such as health 
and strength. For our purposes here, it is enough to say that human beings 
are material creatures living in and utilizing a material world. We would be 
living according to our “internal principle” when the use of those goods is 
intelligently directed in such a way as to produce excellence in action.
It is at this juncture that we can move nearly seamlessly into a con-
sideration of Spinoza, for Spinoza is especially insistent upon the connec-
tion between acting from one’s own nature and independence or freedom. 
Freedom is the ultimate good for Spinoza, and when one thinks about it, 
freedom can certainly be characterized as a form of independence and thus 
self-suffi  ciency. Indeed, Spinoza shares a number of concepts with Aristo-
tle when it comes to thinking about the connection between freedom and 
self-suffi  ciency. First among them is that the free person acts from his or 
her own nature or from an “internal principle.”24 Spinoza defi nes true vir-
tue as living “by the guidance of reason, and so weakness consists solely in 
this, that a man suff ers himself to be led by things external to himself and is 
determined by them to act in a way required by the general state of external 
circumstances, not by his own nature considered only in itself.25 Notice that 
for Spinoza, freedom, which we are now identifying with self-suffi  ciency, 
is a function of the degree to which we act from and within ourselves. 
Th e passage may suggest that Spinoza is even less willing than Aristotle to 
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allow external goods to be a part of what it means to be self-suffi  cient or 
free. If things are “external” to us, they are for Spinoza impediments to our 
freedom; but like Aristotle, this does not mean we must live in isolation. 
Indeed, we must live among other things, and especially other persons, if 
we are to have any real freedom.26 If freedom is not a form of separateness 
from other things and persons, what, then, does Spinoza mean by “external 
circumstance”? External circumstances are those forces that impede our 
acting from our “own nature considered only in itself.” Other things and 
persons can be impediments for us, but that is not so much a function of 
them as it is with whether we are guided by reason or knowledge in deal-
ing with them. In other words, the mere “externality” of things or persons 
is not the issue, but whether our actions with respect to them are guided by 
knowledge and reason.
Being guided by reason is, again like Aristotle, a form of activity for 
Spinoza. To be active and not passive is to be free.27 A life guided by reason 
is thus the active and therefore the free and self-suffi  cient life. However, the 
primary way in which we impede our freedom has little to do with what 
is actually outside of us, but rather with what is inside—namely, our emo-
tions.28 As Spinoza puts it, “We shall readily see the diff erence between the 
man who is guided only by emotion or belief and the man who is guided 
by reason. Th e former, whether he will or not, performs actions of which he 
is completely ignorant. Th e latter does no one’s will but his own, and does 
only what he knows to be of greatest importance in life, which he therefore 
desires above all. So I call the former a slave and the latter a free man.”29 To 
do “no one’s will but [one’s] own” is to make reason our internal principle.30 
Why is reason so important? It is because the person guided by reason is 
one who has what Spinoza calls “adequate ideas.” Adequate ideas concern 
knowledge of the world within which we move, and we move successfully 
within that world when we understand it and how to deal with it. When we 
don’t have adequate ideas, the world, in a sense, moves us, for we are the 
passive recipients of the forces “out there” (or in the case of emotions, “in” 
there) that push us here and there. Th e more adequate our ideas, the more 
free, active, and independent we become. Emotions are essentially passive 
states for Spinoza. Th ey happen to us rather than function as things we do. 
In this respect they are “external” to us because they seem to move us rather 
than us moving them.31 Th ey are also not effi  cient tools for dealing with the 
world, but rather more reactions to it. Spinoza, then, like Aristotle, holds 
that the life ruled by reason is the perfected form of human activity.32
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With respect to virtue, Aristotle emphasizes excellence in action, as we 
saw. Spinoza’s perspective is consistent with Aristotle’s but carries with it a 
slightly diff erent tone, namely, that virtue is competence in action.33 Both 
regard the moral virtues as forms of excellence, and the scope of the term 
virtue in both cases extends beyond what we typically think of as moral. In 
Spinoza’s case, virtue is essentially effi  cacy. In Aristotle’s case, all excellences 
of action qualify as “virtuous” in some sense. For both thinkers, however, 
“competence” and “excellence” are circumscribed by the moral virtues.
If what we have said is reasonably accurate, then we have arrived at a 
composite picture of self-suffi  ciency as a philosopher might defi ne it: Th e 
self-suffi  cient individual is the self-motivated person guided by reason whose 
actions are virtuous in nature. Given that characterization of what a phi-
losopher might look for in determining self-suffi  ciency, how do western 
heroes stack up against it?
White Hats and the Heads Th ey Cover
One of the tropes of western fi lms is that the good guy always wears “a white 
hat.” Sometimes this is literally true, but the expression is in all cases meant 
to convey that the western hero is in the service of some good. Th e particu-
lar goods may vary from securing justice to protecting the weak, but heroes 
are the “good” guys because they actually are securing some good.34 It is true 
that a number of the “antiheroes” of many more contemporary western fi lms, 
such as Unforgiven (1992), blur the distinction between good and bad. But 
the ones who command our allegiance, such as William Munny (Clint East-
wood) of that same fi lm, are still generally in the service of some overarch-
ing moral good (in this case bringing “justice” to the cowboys who cut up 
one of the town whores). Generally speaking, it seems safe to assume that 
western heroes have fulfi lled that condition of self-suffi  ciency that requires 
some demonstration of, and commitment to, moral excellence. Certainly 
the virtue of courage is almost always present, and some form of the virtue 
of justice is typically a part of the hero’s character as well.35
But do these virtues emerge from a life guided by intelligence? We noted 
earlier that western heroes seem to be men of action rather than refl ection. 
But does that imply that reason is not at the center of their actions? Rea-
son might be considered along at least two dimensions. In the fi rst, reason 
would include the idea of wisdom gained through experience. If so, most 
western heroes would seem to qualify. Such wisdom, for example, is the case 
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with Wyatt Earp as John Ford depicts him in My Darling Clementine (1946); 
Earp, by the time he gets to Tombstone, has been marshal elsewhere long 
enough to handle virtually any situation.36 Th is example is not an isolated 
one. Th ere are very few “greenhorns” among western heroes. Most heroes, 
even if they are young in age, have the sort of experience that gives them a 
kind of practical wisdom. Indeed, hinting at that past experience is oft en a 
part of the way in which the hero’s character is developed on-screen.
Th e second way in which reason has a role to play in self-suffi  ciency is 
with respect to self-knowledge. Th e self-suffi  cient man would know him-
self, his plans, his purposes, his goals, and why what he’s doing needs to be 
done. Perhaps the term self-motivated captures this sense of reason, but a 
strongly driven person might be self-motivated and yet driven irrationally 
and obsessively. Th e foregoing point brings to mind Ethan (John Wayne) of 
John Ford’s Th e Searchers (1956). Th ough a compelling man, and a man in 
possession of some of the other characteristics of self-suffi  ciency we have 
identifi ed, Ethan is essentially “unfree,” as Spinoza defi nes that term. He is 
so obsessed by his quest to fi nd Debbie and purge the world of her racial 
impurity that it is diffi  cult to think of him as a western hero. Indeed, even 
the good he serves at the beginning of the fi lm in seeking to return Deb-
bie home is corrupted by his obsessive quest. Th ough redeemed in the end, 
Ethan’s fascination for us comes precisely because he possesses so many of 
the characteristics we expect from a western hero yet puts us off  from quite 
according him that honor.37 Th e ending of the fi lm, however, where Ethan 
returns Debbie home, does strongly suggest that Ethan has gained something 
signifi cant in self-knowledge and thus a form of freedom or independence 
he lacked through most of the film. In general, then, we expect self-
suffi  ciency to include a signifi cant level of self-understanding, and we can 
safely look for that element when considering western heroes. Our conclu-
sion thus seems to be that western heroes are likely to be men guided by 
reason and would not be heroes if they were not.
Th e Call of the Wild
It would seem that the general characteristics of the self-suffi  cient man as 
described by our philosophers are arguably present in the typical western 
hero. Yet such a conclusion is no doubt still being drawn at too generic a 
level to be of much analytical value. If nothing else, we have yet to say much 
about the western hero’s connection to community. I believe one of the 
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best fi lms for exploring a number of issues connected to self-suffi  ciency is 
John Ford’s Th e Man Who Shot Liberty Valance. Ostensibly, the fi lm could 
be said to have two heroes. Th e fi rst, Tom Doniphon (John Wayne), is the 
quintessential western hero—strong, fast with a gun, sure of himself, and 
he even wears a white hat! Th e other possible hero is Ransom Stoddard 
(Jimmy Stewart). Aft er being away for some years, Stoddard has traveled 
back to Shinbone to attend the funeral of Doniphon. By this time Stoddard 
is a U.S. senator with a long record of accomplishments, all as a result of his 
instrumental role in leading the territory to statehood, a feat that was itself 
predicated upon his reputation as the man who shot Liberty Valance (Lee 
Marvin). Th e fi lm is organized as a narrative Stoddard tells to some newspa-
permen about the old days in Shinbone. At the opening of the story Stoddard 
is a young lawyer traveling west because he took Horace Greeley’s advice 
to go west literally. We do not know if Stoddard was headed for the town of 
Shinbone; but the stagecoach conveying him was robbed, and Stoddard was 
whipped by Liberty Valance and left  for dead. He was subsequently brought 
to Shinbone, and from there the rest of the story unfolds. Given Stoddard’s 
attributes—his importance to the town and the territory, his winning away 
of Doniphon’s girlfriend Hallie (Vera Miles), and his reputation for having 
shot Liberty Valance—he would seem to have all the necessary credentials 
for being one of the heroes of the fi lm.
Stoddard does indeed possess many of the qualities we have identifi ed 
with the self-suffi  cient hero above: he has a tremendous sense of purpose, 
self-knowledge, and self-directedness. His courage and acceptance of respon-
sibility are unquestionable, and he is, by the standards of the day, a learned 
man, who even opens a school to teach others to read and to understand 
their civic history and responsibilities. But Stoddard is not the central hero 
of this fi lm, nor even perhaps a hero. Th e story he tells reveals that Doni-
phon, and not he, shot Liberty Valance, though Stoddard did show courage 
by facing Valance directly at the time of the shooting. Stoddard has secretly 
lived with the truth that it was not he who shot Liberty Valance, though he 
is the one who reaped the glory from it. Th e lie he lived had instrumental 
value in bringing about the “good” of the taming of the West. But its cost 
was clearly a loss of self-suffi  ciency for Stoddard. Stoddard could never “be 
himself ” so long as he lived as someone else, and for that reason alone, his 
heroism is tarnished.
But that is not the only reason Stoddard is not the hero. Ford indicates 
throughout the fi lm that something important about what the West rep-
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resents is lost with the arrival of the world that Stoddard brings with him. 
Ford fi lms the story in black and white, and there are virtually no landscapes 
(unlike other Ford westerns), thus draining the West of all its color and 
strongly reinforcing a sense that something good has been lost. Th e open-
ing and closing shots of the fi lm, in addition, are of a moving train—Ford’s 
symbol for civilization and the incursion of the East.38 Th e sacrifi ces, com-
promises—and in this case, lies—that go into taming the West provide a 
dark contrast to the bright optimism we see with Doniphon until the point 
in the fi lm where he loses Hallie and the coming of civilization seems inevi-
table.39 Ford clearly means for us to see Doniphon as the hero, but he is a 
tragic hero whose own goodness and sense of justice are his very undoing 
in the end. Doniphon’s skill, courage, and knowledge of how to function 
well in the precivilized West are used time aft er time to save Stoddard and 
to make possible what is to come. Ford’s point is clear: the coming of civi-
lization is inevitable and it is brought about on the backs of men like Doni-
phon. Moreover, Ford is suggesting as well that the qualities of character 
men like Doniphon possessed are being lost, and the viewer has the sense 
that it is precisely something connected to the self-suffi  ciency of such men 
that is sacrifi ced.40
Yet Stoddard, more than Doniphon, is the man who appears to possess 
the central good of the philosophers with respect to self-suffi  ciency: namely, 
reason. Th rough his law books he at once represents to us both the order 
and impartiality of civil society and the education needed to understand 
such books. Indeed, education is actually depicted as the central good of 
civilization, as witnessed in the schoolroom scene where behind Stoddard 
on the blackboard is written: “Education is the basis of law and order.” If 
all law and order is grounded in education, then encouraging education 
is the key to the diff erence between an order imposed by men like Doni-
phon (or for that matter Liberty Valance) and the order that comes under 
the impartial rule of law. Indeed, Stoddard’s law books are symbolic of the 
institutionalization of reason. Th ey are reason socialized. His activities as 
a teacher are an eff ort to instill reason among his students. Th e two are 
meant to be integrally connected. Typically in Ford fi lms women embody 
the good of education, but in this fi lm Hallie is uneducated; yet her thirst 
for education portrays the ineluctable drive toward it that is both a feature 
of and a precursor to civilization. Hallie is so drawn to the call of education 
and civilization that she, perhaps to her later regret, leaves Doniphon for 
Stoddard. In this connection it is interesting to note that Doniphon, unlike 
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Hallie, can read, though not particularly well. Yet while the scene indicat-
ing Doniphon’s ability to read also, no doubt, demonstrates his intelligence, 
Ford shows that Doniphon thinks reading to be of generally little value, and 
knows only so much of it as might be needed to conduct business or to keep 
informed.41 Hallie, by contrast, seems to crave education for its own sake, 
and she seems to crave it for the sake of the good, since she wants to be able 
to read “the Good Book” for herself.42
As Aristotle noted in the passage we cited earlier, once the “necessities 
of life” have been provided, the virtues connected to self-suffi  ciency, includ-
ing intellectual ones, can be engaged. But this point raises some signifi cant 
issues for our topic here. Ford fi lms in particular, and perhaps most other 
westerns as well, take place either prior to or at the transition toward that 
point in which the “necessities of life” are provided—namely, toward what 
we are calling “civilization.” Arguably the most basic necessity is some sort 
of law and order, for without that any other necessary good is precarious at 
best.43 Now Doniphon protects Stoddard at every turn, including allowing 
him to gain the reputation as the “man who shot Liberty Valance.” In this 
respect, the fi lm demonstrates that the sorts of skills and virtues Stoddard 
possesses cannot be exercised in the precivilized world where Doniphon 
reigns. At least for Aristotle, self-suffi  ciency, to have a chance of being exer-
cised, presupposes a certain level of material and social well-being. Th e man, 
in this case Stoddard, put in precivilized circumstances is actually no lon-
ger self-suffi  cient. Indeed, what this fi lm, along with many other westerns, 
teaches us is that such a person may be more dependent and thus less in a 
position of self-suffi  ciency than others who had not devoted themselves so 
singularly to the pursuit of virtues made possible by civilization.
But Ford’s message goes in the other direction as well—namely, that 
Doniphon cannot make the transition to Stoddard’s world. His self-
suffi  ciency is also highly context bound. He could perhaps make the transi-
tion to Stoddard’s world if he had paid more attention to what philosophers 
recommend, that is, the development of his reason to the point where he 
could fi gure out how to apply the virtues he does possess to the new order. 
But Doniphon is not really in a position to put his own house in order in that 
way. His reason for not doing so is not because his habits all go in the other 
direction, as our fi rst refl ections about this matter might suggest. Doniphon 
cannot devote himself to cultivating virtues suitable to civilization because 
of his apparent devotion to another good, namely, bringing civilization to 
the territory. Doniphon protects men like Stoddard, and thus the entrance 
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of civilization, at the cost of his own well-being. Th is point is most clearly 
demonstrated at the political convention where Doniphon—having already 
fallen precipitously from his former glory—shows up to ensure that Stod-
dard gets elected territorial representative and recounts to him the true story 
of the shooting of Liberty Valance. By contrast, during the fi lm Stoddard 
never quite processes the nature of the world in which he fi nds himself and 
the degree to which he needs a man like Doniphon in order to succeed. In 
other words, he, unlike Doniphon, does not see beyond his own narrow 
framework until the poignant end of the fi lm, when we sense that Stoddard 
does fi nally understand what he and others owe to Doniphon. Ironically, 
for all Stoddard’s learning, Doniphon is clearly the wiser man. Doniphon 
has the sort of reason that sees the good, but tragically cannot prepare for 
it himself. Th e nature of his devotion to the good in the precivilized world 
he inhabits—that is, as the counterweight to the violence and disorder Lib-
erty Valance represents—puts him in the position of being unable to turn 
to his own self-development without sacrifi cing the very good he sets out 
to secure. Th at, of course, is the tragedy of his situation.
Whether this sort of tragedy is necessary is a question we cannot answer 
here. Instead, we must ask whether self-suffi  ciency is necessarily inappli-
cable to those in a precivilized condition, where most westerns take place. 
Aristotle seems to conveniently answer this question affi  rmatively, indicating 
not only that Doniphon cannot be self-suffi  cient, but that Stoddard cannot, 
either, despite his learning. Conceptually this solution is clean; no one in a 
precivilized state can be self-suffi  cient because the goods needed are simply 
not available. By the same token, such a solution seems to rub against com-
mon sense. Doniphon certainly, and even Stoddard to a large extent, appears 
to have at least some degree of self-suffi  ciency, even according to the general 
criteria laid down by our two philosophers. Perhaps it is at this point that 
we may wish to separate Spinoza from Aristotle a bit, for his approach to 
the issue seems more internally focused than Aristotle’s. Rather than giving 
considerable weight to external goods, the Spinozistic approach, following 
the Stoics to some extent, would center upon the degree of self-directed-
ness within one’s circumstances. By this standard, Doniphon is clearly self-
suffi  cient—at least until his circumstances change, and Stoddard is not out 
of the running for this form of self-suffi  ciency, either.
Most Ford westerns depict the intersection of the precivil and civil 
orders. Th at dividing line of civilization highlights an opportunity for us to 
recognize a possible diff erence between the two philosophers not so appar-
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ent above in our eff orts to unify them. Aristotle has a teleological view of 
human nature, one that supposes a natural movement toward fulfi llment 
and maturity by each of us. When Aristotle looks at the nature of something, 
including human nature, he looks at it from the standpoint of the best con-
dition it can realize. For him, therefore, self-suffi  ciency would be present 
only in that full state of completion and maturity of which human beings 
are capable. Teleology need not, however, be linked to Spinoza’s conception 
of activity or freedom. Here activity, as knowledgeable self-direction, seems 
to be enough.44 Th e question of completeness is left  alone. Th is diff erence 
allows us to draw a distinction between ontic self-suffi  ciency on the one 
hand and procedural self-suffi  ciency on the other.
Ontic self-suffi  ciency would be a condition in which all the primary 
goods needed for human excellence, including the external ones, are pres-
ent and being exercised.45 Ontic self-suffi  ciency would be possible only in 
civilization, where all the materials for self-realization are available. Nei-
ther Doniphon nor Stoddard are self-suffi  cient in this ontic sense, nor 
would we typically expect westerns to provide us such examples. But they 
(and other heroes) may be, to various degrees, procedurally self-suffi  cient, 
if their actions are fully self-directed and guided by knowledge and intel-
ligence appropriate to their circumstances.46 Th ough not all the elements 
needed for completion are either present or yet acquired, the individual 
manages to successfully negotiate his environment, pursue real goods, 
and act from understanding and a sense of self-purpose. Doniphon and 
Stoddard may both qualify on this basis. Th e philosophical question here 
is whether procedural self-suffi  ciency is (or can be) seamless across con-
texts. John Ford’s answer to this question is negative:47 the characteristics 
of self-suffi  ciency in the precivilized context are diff erent from those in 
the civilized one to the point where one set must be traded for the other, 
producing some inevitable loss.48
Th e worlds of Doniphon and Stoddard intersect as civilization is being 
realized, but they never merge. It is, paradoxically, the ordinary, apparently 
non-self-suffi  cient, individual who makes the transition from precivil to 
civil society seamlessly. Th e heroes are the bridge upon which the common 
man walks. Th at is the democratic “fi nal cause” of the American western 
that renders its heroes so diff erent from other mythical heroes of Western 
civilization. No better illustration of both the democratic purpose and the 
tension between Stoddard’s and Doniphon’s worlds can be found than the 
schoolroom scene. Led by Stoddard, the class is a model of democratic diver-
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sity, including a Swedish immigrant, a number of Latino (Mexican) children, 
white males and women (including Hallie herself) and an African American, 
Pompey (Woody Strode), who also happens to be Doniphon’s helper. When 
asked what she has learned about the United States, the Swedish immigrant 
says that the United States is a republic and a republic “is a state where the 
people are the boss!” And Pompey, with a picture of Lincoln off  to his side, 
when asked to speak about the Constitution, confuses it with the Declara-
tion of Independence.49 Th ese are the people who will benefi t once Liberty 
Valance is cleared away and order and civilization brought in, as Stoddard 
fully explains to them. But the whole exercise is interrupted suddenly by 
Doniphon, who bursts in the room telling Pompey he’s been wasting his 
time reading, as he points out to Stoddard that Liberty Valance has hired 
some guns to prevent the democratic process from taking place. Th e world 
belongs again to Doniphon, and Stoddard is forced to admit, aft er eras-
ing the sentence mentioned earlier from the blackboard, that “when force 
threatens, talk is no good anymore.” Each man is thus a master in his own 
world, but their worlds do not mesh easily.
“Rugged” Individualism
Perhaps the most poignant symbol of Th e Man Who Shot Liberty Valance 
is the “cactus rose” that Hallie picks at the beginning of the fi lm near the 
burned-out house Doniphon had built for the two of them. At the end of 
the fi lm she places it upon Doniphon’s coffi  n. Years earlier Doniphon had 
given a cactus rose to Hallie as a kind of courting gesture, and at the end 
of that scene Hallie shows it to Stoddard and mentions how beautiful it is. 
Stoddard agrees, but then asks Hallie if she has ever seen a “real” rose. She 
responds that she has not but that she hopes they will dam the river one day 
and bring lots of water to the area so there can be all kinds of fl owers. Th e 
cactus rose could symbolize many things: from the thorny barren beauty of 
the West to Tom Doniphon himself. But it is the comment that the cactus 
rose is not a “real” rose that is especially arresting. Real things, including, 
one must suppose, real human life—importantly, civilized life—are to be 
found in the East. Th e West is at best a shadow of something more real. But 
what exactly is so unreal about the West, and would not something be lost 
if cactus roses were replaced with more conventional fl owers? Moreover, 
based on our argument above, if both procedural and ontic self-suffi  ciency 
can be found in civilization, what could possibly be left  to lament in the 
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disappearance of Tom Doniphon’s West, especially if ontic self-suffi  ciency 
is not possible there?
Th ere is, I believe, an important virtue, threatened by civilization, that 
may be a species of self-suffi  ciency, but that nevertheless needs a separate 
mention here. Th at virtue is self-reliance. To suggest that the cactus rose 
is somehow less real than the “real” rose is an indication of a failure to 
understand self-reliance. As Emerson (1803–82) expresses it in his famous 
essay of that title, self-reliance is truth to oneself as a distinct and unique 
individual.50 It is not action in isolation from others, but it is action will-
ing to be separated from others, if there is no other way to remain true to 
oneself. Its enemy is thus not cooperation but conformity. To suppose that 
the cactus rose must be evaluated by a standard applicable to some other 
fl ower is to enforce a kind of conformity upon the cactus fl ower. Th e cactus 
rose has its own nature, and it must ultimately look there for its standards 
of excellence. Th is is Emerson’s message for human beings as well. Civiliza-
tion has a conforming element to it that dulls our sense of what we are as 
individuals and what we can do on our own. As Emerson puts it, “Th e civi-
lized man has built a coach, but has lost the use of his feet.”51 He is carried 
along more luxuriously, perhaps, but at a price of forgetting that he has his 
own set of legs.
It may be that the concept of self-suffi  ciency as we have been discuss-
ing it would, upon more extended refl ection, lead one necessarily to the 
virtue of self-reliance. Yet logically there is nothing in the accounts of self-
suffi  ciency we have given to this point that speaks of the individual as ruling 
him- or herself according to his or her own unique and individual nature. 
Th e defi nitions and explanations we have presented are all consistent with 
general ideas of human excellence, activity, or virtue. Even our account of 
procedural self-suffi  ciency does not refer directly to standards predicated 
upon uniqueness of self. Philosophers, of course, tend to be comfortable 
with universals, but our admiration for the western hero does not stem 
from recognizing a more perfect rendition of a general model of human 
excellence, however self-suffi  cient the model. It is the hero’s fi delity to his 
own truth that makes the western a unique genre. Th e western hero oft en 
rides off  alone, not because he is antisocial, or because he is able to survive 
without help from others, but because there are no “companions” for him, 
given the truth he must follow. If doing so ends tragically, as it does for 
Doniphon, we are all the more moved and sympathetic, but our opinion of 
him remains high because, even in the face of personal sacrifi ce, he carries 
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on according to what he is and not according to something he is not. Doni-
phon cannot be Stoddard; and if he were in a position to devote himself to 
ontic self-suffi  ciency and make the transition to civilization, he would not 
look like Stoddard when done.
In Th e Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, Ford clearly laments the loss 
of self-reliance as civilization encroaches, but oddly enough not just with 
respect to Doniphon, but more so with respect to Stoddard. Stoddard 
has the same material for true self-reliance that Doniphon does, but we 
see in the closing scene on the train a glimpse that he may have compro-
mised that self-reliance in the process of bringing on civilization. I am not 
speaking here just of Stoddard’s unwillingness to correct the conductor 
who repeats the myth about the man who shot Liberty Valance, but rather 
of the indication that Stoddard’s and Hallie’s true selves belong more to 
Shinbone than to Washington (Hallie says, “My heart is here”) as well as 
the game of politics Stoddard plays when he promises the conductor to 
write the railroad about the good job it is doing. Th e disingenuous pos-
turing by Stoddard, confi rmed by the look on Hallie’s face, seems a far cry 
from the principled man we saw earlier in the fi lm. Hallie and Stoddard 
have compromised themselves as they have distanced themselves from 
Shinbone. Doniphon, by contrast, always seems true to what he is, which, 
as we’ve seen, is part of the tragedy in the end. Ford may be mistaken in 
believing that civilization is the inevitable corruptor of self-reliance, if not 
self-suffi  ciency. Th at is an interesting point for refl ection. Certainly the 
philosophers we have mentioned regard self-suffi  ciency as being fostered 
by civilization, not diminished by it. But Ford is doing art, not philosophy, 
and as such can point us to real concerns without necessarily arguing for 
a necessary connection.
It is not just the individual who is diminished by the loss of self-reliance, 
but democracy as well. Th e disappearance of self-reliance in a democratic 
setting is a license for mob rule. For if sovereignty is democratic in nature, 
the only possible check upon mass conformity is the willingness of some of 
society’s members to stand up for a truth that others may not share. Democ-
racy can be a great power for wealth and equality, but that same power can 
be an overwhelming detriment to self-reliance. Th e leading fi gures in a 
Ford western are perhaps not always self-suffi  cient, as we noted with Ethan 
in Th e Searchers, but they are all self-reliant. Th at distinction raises numer-
ous interesting questions about the relationship between self-reliance and 
self-suffi  ciency and the role of the former in the development of the latter.52 
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We, unfortunately, have no space to explore such questions here. Suffi  ce it 
to say that these sorts of questions are naturally evoked by the western fi lm 
or novel, and thus can serve the cause of philosophical refl ection. If self-
reliance is a virtue, as I believe it is, it is no accident that one of the great 
American thinkers, Emerson, devotes an essay to it, or that it is repeatedly 
championed in the American western fi lm and novel. Self-suffi  ciency may 
broadly identify a form of human excellence that has been handed down to 
us from the refl ections of Western philosophers; but self-reliance is America’s 
contribution to the pantheon of particular moral virtues and the American 
western is its cultural signature.
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32. Spinoza is not averse to talking about perfection (E3P11) despite the fact that 
his theory is not teleological. Th e most we can say here is that Spinoza thinks of “real-
ity” and “perfection” as the same (E2Def.6), meaning that the more perfect a thing is, 
the more it exerts its reality on the things around it. For humans that sort of perfection 
comes with knowledge.
33. Spinoza says that “by virtue and power I mean the same thing” (E4Def. 8). Power 
is competence of action within one’s environment. His defi nition of virtue, then, is less 
teleological than Aristotle’s notion of “excellence,” which may suggest standards and 
hierarchies of the good.
34. In Th e Big Trail mentioned in note 1 above, Breck Coleman says: “I’m the law 
out here; that’s all; and the law is justice.” 
35. Th ere remains, however, the interesting question (which we are unable to answer 
here) of the so-called unity of the virtues (the doctrine that we cannot really possess 
any virtue without all the others). Th e issue is especially interesting if considered in a 
“precivilized” state, as discussed below.
36. For example, rather than shoot and kill the drunk Indian causing trouble in the 
saloon during an opening part of the movie, Earp fi nds a way to disarm him harmlessly 
and to simply throw him out of the bar. Th is suggests not only an ability to recognize 
alternatives, but an understanding of the meaning of proportionality in the use of force, 
as well as a concern for harm to others.
37. Th ere is much we could talk about here, and Ethan provides a good example of 
how the model of self-suffi  ciency we are using might encourage insights into the fi lm. 
For example, the ending of the fi lm, where only Ethan remains outside the home into 
which the others have returned, leaves open the question of whether Ethan has resolved 
his internal diffi  culties and is thus a candidate for self-suffi  ciency, or whether this is the 
end of but one form of searching, to be followed by others. Th e fi lm also raises some 
important questions of just how one comes to grips with one’s own irrationalities and 
what it takes to overcome them, especially in cases where one possesses skills and prac-
tical wisdom that can be turned in the wrong direction.
38. One of Ford’s most famous silent fi lms, Th e Iron Horse (1924), is a paean to 
the linking of East and West by the railroad and its importance in taming the West 
and bringing about civilization. “Civilization” as I use it here refers generally to the 
rule of law, rather than men, and to some regular administration of impartial justice. 
Its meaning does include some signifi cant control over nature and a level of material 
prosperity.
39. When the truth fi nally unfolds and the editor of the town paper tears up his 
notes and is asked by Stoddard if he is going to use the story, the editor delivers the 
most famous line of the movie: “Th is is the West, sir. When the legend becomes fact, 
print the legend.”
40. In My Darling Clementine the coming of civilization is only just begun. Earp 
settles his score with the Clantons with the precivilized form of justice, namely, clan 
52 Douglas J. Den Uyl
revenge. Earp says when help is off ered to him that “this is a family aff air” and even 
hides (though still carries with him) his marshal’s badge, indicating that it is not law 
derived from civilization that will handle the matter, but a precivilized form of justice, 
clan warfare. Consequently, the qualities of character Ford admires are not yet darkened 
by civilization, though both fi lms are clearly about the transition from precivilization 
to civilization.
41. Yet Doniphon also joins Peabody, the newspaper editor, at the dinner table dur-
ing the dining-room scene, when he could have joined any other patron in the place. 
Peabody, besides Stoddard, is the main representative of civilization in Shinbone, and 
Doniphon’s choice of dinner companion indicates that he is drawn in some degree to 
intelligence and culture.
42. Th e distance from civilization is humorously demonstrated when Hallie, being 
shown the proper way to set a table by Peabody, asks, in response to being told where 
the knife and fork go, whether Peabody is “superstitious or something”!
43. Obviously, “necessities” is ambiguous. Were it interpreted to mean mere biologi-
cal survival, then the characters of this fi lm and other westerns do have the “necessities.” 
But precisely because the social order is still in fl ux, and also because many human goods 
cannot be pursued until that social order is subjected to law, peace, and prosperity, the 
interpretation of “necessities” off ered here seems plausible. Moreover, I suspect that 
Aristotle has in mind the presence of a relatively signifi cant amount of cultural wealth, 
since even the solitary philosopher would need both the leisure and the educational 
background to pursue his contemplations.
44. Th e issue of teleology in Spinoza is a complicated one, though Spinoza himself 
seems to eschew fi nal causes (E1P16, 25, 28). Still, Spinoza, as much as Aristotle, puts 
the philosophic life at the center of his meaning of activity, and it is hard to imagine 
such a life apart from the provisions of civilization. I believe, therefore, that the notion 
of “reason” in both would not make them ultimately so far apart as I am currently mak-
ing them here.
45. Again, I’m not referring to all goods, but those goods (whatever they may be) 
that are “necessary” for self-suffi  ciency as Aristotle might conceive of them plus those 
appropriate to one’s own life plans as described by Annas above.
46. Th is distinction echoes one I use when referring to forms of practical wisdom 
in my book on prudence. Th ere I defi ne “ontic excellence” as “the best state or condi-
tion (accompanied by the appropriate performances) of the most perfect example of 
‘the thing’ in question.” I use “conatic excellence” as simply “exercising one’s present 
capacities to their fullest” with the materials one has at hand. Th e Virtue of Prudence 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 213–23.
47. It is an answer that goes way back for Ford. In the closing scene of Stagecoach 
(1939), Doc says sarcastically as Ringo and Dallas are driving to Mexico, “Th ey’re saved 
from the blessings of civilization.”
48. We appreciate by asking this question why the philosophers may be compelled 
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to turn to the intellectualist solution, for it seems, as Aristotle said, the least dependent 
on circumstances and thus the most likely candidate for seamlessness.
49. Th at confusion is itself an important commentary on the relationship between 
the two. Interestingly, in a move that must have been deliberate on Ford’s part, Pompey 
has trouble remembering the part of the Declaration that says, “All men are created 
equal”—a clear indication of Ford’s recognition of the lack of equal treatment accorded 
African Americans.
50. As he says, “If you are true, but not in the same truth with me, cleave to your 
companions; I will seek my own. I do this not selfi shly, but humbly and truly.” Emerson: 
Essays and Lectures (New York: Penguin, 1983), 273.
51. Ibid., 279.
52. For my part, self-reliance is an individualistic form of the Socratic virtue of 
knowing oneself. It may be a necessary step to self-perfection, but can be exhibited 
prior to such perfection.
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MOMMAS, DON’T LET YOUR BABIES 
GROW UP TO BE PRAGMATISTS
B. Steve Csaki
Th ere is no reasonable argument against the (true) assertion that the ulti-
mate American cinematic cowboy was, and remains, John Wayne. Th e 
questions of exactly why and how he and his fi lms so captured the Ameri-
can psyche remain somewhat open. In fact, there are myriad aspects to this 
question, but I believe that there is one overarching explanation as to why 
John Wayne was so clearly special: he was an excellent pragmatist. I shall 
argue that any cowboy hero must act pragmatically and that John Wayne so 
embodied the true sense of the classical American pragmatist that this was 
one of the primary factors that enabled him to become the symbol of not 
only the American West but also of American men in general.
Since it would be impossible to cover all of John Wayne’s westerns in 
this essay, I shall concentrate on two of his fi lms: Rooster Cogburn (1975, 
the sequel to True Grit, 1969) and Th e Cowboys (1971). I choose to examine 
these particular fi lms for two primary reasons. First, Wayne’s persona had 
been perfected by the time he made these fi lms. Second, and perhaps most 
obviously, Wayne is quite literally a father fi gure in Th e Cowboys, and so 
we very clearly see the attributes (in both Wayne and the boys) that a good 
(western/cowboy) man should possess and how they are earned by, rather 
than bestowed upon, a cowboy.
Pragmatism is an empirically based philosophy and, as such, experi-
ence plays a critical role in the successful application of the methodology. 
A pragmatic approach expands the notion of experience to include not 
only one’s personal experience but the experiences of others as well. Th us a 
father fi gure, a library, TV, the Internet, or simple observation of others all 
count as types of experience that one can use to a pragmatic advantage. In 
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western fi lms the heroes are exemplifi ed as role models so we ought to be 
able to learn from their experiences.
Before we can directly proceed to examine the fi lms, we must at least 
begin a rather monstrous undertaking. In a relatively short space, a frame-
work (however structurally slender) of what it means to be a pragmatist must 
be erected. Th is is really a twofold task. First, the pragmatic theory must be 
outlined and then how this theory is utilized or lived on a day-to-day basis 
must be explained. Once some aspects of pragmatism have been introduced, 
then I shall draw from the fi lms in order both to explain additional com-
ponents of pragmatism and to show that John Wayne’s characters are prag-
matic. Finally, once the framework of pragmatism has been completed and 
various examples have been examined, we can look at the fi lms a bit more 
closely and see how pragmatism fi ts. Once the fi lms have been examined, 
it will be possible to see that John Wayne’s characters typically represent an 
excellent example of the theory and technique that is pragmatism. In fact, 
we shall see that these characters are not only functional pragmatists but 
exceptionally good pragmatists.
William James (1842–1910) off ers a simple and yet gripping analogy to 
help us understand what pragmatism is and how it works in a series of lec-
tures he gave in 1906–7 to explain just this issue—the meaning of pragma-
tism. In the second of these lectures James tells the story of a camping trip 
that he and some friends took. James went for a walk and returned to fi nd 
that “a ferocious metaphysical dispute” had split the group into two equally 
opposed factions. As James puts it, “Th e corpus of the dispute was a squir-
rel—a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while 
over against the tree’s opposite side a human being was imagined to stand.” 
Th e person in question is trying to get a good look at the squirrel, but every 
time the person tries to see the squirrel and circles the tree in order to do 
so, the squirrel moves fast enough (in the same direction) to keep the tree 
in between itself and the person. Th us, the person never can see the squir-
rel at all. James sums up the ensuing argument in this way: “Th e resulting 
metaphysical question now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or 
not? He goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but 
does he go round the squirrel?”1 Of course, half the members of the camp-
ing party answer yes, while the other half say no.
Both parties look to James to settle the dispute since his vote will give 
either side the advantage by one. James solves the dispute by saying, “Which 
party is right, I said, depends on what you practically mean by ‘going round’ 
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the squirrel.”2 James goes on to explain what he means by saying that if one 
means “around” in terms of compass directions, then of course the man goes 
around the squirrel. However, if one means “around” in the sense that you 
must be fi rst in front of, then beside, then behind, and so on, then, equally 
obviously (since the squirrel is always facing the man on the other side of 
the tree), the man never does go around the squirrel. James says that nearly 
all of the disputants were in agreement with his solution, though a couple 
grumbled that he had off ered only a “shuffl  ing evasion.”3 Case solved! Here 
the pragmatic method is employed in order to clarify the actual question at 
hand and in so doing off ers up a simple solution. Th is example is perhaps 
one of the simplest utilizations of the pragmatic method.
Now I, for one, can easily imagine replacing William James with John 
Wayne in this example. We’d need to add guns and horses, of course, but 
it seems to me that any of his characters would otherwise be a natural 
fi t. Can’t you just hear him saying, “It all depends on what you mean by 
‘round,’ Pilgrim.” Of course, I realize that asking the reader to imagine 
this scenario is hardly a compelling argument that John Wayne is a prag-
matist, but it’s perhaps a start. As we shall see, the example James off ers 
actually tells a great deal more about the pragmatic method than may 
initially meet the eye.
First, the pragmatic method is one that is used initially only as necessary.4 
Th e meaning of this claim requires some explanation. Both James and John 
Dewey (1859–1952) were in agreement with Aristotle (among others) that 
the vast majority of human behavior is habitual in nature. Th e classical prag-
matists5 asserted that it is only when confronted by a problem that requires 
some immediate action that we are derailed from the tracks that are our 
usual habits. In James’s example above, the simple fact that others disagree 
with us is enough to prompt us out of our regular routine. Disagreements, 
particularly powerful ones, will prompt most people to abandon habitual 
activity for at least some period of time.
While one might argue that the squirrel problem is clearly one that seems 
to require only “mental” action, it nevertheless represents a problem that 
requires addressing. Th e very fact that people have become so immersed 
in the argument indicates that there is need of reasonable clarifi cation to 
restore the peace. With respect to it being a “mental” (versus physical) prob-
lem, as a general rule, pragmatists are opposed to dualisms of this nature. 
Th e notion that there is such a thing as thinking as opposed to acting is not 
germane to pragmatism. Au contraire, pragmatists assert that thinking is 
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an action6 that is utilized only in order to accomplish a goal, which in turn 
typically requires some sort of other action to complete.7
While there are a plethora of aspects and details of pragmatism that are 
of interest generally speaking, for the purposes of showing that John Wayne 
is the ultimate pragmatic hero, this particular problem-solving orientation of 
pragmatism is the one that I shall investigate fi rst. Aft er all, a western that has 
no problem is no western at all. Further, a hero with no adversity or obstacles 
that must be overcome is no hero—cowboy or otherwise. While pragmatism 
is a holistic philosophical methodology in the sense that it should suffi  ce to 
overcome all potential problems one might encounter—ethical, economic, 
political, epistemological, ontological, and so on—the use of pragmatism 
and the pragmatic approach to solve problems and overcome obstacles that 
might keep one from accomplishing an important task is initially of most 
interest when discussing the American western fi lm.
John Dewey refers to the particular aspect of the pragmatic method that 
deals with, and ultimately solves, problems as “inquiry.” It is actually through 
the process of inquiry that we advance to the point that we can identify what 
initially appears as only a confused situation—more precisely, as a problem. 
According to Dewey, “Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of 
an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent 
distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situa-
tion into a unifi ed whole.” Th e situation in question is any situation that one 
confronts that causes doubt, anxiety, or uncertainty. Dewey is very clear in 
his insistence that these feelings are generated because the situation itself 
“has these traits.”8 In other words, there is a reason (or reasons) beyond a 
person’s state of mind that causes that person to feel doubt, anxiety, or any 
other feeling that might be generated in a given situation. He claims it would 
be “pathological” were one to feel doubt (strictly) internally where there was 
no “objective” reason to feel it. Th e bottom line here is that people simply 
are not comfortable in situations that are “indeterminate” in nature. Th ese 
situations are in a sense profoundly unacceptable. Indeterminate situations 
could be confusing at best or dangerous at worst, and as we know, in west-
erns they nearly always are dangerous.
In Rooster Cogburn, in the scene in which Wolf (Richard Romancito) falls 
asleep when he is on guard duty and is captured by Hawk (Richard Jordan), 
Rooster wakes up with a start because he hears a muffl  ed call from Wolf. 
Th is is an example of what Dewey means by an “indeterminate situation.” 
Rooster’s fi rst reaction is (and must be), as Dewey puts it, “pre-cognitive.”9 
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Th at is to say, it is a reaction that occurs prior to any formalized thought. He’s 
startled and awakened. Th e fi rst step in the pattern of inquiry is to establish 
what the problem actually is. Before Rooster can respond he must make the 
situation less indeterminate, at least by recognizing enough of what is actu-
ally happening to formulate an understanding of the problem. Of course, 
Rooster does this almost immediately as he calls out for Wolf.
Once the problem has been correctly identifi ed, there are a couple of 
courses of action one can take to try to make those initial apparently dispa-
rate elements into a “unifi ed whole.” Dewey uses the terms “experimental 
operation” and “reasoning.” Reasoning (as any philosopher can tell you) is 
an extremely valuable tool, but as any western afi cionado can also tell you, 
nothing actually gets done by reasoning alone. Action is required to change 
any situation,10 particularly to change it in your favor. One gains experience 
of what might change the situation favorably or unfavorably from having 
been in similar situations before and having used experimental operations 
with varying degrees of success.
In the beginning of Th e Cowboys we see one of the clearest instances of 
thought or reasoning in trying to solve a problem that we fi nd in any Wayne 
fi lm. Aft er Wayne’s character, Wil Anderson, learns that his ranch hands 
have all gone off  to search for gold, he goes looking for anyone he can fi nd to 
help him get his cattle to market. He fi nds no one and ends up in the saloon, 
where we see him thinking over the problem, and apparently coming up 
dry. Th e bartender (Slim Pickens) actually suggests hiring schoolboys for 
the cattle drive. Once the idea of hiring boys is adopted by Wil,11 much of 
the rest of the movie revolves around “experimental operation,” which will 
indicate whether or not this approach to solving the problem is a viable one. 
While we see that this particular Wayne character (like most) is better at the 
experimental aspect of inquiry than reasoning, still we see that he actually 
has employed both aspects of inquiry to deal with the problem.
Adoption of the method of inquiry specifi cally (or the pragmatic method 
more generally) results fi rst in a realization (and later in an attitude) that 
holds that previous experience is absolutely essential to determining the 
correct course of action in any given situation. First, obfuscation must be 
reduced to the point that a succinct account of the situation can be estab-
lished—that is, a problem is formulated. Th is is not as easy to accomplish 
as it might seem. Nonetheless, if the problem is not correctly identifi ed, 
then the likelihood of a successful outcome or solution is signifi cantly less-
ened. Th e more experience a person has, the more likely that the situation 
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in question resembles some previously encountered situation. Whether 
one responded rightly or wrongly the last time, if there was a last time, that 
previous experience puts one at an advantage in terms of correctly estab-
lishing what the problem might be in a “novel”12 indeterminate situation 
that occurs.13 While it may occasionally be “better to be lucky than good,” a 
pragmatist holds that it is always better to correctly utilize previous experi-
ences than merely to be lucky.
Both Rooster Cogburn and True Grit represent fairly standard western 
plots. In each fi lm Rooster is selected to go aft er particularly rough crimi-
nals because he is a man with “grit.” Grit, an abrasive toughness, is required 
to take on the most vicious criminals. In both fi lms the problem seems 
straightforward: locate the bad guy and bring him to justice. However, the 
real application of the pragmatic method is in the details. Generally speak-
ing, a plan is made and put into motion; however, in reality the implementa-
tion of the plan is always more complex than it seems due to unforeseeable 
circumstances. Th e best and most effi  cient way of dealing with these diffi  -
culties that crop up is to use the pragmatic method. Th is is what we see in 
both True Grit and Rooster Cogburn, and most other westerns.
In Rooster Cogburn one of these unforeseen situations occurs when 
Rooster has appropriated the nitroglycerin from Hawk and is trying to get 
it back to Fort Smith. Th is is half of his assignment; the other half is to bring 
Hawk in—alive. It becomes clear that he, Wolf, and Eula will not be able to 
stay ahead of Hawk and his gang and at the same time retain possession of 
the explosives. Rooster’s group comes to a river, where there is a raft  to be 
used for crossing. Rooster realizes immediately that this raft  off ers the best 
chance to elude Hawk and his gang. Even though he hasn’t had much, if 
any, experience with raft ing through rapids, this pragmatic solution to the 
problem ultimately allows the group to at least put off  the inevitable clash 
with Hawk and his gang. Th e speed with which Rooster is able to make these 
sorts of decisions makes it clear that he is an accomplished pragmatist, one 
who has employed this methodology many times in the past, since practic-
ing pragmatism on a regular basis improves one’s ability to use it eff ectively 
and effi  ciently.
Th e primary and pronounced diff erence between pragmatism and other 
philosophical systems (be they ultimately empirical or rational in nature) 
is that to be truly pragmatic one cannot accurately abstract from previous 
situations and experiences to produce general rules or laws that are to any 
signifi cant degree fi xed. Th is is because the methodology tends to mirror 
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reality, rather than attempting to force reality to conform to its description 
or account of it. Given the relatively fl uid methodology adopted by the prag-
matists, absolutes are necessarily rejected. All established “truths” are sub-
ject to revision. Th is controversial claim with respect to the nature of truth 
required a great deal of eff ort by both James and Dewey to explain, and the 
extent to which either was entirely successful remains an open question.
While it would be much thrift ier to refrain from a discussion of prag-
matism’s conception of truth in this chapter, it would be equally dishonest. 
John Wayne’s characters usually get it right.14 Th ey manage to accomplish 
their tasks no matter the odds against them. It is extremely diffi  cult to sepa-
rate “being right most of the time” from somehow knowing, or at least rec-
ognizing, the “truth.” So the question arises: Does a pragmatic conception 
of truth fi t with the notion that John Wayne’s characters “get it right”?
James argues, “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, cor-
roborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.”15 An idea must 
fi t within the framework and structure of a person’s life and the experiences 
that make up that life. If it will not fi t, it cannot be assimilated. Although 
this notion may sound subjective and personal, it is not nearly as subjective 
as it sounds.16 James does not mean that assimilation of new information 
is a choice. He means, quite literally, that if it is not possible to assimilate an 
idea, then that idea cannot be true.
Th e other three terms James employs—validation, corroboration, and 
verifi cation—all rely upon past (or future) experiences and interaction 
with the world. However, as opposed to assimilation, these three terms 
are concerned with the more “objective” side of experience, including the 
experience(s) of others. James uses the term “agreement” when discussing 
all these terms, and one can also substitute the word “match” with respect 
to what “true” means for a pragmatist. Th e idea or thought that one has 
about any particular issue must match with what’s “out there.” If it doesn’t 
(and there is no good explanation as to why), then that particular idea is 
likely to be false.
Since no two situations are identical, previously established “working” 
truths may or may not be adequate in solving new problems. Th is aspect of 
pragmatism opened it to the charge of being a completely relativistic philo-
sophical theory (and hence very bad, morally speaking). If there are no fi xed 
truths, how can we know what is right and what is wrong? Further, how can 
there even be a “right” and “wrong” if these notions are not fi xed? Tradition-
ally, ethical theorists have typically preferred systems that have absolutes with 
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respect to what is morally permissible (and impermissible). For example, 
“Th ou shalt not kill.” Th is is certainly simple, but to apply it literally to the 
western would eliminate the genre. In addition, there will always be people 
who are immoral and don’t mind breaking an absolute law. How do you deal 
with those people without breaking the very rules that they have broken? 
Of course, some western plots revolve around this very issue.17
In order to deal eff ectively with the complicated ethical issues in most 
westerns, a pragmatic approach to ethics is extremely practical (no pun 
intended). A pragmatic hero would have a general rule that said something 
like, “Th ou shalt not kill unless I deem that the situation warrants killing.” 
Just as with any problem, a pragmatic approach to ethical “truths” dictates 
that each situation is weighed individually, although past experiences are 
used in this weighing process. Even so, there are interesting and diffi  cult 
questions surrounding any real ethical issue.
In a “good” traditional western, there is always a trespass against some-
one’s rights. Th is moral violation is usually obvious to the audience. Th e 
hero must somehow “right” the situation. How the hero goes about the task 
is what makes the western worth watching. Does the hero simply commit 
the same crimes as the villain, but with “right” on his side? In Rooster Cog-
burn, we see Rooster being relieved of his duties for this very reason. Sure, 
he brings in the bad guys, but too many of them are brought in dead. Judge 
Parker (John McIntire) essentially tells Rooster that he’s no diff erent than 
they are when he says, “Rooster, any deputy who shoots and kills sixty-four 
men in eight years is breaking the law; not aiding and abetting it.” Of course, 
shortly thereaft er Rooster is rehired by Judge Parker precisely because he is 
the only man who can do the job, thus reinforcing the notion that although 
he will go as low as he needs to in order to bring in the bad guy, sometimes 
this approach is the only one that will work.
Th e juxtaposition of Judge Parker’s courthouse in Fort Smith and the 
“territory” is refl ective of a tension: the rationalistic, absolutist conceptions 
of right and wrong in terms of the written law versus the diffi  culty of the 
application of these ideas in actual situations. As Rooster tells Judge Parker 
(in Rooster Cogburn), “Well, Judge, out there in the territory they don’t know 
about all these newfangled laws. We know it, but they don’t. Th ey’re still 
shootin’ in the same direction: at me!” Th is is the best Rooster can off er to 
explain his routine use of what the judge considers excessive force. In other 
words, if you were in those situations and you wanted to enforce the law and 
survive, it was essentially either kill or be killed. So, naturally from his vantage 
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point—on paper, that is—Judge Parker has trouble diff erentiating Rooster’s 
behavior from that of the criminals he is charged to bring to justice.
In general, there are subtle (or not so subtle) diff erences in the behavior 
of the hero (versus the villain) that the audience can detect. At the end of 
Th e Cowboys, aft er Long Hair18 (Bruce Dern) has killed Wil, and the boys, 
with the help of the cook Jebediah Nightlinger (Roscoe Lee Browne), have 
buried him, they decide to take the herd back from the rustlers. Just before 
he died Wil asked Nightlinger to see to it that the boys got back home safely. 
Th e cowboys surprise the cook, tying him up so that he can’t stop them from 
going aft er the herd. Th ey tell him what they intend to do, and he agrees to 
help them make a plan if they’ll untie him. Nightlinger’s plan works, and 
they are able to retake the herd aft er the necessary gunfi ght at the end. When 
the dust clears, they can see that Long Hair is trapped under his horse, cry-
ing out that his leg is broken.
At this point, with Long Hair helpless, the boys have several choices as 
to what they can do about him. Th ey can kill him by shooting him. Th ey can 
help him get free of the horse and presumably seek “legal” justice. Or, they 
can choose to do nothing, which is more or less what they do.19 Because the 
audience is intimately acquainted with the history of this man—the man 
who shot an unarmed John Wayne in the back—the boys’ choice seems the 
right one. It’s hard to imagine a Kantian or other rationalist system that 
would allow this response to be morally permissible, let alone right. It is 
precisely this convoluted ethical dimension of a western that, if thought-
fully presented, can make it a classic. However, if it is too simply portrayed, 
it makes the fi lm merely another tale of revenge.
Th ere is a critical question with regard to the role of pragmatism and the 
cowboys’ behavior in cutting the reins. We must assume that the boys are 
doing their best to follow Wil’s example in their behavior. If John Wayne is 
supposed to be a real pragmatist, then the question naturally arises: Would 
a pragmatic ethical approach allow for this type of justice? In other words, 
did they do the right thing, pragmatically speaking? Th is is a diffi  cult ques-
tion, but I think that one can answer it affi  rmatively.20
First, we know that Long Hair has been to jail already; however, the fi lm 
demonstrates that he has not reformed. He lies to Wil at their fi rst meeting. 
He claims that he lied because he believed that no one would hire a man 
who has just been released from the penitentiary. Wil tells Long Hair that 
the lying, not the prison time, is the reason he won’t hire him.
Later Long Hair steals the herd, shooting (in the back) and killing an 
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unarmed man in the process. Sending this individual back to jail does not 
seem to be a choice that will be of benefi t to anyone in the long term. How-
ever, killing him outright makes it too diffi  cult to distinguish his criminal 
behavior from that of the cowboys themselves. He is unarmed and helpless 
just as Wil was. Th e choice they make, handing the knife to Dan (Nicolas 
Beauvy), who was particularly traumatized by Long Hair, so that he can let 
loose the horse, is clearly a choice of vengeance. As he is dragged on the 
ground by the running horse, Long Hair will suff er terribly before he dies. 
Yet one can make the argument that Long Hair is ultimately responsible 
for his own fate.
How can we be sure that the cowboys made the right choice, morally 
speaking? Sometimes a pragmatist must wait for the data to roll in before 
an answer is clear. In a diffi  cult case like this, it might take years for the 
cowboys to learn whether or not they made the right choice. It is possible 
that they might never know for certain. Th is is not a fault of the pragmatic 
method; this is the reality of the situation. Meaningful ethical issues are 
usually not simple, and while we desperately desire a simple answer to the 
problem, sometimes one is not forthcoming. Because pragmatism accepts 
the sometimes murky nature of these situations as part and parcel of reality, 
it is well suited to the moral concerns of the western.
While the ethical issues in Th e Cowboys are quite interesting from a 
pragmatic point of view, the plot of the fi lm is perhaps even more so. In the 
beginning, it seems to involve a very simple problem that is approached 
pragmatically, even if the solution proves to be unorthodox. Wil’s cattle 
need to get to market so that he can sell them and pay his bills. Th e only 
available bodies are boys from the age of thirteen to fi ft een. Wil weighs the 
other options (none, really) and decides to use the boys aft er a brief test of 
their horsemanship skills. Th is appears to be a simple and straightforward 
pragmatic solution to a problem.
However, at some point during the cattle drive a signifi cant shift  occurs. 
Th e goal for Wil changes from getting the cattle to market no matter the 
cost to being a better father to the cowboys than he was to his own sons, 
who died because they “went bad.” Th e audience may not realize that this 
shift  has occurred until aft er Wil’s death makes it obvious. Wil’s failure to 
complete the drive is intentional to the extent that he chooses his second 
goal, that of showing the boys how a good man ought to conduct himself, 
over the fi rst, of getting the cattle to market.
Of course, these two goals are not mutually exclusive. Had circumstances 
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been diff erent both could have been accomplished simultaneously. Further, 
it is not entirely clear that Wil made the best choices in a pragmatic sense 
to accomplish his goals. Clearly, he was right in hiring the boys to take his 
cattle to market since the boys ultimately got them there. (One has to won-
der though, was it worth the life of Charlie Schwartz [Stephen Hudis], one 
of the boys who dies along the way?) It is not quite as clear that Wil’s self-
sacrifi ce was necessary in a pragmatic sense, but perhaps no other behavior 
could have made Wil’s point as clearly to the boys as his willingness to die 
for his principles. Certainly, there are situations in which sacrifi cing oneself 
may well be the most pragmatic option available. I think that in this case 
we see the meeting of a generally pragmatic approach with what appears to 
be a more principle-based ethical system.21
Lovers of the western are familiar with the “code of the West,” though it’s 
harder to make a list of the rules that make up the code than it might seem. 
It might start something like this: A true hero keeps his word.22 You don’t 
shoot a man in the back (even if he is a bad guy). You give a man a chance 
to draw before you shoot. You care for those who can’t care for themselves. 
And so on. However, before any more laws of the code are listed, perhaps a 
closer look at the application of the “code” is in order. I think we’ll see that the 
code—while it may look like a set of absolute rules that must be followed—is 
actually applied pragmatically. As long as the code works in a given situation, 
our heroes will adhere to it, but should it prove a hindrance to the task at 
hand, it will be ignored. In other words, if we look closely at the heroes and 
their actions in western fi lms, we’ll see that there are so many exceptions to 
the code that it can hardly be considered an absolute set of rules at all.
For example, the “rule” against shooting a man in the back seems to 
be suspended once the fi ghting has commenced. In what is arguably John 
Wayne’s most famous scene ever, the mounted shootout in True Grit when 
Rooster alone takes on fi ve men, Rooster shoots two of Ned Pepper’s (Robert 
Duvall) gang in the back aft er he charges past them (and they have ridden 
past him). As for the rule that one ought to give a man a chance to draw, 
in the opening scene of Rooster Cogburn, Rooster shoots all three crimi-
nals even though only one drew on, and shot, Rooster’s deputy. In both 
fi lms, Rooster is also almost as quick to lie to the bad guys as he is to “pull 
a cork.” Simply put, Rooster adheres to the code of the West as long as it 
suits his needs, and yet there is no doubt at all that he is a good man—that 
he is heroic, in fact.23
John Wayne did not become a cinematic icon because the audience was 
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willing to allow his characters to be unethical just because they were John 
Wayne’s characters. Th is would be putting the cart before the horse, in a 
sense. John Wayne was able to make the audience believe that he made the 
only possible choices that could be right given the circumstances as they 
presented themselves. Th e choices were right not because they adhered to 
some set of rules, but rather because things were as right as they could be 
in the end. Th e audience understood and valued the pragmatic approach 
that John Wayne’s characters applied so eff ectively, whether the problematic 
situation was one where the ethical concerns were highlighted or one where 
they were more subdued. People who watched and loved his movies imagined 
that they too were capable of making the right choices under duress, just as 
the Duke did. Audiences recognized and admired John Wayne’s pragmatic 
skills as they were seen in his characters.
Pragmatism is not a philosophy that was invented or created by some 
great thinker. Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) is recognized as the fi rst 
person to use the word pragmatism to describe a problem-solving method-
ology that had some similarities to the scientifi c method, and hence he is 
considered the father of classical American pragmatism. William James and 
John Dewey24 went on to make the term internationally renowned. Th ough 
it is associated with certain fi gures, pragmatism remains a description of a 
way of doing things rather than a detailed system that explains how things 
might be or should be. Pragmatism as a methodology preexists the philo-
sophic label and has been applied for centuries. It is for this reason that John 
Wayne could be a pragmatist without ever being aware that he was one. He 
did not need to read a book, take a course, or join a group to become a prag-
matist. He simply needed to use the methodology that has been described 
as pragmatism. His audiences did not need to do any of those things either 
to recognize his gift  of being able to portray an accomplished pragmatist, 
which in truth any cowboy who could survive in the Old West, let alone 
prosper, would have had to have been. We need only to watch John Wayne’s 
characters to understand how a great pragmatist would function. When we 
do so, it is impossible not to admire that way of acting.
Notes
 1. William James, Pragmatism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 25.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
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 4. Th is assertion requires a bit of fl eshing out in order to explain what may at fi rst 
glance seem incorrect. Both James and Dewey argue that we have always been prag-
matic, and thus that we have always used the pragmatic method as a problem-solving 
methodology. So, historically speaking, pragmatism is nothing new. Hence the subtitle 
of James’s lectures: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Th inking. We can trace pragma-
tism back to the Greeks in general and Aristotle specifi cally. However, it (in my view, 
still) has not been recognized as a methodology that can be adopted wholesale. In other 
words, fi rst, we do not recognize that we regularly employ pragmatism when confronted 
by a problem that requires immediate attention/solution, and second, we do not under-
stand that this very methodology (that we do use) can also be used across the board to 
address any problem, philosophical or otherwise.
 5. I use this phrase to distinguish the “original” American pragmatists (Charles 
S. Peirce, James, Dewey, George H. Mead, and others) from later so-called pragmatists 
(like the logical positivists who followed them, or contemporary fi gures such as Rich-
ard Rorty).
 6. For example, see John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover, 1958), 
67–68.
 7. Th e relationship between thought and action in pragmatism is much like a 
Hegelian sandwich. Th ought typically begets action. Th e result(s) of the action inspires 
thought and refl ection. Th is may, in turn, generate additional actions. Any one instance 
of pragmatic action is assimilated as experience to be used again. Th e movement of 
pragmatism is always progressive and always goal oriented; while somewhat Hegelian 
in this respect, individual pragmatists diff er in terms of the extent to which they see 
any “ultimate” end to the progress. So, unlike Hegelianism, pragmatism is not actually 
a teleological philosophy.
 8. John Dewey, Th e Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. John J. McDermott (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 226–27.
 9. Ibid., 238.
10. Of course I realize that one can choose to do nothing—to not act. In this case 
the choice is the action. Pragmatists are antidualist.
11. He reaches this decision, at least in part, presumably because he has been forced 
to admit that he himself was only thirteen years old when he went on his fi rst cattle 
drive.
12. Most pragmatists would agree that it is unlikely that one would encounter a com-
pletely novel situation. Generally speaking, the situations (and therefore the problems) 
that we encounter are not radically diff erent from our previous experiences. Th ere are 
of course exceptions to this general rule. However, these types of situations would not 
be commonplace.
13. If John Wayne’s characters were real people, then one would naturally expect that 
they would learn, such that his characters in later fi lms would react more quickly and 
accurately to situations. I believe that one can see in his acting that he learned how to 
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display this capacity or tendency in his later fi lms. Th e young John Wayne typically made 
the right decisions, but watching the older John Wayne one feels that he’ll be right—pre-
sumably as the result of a perceived confi dence that only experience provides.
14. When I say “Th ey get it right,” I mean that they have been correct in the sense 
that they are not wrong, but since the issues in western fi lms are so oft en moral con-
cerns, I must also mean that they are ethically “right” as well.
15. James, Pragmatism, 92.
16. It is critical to keep in mind the fact that James (along with the rest of the prag-
matists) rejects the notion of duality, particularly in terms of a mind/body split. Th us, 
just because a new idea confl icts with my previously held beliefs, this does not mean 
that I cannot assimilate it. Th is just means that I may not want to assimilate it. So, it can 
be true even if I don’t want it to be true. For pragmatists truth is not entirely subjective, 
though it has subjective components.
17. While I have limited my discussion of Wayne to the later fi lms, I would be 
remiss here not to mention Angel and the Bad Man (1947) as a fi lm that examines this 
very issue.
18. Although the cast list identifi es this character as “Long Hair,” he introduces him-
self to Wil Anderson as “Asa Watts.”
19. While it’s literally true in the fi lm that Dan cuts the reins, allowing the horse to 
get up and drag Long Hair, this outcome was inevitable. Eventually Long Hair would 
have tired of holding onto the reins and would have been forced to let go, letting the 
horse get up. Waiting for this to happen just would have been rather boring and slow 
for the audience.
20. Th e wonderful (and terribly diffi  cult) aspect of the pragmatic approach is the 
fact that one could (almost) as easily answer this query in the negative. A pragmatic 
argument could be fashioned that the boys should have made a diff erent choice. I leave 
that argument to the reader to make.
21. One can’t help but think of Kant here, but actually any rationalistic system of 
ethics might off er up a similar outcome. While I am arguing that cowboy heroes are 
pragmatists, I cannot spit in the wind and claim that they do not share a code of behav-
ior that is based on certain inalienable unwritten laws—or do they?
22. Th is is an extension or subset of the rule that one should be honest and tell the 
truth.
23. While one might argue that Rooster is an exception to the characters that John 
Wayne typically portrayed, I would counter that John Wayne chose to play him in two 
diff erent movies and that Rooster Cogburn was one of his most famous characters. I 
would further suggest that we’d fi nd similar behavior in many of John Wayne’s other 
characters if we looked closely at them.
24. Of course I include George Herbert Mead and George Santayana as important 
fi gures in the development of classical American pragmatism.
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TWO WAYS TO YUMA
Locke, Liberalism, and Western Masculinity in 3:10 to Yuma
Stephen J. Mexal
Westerns . . . created a model for men who came of age in the twentieth 
century.
—Jane Tompkins, West of Everything
John Locke and the Western Hero
At one of the climactic moments of the 1957 fi lm 3:10 to Yuma, rancher Dan 
Evans (Van Hefl in) realizes, in the timeless tradition of countless devil-may-
care western heroes, that his task has become all but hopeless. Dan has agreed 
to bring outlaw Ben Wade (Glenn Ford) to justice for the price of $200, money 
he desperately needs to pay his land debts. His job is to put Wade on the 3:10 
p.m. train to Yuma, Arizona, where Wade will be imprisoned.
It is near the end of the fi lm—when he is holed up in a hotel room 
with Wade and waiting in trepidation for the train—that Dan realizes he is 
utterly alone in his charge. Th e men who had originally agreed to help him 
have abandoned him, and Wade’s seven-man “outfi t” of criminals is wait-
ing outside the hotel, nearly certain to kill Dan and free Wade the moment 
they leave the hotel room. Recognizing that the undertaking has essentially 
become a lost cause, Butterfi eld (Robert Emhardt), the stagecoach owner 
who originally agreed to pay Dan the $200, absolves him of his duty. It’s 
just not worth it, Butterfi eld decides. Th en, somewhat incredibly, he off ers 
to pay him the money anyway, even though he has just released Dan from 
his obligations.
Earlier, Dan has declared his interest in the situation to be merely trans-
actional. He is, he announces, “just doing this for the money” to pay his 
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debts and maintain his property. And so, with his contractual obligations to 
Butterfi eld dissolved and his fi nancial compensation secured, to risk death 
by trying to deliver Wade to the train anyway is irrational.
Yet Dan does precisely that. Declaring that he’s “got to” go through with 
the plan, even though neither contract nor fi nancial exigency is actually 
forcing him, he seems to abandon rational self-interest and familial obliga-
tion. He must deliver Wade to justice, he says, if only because “people should 
be able to live in decency and peace together.” In saying this, he proclaims 
rational self-interest to be subordinate to a broader public good.
Tellingly, Dan links this new interest in the public good to a particular 
conception of masculinity. As he prepares to leave the hotel room and face 
seemingly insurmountable odds, he tells his wife, Alice (Leora Dana), who 
has come to try to change his mind, that though he has not been able to pro-
vide her with much in the way of material luxuries such as jewelry, or even 
necessities like ample food, he nevertheless hopes that this one moment in 
which he rejects economic individualism and embraces civic-mindedness 
will make up for his defects as a provider and a husband. Abnegative repub-
licanism will be his legacy as a man. Th is fi nal act, Dan proclaims, will be 
something “worth remembering” for his wife and children.
Ultimately, Dan Evans does not die, and he successfully accompanies 
Ben Wade to the jail in Yuma. In the 2007 remake of the fi lm, though, the 
character is not so lucky. In this version, at the crucial moment when all hope 
is apparently lost, Butterfi eld (Dallas Roberts) again absolves Dan (Chris-
tian Bale) of his obligations and again off ers to pay him the $200 anyway. 
Again, Dan turns him down. Dan then turns to his fourteen-year-old son 
William (Logan Lerman) and bestows manhood upon him. “You’ve become 
a fi ne man,” he tells his son. “You got all the best parts of me.” Much as in 
the 1957 fi lm, Dan links patrimony to a particular conception of the good, 
or what he identifi es as the “right.” However, in the 2007 fi lm, right action 
does not mean subordinating individualism to abstract notions of justice 
and civic responsibility. Instead, Dan renegotiates his contract. In place of 
the original $200, he demands from Butterfi eld water rights for his land 
and $1,000 to be given to his wife. Butterfi eld agrees. And though Dan asks 
his son to “remember that your old man walked Ben Wade to that station 
when nobody else would,” it is clear that his real legacy of masculinity is 
one of property, not civic spirit. In the 2007 fi lm, Dan Evans also succeeds 
in putting Ben Wade (Russell Crowe) on the train to the Yuma jail, but it 
is a hollow victory for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that 
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William is forced to watch his father die in the act of ensuring his son’s 
right to property.
Although Dan Evans’s actions at the climax of the 2007 fi lm are moti-
vated by his desire to provide for his dependents, it is important to note 
that the fi lm confl ates “family protector” with “property protector.” Th at is 
to say, Dan’s entire ability to care for his family is predicated on the abso-
lute supremacy of property, a principle that forms the bedrock of atom-
istic individualism. And though Dan seems unconcerned with acquiring 
property for its own sake, the fi lm’s willingness to equate masculinity with 
property acquisition says much about its post–cold war politics. As a result, 
Dan’s readiness to escort Wade to the station should not be misconstrued 
as a readiness to die or to be martyred for his family. Instead, the scene is 
better understood as a negotiation for hazard pay. Dan is undertaking an 
unusually dangerous job and, as a proper liberal subject, expects to be paid 
accordingly. Th us, while it may not be in his personal interest to die, it very 
much is in his interest to renegotiate his contract and attempt to complete 
the work. Under Dan’s model of liberal individualism, ensuring property 
means ensuring inheritance, both of which, ultimately, sustain the untram-
meled autonomy of the individual.1
Th e two fi lms, separated by fi ft y years, off er an opportunity to exam-
ine the relationship between individual autonomy, property, the state of 
nature, and masculinity in a fi lm genre that has long served as a repository 
for American fantasies about freedom and conquest. Over the course of 
the two fi lms, Dan Evans and Ben Wade come to represent a changing set 
of ideas about American masculinity and liberal selfh ood in the twentieth 
century. Th e 1957 fi lm valorizes a masculine civic liberalism over absolute 
liberal autonomy, whereas in the 2007 fi lm, with the specter of communism 
vanquished and laissez-faire capitalism triumphant, western masculinity 
ultimately means unyielding liberal individualism.
Th e archetypal hero of the classic Hollywood western is a fi gure with his 
roots in the political ideas of seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke. 
As political historian Louis Hartz writes, the political philosophy of John 
Locke is at the core of what has come to be called classical liberalism in Amer-
ica.2 Locke believed that individuals possess a foundational and inalienable 
liberty. His conception of the autonomous self governed western expansion 
as a historical phenomenon, but it also guided the representation of liberal 
selfh ood in fi ctional western narratives. Th at is, it shaped the development of 
the physical West, but also the cultural development of the western. And the 
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western, of course, changes over time. Th ough genres can seem remarkably 
stable, this apparent durability is an illusion; genres seem constant precisely 
because they conform so eff ortlessly to any given historical moment. Each 
generation gets precisely the western it needs. Because of this, the transition 
from Hefl in and Ford’s cold war–era portrayal of Dan Evans and Ben Wade 
to Bale and Crowe’s post-1989 representations of the same characters off ers 
a unique opportunity to chart the Lockean underpinnings of the western 
myth and the evolution of masculine liberalism in America.3
If the prototypical Lockean fi gure is masculine, capitalist, and in pos-
session of the unswerving belief that the social good most oft en follows the 
individual good, then the two fi lm versions of 3:10 to Yuma off er important 
examples of the ways in which the western has been used to reimagine lib-
eral selfh ood. Locke explained the foundational autonomy of individuals 
by appealing to the language and logic of the natural world. In a premod-
ern “state of nature,” he argued, humans are naturally free. And given that 
the western is at least partly a fantasy about the autonomy of white males, 
the genre’s Lockean foundations normalize white masculine privilege, jus-
tifying that privilege as the by-product of the “state of nature” found in the 
nineteenth-century West. As such, representations of masculinity in the 
fi ctional American West are about the conquest of the far West in the nine-
teenth century, but they also navigate the shift ing relationship to that legacy 
of conquest in the twentieth. To put it another way, the 1957 and 2007 fi lms 
3:10 to Yuma are not just about liberality, masculinity, and the West in 1884, 
when the fi lms are set, they are also about how those topics are understood 
as historical narratives in 1957 and 2007, when the fi lms were made. Both 
fi lms, then, use western space to reconsider the “natural” foundations of 
Lockean classical liberalism. Ultimately, the fi lms place individual rights and 
public needs into a dialectical relationship, one informed by the vagaries of 
their unique cold war and post–cold war historical moments.
Liberalism and the Western “State of Nature”
Liberalism in its original incarnation, what political theorists today identify 
as “classical liberalism,” is roughly synonymous with personal freedom. It is 
a political philosophy that puts the individual at the center of governance. 
Under classical liberalism individuals are naturally autonomous, and from 
this simple premise—people are free—springs the entire apparatus of lib-
eral governance. Governments derive their legitimacy from persons, and 
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do not interfere with core liberal values such as freedom of thought and 
speech, the right to existence, communities bound by the rule of law, and 
an essential right to property. Th is right to property comes, like everything 
else, from the essential freedom of the individual. Because a person owns 
himself, he also owns his labor, and it is labor that creates the value that 
produces property.4
Th ough liberalism has its conceptual roots in a slew of Enlightenment-
era thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Th omas Hobbes, Charles 
Montesquieu, and later David Hume and Adam Smith, American liber-
alism has most oft en meant the liberalism of John Locke. Laid out in his 
Two Treatises on Government (1689), Locke’s ideas formed the core of 
what would come to be called liberality in America. Th ough the extent of 
Locke’s infl uence and the cohesiveness of his philosophy are the subjects 
of perennial debate, Locke still remains the clearest expression of indi-
vidual autonomy in nineteenth-century America, the period in which 
most westerns are set.5
Th ere are a number of important reasons why Lockean liberalism 
explains the political philosophy of the western, but the most obvious is the 
centrality of nature in both the western fi lm and in Locke’s conception of 
the individual. Locke held that every man is self-governing, and that there 
is no natural or foundational political authority. Because he found the philo-
sophical justifi cation for this intrinsic liberality in what he called a “state of 
nature,” and the subtext of every western fi lm involves “civilizing” or “set-
tling” supposedly natural spaces, Locke’s governmental treatises provide a 
useful guide to both the western as a political text and the lasting endurance 
of the western in the American mind.
Land, then, is both setting and subject in the archetypal western. Land 
rights, water rights, and ranching politics provide the grist for most western 
plots, and the stark, sweeping vistas of the American West lend a crackling 
visual texture and mythic resonance to the otherwise quotidian dramas 
acted out by terse men in dusty clothes. For Locke, the natural world func-
tioned as a sort of thought experiment, an imaginary space in which he 
was able to arrive at the conclusion that individuals possess a foundational 
liberality. What, he wondered, did the individual look like before commu-
nities or nations or political loyalties? What did the individual look like in 
a prelapsarian “state of nature”? For Th omas Hobbes, writing thirty-eight 
years before Locke, the state of nature was a state of war, a condition of 
perpetual anarchy that could be avoided only by subordinating the self to 
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a strong civil government. For Locke, though, the state of nature was sim-
ply a space in which humans were naturally free. To “understand political 
power right,” he wrote in the Second Treatise, “we must understand what 
state all men are naturally in.” Th at natural state, he continued, is “a state of 
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and 
person, as they think fi t, within the bounds of the law of nature; without 
asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.” Perfect free-
dom, though, does not mean anarchic freedom, because Locke believed 
that natural human liberty was partly constrained by the relative peace of 
the “law of nature.”6
Locke’s nature is a state of pure and perfect freedom, and does not imply 
a state of perpetual war. Nature, Locke clarifi es, is “a state of liberty, yet it is 
not a state of license.” Yet because the state of nature means freedom, any 
government is going to mean a reduction in the foundational freedoms of 
the state of nature and should accordingly be regarded with suspicion. As 
Ruth W. Grant writes, by “identifying the state of nature as the worst case, 
Hobbes teaches obedience to civil government. By identifying the state of 
war as the worst case, Locke justifi es resistance.” Th is simple hypothesis, 
postulating that natural space is the fount of individual freedom, delineates 
a perfect human liberality as well as a natural resistance to governmental 
authority. It also does much to explain the recurring appeal of the western 
in the twentieth century (aft er all, the genre harkens back to an earlier era 
of romantic individualism), as well as the role of western lands in the nine-
teenth-century public imagination.7
In the nineteenth century, the American West was widely seen as a 
“safety valve,” a sort of regulator of socioeconomic tensions. In contrast 
to the entrenched class inequality in the East, the American West was 
viewed as an opportunity to start over, to renew the promise of American 
individual liberty. If resources became scarce in the East, the nation could 
release some of the social pressure engendered by that scarcity simply by 
encouraging migration west. Th is notion of the West as a safety valve was, 
of course, a myth, if a deeply attractive one. It was predicated on a vision 
of a frontier containing a reservoir of natural resources suffi  cient to fulfi ll 
the economic and political desires of all social classes. As Richard Slotkin 
writes, this frontier myth, which chiefl y involves “the conquest of the wil-
derness and the subjugation or displacement of the Native Americans who 
originally inhabited it,” has been, in the popular imagination, “the means 
to [the American] achievement of a national identity, a democratic polity, 
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[and] an ever-expanding economy.” Th e frontier, in this mythic schema, 
off ers a sort of reset button to civilization, a way of purifying and renewing 
the social contract.8
Although this particular ideology of the American West is indeed a myth, 
it is worth noting that this view of the frontier, which sustained western 
migration as it was enacted in the nineteenth century and reimagined in 
the twentieth, is also a logical outgrowth of Lockean liberalism. If persons 
derive their freedom from nature, then it only makes sense that persons 
can renew those foundational freedoms by returning to nature. Donald 
Worster calls this the “Lockean imperative,” writing that because Locke’s 
notion of property rights springs from his notion of natural freedom, then 
property and freedom both come from the act of developing a piece of 
land, “taking it out of a state of wildness and into one of cultivation.” Yet 
in the frontier myth, actual labor is less important than abstract identifi ca-
tion with the land. As Will Wright notes, the archetypal cowboy is defi ned 
by his honor and “wilderness identity, not by his job.” Due to this roman-
tic association of the American frontier with the Lockean state of nature, 
American liberal selfh ood and western wilderness are always conjoined in 
the western genre.9
In both versions of 3:10 to Yuma, the benefi ts of viewing the American 
West as a new “state of nature” accrue solely to white men. Th is is consistent 
with the nineteenth-century racial politics of “civilization.” In the rhetoric of 
civilization, the myth of the frontier as a space where persons might renew 
the individualism implicit in the original liberal social contract is predicated 
fi rst on the identifi cation and elimination of “savages.” Th at is to say, for 
white immigrants to be able to regard the geography of the American West 
as a Lockean “state of nature” requires the eff acement of Native Americans 
and, aft er 1848, Mexicans.10 As such, nonwhite persons are largely absent 
from both fi lms, although in the 2007 version, Ben Wade’s gang of outlaws 
does, somewhat perfunctorily, include a “Mexican sharpshooter and an 
Apache.” Th e subtextual drama, then, becomes a de-racialized, ahistorical 
battle over the nature of nature. Is the American West a space of peaceful, 
disconnected individualism, as Dan Evans seems to believe? Or is it a space 
in which individual desires are allowed to run wild? “It’s man’s nature to 
take what he wants,” Ben Wade declares in the 2007 fi lm, encapsulating his 
position that the American West is a space for the type of hard liberalism 
that presumes the absolute autonomy of the individual. However, this dec-
laration, which naturalizes excessive individualism, is notably absent from 
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the 1957 version of the fi lm. As such, the issue of freedom and its limits 
frames the evolution of 3:10 to Yuma from a 1957 cold war drama to a 2007 
post–cold war fi lm.
Freedom and Man
Ben Wade is a charming rake. (We are meant to understand this because 
he delays his getaway in order to seduce a female bartender in Bisbee. 
Noncharming criminals, it seems, are famously indiff erent to bartenders.) 
Clearly, the audience is meant to be seduced by him, too, as his vision of 
the American West is one in which individual liberty does not necessarily 
mean moral action. In Wade’s West, crime is easy and the spoils plentiful. 
For him, the West represents an infi nite feast for the unrestrained appetites 
of the atomistic liberal self.
And yet the 1957 fi lm takes pains to emphasize the collaborative nature 
of his criminal threat. Wade’s gang is repeatedly referred to throughout as 
an “outfi t,” a term emphasizing its disreputable collectivity. Ben Wade is 
a dangerous individual, but his real threat to civic order comes from the 
fact that he is a member of an organized cooperative whose members are 
working in tandem to plunder the surplus of American capitalist enterprise. 
During the stagecoach robbery, for example, the coach driver overpowers 
one of Wade’s gang and, holding the man in front of him for protection, 
threatens to shoot him. Ben Wade pauses only briefl y before shooting both 
the driver and his own accomplice. Later, when the men are celebrating in 
a bar, Charlie Prince (Richard Jaeckel), Wade’s right-hand man, toasts Wade 
for killing an individual in order to sustain the continued existence of the 
group as a whole. It is benefi cial, he says, to have had to “say good-bye to 
one of the outfi t,” because if they had not, it might have been “good-bye for 
some of the rest of us.” Th e existence of the group trumps the rights of the 
individual, heightening, in the 1957 fi lm, the threat of the western outlaw 
by aligning that fi gure with a cooperative entity. In this, the fi lm rewrites 
the tropes of the western for the age of the cold war. Th e threat of “the out-
fi t” is, of course, an imperfect analogy to the perceived communist threat in 
1950s America. Aft er all, Ben Wade is identifi ed as “the boss” of the outfi t, 
in the familiar language of the professional-managerial class, and his gang’s 
core motivation is obviously capitalist. Yet at the fi lm’s outset, his coopera-
tive “outfi t” does present a stark contrast to Dan’s atomistic liberalism. Th e 
ultimate victory of Dan Evans in the 1957 fi lm is, in a small way, a repu-
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diation of Ben Wade’s willingness to value the rights of the group over the 
rights of the individual.
In the 1957 fi lm, Dan Evans gradually moves away from hard liberalism 
and toward a philosophy that limits the absolute autonomy of the individual 
in favor of a broader civic good. A civic-minded republicanism, of course, 
is not incompatible with liberalism. Th e whole premise of Locke’s political 
philosophy was that persons surrender particular foundational liberties 
in order to form a liberal civil society. By entering into social contract to 
become “united into one society,” he wrote, each individual man must relin-
quish “his executive power of the law of nature” and “resign it to the pub-
lic,” thus forming “a political or civil society.” So by surrendering absolute 
individual autonomy, or the “executive power of the law of nature,” liberal 
civil society becomes possible. But because the American West was, in the 
nineteenth century, popularly seen as a place to renew the social contract, a 
large part of the fantasy of the western is the notion of a political sphere that 
is somehow closer to the hard individualism of the original state of nature. 
At the start of the 1957 fi lm, Dan Evans is much nearer to this foundational 
liberalism, and it is only by the close of the fi lm that he begins to fuse civic 
duty with individualism. Ultimately, his transition from hard liberalism to 
a soft  republicanism is intermeshed with the fi lm’s ideas about the roles and 
responsibilities of the masculine subject.11
Aft er watching Wade hold up the stagecoach in the fi lm’s opening scenes, 
Dan tells his wife, Alice, about the escapade and emphasizes that he took no 
action. He is no solitary ranger-hero, fi ghting with six-gun for principles that 
do not materially benefi t him. It “seems terrible,” Alice says in response, “that 
something bad could happen and all anybody can do is stand by and watch.” 
At fi rst, Dan is unswayed by this logic. Alice is evoking abstract notions of 
bad and good, and she feels that “bad” actions by one individual ought to 
require a “good” response by a second, ostensibly disinterested individual, 
a response that exceeds simple “watch[ing].” To this, Dan sensibly replies, 
“Lots of things happen and all you can do is stand by and watch.” He alludes 
not only to the social responsibility of the atomistic individual (that is, he 
is not obligated to do more than “watch”), but also to the limits of individu-
alism itself (there were seven criminals and he was one man; he could not 
reasonably have done more). Alice, though, yokes Dan’s passive response 
not to his status as a liberal subject, but to his status as a masculine subject. 
Masculinity, she seems to imply, demands civic liberalism. It is not good, 
she says, for Dan’s sons to hear that he observed a crime and did nothing to 
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stop it. (In the 2007 fi lm, Dan’s sons actually watch the crime with him.) She 
ultimately connects his behavior to three topics, all of which play a key part 
in Locke’s liberalism: masculinity, autonomy, and property. Aft er suggesting 
that he is providing a poor model of masculinity for his sons, she revises the 
conventions of liberal autonomy, suggesting liberal individualism should 
not lead to selfi sh inaction, but rather to civic action. Because Wade has 
stolen private property, she suggests, he has made an implicit threat against 
Dan’s autonomy as a liberal subject: “Dan,” she fi nally says, “you have to do 
something. You can’t just stand by and watch. You work so hard.” Th is fi nal 
sentence about his work as a rancher is, logically speaking, irrelevant to the 
matter at hand. Th e fact that Alice views it as relevant conveys much about 
the status of masculinity, property, and the civic responsibilities of the lib-
eral subject in the imaginary West of 1950s America.
For many American liberal intellectuals in the 1950s, combating the 
postwar anxiety and malaise that they felt made people vulnerable to extrem-
ist politics meant recasting liberalism as something hard, virile, and mascu-
line. As K. A. Cuordileone notes, this impulse ultimately found its apex in the 
Kennedy administration, which reconciled “liberalism itself with masculine 
virility.” Yet it also had important implications for the gender politics of the 
era. In the 1950s liberal imagination, there was a nexus between political 
and sexual subversion. “Like homosexual relations,” Cuordileone writes, “the 
practice of politics under Communism becomes transgressive.” Similarly, as 
Robert D. Dean notes, there was a “pattern of republican ‘engendered’ civic 
virtue taken as the basis for individual political legitimacy by both Cold 
War conservatives and left -centrists.” As a result, the 1957 3:10 to Yuma, 
like most westerns, imagines the American West as a space of freedom, a 
chance to renew the foundational liberal moment when autonomous indi-
viduals enter into social contract. Yet cold war politics demanded that that 
reimagination of liberal selfh ood be not an atomistic individualism but a 
robust, heterosexual, masculine liberal republicanism. It was not only key 
that liberalism be framed as virile and masculine, it was crucial that Ameri-
can liberal governmentality, rather than absolute liberal autonomy, be the 
proper legacy of the individualism of the American West. As a result, the 
1957 fi lm is not a fantasy about unyielding liberal autonomy; it is instead a 
fantasy about the surrender of that absolute self-interest in the service of a 
masculine defense of the American public good.12
Because Ben Wade’s criminal act involves usurping the liberal right to 
property, his crime also functions as a more general threat against liberal 
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individualism. In overturning the rights of the individuals whose property 
was transported on the stagecoach, Ben synecdochically threatens the prop-
erty rights of all liberal individuals. In this, Alice suggests, he represents a 
danger to liberal property generally, even though he did not threaten Dan’s 
property rights specifi cally. Because Dan “work[s] so hard,” he as a property 
owner cannot “just stand by and watch.” Within the logic of the text, the 
best way for Dan to ensure the continued liberal right to personal property 
is to defend the rights of other liberal subjects, even if Dan’s property was 
not directly trespassed upon. Because bringing Ben Wade to justice is good 
for the property rights of other liberal individuals, it is also, Alice suggests, 
good for Dan’s property rights. Civic action thus becomes liberal action.
Perhaps more to the point, Dan’s civic turn is also fi gured as the most 
masculine course of action, the proper task of a husband and father. Liberal 
individualism is used to cultivate a sense of masculine republican virtue. It is 
toward this civic-mindedness that Dan Evans moves over the course of the 
fi lm, ultimately choosing to transport Ben Wade to Yuma even though there 
is no fi nancial or contractual reason for him to do so. Th is transformation is 
never fully explained; instead, civic liberalism is uncritically framed as the 
best course of action and Dan, as the movie’s hero, necessarily embraces that 
course. Getting Ben Wade to Yuma is not “right” from the perspective of an 
atomistic individualist, but it is “right,” Alice suggests, from the perspective 
of a republican male interested in defending the public good. As a result, 
masculinity in the 1957 3:10 to Yuma involves a repudiation of absolute 
liberal individualism. But repudiating absolute individualism also means 
repudiating crime, as well as embracing the supremacy of private property. 
Being a man, by the close of the fi lm, involves defending the property rights 
that come from “work[ing] so hard,” and moreover embracing the seeming 
paradox of defending those liberal property rights by placing the interest 
of the public over the interest of the individual.
Th at is not to say that the fi lm rejects Lockean liberalism. A key part 
of Locke’s philosophy is the way in which autonomous individual actors 
come together to form communities and, in so doing, surrender some of 
the absolute liberality of the state of nature. Even in the state of nature, he 
writes, persons living under the “law of nature” must work to “preserve the 
rest of mankind,” so long as that preservation does not come at the expense 
of one’s own life or property. But once persons form communities—that 
is, once liberality becomes liberalism—the absolute freedom of the state 
of nature is irrevocably altered. Every man, Locke writes, “by consenting 
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with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself 
under an obligation to every one of that society.” Once persons have entered 
into social contract, the “fi rst and fundamental” law and duty becomes “the 
preservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) 
of every person in it.” Given this, one way of grasping Dan Evans’s charac-
ter arc in the 1957 fi lm is as embodying a transformation from atomistic 
natural law liberalism to a republican liberalism that is bound to the “pres-
ervation of society.”13
Th is embrace of civic liberalism is also, in the fi lm, an embrace of a higher 
and more authentic masculinity. As Lee Clark Mitchell has noted, western 
fi lms are obsessed with particular representations of masculinity; the genre, 
he writes, “allows us to gaze at men, [and] this gaze forms such an essential 
aspect of the genre that it seems covertly about just that: looking at men.” 
Th is is surely true of the 1957 3:10 to Yuma, where much screen time is spent 
taking in Ben Wade’s raffi  sh smile or Dan Evans’s soulful eyes. Yet its fi lmic 
gaze is also very much about observing particular forms of political mascu-
linity. In the fi nal scene of the fi lm, once Dan has boarded the train to Yuma 
with Ben Wade, he grins and waves to his wife, Alice, who has observed his 
success. Th ere is a complex of gazes here. As an audience, we watch Dan 
watch himself by watching Alice watch him. Dan knows he has succeeded as 
a citizen and, more important, as a man, because he has obtained the smiling 
approval of the woman who begged him to “do something.” Th e accomplish-
ment of the protagonist—that is, the simple fact that Dan has successfully 
put Ben on the train—is rife with political signifi cance. Dan’s achievement, 
ultimately, is a triumph of masculine civic liberalism.14
In the years between World War II and the Vietnam War, westerns 
served important ideological functions in the imagination of American civic 
masculinity by using myth to understand American imperial autonomy as 
well as the origins and limits of liberalism. As Stanley Corkin observes in 
his study of westerns and the cold war, the western normalized and justi-
fi ed American liberal hegemony in the middle part of the twentieth century. 
Westerns, he writes, “articulate the necessity of engaged heroes who mor-
ally ensure the rule of right. National interest is defi ned not simply by the 
goal of occupying contiguous lands but also by the imperative of reorder-
ing them according to a distinctly U.S. vision of civil society.” In the 1957 
3:10 to Yuma, Dan Evans most clearly becomes the fi lm’s hero at the point 
at which he most clearly becomes a man: when he repudiates liberal indi-
vidualism in favor of a liberal civil society. In this, the fi lm not only engages 
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with the age-old debate over Lockean liberalism and the proper relation-
ship between individual autonomy and civil society, it also invokes deeply 
resonant myths about American character. In doing this, it presents a virile, 
masculine liberal republicanism as not only the ultimate legacy of American 
individualism but also, and more important, as the fi nest defense against 
threats to American liberal hegemony.15
Contract and Liberal Selfh ood
Th e few signifi cant diff erences separating the 2007 from the 1957 3:10 to 
Yuma largely pertain to the rights and responsibilities of the masculine lib-
eral subject, and signal much about the status of the western in the post–
cold war age. One obviously important divergence is that Dan, having been 
absolved of his contractual responsibilities and told he will be paid anyway, 
does not selfl essly insist on transporting Ben Wade to the train regardless. 
Instead, in the 2007 fi lm, he uses the opportunity to negotiate for additional 
payment. His fi rst demand concerns property rights. Earlier in the fi lm, 
Hollander (Lennie Loft in), the marshal and a rival landowner who has lent 
Dan money and hopes to take Dan’s land as payment, has prevented water 
from fl owing to his property. “Before water touches your land,” Hollander 
tells him, “it resides and fl ows on mine.” He is, he argues, therefore justi-
fi ed in doing with it as he likes. In Hollander’s view, individual rights are 
not oriented toward the public good or even toward fairness; instead, they 
simply ensure the absolute supremacy of property. “A man has to be big 
enough to see how small he is,” Hollander smirks, suggesting that because 
of the natural contours of the land and water, his right to property neces-
sarily trumps any claims Dan might make. Accordingly, Dan’s fi rst step in 
renegotiating his contract is to demand guarantees from Butterfi eld “that 
Hollander and his boys will never set foot on my land again,” and that his 
“water’s going to fl ow.” Butterfi eld accedes to these new demands, as well as 
to Dan’s further request that Butterfi eld give his wife $1,000, a 500 percent 
increase on their original agreement. Butterfi eld agrees to this, too, and it 
is only at this point that Dan turns to his son and tells him that he’s fi nally 
found “what [is] right,” marking his patrilineage explicitly through abstract 
notions of right action and masculinity, but implicitly through the redou-
bled centrality of liberal individualism. Unlike in the 1957 fi lm, Dan Evans 
does not take Ben Wade to the train simply because it is “right,” he does it 
because he gets stuff  out of it.
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In the 2007 fi lm, Dan views his contract with Butterfi eld as, in fact, a 
contract. As Brook Th omas has noted, there are a number of important 
links between classical liberal selfh ood and the emergence of contract 
law in the nineteenth century. “By promising individuals equal chance to 
develop,” Th omas writes, “contract claims to produce an equitable social 
harmony that has been achieved through a network of immanent and self-
regulating exchanges rather than a social order imposed artifi cially from 
above.” A contract, then, assumes liberal subjects. Unlike in the 1957 fi lm, 
Dan Evans does not subordinate his own economic well-being to the higher 
claims of society; instead, he insists upon the validity and fundamentally 
liberal (rather than civic or republican) tenor of the original contract entered 
into with Butterfi eld. Th e material benefi ts for Dan’s family are obtained 
through his adherence to his own status as a liberal subject. If, in the 1957 fi lm, 
Dan best serves himself and his family by foregoing absolute liberal autonomy 
in the name of civic liberal republicanism, in the 2007 fi lm, he aids himself 
and his family by holding hard and fast to his own liberal subjectivity.16
In another significant revision, Wade’s accomplice Charlie Prince 
appeals to the liberal self-interest of the populace of Contention, Arizona, 
off ering $200 to any member of the town willing to kill Dan, the sheriff , or 
the sheriff ’s deputies. Th ough it is in the civic interest of the town to ensure 
Wade’s incarceration, it becomes in the economic interest of the individual 
townspersons to ensure Wade’s escape. Th is potential site of tension, though, 
is immediately resolved, because no one is willing to put the needs of the 
public above individual interest, and Dan is soon dodging bullets from 
everyone in town. Th e liberal subjects of the town of Contention are citizens 
in name only. For both Dan and the residents of the town, it is an absolute 
liberal individualism, not a republican civic-mindedness, that denotes the 
values of the day.
Indeed, in their devotion to absolute self-interest, in the 2007 fi lm it 
is the heroes who come closest to embodying the unyielding liberal indi-
vidualism embodied by the villain Ben Wade in the 1957 fi lm. And yet this 
exaltation of individual masculine autonomy is seemingly undone by the 
fi nal moments of the fi lm. In the 2007 version of the fi lm, Dan Evans does 
succeed in putting Ben Wade on the train, but it is a hollow victory, one that 
occurs only because Ben Wade allows it to.
As Dan hustles him through the town, ducking bullets from Wade’s gang 
as well as the townspeople eager to earn their $200 from Charlie Prince, Ben 
Wade suddenly decides he has had enough. He hurls Dan to the ground 
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and is moments from killing him when Dan blurts that he “ain’t never been 
no hero.” His foot, Dan tells Wade, which he has long claimed was injured 
in an act of Civil War heroism, was in fact accidentally shot by one of his 
own soldiers. He says that he has been unable to tell that particular story to 
his sons, and as a result simply invented the story of his own war heroism. 
Th is, he suggests, is one reason why he has been so keen to escort Wade to 
the train—because in addition to the economic inheritance he has secured 
from Butterfi eld, his actions provide a fi gurative inheritance of his own 
masculinity. Hearing this, Wade stops choking him, thinks for a moment, 
says, “Okay,” and then helps him to his feet.
From this scene onward, the two men work in tandem to get to the train. 
At the crucial moment, outlaw Wade hops onto the train of his own volition, 
only to watch as his own gang kills Dan Evans. Wade then exits the small train 
jail cell and receives his fi rearms from Charlie Prince. Dan’s son William, 
who has been observing everything, rushes to his father’s supine and bloody 
body and says, “You done it, Pa, you done it. You got him on the train.” Th e 
obvious irony, of course, is that Ben Wade is not at that moment actually 
on the train. Yet Dan Evans dies secure in the knowledge that through his 
commitment to liberal individualism he has ensured his sons’ inheritance. 
He also dies knowing he has profi tably performed a sort of theater of mas-
culinity. Even though Ben Wade is off  the train, he was at one point success-
fully put on the train, and Dan’s status as an autonomous man of action has 
therefore been secured. Th e facts that justice will not be served, that Wade 
will walk away, and that Dan has lost his life are somewhat irrelevant. He 
has performed his liberal masculinity by negotiating for more money and 
successfully, if temporarily, putting Ben Wade on the train.
Th e fi nal moments of the fi lm provide an odd resolution to this moral 
and political ambiguity. As William crouches over the body of his father, Ben 
Wade puts his gun belt on, thinks for a moment—as if calculating the heist 
spoils split seven ways, as opposed to one way—and then quickly executes 
every member of his gang. He then puts himself on the train to the Yuma 
jail, and the credits roll.
Th e abnegative masculine republicanism that characterized the end of 
the 1957 3:10 to Yuma has been, fi ft y years later, completely inverted. Dan’s 
motivations stem more from the sovereignty of the Lockean liberal self than 
from any abstract notions of the public good. And his rhetoric of masculine 
duty is exposed as just that, rhetoric. Apparently, in order for Dan to estab-
lish himself as a liberal man of action it is not important to actually ensure 
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that Wade goes to prison and that justice is served; it is suffi  cient to simply 
make sure Wade gets on the train. Whether or not he stays on the train is, 
in the eyes of Dan’s son, all but irrelevant.
In this sense, the empty signifi ers of masculine republicanism have 
replaced its substance. Th e 1957 fi lm’s interest in republican duty and mas-
culine action is reproduced here only to distill that interest into a series of 
token symbols. Masculinity and civic spirit in the 2007 3:10 to Yuma are 
but gestures, and the thematic apex of the fi lm is its exaltation of hard lib-
eral individualism. Th e tragedy of Dan’s death is soft ened, and his heroism 
assured, because he expresses a foundational liberal value of benign self-
interest: he was able to derive material benefi ts from a contract between 
two liberal subjects. Unlike the 1957 Dan Evans, who claimed he was only 
shepherding Ben Wade “for the money,” yet ultimately reveals himself to be 
doing it for abstract republican values of community and law, the 2007 Dan 
Evans is not only actually doing it “for the money,” he is doing it for a lot 
more money. (And water rights.) Along similar lines, the audience’s estima-
tion of Russell Crowe’s Ben Wade is shaped not only by the fact that he twice 
puts himself on the train to Yuma, but also by the fact that he executes his 
“outfi t” of outlaws aft er they kill Dan Evans. Yet this apparent act of moral 
retribution is also a moment of liberal self-interest. With no one left  alive to 
share in the spoils of the heist, the money will presumably be Wade’s alone 
as soon as he escapes again from Yuma jail (which he has done several times 
before). In the 2007 fi lm, then, the American West is upheld as a mythic 
“state of nature,” a space of atomistic liberal selfh ood where a person’s fi rst 
duty is to himself and his property, and civil society holds no claim on the 
liberty of any individual.
Th is was a distinct consequence of a new economic consensus aft er 
the cold war. By the turn of the twenty-fi rst century, the threat of the “Red 
Menace” had become a well-faded memory, and global capitalism was 
widely seen as the new consensus of the age. If in 1957 it was important 
that the mythical frontier—the wellspring of American liberal individual-
ism—was masculine, virile, and oriented toward the public good, then by 
2007, with American capitalism facing no equivalent ideological threats, 
writers and fi lmmakers were free to reimagine the frontier as a site of abso-
lute freedom and absolute wealth. With capitalist hegemony unimperiled, 
the mythic frontier could be evoked to sustain an ideology of atomistic 
liberalism, an ideology buttressing a new and dubious liberal right: the 
right to get rich.
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Western Masculinity and the Cold War
It is the 1957 fi lm that bears the closest resemblance to its source material, 
Elmore Leonard’s 1953 short story “Th ree-Ten to Yuma,” in which the Dan 
Evans character (here not a rancher but a marshal named Paul Scallen) suc-
cessfully boards the train to Yuma with the Ben Wade character (named 
Jim Kidd). In this story, too, the narrative resolves itself in lawfulness and 
civic duty, but Scallen is not given the same liberal-republican narrative arc 
as Dan Evans in the 1957 fi lm. Because it is Scallen’s job to deliver Kidd to 
Yuma, not one he assumes for additional money, liberal self-interest and 
public service are fused. Th ough Scallen admits it was the money that ini-
tially made him become a lawman, he tells Kidd that money cannot sway 
him from his responsibilities to the public.
What is most signifi cant about the two fi lmic reinterpretations of “Th ree-
Ten to Yuma” is what they signal about the American West in the popular 
imaginations of 1957 and 2007. Much in the same way that the history of 
American western expansion in the nineteenth century is a political his-
tory, so also is the history of the western fi lm genre in the twentieth century 
also a political history. Both fi lms evoke a set of myths about the American 
West, Locke’s “state of nature,” and masculine freedom. But the 1957 fi lm, 
born in the age of McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, takes pains to translate liberal individualism into liberal republican-
ism, and fuse that to a heterosexual masculine virility. Being a man, in the 
1957 fi lm, means upholding the rule of law. By the close of the fi lm, Dan 
Evans’s atomistic liberalism has been fully transformed into a masculine 
liberal republicanism, and the West has transformed from a liberal “state 
of nature” to a civil society.17
Th e 2007 fi lm, in contrast, valorizes the sovereignty of the liberal subject, 
in the process reducing masculinity to a series of empty gestures. Unlike the 
abstract republican masculinity embraced by the 1957 fi lm, here, Dan Evans’s 
manhood is little more than a series of artful narratives that obscure the fi lm’s 
real vision of western selfh ood: an absolute and unwavering commitment 
to economic self-interest. By 2007, with the cold war a fading memory and 
1950s-era conformity-masquerading-as-civic-mindedness long forgotten, 
the western has been reimagined yet again as a cultural repository for myths 
about the perfect and foundational freedom of Locke’s “state of nature.” In 
the 2007 fi lm, though, the western myth is not about purifying and renew-
ing the social contract, it is about purifying and renewing the freedoms of 
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the individual as that individual existed before the political technologies 
of civil society. If in 1957, atomistic liberalism is dissolved into the public 
well of republican duty, then by 2007, republican duty has been cast aside 
in favor of recapturing the absolute sovereignty of the Lockean liberal self, 
in the “state of nature” of the fi ctional American West.
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L ANDSCAPES OF
GENDERED VIOLENCE
Male Love and Anxiety on the Railroad
Lindsey Collins
At President Obama’s inaugural luncheon, hanging behind the president’s 
table was Th omas Hill’s View of Yosemite Valley (1885). Hill, a painter in 
the Hudson River tradition, is perhaps best known for his painting Th e Last 
Spike (1881), which commemorated the 1869 completion of the transcon-
tinental railroad in Promontory Summit, Utah. Like the railroad’s comple-
tion, Yosemite’s preservation, decreed by Abraham Lincoln aft er the Civil 
War, was a symbol of national unity. Commenting on the signifi cance of the 
painting chosen for Obama’s inauguration, Senator Dianne Feinstein noted, 
“As a country struggled with Civil War, many Americans looked West to 
the dawn of a new era.” Hill’s painting, said Feinstein, captured “America’s 
essence: our land of opportunity, optimism, and freedom.”1
Th ough the inaugural luncheons, during which Congress formally 
welcomes the new president, have taken place since 1953, the tradition of 
choosing a specifi c painting for the event began only in 1985. According to 
the U.S. Senate’s Web site, the chosen painting “refl ects the offi  cial theme of 
each year’s inaugural ceremony.” Th e choice of a landscape is not completely 
new; of the seven inaugural paintings, three have been landscapes, one a 
depiction of the Capitol, and the others portraits: of Jeff erson, Washington, 
and John Adams. President George W. Bush’s 2005 inauguration showcased 
another Hudson River school painting, Albert Bierstadt’s Wind River, Wyo-
ming (1870), a choice meant to place Dick Cheney (with his Wyoming back-
ground) and Bush (self-fashioned as a Texan rancher) squarely within the 
Rooseveltian tradition of the self-made western man. Whether the inaugural 
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paintings are rugged western landscapes like Yosemite or portraits of great 
American patriarchs such as Jeff erson, they serve in this context the same 
rhetorical function: Great Men and Great Nature legitimize presidential 
authority and consolidate the nation.
I begin here, at Obama’s luncheon, to suggest that the intertwining of 
masculinity, leadership, western landscapes, and the kinds of technologies 
that have made access to those landscapes possible comprises a narrative of 
national healing and progress that is still as viable and powerful, though dif-
ferently infl ected, as it was when Hill painted Th e Last Spike. Angela Miller 
has argued that classical American landscape painting has served primarily 
as a “retreat from history into nature”: the landscapes depicted by Bierstadt, 
Hill, Th omas Moran, and Frederic Edwin Church are vast, awe-inspiring, 
and, for the most part, completely depopulated.2 It is interesting, then, that 
Hill’s painting, which shows a Yosemite without people, out of time and cul-
ture, is used as a national symbol specifi cally to anchor Obama within his-
tory, tying him both to Lincoln and to the symbolic promise of the American 
West. Hill’s painting at Obama’s inauguration is important, then, as much 
for what it is called upon to signify as for what it excludes: just beyond the 
painting’s frame and Feinstein’s speech is the tension between who gets 
left  out of these landscapes (the Miwok, in this case) and who is included 
in the triumphant narrative of the election of the fi rst African American 
president. Hill’s painting and Feinstein’s speech provide a means to reframe 
western fi lms, particularly the ways that western fi lms have engaged with 
railroads. In American painting, literature, and fi lms, railroads have fi gured 
as a cut across rugged western landscapes, ambivalently signaling either 
these landscapes’ imminent demise or the western dream coming to frui-
tion. Trains and railroads created the material conditions of possibility for 
the “discovery” and symbolic burdening of the West, and as key elements 
of the representation of the West in paintings, photographs, and fi lms, they 
are technologies that bring forth uneasy relationships between progress and 
nostalgia, masculine Anglo authority and lawlessness, and what counts as 
the U.S. national and natural body. Th e fi lms I consider expose the strained 
seams of the triumphant story of the American West.
To describe how railroads in western fi lms demonstrate both connec-
tion to and severance from highly gendered, racialized landscapes, I exam-
ine 3:10 to Yuma (1957 and its remake of 2007) and Tycoon (1947). 3:10 to 
Yuma is a story of failing rancher Dan Evans and his decision to help trans-
port notorious outlaw Ben Wade to the train to Yuma prison. I consider 
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the original 3:10 to Yuma and its remake to illustrate the ways that trains 
animate masculinity and justice in western landscapes, and how issues of 
male homosociality, landscape, and modernity seem to have shift ed in the 
fi ft y years between each version. Tycoon stars John Wayne as Johnny Mun-
roe, a railroad engineer in the Andes who battles a railroad tycoon and the 
South American landscape to complete a tunnel project. Th ough many of 
the most familiar westerns are set in the American West, I argue that the 
domestication of space by the railroad is not limited to this country but is 
part of a broader transnational imperializing project.
As the transcontinental railroad was being completed in the late nine-
teenth century, this East-West orientation also produced the North-South 
axis as a space of desire and longing. Mexico and South America fi gure 
prominently in westerns as both hideouts for the bad guys and as the next 
best western frontier. When Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid run out 
of options in the West, they hop a train to Bolivia to make a not-so-clean 
start as bank robbers. Th ough its setting in South America may seem to 
challenge its consideration as a traditional western fi lm, Tycoon provides 
an example of how the South becomes an imperial extension of the cul-
tural imaginations of the American West. In American frontier ideology, 
looking west oft en also meant looking south, for expansionist discourses 
have long framed the South American frontier as a logical extension of the 
western frontier.3
Western fi lms have been theorized primarily as sites of “binary bat-
tles—good versus evil, populists versus profi teers, and man versus nature.”4 
Railroads and trains, however, make such binary readings diffi  cult. Trains 
have occupied a central and confl icted position in westerns, as they have in 
American cultural imaginaries in general. As emblems of change and the 
abandonment of simple moral codes, they both displace and create nostal-
gia for the American frontier (Johnny Guitar, 1954) and enable lawlessness 
(High Noon, 1952) and the subsequent restoration of order (3:10 to Yuma). 
As central plot devices, railroads are multivalent and embattled. Th ey are 
controlled by powerful corporations but available for resignifi cation or rob-
bery; they can herald progress or emasculating urbanization. If the western 
is supposedly about binaries of good and evil, city and countryside, cowboy 
and Indian, then trains, as technologies that literally move between these 
locations, make unsteady metaphors in fi lms.
Rethinking trains in these fi lms means rethinking what the West signi-
fi es and, in turn, reconsidering the ways in which the western’s male hero 
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has been understood to relate to his landscape. In Landscapes of the New 
West, Krista Comer argues that literary representations of the West have 
produced a western male subject with certain “spatial prerogatives.” Th e 
“supremely confi dent, white masculinism” that dominates such represen-
tations is linked to a “particular kind of landscape perspective that oper-
ates here, that of panorama—the vast, unobstructed view from mountains 
and mountaintops.” Such a viewpoint, one that enables mastery by fi xing 
nature in the stable position of the bird’s-eye view, “preserves what is fun-
damentally under assault in modernity: a place of Archimedean overview, 
a place that enables an unambiguous survey of a presumably stable social 
world.”5 Westerns embody this spatial prerogative perhaps more than any 
other genre, through the fi lms’ wide, panoramic shots, capturing the rugged 
landscape in a wide-angle lens, and the iconic masculine hero whose gaze 
surveys this territory. Indeed, the technologies of fi lm and railroads worked 
concurrently to reinforce this paradigm. As Lynne Kirby argues in Parallel 
Tracks, a history of the silent fi lm’s development alongside the railroad, “the 
kind of perception that came to characterize the experience of the passenger 
on the train became that of the spectator in the cinema.” For Kirby, “what 
early train travelers referred to as ‘the annihilation of space and time’ owed 
something to the eff ect of the panorama, an eighteenth-century invention 
that was the virtual reality experience of its day.”6
Many feminist philosophers, such as Luce Irigaray, Susan Bordo, Eliza-
beth Grosz, and Donna Haraway, have pointed out the ways that masculinist 
philosophical traditions have participated in this panoramic epistemology by 
coding the mind as immaterial, disembodied, and male, and, conversely, the 
body as natural, material, and female. In this formulation, which Carolyn 
Merchant has critiqued forcefully, natural landscapes are the passive femi-
nine proving ground for masculine projects of technology and progress.7 
In the fi lms I consider, however, the landscape is unyielding and uncoop-
erative, and the view from and of trains is not so straightforwardly pan-
oramic, with all the identity-consolidating properties such a view confers. 
Rather, it is fraught with anxiety and failure, an always striving but never 
quite successful attempt to reconcile modernity, rationality, and masculin-
ity. In Tycoon and 3:10 to Yuma, trains make an unobstructed view diffi  -
cult, if not impossible. Th e kinds of spatiotemporal experiences trains allow 
are always partial: smoke, dust, overwhelming noise, and unreliability are 
railroads’ constant companions, even as railroads are put to the service of 
empire building.8
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Railroad Histories: Anxiety in Motion
Just as the railroad changed people’s relationship to time and space by 
shrinking the continent and providing a view of the world in motion, the 
railroad’s fi nancial and material presence accelerated the development of 
movies, another technology that altered people’s relationship to time. Th e 
“motion” in “motion picture” is bound up with trains in almost every way. 
One important example of this relationship is San Franciscan Eadweard 
Muybridge’s studies of photography and motion that led to fi lms, accom-
plished in large part by the patronage of transcontinental railroad robber 
baron Leland Stanford. And there’s also the motion of artists, tourists, and 
fi lmmakers on trains that carried them from East to West, which was the 
subject of the most popular kind of early fi lms, and later the hub of the fi lm 
industry itself.9
Th e earliest popular, nonnarrative American fi lms, called “actuality 
pictures,” were oft en made as advertisements by railroads, chambers of 
commerce, hotels, and boosters in Colorado and other “unsettled” western 
states to promote tourism and development. Andrew Brodie Smith explains, 
“Railroads were among the fi rst businesses to recognize the promotional 
value of moving pictures. . . . A natural affi  nity existed between the railroad 
and cinema. Films made from moving trains showed off  the new medium’s 
ability to record movement and register speed.”10 In 1905, George C. Hale 
opened a theater that looked like a railroad car called Hale’s Tours and Scenes 
of the World. “Ticket sellers dressed like conductors, and signs advertised 
excursions to exotic locations” while the train car swayed and rumbled with 
the fi lm’s motions.11 Learning about the West, then, was also bound up in 
learning to be a good fi lm spectator, to produce an entirely new relation-
ship to space and time. One could experience the rumbling of the railcar in 
time with the fi lm, located on a train in a diff erent but theoretically simul-
taneous time and place.
Th e history of wilderness preservation in the American West is also 
deeply dependent on railroad patronage. In “Trains in the Wilderness,” 
Kevin DeLuca argues that the Southern Pacifi c railroad was instrumental 
in helping preserve Yosemite. Even as the Californian naturalist and writer 
John Muir lamented its arrival, the Southern Pacifi c was crucial to Muir’s 
preservation eff orts. Southern Pacifi c executives were among fi rst Sierra Club 
members, and in 1890 Muir appealed to owner Henry Harriman to help win 
Yosemite’s federal protection. Th e Southern Pacifi c had long transported 
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tourists and subsidized photographers and artists to record Yosemite, and 
in 1898 the railroad founded Sunset magazine as a forum for these artistic 
renderings. DeLuca writes, “Literally, then, through photographs, paint-
ings, and literary essays the railroads fashioned a corporate rhetoric that 
promulgated park formation and wilderness preservation. . . . Promoting 
the spectacular wilderness scenery of the West served the twofold purpose 
of luring folks to ride the trains as tourists and persuading them to settle in 
the West as pioneers.”12 Th e railroad thus helped make the West available 
for the dream of national unity forged through bodily and natural unity. 
Th e West’s representation was accomplished through the physical mobil-
ity aff orded by trains and through tourism and the resulting photographic 
records it inspired.
Th is dream was not bounded by the borders of the U.S. nation, but 
instead gave way to what Ricardo Salvatore calls an “imperial mechanics.” 
Th e possibility of a pan-American railway that would connect all the capi-
tals of the American continent was fi rst discussed at the 1889–90 meeting of 
the American republics in Washington. Th ough the pan-American railroad 
was never created, the imperial mechanics that produced a longing for a 
United States intimately connected to South America demonstrate the kind 
of “mechanical utopianism” that informs Tycoon.13
As I have mentioned, the imperial transnational ambitions embodied 
in trains were not unchecked utopian fantasies, but instead have been con-
stantly accompanied by concerns about how railroad technology might 
change American landscape and national character. In Th e Machine in the 
Garden, Marx relates a story about Nathaniel Hawthorne, who in 1844 was 
describing in his notebook an idyllic scene in Concord, Massachusetts, when 
a train whistle intruded. Hawthorne wrote, “But, hark! there is the whistle 
of the locomotive—the long shriek, harsh, above all other harshness, for the 
space of a mile cannot mollify it into harmony.” Marx explains how pasto-
ral pleasure is transformed into dissonance: “Now tension replaces repose: 
the noise arouses a sense of dislocation, confl ict, and anxiety.”14 Th e train is 
both progress and nostalgia: the pastoral ideal is tainted, but the train is the 
means by which one can traverse a landscape. Th is ambivalence registered 
by Hawthorne, and later by Th oreau and Emerson, is accompanied by liter-
ary denouncements such as Frank Norris’s 1901 Octopus, in which Norris 
famously calls the train “the galloping monster, the terror of steel and steam 
. . . the leviathan, with tentacles of steel clutching into the soil, the soulless 
Force, the iron-hearted Power, the monster, the Colossus, the Octopus.”15
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But as Patricia Nelson Limerick and Mark Klett argue, Leo Marx’s 
machine in the garden is about an eastern pastoral, not the failed arid 
landscapes of the West. As they wryly note, Marx’s theory applied to the 
West would be better called “Abandoned Machine in the Desert.”16 In the 
fi lms I consider, trains are situated somewhere between romantic ambiv-
alence and Frank Norris’s fearsome machines. Trains both threaten and 
consolidate national and natural masculine bodily unity. Despite the nar-
ratives of heroic masculinity and western progress that these fi lms may 
off er, I argue that trains and railroads are technologies that give rise to 
transitional masculinities, or masculinities that must always defi ne them-
selves against the specters of time, as well as gendered and racial Others, 
and that also expose the landscapes of the West and of the male self as 
landscapes of failure.
In westerns, trains create a narrative structure in which drama is pro-
duced through the elements of motion, standardized time, and violence. Th e 
earliest model for this was the Edison Company’s Th e Great Train Robbery of 
1903, described as the fi rst western fi lm, which sparked a fl urry of American 
fi lm production of crime fi lms about the West. Nine minutes long, the fi lm 
was based on Butch Cassidy’s train robbery in Wyoming and served “loosely 
as a narrative model for gun-wielding crime and horse-chase retribution.”17 
Th e Great Train Robbery is a productive site for thinking about how narra-
tive, motion, fi lm, western tourism, and train technology and the anxiety 
it produces come together. Th e fi lm was shot in New Jersey: the four train 
robbers fl ee into a wooded area with a creek, rather than escaping into a 
rugged canyon or a dry, open expanse. Geographical details aside, the fi lm 
transferred the popular English crime genre into the West, thus making it 
a viable, profi table fi lmic subject. Th e Great Train Robbery is “signifi cant 
in its advance of narrative continuity under the auspices of the station’s 
railroad clock.”18 Unlike 3:10 to Yuma and Tycoon’s interest in individual 
male protagonists, the fi lm focuses on groups—the robbers, the passengers 
forced to disembark from the train, and the posse recruited to pursue the 
criminals. But the fi lm’s fi nal scene involves the viewer in the action when 
the head train robber, alone in the frame, points his pistol at the audience 
and fi res. Th e fi lm ends in a cloud of gun smoke. Th is scene, stunning to its 
contemporary audiences, suggests that the action produced by standard-
ized, simultaneous time is inescapable. Th e railroad narrative inaugurated by 
Th e Great Train Robbery illustrates what Lauren Berlant calls “the National 
Symbolic,” which she defi nes as “the technology of collective fantasy” that 
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registers “an intense, complex, and conceptually incoherent experience of 
Anglo-American manhood.”19
If fi lms about trains produced a collective fantasy of rationalized time 
and justice, the railroad’s insistence on standardized time also produces 
anxiety about successfully performing masculine duties. In Tycoon, Johnny 
Munroe cracks under the strain of completing a safe, sound railroad tunnel 
in his boss’s time frame and before a big fl ood hits. In 3:10 to Yuma, Dan 
Evans clutches a pocket watch in anticipation and dread of the arriving train 
that will take Ben Wade to prison. Th ese narratives of masculine success are 
also threatened by the presence of the heroes’ Others. For Johnny Munroe, 
it is his wife’s presence in a landscape where she doesn’t belong, and Chi-
nese railroad workers are unsettling to Dan Evans’s group as it transports 
Ben Wade through the mountains.
Lynne Kirby explains how the late nineteenth century’s views of hysteria 
as a specifi cally female disease were modifi ed by theories of male hysteria, 
a condition produced by increased train travel, and thus increased train 
accidents, which caused “traumatic neuroses” such as “railway spine” and 
“railway brain.” Th ese problems were supposedly more common among 
working-class men, surprisingly, and not the “eff eminate men of the idle 
class.” Th e French neurologist Charcot, an early psychological theorist, 
described the suff erers of this condition in an 1888 study as “those who 
experience in their bodies and lives the metaphor of a characteristic trait of 
hysteria—mobility.” Kirby explains,
If mobility of mind is one of the chief characteristics of female hys-
teria (the rapid ease with which the hysteric passes from laughter 
to tears, for example), mobility of social place is the male hysterical 
equivalent. . . .
In a kind of mirror image of otherness, one can see that cultural 
displacement as massive as nineteenth-century mechanization and 
urbanization—railway-assisted—traumatized its victims into a 
condition akin to female hysteria. In other words, it “emasculated” 
men, and not only those men of a certain class. Women, proletar-
ian men, tramps, and other social marginals were made to bear the 
brunt of the shocks of modernity. Yet, as standard-bearers of the 
pathologies of modern culture, these signifi ers of non-middle-class 
men were the frightening symbols of what middle-class men were 
in danger of becoming as potential victims of hysteria, the psychic 
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disease of a modernism to which all were subject: the social and 
sexual Other.20
Th ough the highly rationalized, panoramic consciousness produces a 
colonizing subjectivity, this “train-infected consciousness” creates an inher-
ently unstable, yet always transitional masculinity.21 Trains in Tycoon and 
3:10 to Yuma seem to be narrative devices for accepting progress, mastering 
one’s destiny, and becoming the right sort of western man. But the anxious 
currents in the fi lms themselves present, in fact, a very diff erent sort of west-
ern hero, one whose movement through failed landscapes refl ects the insta-
bilities inherent to the projects of colonialism and masculinity, an instability 
constitutive of the technologies of fi lms and railroads themselves.22
Tycoon: Women, Nature, Trains, Trouble
Richard Wallace’s Tycoon (1947), starring John Wayne as a railroad engi-
neer in South America, nicely crystallizes western fi lms’ preoccupation with 
railroads as technologies that enable manhood, delimit industrial versus 
“wild,” spectacular, panoramic landscapes, and protect and restore proper 
femininity to both women and the land. A big-budget eff ort by RKO, the 
fi lm attempted to capitalize on the iconic status of its lead star as a western 
hero, even though it did not bill itself as a western per se.23 Th ere are, how-
ever, signifi cant shared elements, particularly John Wayne’s consolidation of 
masculinity vis-à-vis his eff eminate foil: the hard-living John Wayne fi ghts 
the excesses of wealth and corporate control embodied by the railroad’s 
owner, Mr. Alexander (Cedric Hardwicke), a dandy in a velvet smoking 
jacket who paints still lifes and boasts of European travel.
Th ough Wayne isn’t battling Indians or leading a cavalry in Tycoon, his 
masculinity is central to the fi lm, and it is important to consider the fi lm not 
as an unsuccessful nonwestern detour for the actor, but as an integral part 
of Wayne’s body of work that links the West to the South through railroad 
technology. In Tycoon’s opening scene, railroad engineer Johnny Munroe 
reprimands a young South American boy who is playing at being an engi-
neer like Johnny. Aft er Chico (Fernando Alvarado), whose name, literally 
“Boy,” reinscribes the fi lm’s white-brown, man-boy power diff erences, gets 
too close to the blasting and his friend is scratched by falling debris, Johnny 
disciplines him in front of his friends with a mock punch to the face, say-
ing, “A good engineer doesn’t get his men hurt, and if he does, he has to be 
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punished.” Chico returns to his friends, bragging, “He hit me with his fi st 
because I am an engineer. But you, he would take down your britches and 
paddle your rump.” South America here fi gures as an extension of the already 
closed American West, a place where (white) labor is carefully managed and 
valued by head engineer Johnny Munroe, and where South American boys 
can hope to become part of the American patriarchal family by becoming 
civilized, masculine adults through railroad technology.
Th e fi lm’s love interest, the racially ambiguous Maura (Laraine Day), is 
controlled by her father, Alexander the railroad tycoon, who manages her 
“like a railroad or a mine.” In an early meeting, Johnny and Maura have a 
sexually charged conversation in which Johnny demonstrates, with the aid 
of his hat and Maura’s scarf as props, how he’ll ravage the landscape with 
dynamite and heavy machinery to complete the railroad fi rst through the 
Andes and next “anywhere they want a railroad—Alaska, China, Tibet,” as 
Maura looks on adoringly. Maura’s father walks in on this scene of seduction 
and quickly asks Johnny to leave. Th e boundaries of sexual propriety have 
been transgressed not because of Johnny and Maura’s close physical prox-
imity or inappropriate fl irtation, though the stodgy Mr. Alexander clearly 
doesn’t appreciate this uninvited visitor to his daughter. Th e sexual conno-
tations of Johnny and Maura’s conversation are formed not through their 
bodies but through allegories of femininity and masculinity, traits rescripted 
as untouched female landscape changed and improved by the marvels of 
western male technical prowess. Maura’s scarf, like the South American 
landscape itself, is the raw, feminine material that is ripe for empire build-
ing in the Andes and at home. When his relationship with Maura becomes 
diffi  cult due to her father’s interference, Johnny complains to a friend as he’s 
dynamiting the railroad’s tunnel, “women trouble, trouble, women, they’re all 
the same thing.” Tunneling through the South American mountains means 
intimate and dangerous contact with a resistant, feminized landscape.
In Johnny’s conversations with other men, there is a constant slippage 
between Maura and the railroad. Aft er the tunnel collapses a third time and 
kills Johnny’s good friend Curly (Michael Harvey), Johnny’s approach to the 
project changes drastically. Instead of continuing to battle Alexander for 
safer materials for the tunnel, he forges ahead with building a bridge over 
the river, his original plan all along; but now he acts callously, pursuing the 
bridge’s completion without regard for his men’s safety. Even the hard-nosed 
Alexander becomes alarmed at Johnny’s business practices; visiting the site 
one day, he says, “I’ll give you a ninety-day extension if you like.” Johnny 
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responds, “You gave me a wedding once. Since then I’ve been very careful 
about what I accept from the Alexanders.” Aft er Curly’s death, Maura accuses 
her father of denying Johnny raw materials, like lumber and rails, and impli-
cates her father in Curly’s death by accusing him of deliberately sabotaging 
the tunnel project through cheap, unsafe construction to spite Johnny, her 
new husband. But Maura’s decision to leave Johnny and return home coin-
cides with the tunnel’s collapse, suggesting again that South America and 
the railroad become embodied in Maura as feminized landscapes in prog-
ress, to be brought into full womanhood by the furrowing and tunneling 
technologies of masculine western progress and heterosexual romance. Th e 
bridge cannot be completed without Maura’s return, Chico’s assimilation, 
and the triumph of masculine group work.24
In the fi lm’s fi nal action scenes, a big fl ood moves down the Rio, threat-
ening to tear down the bridge and expose Johnny’s cost-cutting engineering. 
Having alienated all of his former white colleagues with his brash disregard 
for their safety, Johnny runs to the Rio in a downpour and tries to pay the 
local South American men to help him reinforce the bridge. Aft er they refuse 
to perform such a dangerous task for any amount of payment, the omni-
present Chico follows a beaten Johnny into his house, and like a good white 
engineer in training, Chico distances himself from the brown workers by 
saying, “Th e men are stinkers. Th ey will not work.” Fortunately for Johnny, 
Maura comes home to save their marriage and tell him that his disaff ected 
white colleagues have stepped up to perform their duty as white men and 
engineers. But ultimately, Johnny is not the hero, and there is no technical 
triumph over nature. Despite working through the night and Johnny’s brave 
and dangerous eff ort to drive a train onto the bridge to weight it down and 
salvage the structure, when the fl ood hits, the middle of the bridge collapses 
and sends the train plummeting hundreds of feet below into the river gorge. 
Nevertheless, heroism happens in (white) groups of men. White men do the 
work—the locals are “stinkers.”
Despite the fi lm’s happy conclusion—Johnny and Maura reunite, his 
formerly angry coworkers become supportive board members, and Alexan-
der fi nds love and makes Johnny the boss again—Johnny Munroe is less an 
independent hero than someone deeply dependent on the capital of South 
America, his white labor force, and the availability of an inconstant sup-
ply of feminine nurturing. Th e train ultimately pitches off  the bridge when 
the fl ood comes down the river, suggesting that the technical landscape 
ultimately fails, but Johnny is reincorporated into the folds of patriarchal 
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capital. Th ough trains and tunnels fail, masculinity is given just enough to 
survive, even as it’s shown to be just a farce. Th e train is conscripted into a 
narrative of triumphant masculinity, though the victory is fragile and the 
prospect of failure is constantly exposed.
3:10 to Yuma: Male Love and the Railroad Plot
If Tycoon is about the attempt to consolidate masculine wholeness through 
nature and woman, 3:10 to Yuma, especially its 2007 remake, demonstrates 
the acute anxiety and scenes of violence that trains produce, only to be 
assuaged by male homosocial love. Th ough I discuss the 1957 original, I 
focus primarily on the remake because of the complex ways it develops the 
love plot between criminal Ben Wade (Russell Crowe) and rancher Dan 
Evans (Christian Bale).
Th e fi lm’s 2007 version opens with a scene that coalesces the meta-
histories embedded in travel to the West: fourteen-year-old William (Logan 
Lerman), Dan Evans’s son, lies in bed, around which are scattered dime 
novels, such as one called Th e Deadly Outlaw, while beside him his younger 
brother, Mark, who has been brought to Arizona to overcome tuberculo-
sis, wheezes in bed.25 William hears a noise outside. Hollander (Lennie 
Loft in), a land baron in cahoots with the railroad whom Dan owes money, 
has sent men to burn down the family’s barn in the night. Dan limps over 
to the window—his leg, we learn, was partially amputated aft er an injury 
sustained fi ghting for the Union army—not to scare off  his attackers, but to 
grab the gun William is holding. When Dan assures William, “I’ll take care 
of this,” William replies with contempt, “No, you won’t.” Even his younger 
son, Mark, who still believes in his father as a war hero and capable man, is 
dubious of Dan’s ability to handle the situation:
Dan: I’m gonna tell Hollander to make this right. I’m gonna tell him 
to pay for a new barn.
Mark: Maybe we should just shoot him, like Will says.
National and familial reproduction is what’s at stake in these fi rst scenes. 
How can the family, the ranch, the western dream hold when William tells 
his father, “I ain’t ever walking in your shoes”? Dan, a failing rancher in 
drought-affl  icted Arizona, has rising debts, two young boys, one of whom 
is recovering from tuberculosis, and a wife to support. When notorious 
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outlaw Ben Wade and his gang ride through Dan’s property to hold up a 
railroad-owned stagecoach, Dan is again emasculated in front of his boys, 
especially William, who watches in disgust as his father lets Ben Wade and 
his outlaws make off  with their horses. Butterfi eld (Dallas Roberts), a South-
ern Pacifi c executive, off ers Dan $200 to transport Wade to Contention City 
to be put on the 3:10 train to Yuma prison. Defending this dangerous deci-
sion to accept this off er to his wife, Dan pleads, “In six months from now, 
everything’s gonna be green. Cows are gonna be fat. We might even see the 
steam from the train coming over the ridge. We’ll be alright. But we won’t 
make it through the next six days if I don’t do this. . . . I’m tired of the way 
the boys look at me. I’m tired of the way that you don’t. I’ve been standing 
on one leg for three damn years, waiting for God to do me a favor. And 
he ain’t listening.” If natural landscapes are failures, beset by drought and 
vicious landlords, then the railroad’s man-made landscapes off er possible 
salvation. Yet the Southern Pacifi c’s progress narrative, the promise of its 
peaceful, pastoral coexistence with the green grass and healthy cattle on the 
ranch, also constantly undermines Dan’s livelihood. Like Dan’s conscription 
into the Union army during the Civil War, his decision to help Butterfi eld 
transport Wade isn’t really a choice. Th e $200 the Union army pays Dan for 
his injured leg is too little too late, another emasculating disavowal of Dan’s 
body, which has literally sacrifi ced itself for the nation. At every turn, Dan is 
reminded of his lack of masculine agency: his son’s cutting words, his stolen 
horses and dying cattle, his barn that the railroad burns down, his wife’s sly 
admiration of Ben Wade when he compliments her eyes.
In the 1957 version, Dan Evans, played by Van Hefl in, is a man who has 
resigned himself to his bad luck. Yet despite this surrender to fate, he is 
portrayed as someone who still can make decisions like a man. When Dan 
returns home from the scene of the stagecoach robbery, his wife, Alice, 
questions his actions. But Dan retains his sons’ admiration and respect 
when he replies that there’s “not much else I can do.” Like the drought, 
Ben Wade and his gang constrain the choices available to Dan. When 
Alice asks why he didn’t do anything to stop Wade, Dan replies, “What, 
and get myself shot, too?” When she remarks how terrible it is that Wade 
killed a man on the stagecoach, Dan shrugs, “Th at’s life—lightning can 
kill you. Th ree years of drought are killing my cattle. Th at’s terrible, too.” 
Van Hefl in’s inaction here reads like pragmatism, caution, and rationality, 
all hallmarks of a good western hero, versus Christian Bale’s resentment, 
fear, and reluctance.
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Th ere are also some substantial diff erences between Glenn Ford’s Ben 
Wade in 1957 and Russell Crowe’s in 2007. While in the original, Ben Wade 
is a coy, manipulative and charming criminal, in the remake, Wade is equal 
parts conscienceless killer and a sensitive nature lover who sketches a hawk 
before slaughtering the survivors of the derailed stagecoach. Like Daniel 
Boone or Mary Louise Pratt’s sensitive colonizer-naturalist, or “seeing-
man,” Wade is a romantic, well-traveled fi gure.26 He romances the barmaid, 
promising to take her to Mexico. Aft er their tryst he sketches her, nude 
and reclining, and later sketches Dan as they wait for the train’s arrival in a 
hotel’s bridal suite. And, like Natty Bumppo and Boone, Wade is attuned to 
the ways and plight of Native Americans.27 One night, as his captors camp 
out on their way to Contention City, Wade saves Dan’s life from an Apache 
ambush by sensing their presence, sneaking up on them as the Apache fi re 
on the camp, and slaughtering all three of them single-handedly. Later, 
Wade accuses his captor Byron McElroy (Peter Fonda), a railroad merce-
nary, of gunning down Apache women and children when he was working 
for Central railroad: “Byron acts pious. A few years ago, when he was under 
contract with Central, I seen him and a bunch of other Pinks mow down 
thirty-two Apache women and children. . . . Th ere was young ones running 
around crying and screaming, no more than three years old. And his boys 
shot them all, then pushed them into a ditch. Some of them was still crying. 
I guess Byron fi gured that Jesus wouldn’t mind. Apparently Jesus don’t like 
the Apache.” Wade is lawless, but at least he isn’t a Pinkerton. His morality 
exists outside of structures of capital and railroad power.28
On one level, the fi lm is a story about Dan Evans’s almost monomaniacal 
devotion to masculine notions of duty, honor, and what’s right, and as such 
he represents a clear good guy who works against Wade’s badness. Dan and 
Wade inhabit the West in fundamentally diff erent ways. Wade operates with 
a gang of devoted lackeys, while Dan struggles to command the respect of 
his young boys. Wade abides by the code that “it’s in a man’s nature to take 
what he wants,” while Dan follows the law until his last breath. Th e fi lm is 
set up as a struggle between these two forms of existence: lawlessness and 
order. In the original, this binary narrative is fairly uncomplicated. But in 
the remake, if the railroad is the narrative device that moves Wade toward 
justice, Dan toward redemption, and his family’s existence toward stabil-
ity, then the fi lm reminds us that this narrative is inherently unstable. If the 
railroad is the path of justice, it is also the path of Pinkertons, and related 
to the violent slaughter of Native Americans, the exploitation of Chinese 
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labor, and the corporate erasure of the western dream of small ranches and 
big, free open spaces. An unstable narrative, that is, to everyone but Dan. 
Th e narrative’s movement forward in time along the railroad to the station 
in Contention, always anticipating its inevitable arrival for the 3:10 train, 
reads like a script that everyone except Dan knows he has to follow in order 
to become someone, to get a leg to stand on. It is this anticipatory movement 
itself along the railroad’s narrative and spatiotemporal axis that legitimizes 
Dan in advance of his success, and regardless of the outcome of his danger-
ous task. When Dan tells William to go back home to the ranch, he says to 
his son, “You just remember that your old man walked Ben Wade to that 
station when no one else would.”
Although William has begun to respect his father again, suggesting 
that the railroad’s path to masculinity and justice is a reliable one, the fi lm 
undercuts this stability by illuminating the love between Dan and Wade and 
the anxiety of racial diff erence along the railroad. Aft er the Apache attack, 
Wade escapes from Dan and his group, but they fi nd him again at a Chi-
nese railroad work site, captured and being tortured by the white railroad 
engineers. In this brief but crucial scene, William locks eyes with a Chinese 
boy his age working in the mountain tunnels. While Dan single-mindedly 
pursues his captive, the Chinese boy, who is pushing an overloaded wheel-
barrow down the tracks, glares at William resentfully. William returns this 
gaze with awe and discomfort in this scene of violence, exploitation, and 
racial diff erence. Th e railroad tunnel is a site in which people lay claims to 
diff erent versions of morality. Boles, the railroad foreman, justifi es torturing 
Wade because he killed his brother, while the doctor in Dan’s group argues, 
“You can’t do that, it’s immoral.” But Dan’s version of morality isn’t based on 
vengeance or universal humanism. Dan and the doctor shoot Wade’s cap-
tors, liberate Wade, and throw dynamite in the tunnel to make their escape, 
illustrating that some forms of violence are more valid than others. In Dan’s 
version, forward motion along the railroad’s regime of standardized time is 
the only possible path to masculine honor and justice. But for this plot to 
work, Dan must disavow the discomfort that William feels in the presence 
of racial Otherness.
Th e fi lm’s homoeroticism also interrupts the railroad plot. From their 
very fi rst encounter, Wade relates to Dan with bemused aff ection and indul-
gence. When Wade’s posse scatters Dan’s cattle during the stagecoach holdup, 
Dan asserts, “I need ’em back. Th ey’re all I got.” Th ough he is soft -spoken, 
Dan’s demeanor is deadly serious, as it is for the majority of the movie. 
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Wade’s expression in this scene, however, is one of amusement and tender-
ness: Dan’s mild assertiveness is endearing. Th ere are stark diff erences in 
the ways that homosocial love is played out between the 1957 and 2007 ver-
sions, especially in the love triangle between Dan, Wade, and Wade’s lackey 
Charlie Prince (Ben Foster). In the original, Wade’s gang relaxes in a bar 
while Wade ogles the pretty barmaid. Charlie sits at the opposite end of the 
bar, and then leaves Wade to his seduction. When another gang member 
wonders where the boss is, Charlie replies, “Don’t worry about him, he’ll be 
along. He can handle that hick posse single-handed. Yah!” and rides out of 
town. In the remake, Charlie sits right next to Wade at the bar, noticing his 
interest in the barmaid. With downcast, humbled eyes, Charlie says soft ly, 
“Marshal’s only half stupid. He’s gonna be back soon. You’re going across 
the border? I won’t be far. I’ll wait for you.” Wade brushes him off , never 
looking at him: “Alright, Charlie.” 
Th e scenes of Wade’s desire for the barmaid match those of his desire 
for Dan almost exactly. Th ough Dan doesn’t get naked, both couples retire 
to rooms, where Wade lovingly sketches their portraits. As Dan and Wade 
await the 3:00 hour in a hotel bridal suite, Wade lies on his back on the bridal 
bed: “So this is the bridal suite. I wonder how many brides have taken in 
this view.” If Wade is a virginal bride, he is a craft y one. He almost seduces 
Dan into letting him go with off ers of money so that Dan can send his boys 
to school and be a “bona fi de Arizona rancher.” Th ough Dan is tempted, 
he can’t consummate his masculinity and honor with Wade in the bridal 
suite—the pull of the railroad justice plot is too strong.
Th ough Dan resists being derailed by Wade’s seduction, he oft en seeks 
Wade’s approval, suggesting that attaining masculine legitimacy means 
being sanctioned not only by the railroad’s model of justice but by Wade’s 
love as well. Th e scenes in which Dan courts and receives Wade’s approval 
are usually accompanied by violence, such as when Wade taunts Dan by the 
campfi re one evening:
Wade: I imagine debt puts a lot of pressure on a marriage.
Dan: You imagine? What do you know about marriage? We can’t all 
be cutthroats and thieves.
Wade: Well, I know if I was lucky enough to have a wife like Alice, I’d 
treat her a whole lot better than you do, Dan. I’d feed her better, 
buy her pretty dresses, wouldn’t make her work so hard. Yeah, I 
bet Alice was a real pretty girl before she married you.
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Dan has had enough: he jumps up and puts his rifl e against Wade’s neck, 
threatening to “cut him down” if he hears another word about his wife. But 
though Wade’s insults jab at Dan’s ability to be a good husband, they result in 
Dan being incorporated into Wade’s model of masculinity and in an expres-
sion of aff ection when Wade smiles and says, “I like this side of you, Dan.”
Another moment of intimate violence is when Dan successfully gets 
Wade to the station. When Wade can’t convince Dan to take his money 
and go home, Wade begins to fully cooperate, becoming an extension of 
Dan’s body by shooting some of Dan’s would-be assassins on the way to the 
station. Wade demonstrates that the nature of the railroad plot is a serious 
joke. Wade humors Dan by allowing him to take him to the train, partially 
out of his love and respect for Dan, but also because he recognizes that only 
through Dan’s death will Dan be able to earn respect in legitimate, socially 
sanctioned ways. Dan reveals some distance from his own plot, however, 
when he seeks Wade’s approval. While they hunker down in the station to 
wait for the train, Dan tells Wade, “I ain’t stubborn. . . . You said I was stub-
born.” Even though Wade thinks Dan is foolish for keeping his family on a 
dying ranch, Dan remains there so that Mark can breathe dry air and recover 
from tuberculosis. Wade has a confession of his own: he’s escaped from Yuma 
prison twice. Th is confession has the power to unravel Dan’s entire reason 
for being, his belief in the railroad model of masculinity and justice, yet Dan 
and Wade start laughing together. Dan courts Wade’s approval, and Wade 
tells Dan that his eff orts are probably in vain. Nevertheless, Wade continues 
to shoot at his own men to defend Dan’s eff orts to put him on the train.
Th e fi lm’s fi nal scenes illustrate the simultaneous seriousness and fragil-
ity of the railroad plot. Th e train rumbles into the station, obscuring every-
thing with its gigantic plumes of smoke and deafening engine. Close-ups of 
the smokestack position the train as a powerful technology that obliterates 
and overwhelms the human scale. Yet the train is late, hardly a model of 
rationalized time and justice, and since Butterfi eld has reneged on his off er 
to help Dan take Wade to the station, Wade has to put himself in the prison 
car. No offi  cers of the law or railroad are there to ensure order. Th e train’s 
only passengers are old men who appear to be hobos. When Charlie Prince 
fi res fatal shots into Dan’s back and then tosses Wade his confi scated pistol, 
Wade shoots Charlie point-blank in the heart, grabbing him by the shirt to 
bring the two face-to-face. Charlie’s devotion to Wade violates Wade’s love 
for Dan, which includes helping Dan follow the railroad plot to its conclu-
sion and thereby attain masculine legitimacy.
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Like Lynne Kirby, Kristin Ross tells a story of the rise of technologies 
of motion—trains, fi lms, cars—that form new, panoramic ways of seeing 
and thereby create “l’homme disponible,” or “moveable, available man (or 
woman) . . . open to the new demands of the market.” Fueled by the “accel-
eration in commodity production and circulation,” l’homme disponible is 
able to continuously “recas[t] his identity by means of continuous displace-
ment.”29 But for Dan, railroad space and time is still a trap, though it’s the 
only game in town.
Lauren Berlant’s notion of “cruel optimism” helps makes sense of Dan’s 
continued investment in the railroad plot. Berlant describes cruel opti-
mism as an aff ective mode that arises particularly in neoliberal economies, 
but it is relevant to the railroad’s (failed) promises of progress, rationality, 
and justice. Berlant defi nes cruel optimism as “a relation of attachment to 
compromised conditions of possibility,” particularly for “people without 
control over the material conditions of their lives and whose relation to 
fantasy is all that protects them from being destroyed by other people and 
the nation.”30 Berlant continues, “What is cruel about these attachments 
. . . is that subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss 
of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their 
well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment, the continuity 
of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject’s sense 
of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the 
world.” Ordinary life is a state of crisis for Dan, bound and imprisoned by 
natural time: the rains that will save his ranch will come when they come. 
But by attaching himself to the train, Dan emplots himself in a narrative 
in which motion to and along the railroad will bring security, the certitude 
of standardized time, and familial and patriarchal reproduction, even as 
Dan’s faith in the railroad spells his death. Berlant writes, “Some scenes of 
optimism are crueler than others. Where cruel optimism operates, the very 
vitalizing or animating potency of an object/scene of desire contributes to 
the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the 
work of attachment in the fi rst place.”31 Th e fi lm repeatedly acknowledges 
the hopelessness of Dan’s optimism, particularly when Ben Wade’s horse 
gallops alongside the train in the fi nal scene, signaling his imminent (third) 
escape and the futility of such a powerful machine against the western out-
law. Yet Dan’s sacrifi ce for the railroad still reads as heroism, legitimized by 
the indulgences of male love. Like Dan’s family’s ranch, the railroad plot’s 
continuity is assured, held together by cruelty, anxiety, and love.
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“ORDER OUT OF THE MUD”
Deadwood and the State of Nature
Paul A. Cantor
Deadwood is a show about how order arises out of the mud. Th at’s what 
you see in the opening credits, and that’s what you see as the story moves 
forward: men coming together out of the most limited motives to create 
something larger than themselves. Order is provisional and mysterious. 
It requires a temporary suspension of immediate concerns in the interest 
of an agreed-upon fi ction about a better tomorrow.
—David Milch, Deadwood: Stories of the Black Hills
Order without Law?
“John Locke” sounds like a good name for a frontier marshal in a Holly-
wood movie, but we do not usually associate the English philosopher with 
the Wild West. Yet in his Second Treatise of Government, Locke speaks of 
“the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America.”1 In fact, he makes over 
a dozen references in this book to America, many of them specifi cally to 
Indians (if not cowboys). Locke (1632–1704) is carrying on a debate about 
the important philosophical concept of the state of nature, a debate inaugu-
rated by Th omas Hobbes (1588–1679) in his Leviathan, where he also speaks 
of “the savage people in many places of America.”2 Th e third most famous 
fi gure in the state of nature debate, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), tells 
“the story of a chief of some North Americans” in his Second Discourse.3 
Evidently America was very much on the mind of the European thinkers 
who contemplated the issue of the state of nature.
Th ese inquiries into the state of nature were an attempt to conceptual-
ize the pre-political existence of humanity, life without codifi ed laws, pub-
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lic offi  cials, or other manifestations of government power. Th e idea of the 
state of nature has thus fi gured prominently in modern political philosophy. 
Imagining human life without political institutions off ers a way of analyz-
ing the need for and value of such contrivances. One can truly say: “Tell 
me a philosopher’s evaluation of the state of nature, and I will tell you his 
evaluation of the nation-state.” In Leviathan, Hobbes presents such a hor-
rifi c portrait of the state of nature as a war of all against all that he ends 
up endorsing any form of government, no matter how absolute, as better 
than none. By contrast, in creating an attractive portrait of the state of 
nature as idyllic, peaceful, and noncompetitive, Rousseau in his Second 
Discourse raises serious doubts about the legitimacy of civil society as an 
alternative, especially given its economic, social, and political inequalities. 
In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke craft s an image of the state of 
nature roughly midway between the extremes of Hobbes and Rousseau—
less warlike than in Hobbes but more competitive and confl icted than in 
Rousseau. As a result, Locke’s version of the state of nature allows him to 
legitimate political authority while still reserving the right to criticize the 
specifi c forms it takes.
If the existence of America infl uenced state of nature thinking in Europe, 
the writings of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau in turn infl uenced the politi-
cal development of America. All three philosophers have had an impact 
on American political thinking, specifi cally that of the founding fathers. 
Locke is generally credited with being the chief theorist behind the prin-
ciples embodied in the United States Constitution, such as the separation of 
powers.4 Accordingly, it is not surprising that American popular culture has 
sometimes shown the infl uence of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, especially 
in that most American of all genres, the western. Th is infl uence, whether 
direct or indirect, is particularly evident in the HBO television series Dead-
wood (2004–6), created by writer-producer David Milch. Widely recognized 
as one of the most sophisticated and artistic shows in the history of television, 
Deadwood is thoughtful, intelligent, and as close to philosophical as popular 
culture ever gets. Milch has been unusually forthright and forthcoming in 
discussing the show, in interviews, DVD commentaries, and his book about 
the series, Deadwood: Stories of the Black Hills. As a result, we have a rare 
opportunity—to study the philosophical underpinnings and implications of 
a television show as explicitly formulated by its creator.5 At the same time, 
analyzing Deadwood helps clarify the issues at stake in the debate among 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau about the state of nature.
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Milch was attracted to the story of Deadwood, a mining camp in the 
late 1870s in what is now South Dakota, by a unique set of circumstances. In 
1875, rumors began to spread of gold fi nds on Indian land in the Black Hills. 
Because of the U.S. government’s treaty with the Sioux, this land belonged to 
them and was outside federal jurisdiction (as for the state of South Dakota, 
it did not even exist at the time). Th us the people who poured into the 
Deadwood camp in search of gold and other ways to make their fortune 
were there illegally to begin with and were not subject to any government 
authority, municipal, state, or federal. Almost the fi rst words we hear in the 
fi rst episode of the series come from a jailed criminal in Montana saying 
wistfully: “No law at all in Deadwood?”6
Th e situation in Deadwood thus allowed Milch to explore a subject 
he had become fascinated by during years of working on television police 
dramas such as Hill Street Blues and NYPD Blue—the potential disjunction 
between law and order: “A misapprehension that can distort one’s under-
standing of Deadwood—and the world in which we live today—arises from 
the way that law and order are commonly conjoined. Th e phrase ‘law and 
order’ can easily create the impression that these two very diff erent social 
phenomena arise from a common human impulse, or that they are some-
how one and the same. Law and order are not the same. It is common for 
us to try to retrospectively apply the sanction of law to the things we do to 
maintain order. Our desire for order comes fi rst, and law comes aft erward.”7 
In short, what intrigued Milch about Deadwood is how a motley group of 
human beings, pursuing—sometimes viciously—their own self-interest, 
could in the absence of any legal institutions or established government 
nevertheless manage to organize themselves into a community and pursue 
some form of common good. Or to formulate the issue another way: can 
human beings spontaneously arrive at rules that make possible and facili-
tate their productive social interaction, or are they dependent on the central 
authority of the state to create and enforce law and only thereby to make 
life in society feasible?
Th us in looking in Deadwood, at “an environment where,” in Milch’s 
own words, “there was order and no law whatsoever,” he is raising the same 
question that is at the heart of state of nature thinking: how does the pre-
political existence of humanity defi ne the parameters of political life?8 If 
there can be order without law, if human beings can fi nd ways of organizing 
their social life safely and productively in the absence of the state, then the 
state cannot claim to be the sole source of human order and must respect 
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the independently evolved order of society. In short, the idea of order with-
out law sets limits on state authority. On the other hand, if there can be no 
order without law, then the state, as the sole source of social order, can lay 
claim to unlimited authority, absolute power.
Al Swearengen: Nasty, British, and Short
Th e latter alternative is the core of Hobbes’s state of nature teaching and his 
doctrine of absolute sovereignty. Hobbes espouses the position Milch rejects. 
He identifi es law and order, arguing that all social order, all lawfulness in 
society, is ultimately the result of positive law, law made and maintained 
by the state. To be sure, Hobbes talks about “natural law” and the “laws of 
nature,” devoting chapters 14 and 15 of Leviathan to the subject, and thus 
seems to allow for some kind of pre-political social order. But “natural law” 
quickly turns out to be a fi ction in Hobbes’s account:
For the Laws of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy . . . ) of 
themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to 
be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to 
Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without 
the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at 
all. Th erefore notwithstanding the Laws of Nature, . . . if there be 
no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man 
will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution 
against all other men.9
In short, for Hobbes, natural law turns out to be unnatural (“contrary to our 
naturall Passions”) and wholly ineff ectual on its own. In his view, only by 
creating the Leviathan State are human beings able to achieve any kind of 
reliable social order, and for Hobbes an unreliable order is no order at all. 
Hobbes’s blanket endorsement of a centralized political authority, and his 
basic indiff erence to the distinctions among the diff erent forms authority 
might take, are exactly the results Milch is trying to avoid when he insists 
that order is separable from law and preexists it.10
Th us we need to resist the strong temptation to describe the vision of 
Deadwood as simply Hobbesian. To be sure, Deadwood is fi lled with vio-
lence, and one aspect that sets it apart from most television series is the fact 
that from its very fi rst episode, it conditions us to believe that any charac-
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ter might be suddenly killed at any moment. Under these circumstances, 
it seems at fi rst apt to apply to the show the words with which Hobbes 
famously describes the state of nature—as a state of “continuall feare, and 
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brut-
ish, and short.”11 People who frequent Al Swearengen’s (Ian McShane) Gem 
Saloon may indeed fi nd that life in Deadwood is “nasty, brutish, and short,” 
but, aside from the obvious fact that the camp is far from poor, Milch’s most 
basic point in the series is that human life is not solitary, but takes commu-
nal forms even in the absence of the state and in the midst of bitterly divi-
sive economic and social forces. Milch rejects Hobbes’s vision of the state 
of nature as solitary because he realizes that if community is not in some 
sense natural to human beings, then they will be hopelessly subject to the 
dictates of the Leviathan State, the artifi cial construct created to correct the 
defects of the state of nature.12
Nevertheless, despite Milch’s fundamental diff erence from Hobbes, life 
in Deadwood shares many characteristics with the state of nature portrayed 
in Leviathan. Milch may want to show that community is natural to human 
beings, but he does not wish to portray it as coming easily to them. In his 
view, human beings must struggle to achieve community, and must over-
come many potential sources of confl ict to do so. On the sources of that 
confl ict, Milch and Hobbes are in remarkable agreement. Hobbes identifi es 
three forces that lead to the war of all against all in the state of nature: “So 
that in the nature of men, we fi nd three principall causes of quarrell. First, 
Competition; Secondly, Diffi  dence; Th irdly, Glory. Th e fi rst, maketh men 
invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation.”13 
Th e same array of forces is at work in Milch’s Deadwood. Hobbes writes: 
“If any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot 
both enjoy, they become enemies.”14 Th at is exactly what we see happen-
ing in Deadwood, as the characters fi ght, oft en to the death, over women, 
as well as gold, land, and other forms of wealth and property. In addition, 
both Hobbes and Milch see murderous violence as arising from the radical 
insecurity of living without a clear government authority in place. Because 
any man may be attacked by any other at any time, he must forestall his 
potential enemies and attack them fi rst.
Life in Deadwood continually follows this model of the preemptive 
strike. In season 1, episode 2, contrary to the traditional image of the hon-
orable gunfi ghter, Wild Bill Hickok (Keith Carradine) draws fi rst and shoots 
a man who has not yet reached for his gun, merely because he senses—cor-
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rectly, as it happens—that the man meant to kill him. Many of the episodes 
turn on the issue of whether to neutralize an enemy by killing him before 
he can kill you. Th is issue reaches its apex on the communal level in the 
third season, when the “native” citizens of Deadwood, under Al Swearen-
gen’s leadership, must decide how to respond to the appearance in town of 
the mining magnate George Hearst (Gerald McRaney), who draws upon 
his great wealth to build up a private army of Pinkerton agents, which he 
increasingly employs to impose his will on the camp. All of Al’s instincts 
tell him to strike fi rst against Hearst and his army. Swearengen begs a meet-
ing of Deadwood’s elders to tell him why he should not undertake a pre-
emptive strike while he still has a chance of defeating Hearst’s continually 
strengthening forces.
We can readily understand why human beings fi ght over the same 
desired object or to defend themselves or to protect their family and prop-
erty. But the violence in Deadwood becomes so widespread that it oft en 
seems irrational and unmotivated—men fi ghting, it seems, merely for the 
sake of fi ghting. But here, like Hobbes, Milch uncovers the deepest source 
of instability in any community: masculine pride and aggressiveness. Milch 
portrays Deadwood as a community of alpha males who are constantly fi ght-
ing to establish their individual dominance, to maintain a pecking order in 
the town. Hobbes explains this situation with his typical clear-sightedness: 
“For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same 
rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, 
naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no 
common power, to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy 
each other) to extort a greater value from his contemners.”15
Hobbes here explains for us the fi ght between Swearengen and the ex-
lawman and businessman Seth Bullock (Timothy Olyphant) that begins 
the second season of Deadwood, as well as the violent struggles between 
Hearst and a host of other characters in the series. Th is violence always 
seems disproportionate to its ostensible and proximate cause in some minor 
incident. As Hobbes puts it, men “use Violence . . . for trifl es, as a word, a 
smile, a diff erent opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct 
in their Person, or by refl exion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, 
their Profession, or their Name.”16 Because of all these sources of sensitiv-
ity, Deadwood is a powder keg of violence. Given the underlying struggle 
for domination in the town, the slightest incident may trigger an outbreak 
of murderous violence.
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Th e Right to Property
Th e extent of the agreement between Milch and Hobbes on the sources of 
violence among human beings only highlights their more fundamental dif-
ference. For Hobbes, only the institution of the Leviathan State can end the 
cycle of violence in the state of nature. By contrast, Deadwood shows that even 
in the absence of government, human beings have motives for and means of 
limiting their violence on their own, which is another way of stating Milch’s 
principle that order is possible without law. Here is where Milch displays 
his greater affi  nity with Locke, who, unlike Hobbes, conceives of forms of 
order in the state of nature. Th e crux of the diff erence between Hobbes and 
Locke can be seen in the issue of property.17 For Hobbes, there is no property 
in the state of nature: “Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: 
where no Law, no Injustice. . . . It is consequent also to the same condition, 
there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine or Th ine distinct; but onely 
that to be every man’s that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it.”18 
It is entirely characteristic of Hobbes that he views the right to property as 
created only by the state. If the state creates the right to property, then it 
can take that right away at will—a key example of what Hobbes means by 
the state’s absolute sovereignty.19
By contrast, Locke argues that the right to property exists in the state 
of nature and thus preexists the state, or indeed any communal action: “I 
shall endeavour to show how men might come to have a property in sev-
eral parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that with-
out any express compact of all the commoners.”20 For Locke, rather than 
the state being the origin of property, property becomes in eff ect the origin 
of the state: “Th e great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into com-
monwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation 
of their property.”21 Since the right to property exists prior to the state, in 
Locke’s account, he sets limits on the state’s treatment of private property. If 
the express end of government is to protect the right to property, it cannot 
legitimately seize property at will. Locke’s vision of limited government, as 
opposed to Hobbes’s absolute sovereignty, follows from his argument that 
the right to private property exists prior to the nation-state:
But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, 
liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature into the 
hands of the society, . . . yet it being only with an intention in every 
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one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property—for no 
rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an in-
tention to be worse—the power of society . . . can never be supposed 
to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure 
every one’s property by providing against those . . . defects . . . that 
made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has 
the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth is bound to 
govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the 
people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indiff erent and upright 
judges who are to decide controversies by those laws.22
In contrast to Hobbes, then, Locke off ers an example of what Milch 
means by order without law. Although Locke eventually concedes that the 
state is necessary to secure property rights, he insists that they can develop 
in society without the intervention of the state. Th is may seem like a trivial 
distinction—both Hobbes and Locke view the state as ultimately neces-
sary—but if one looks at the conclusions they draw from their contrast-
ing understanding of property, the diff erence is of the utmost importance. 
Locke’s conception of the state of nature as allowing for property rights 
gives him a basis for evaluating diff erent forms of government and cham-
pioning those that secure property rights as opposed to those that violate 
them with impunity.
Locke’s argument for a right to private property prior to the state grows 
out of his theory of self-ownership:
Th ough the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, 
yet every man has a property in his own person. . . . Th e labour of 
his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath pro-
vided and left  it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to 
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It 
being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed 
it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes 
the common right of other men.23
Locke’s argument applies particularly to land as property. He maintains that 
the value of land does not reside solely in the land itself, but more impor-
tantly in what is done with it. If a man fences in and cultivates a piece of 
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land, he thereby increases its productivity and adds to its value, and that in 
turn entitles him to its use and makes it his own. As Locke puts it: “As much 
land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, 
so much is his property.”24
Th e key to Locke’s defense of property rights is that he does not view the 
dividing up of the world into private property as a zero-sum game. It may 
seem that by making a piece of land his own, a man is depriving his fellow 
men of something. But Locke stresses the way an owner improves a piece of 
land by laboring on it and thereby increases the general stock of humanity. 
He even off ers a mathematical demonstration of his point:
He who appropriates land to himself by his labour does not lessen 
but increase the common stock of mankind; for the provisions serv-
ing to the support of human life produced by one acre of enclosed 
and cultivated land are—to speak much within compass—ten times 
more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal 
richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that encloses 
land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from ten 
acres than he could have from a hundred left  to nature, may truly 
be said to give ninety acres to mankind; for his labour now supplies 
him with provisions out of ten acres which were by the product of 
a hundred lying in common.25
Here is the magic of private property for Locke: if ten acres of cultivated 
land are more productive than one hundred acres of uncultivated, then 
a farmer who appropriates ten acres of land to himself will nevertheless 
eff ectively provide his fellow human beings with the benefi t of at least an 
additional ninety acres of land. Hobbes conceives of the state of nature as 
a zero-sum game, a realm of scarcity in which men struggle over severely 
limited goods. Locke, by contrast, off ers the increased productivity of pri-
vate property as a way of generating a new abundance in the state of nature 
that works to everybody’s benefi t and creates a common interest in having 
land owned privately.
Locke and the Old Homestead
We can now see the root of the diff erence between Locke and Hobbes. Locke 
can imagine an economic order independent of the political order. Eco-
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nomic logic can dictate as complicated a social development as the dividing 
up of the world into private property, even in the absence of a government 
to enforce the results. Locke’s argument for the priority of economic order 
over political is the most important example of what Milch means by order 
without law, and perhaps a clearer way of formulating the idea. In Hobbes’s 
view, human beings left  to themselves will simply start killing each other, 
and only the Leviathan State can stop them. In Locke’s more optimistic view, 
human beings left  to themselves will set to work cultivating their gardens 
(the killing starts much later). Locke makes his diff erence from Hobbes 
explicit: “And here we have the plain diff erence between the state of nature 
and the state of war which, however some men have confounded, are as far 
distinct as a state of peace, good-will, mutual assistance, and preservation, 
and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction are one from 
another.”26
Milch displays his affi  nity with Locke on the priority of economic over 
political order in a pointed exchange between his two heroes in season 1, 
episode 4. Wild Bill Hickok has a vision of the future of Deadwood: “Camp 
looks like a good bet. . . . Th ey’ll get the Sioux making peace. Pretty quick 
you’ll have laws here and every other thing.” In Milch’s terms, Hickok makes 
the mistake of viewing law as the prerequisite of all social order. Seth Bull-
ock replies to Hickok’s political vision with a more basic economic consid-
eration: “I’ll settle for property rights.” In the process of laboring on a house 
for his family, Bullock realizes the importance of the economic foundations 
of society. He is not interested in grand political visions; he wants his eco-
nomic circumstances clarifi ed and determined before he will worry about 
political issues, and he believes that Deadwood can fi nd ways to settle prop-
erty disputes on its own.
Th e emphasis on property rights is the most Lockean aspect of Dead-
wood and comes naturally to a show dealing with a gold rush, where the 
fundamental issue for most people is staking out claims to mining territory. 
Milch shows that even in the absence of conventional legal institutions, 
Deadwood is able to evolve ways of establishing and arbitrating property 
rights. We learn in the fi rst episode that a land deal in Deadwood is ratifi ed 
by spitting in one’s palm and shaking hands with the other party. Precisely 
because legal methods of enforcing contracts are unavailable in Deadwood, 
its citizens take the customs they have evolved for making deals very seri-
ously. For all the force and fraud we see interfering with honest commerce 
in Deadwood, we still observe a basically functioning economic community, 
“Order Out of the Mud” 123
in which people can roughly rely on each other’s word—or handshake—in a 
business deal. Since no business can take place in an environment of com-
plete hostility and distrust, it is to everyone’s advantage to observe at least a 
minimum of civility and probity in their dealings with each other. George 
Hearst is usually gruff  and insensitive in his treatment of other people, 
but he tries to be ingratiating in his business deals, working to cover over 
his hostility when he concludes the purchase of Alma Garrett Ellsworth’s 
(Molly Parker) mine: “Advancing your interest, Mrs. Ellsworth, mine, and 
all others, what we do here seems natural and proper” (3, 12). “Common 
economic interest” is about as close as we get to a defi nition of natural law 
in Deadwood, a defi nition very much in the spirit of Locke.
Deadwood even operates with a Lockean defi nition of property. Th e 
premise of the series is that a mining claim is yours as long as you actively 
work it. When Claggett (Marshall Bell), a representative of the territorial 
government, arrives in the camp, he makes this policy offi  cial: “Th e territory 
respects the statutes of the Northwest Ordinance, which state that a citizen 
can have title to any land unclaimed or unincorporated by simple usage. 
Essentially if you’re on it and improve it, you own it” (1, 9). Th is passage is 
so close to Locke’s analysis of property that, for a moment, it sounds as if 
he deserves a writing credit for Deadwood. Actually, this scene is evidence 
of Locke’s profound infl uence on the development of American political 
institutions. Th e Northwest Ordinance did in fact establish this principle of 
land ownership precisely because the governing powers in Washington, DC, 
were thoroughly familiar with Locke and his arguments for private prop-
erty.27 Th e great American principle of homesteading, which successfully 
transformed millions of acres of unproductive land into productive private 
property, was deeply Lockean in spirit. Even if Milch was not familiar with 
Locke’s writings on the subject, his thorough knowledge of American his-
tory led him in a Lockean direction in his treatment of the issue of property 
in Deadwood.
Commerce Tames the Alpha Male
Th e Lockean understanding of property in Deadwood points to a larger 
Lockean spirit in its economic and political understanding of the American 
West. Th e show refl ects Locke’s hope that economics might trump politics, 
that the peaceful and cooperative spirit of commerce might triumph over 
the warlike and divisive impulses of political life. As we will see, David 
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Milch is no friend of capitalism in the form of Big Business, and cannot be 
described as a champion of the free market. Nevertheless, for someone who 
is deeply suspicious of businesspeople, he is surprisingly open to arguments 
for the positive eff ects of commerce on human relations. In Deadwood com-
merce is the chief force that works to produce order without law. Above all, 
it seems to be the only force that can get the alpha males to set aside their 
diff erences, give up their fi ghting to the death, and work together for their 
mutual benefi t.
Th e way in which economic logic can dictate social peace is most clearly 
evident in the career of Al Swearengen. As the owner of the Gem Saloon, 
he hardly seems to be a model citizen. He is involved in crooked gambling 
and prostitution, and we quickly learn that he is also guilty of shady land 
deals and runs a gang of highway robbers. He is responsible for a whole 
string of murders in the opening episodes. He has a hot temper and is bru-
tal in his treatment of women and his subordinates. A perfect example of 
an alpha male, he seeks to dominate all around him and regards himself as 
the unoffi  cial ruler of Deadwood. In short, in the early episodes he shows 
every sign of being the chief villain in the series and the most destructive 
force in the community.
Yet in the course of the series, Swearengen emerges as the chief architect 
of order without law in Deadwood. Of all the many alpha males in town, he 
is the most rational and the most able to control his emotions, especially his 
anger. He realizes when and where economic necessities demand that he 
restrain his violent impulses and work for peace. When the threat develops 
of Deadwood being annexed to the Dakota territory, thus becoming subject 
to the rule of outside forces, it is Al who organizes the infl uential citizens of 
the camp to respond to developments. One day he announces to the elders 
of the camp: “Be in my joint in two hours—we’re forming a fuckin’ govern-
ment” (1, 9). He is constantly working to get the other powerful males in 
town to recognize their mutual self-interest and unite against their common 
enemies from outside the camp.
In the fi rst season of Deadwood, one might well think that Milch was 
setting up a simple contrast between Al Swearengen as villain and Seth Bull-
ock as hero. But the intellectual complexity of the series is evident in the 
way that Swearengen, the criminal, turns out to be a force for order in the 
community, while Bullock, the lawman, turns out to be a force for disorder. 
Although Bullock is genuinely good-hearted and well intentioned, he cannot 
control his emotions, especially his anger and his pride. Bullock is as much 
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of an alpha male as Swearengen, and, as we have seen, their rivalry comes 
to a head at the beginning of the second season in a brutal fi ght. But it is 
Swearengen who realizes that they need to work together against the outside 
forces threatening the camp, and he swallows his pride in order to make 
the conciliatory gesture of returning Bullock’s guns to him and thereby to 
solidify an alliance with a man he initially distrusted and despised. Swearen-
gen continually struggles to calm Bullock’s hot temper and to get him to act 
rationally in the complicated circumstances in which they fi nd themselves. 
In the third season, Swearengen is willing to take calmly a terrible insult 
from Hearst (he chops off  one of Al’s fi ngers), whereas Bullock, provoked by 
mere words, hauls Hearst off  to jail by the ear, thereby threatening to upset 
all of Swearengen’s delicate negotiations with Hearst. Bullock has to learn to 
trust Swearengen. Silas Adams (Titus Welliver), one of Swearengen’s hench-
men, sums up the paradox of his character: “When he ain’t lyin’, Al’s the most 
honorable man you’ll ever meet” (3, 12). In the fi gure of Swearengen, Milch 
seems to be suggesting that one does not need high-minded, public-spirited 
motives to become a pillar of the community.
In line with Locke, then, and in contrast to Hobbes, Milch portrays how 
human beings, following their economic interests, can fi nd ways to control 
their anger and their pride—and thus their violent impulses—and achieve 
forms of social order even in the absence of the state. Th ey quickly reach the 
point where they themselves realize that killing each other is simply bad for 
business. Th is idea is further illustrated in the series in the role of Sol Starr 
(John Hawkes), Bullock’s partner in a hardware store in Deadwood. Unlike 
Bullock, who is a lawman at heart, Starr is born and bred a merchant. He is 
always quoting his Viennese father, spouting maxims such as “You reduce 
costs buying in volume” (2, 3). Because he thinks predominantly in eco-
nomic terms, Starr becomes one of the chief peacemakers in Deadwood. 
In the opening episodes, he labors mightily to mediate between an angry 
Bullock and a suspicious Swearengen. What ought to be a simple economic 
transaction—Bullock and Starr wish to buy land for their hardware store 
from Swearengen—threatens to erupt into a Hobbesian battle until Starr 
gets both Bullock and Swearengen to calm down and settle their diff er-
ences. Generally good things happen in Deadwood when cooler economic 
minds prevail over the hot temper of the aggressive males in the camp. Th e 
hardware store represents the contribution commerce has to make to the 
Deadwood community. As Starr advertises his wares: “Th ese are quality 
items. Th ey meet these folks’ needs. Th ey’re being off ered at fair markup” 
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(1, 1). Without presenting Milch as the Milton Friedman of the western, one 
may note many instances in Deadwood of the market being portrayed as a 
positive force in the community. When a rival bordello opens in town, and 
Swearengen raises the prospect of colluding to set rates, the new madam, 
Joanie Stubbs (Kim Dickens), tells him: “As far as pussy, Al, we’ll want to 
let the market sort itself out” (2, 3). In the second season, Hearst’s geologist 
and advanceman, Francis Wolcott (Garrett Dillahunt), proclaims: “it’s always 
preferable to allow the market to operate unimpeded” (2, 4).
To be sure, Wolcott turns out to be the creepiest villain in the series, 
and Milch presents the business policies he pursues on Hearst’s behalf in an 
extremely negative light. But these policies could justifi ably be described as 
the very opposite of the way a free market operates. Hearst is trying to buy 
up mining claims in an eff ort to create a monopoly, and doing so not by 
straightforward market means but instead by using force, fraud, and politi-
cal infl uence. Hearst represents the intrusion of outside forces, on a national 
scale, into the local marketplace of Deadwood. Here we see Milch’s distrust 
of large-scale business allied with the state, as opposed to the small-scale 
independent entrepreneurship he generally admires. And when Hearst learns 
of the gruesome way in which Wolcott has murdered several prostitutes, 
he fi res him and drives him to suicide—not because of any moral outrage, 
but simply because Wolcott’s behavior is bad for business. Many of the best 
outcomes in Deadwood happen for the “wrong” reasons—that is, not out 
of moral idealism but out of the apparently crudest material motives. Milch 
views that as characteristic of America, and a cause for celebration, not con-
demnation. He wants us to be clear-eyed about America and to recognize 
how its vices are bound up with its virtues: “None of us want to realize that 
we live in Deadwood, but all of us do. . . . Aft er fi rst recoiling in horror, we 
come to love the place where we live, in all of its contradictions. . . . American 
materialism, in all of its crassness and extravagance, is simply an expression 
of the fact that we have organized ourselves according to a more energizing 
principle than any civilization that came before us.”28 From what we see in 
Deadwood, that “energizing principle” is the market economy.
Th e Gold Standard
Milch’s grudging respect for the material motives of humanity is refl ected in 
his peculiar treatment of the motif of gold in Deadwood. Generally in Ameri-
can popular culture, money is viewed as the root of all evil, and the gold rush 
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serves as an archetype of greed at its worst (think of Charlie Chaplin’s great 
silent fi lm on the subject). At times, gold may seem to be the central villain 
of Deadwood. Many men and women die as a result of the quest for it, or 
ruin their lives and destroy their families in the process. Yet in trying to give 
a fuller picture of the human condition, Milch insists on the way that gold 
can be an agent of civilization. He is well aware from his study of American 
history that the West would never have been settled or developed as rapidly 
as it was without a series of gold rushes, from California to Alaska. Gold 
becomes the central symbol in Deadwood of order without law:
Th e initial transactions of gold for drink or gold for sex give rise to 
a more complex social order that is traced in the development of 
Deadwood. Everyone in town takes up a position in a social order 
that is based on the premise that gold has value. . . . Th e agreement 
to believe in a common symbol of value is really a society trying to 
fi nd a way to organize itself in some way other than, say, hunting or 
killing. . . . Agreeing on this single symbol of value has allowed us 
to organize our individual energies on a wider scale. If we’ve got to 
barter wheat for barley and barley for shoelaces, everybody is go-
ing to fi ght, “I worked seven months on these shoelaces and you’re 
going to give me one sheaf of wheat!”29
Th e evolution of gold as a medium of exchange refl ects the self-organizing 
power of society and its remarkable ability to replace violent confrontation 
with cooperative and mutually benefi cial transactions.
In a particularly interesting plot twist, Milch shows how gold can work 
to solve the bitter problem of prejudice in society, a problem of which he has 
been acutely aware in all his television series. Th e community of Deadwood 
is saturated with prejudices of the most noxious and virulent kind—against 
Indians, Jews, blacks, the Chinese, women, and many other categories. Milch 
clearly deplores this aspect of human behavior. He shows that economic self-
interest is one of the few forces in human nature that is powerful enough to 
overcome prejudice. Th e people of Deadwood, as anti-Semitic as they are, 
accept Sol Starr, a Jew, once they realize that he is good for the economy of 
the town. Hearst’s monomaniacal obsession with gold makes him a kind of 
monster, indiff erent to the most basic human concerns, but, on the bright 
side, it also makes him indiff erent to the color line. He employs a black cook 
and forces the classiest hotel in Deadwood to let her live on the premises. 
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He is willing to deal with her son and violate all social taboos by having a 
private dinner with him, only because gold is at stake between them. Milch 
articulates the ambivalent nature of our desire for gold:
Yet the process of abstraction that Hearst embodies, which is sym-
bolized in gold, is also at the very heart of what makes us human. 
It’s the best in us, as well as the worst, and it is oft en both at the 
same time. . . . Hearst sees the power of gold . . . in the way [it] can 
eliminate the stickier aspects of our human particularity. Th at’s why 
Hearst can befriend Odell, the son of his black chef, Aunt Lou. Odell 
has discovered gold in Liberia. For Hearst, the agreed-upon value 
of gold is the root of all civilized behavior. It mandates a calculus of 
utility that trumps even the most deep-seated prejudice.30
How remarkable to hear a television writer describe gold as “the root 
of all civilized behavior” and not of all evil. In the actual episode, Milch 
develops the point at length in a dialogue between Hearst and Odell (Omar 
Gooding): “Before the color [gold], no white man . . . no man of any hue, 
moved to civilize or improve a place like this, had reason to make the eff ort. 
Th e color brought commerce here and such order as has been attained.” 
In the spirit of Locke rather than Hobbes, Hearst sees commerce, not the 
Leviathan State, as bringing order to human society. Th is insight leads to 
an extremely important exchange:
Hearst: But for that gold, you’d never have sat at my table. And for 
the eff rontery in your rising up, except that you’d showed me the 
gold, I’d’ve shot or seen you hanged without a second thought. 
Th e value I gave the gold restrained me, you see, your utility in 
connection with it. . . . Gold confers power, and that power is 
transferable. Power comes to any man who has the color.
Odell: Even if he is black.
Hearst: Th at is our species’ hope—that uniformly agreeing on its 
value, we organize to seek the color. (3, 7)
With all his failings as a human being, Hearst nevertheless gives the most 
eloquent expression of the great Lockean hope of Deadwood—that com-
merce might bring human beings together in peace by overcoming all the 
dark Hobbesian forces that set them at war with one another.
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If human beings can evolve a widely accepted medium of exchange 
out of their commercial transactions among themselves—a complex task 
of social coordination—then they can fi nd other ways on their own of liv-
ing together peacefully and productively. Gold’s importance is that it was 
spontaneously generated as a medium of exchange by market forces and 
not the result of any government action—specifi cally, not a paper currency 
made legal tender by legislative fi at and thus imposed on society from above. 
Milch explicitly draws a connection between gold and the spirit of Lockean 
liberalism in Deadwood:
Yankton, the capital of Dakota territory, was a creation of the Indian 
agencies. It was the governmental bureaucracy, with all that that 
implies. When Deadwood came into being, it threw everything off . 
Provided with an abundant source of economic security of which 
any man could partake [gold], the Black Hills settlers and miners 
had returned to the traditional distrust of government and a renewal 
of pride and self-suffi  ciency, which the oligarchy in Yankton had 
never endorsed. Mining was a real industry as opposed to this sterile 
instrument of suppression, this paper fi ction whose only real use 
was to steal from the Indians.31
As a student of American history, Milch seems to be aware that through-
out the nineteenth century both government currency and treaties with the 
Indians were sometimes not worth the paper they were printed on. He thus 
views paper money as an instrument of government oppression and gold as 
a site of resistance to it. As such, gold is perhaps the best representative of 
the independence of the economic order from the political.
Town with Pity
Rousseau’s understanding of the state of nature diff ers so radically from 
Hobbes’s or Locke’s that the Second Discourse can add to our understanding 
of Deadwood. One of Rousseau’s distinctive contributions to state of nature 
thinking is his claim that natural man is characterized by the trait of pity, a 
point he makes in explicit contrast to Hobbes:
Th ere is, besides, another principle which Hobbes did not notice, 
and which—having been given to man in order to soft en . . . the 
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ferocity of his vanity, or the desire for self-preservation before the 
birth of vanity—tempers the ardor he has for his own well-being by 
an innate repugnance to see his fellow-man suff er. . . . I speak of pity, 
a disposition that is appropriate to beings as weak and subject to as 
many ills as we are; . . . and so natural that even beasts sometimes 
give perceptible signs of it. Without speaking of the tenderness of 
mothers for their young and of the perils they brave to guard them, 
one observes daily the repugnance of horses to trample a living 
body underfoot.32
Milch is Rousseauian in his insistence that pity,  fellow feeling, is innate 
to humanity, and one of its most basic emotions. Compassion, particu-
larly for the physical suff ering of fellow human beings, is remarkably 
pervasive in Deadwood, especially for such a rough-and-tumble camp. 
What most surprises us in Al Swearengen as we learn more about him is 
that this brutal man actually has a tender side, oft en strangely conjoined 
with his cold-bloodedness. At the end of the fi rst season, he carries out 
a mercy killing of the ailing Rev. Smith (Ray McKinnon), and at the end 
of the third, for what can only be described as sentimental reasons, he 
cannot bring himself to kill “Trixie the whore” (Paula Malcomson) on 
Hearst’s orders (although he is willing to kill another one of his prosti-
tutes as a substitute).
Th e outbreak of smallpox in the fi rst season is the fi rst occasion for Dead-
wood to organize itself as a community. Th e heroic actions to save lives on 
the part of Doc Cochran (Brad Dourif) and Calamity Jane (Robin Weigert) 
refl ect the best side of humanity as Milch views it—a genuine concern for 
the welfare of other human beings. Th e specifi c contribution of women to 
life in Deadwood, especially toward the nurturing and educating of children, 
refl ects a Rousseauian view of compassion as essential to human sociability. 
Th e events that truly bring the community of Deadwood together at the end 
of the second season—the funeral of Seth Bullock’s stepson William (Josh 
Eriksson) and the marriage of Alma Garrett and Whitney Ellsworth (Jim 
Beaver)—also make a Rousseauian point about the importance of domestic 
sympathies to social life. Th ere is of course a long tradition in the western 
of presenting women as the great civilizing force on the frontier, and Dead-
wood follows that pattern. Th e building of a new schoolhouse in the third 
season—an archetypal western moment—is one of the central symbols of 
the growth of civilization in Deadwood.
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“What Some People Th ink of as Progress”
Th e deepest way in which Rousseau is relevant to Deadwood is that, of the 
three state of nature thinkers, he is the one who has the gravest doubts about 
the value of civilization. Rousseau calls into question the triumphalism of the 
state of nature narratives in both Hobbes and Locke. Th ey view the move-
ment from the state of nature to the state of civil society as progress, a dis-
tinct improvement in the human condition. By contrast, Rousseau does not 
believe in the inevitability of the movement from the state of nature to civil 
society, and he is not at all convinced that this transition should be called 
“progress.” He insists that the movement out of the state of nature, far from 
being a necessary development, as Hobbes and Locke present it, resulted 
from a “chance combination of several foreign causes which might never 
have arisen and without which [man] would have remained eternally in his 
primitive condition.”33 Moreover, Rousseau argues that even aft er humanity 
left  the state of nature, its development might have stopped at a stage well 
short of the full-blown nation-state, and humanity would have been hap-
pier as a result.34 Human beings in Rousseau’s state of nature live in peaceful 
harmony, largely because they are scattered in the forests and hardly have 
anything to do with each other. Th ere are no alpha males in Rousseau’s state 
of nature, and therefore no violence and in fact no competition whatsoever. 
His natural men and women enjoy the peacefulness and happiness of graz-
ing animals. In contrast to Hobbes, Rousseau views the state of nature as a 
realm of abundance, and in contrast to Locke, he views the development of 
property as generating artifi cial scarcities among human beings.35
Because Rousseau’s state of nature is so much more attractive than that 
of Hobbes or even Locke, his writings serve as a powerful indictment of 
existing governments and helped to fuel modern revolutionary movements. 
Rousseau’s state of nature off ers a model of human freedom and autonomy. 
To be sure, Rousseau explicitly denies that the message of his work is “Back to 
Nature!”36 But his political writings are devoted to the diffi  cult task of recap-
turing as much of the positive aspects of the state of nature as is possible in 
modern civil society. He is highly critical of the way civic institutions have, 
in his view, distorted human nature, especially through the inequalities a 
modern economy creates, with its property rights and division of labor. Th e 
most famous sentence Rousseau ever wrote is the beginning of Th e Social 
Contract: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”37
Deadwood embodies a similar skepticism about the value of govern-
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ment and modern civilization. It may present the town’s movement toward 
developing municipal institutions and being incorporated into the United 
States as inevitable, but it questions whether this truly constitutes progress, 
an improvement in the lives of Deadwood’s citizens. In the spirit of Rous-
seau, Milch raises doubts about the triumphalism of the traditional western. 
Th e standard pattern of the western is the myth of the closing of the frontier, 
the bringing of civilization to the Wild West. Typically, a lawless commu-
nity, overrun by rampaging gunfi ghters, must be tamed by a brave lawman 
or two in concert with civic-minded businessmen, a crusading newspaper 
editor, and a beautiful schoolmarm waiting in the wings to educate a new 
generation of law-abiding city dwellers.
One can hear this standard narrative of progress in the historical fea-
turette Deadwood Matures included in the DVDs of the third season. Th e 
historians tell a familiar tale of the town’s march toward civilization, sparked 
by technological developments such as the telegraph and the railroad, as well 
as the growth of civilizing infl uences such as the schoolhouse and the theater. 
A kind of Hegelian optimism informs these narratives—events in the West 
happened in the way they had to happen and no other outcome could have 
been better. Civilization must be good because it is what history led to. Ele-
ments of the western myth of progress are present in Deadwood, especially in 
season 3, when outside forces truly begin to transform the town. But Milch 
evaluates this transformation quite diff erently, and refuses to view it simply 
as progress. More than any other western I know, Deadwood dwells upon 
what is lost when a town makes the transition to civilization and becomes 
part of the nation-state. What is lost is freedom.
Th e second season of Deadwood begins with Al Swearengen observing 
the new telegraph poles going up in the town and ruefully commenting: 
“Messages from invisible sources, or what some people think of as prog-
ress.” Al is right to be skeptical about the benefi t to Deadwood of becoming 
connected to the outside world. Its citizens will be kept better informed of 
gold prices in the East, and Dan Dority (W. Earl Brown) hopes that baseball 
scores will now be more readily available. But the telegraph will also allow 
the East to exert greater control over the West, and proves in fact to be the 
harbinger of a federal takeover of Deadwood. Th e upside of Deadwood’s 
initial isolation is its local autonomy. Th e bureaucratic and corporate forces 
that invade the town in the second and third seasons take away the camp’s 
control of its own destiny, and have little concern for the welfare of its citi-
zens. Politicians and businessmen eye Deadwood as a place to plunder. 
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Th e government offi  cials who come to Deadwood are mostly looking to be 
bribed. With no intention of settling in the town themselves, they plan on 
governing it from afar, with little or no knowledge of what is actually going 
on there. George Hearst, as the representative of Big Business in the series, 
wishes to add the Deadwood camp to his far-fl ung mining empire. He wants 
to extract as much gold as he can from the Black Hills as fast as possible. At 
the end of the third season, he leaves Deadwood as abruptly as he arrived 
at the end of the second. He cares nothing about the town, speaking with 
contempt of the “small-mindedness and self-interested behavior that’s so 
pervasive in this shithole” (3, 6).
During the fi rst season of Deadwood, one might well think that no one 
could be more evil or worse for the town than Al Swearengen. It is a mea-
sure of Milch’s doubts about the so-called civilizing process that by the third 
season, Al has become a sort of hero in Deadwood for leading the resistance 
to the outside forces trying to “modernize” the town. We certainly start 
rooting for him in his struggles against Hearst, and the mining magnate 
becomes the new villain in the series, indeed chilling us with a degree of cold-
bloodedness that Al could not muster on his worst days. What are the dif-
ferences between Swearengen and Hearst that make the latter the greater 
villain in Milch’s eyes and ours? Swearengen is a tyrant, but he is Deadwood’s 
own tyrant. As a homegrown boss, he is by nature limited in his evil. When 
Al kills someone, he usually has to look him—or her—straight in the eyes. 
In general, he has to live with the consequences of his evil deeds. Indeed, 
he lives among the very people he preys upon. Th is fact does not stop him 
from preying upon them, but it does moderate the way he treats them. He 
never kills indiscriminately. More generally, Al is a better man than his care-
fully cultivated public image as a cutthroat would suggest. Despite giving the 
impression that he is purely self-interested, he actually takes a certain civic 
pride in Deadwood, and from the balcony of the Gem Saloon, he secretly 
watches the public life of the town with a sort of seignorial satisfaction.
By contrast, in his portrait of Hearst, Milch shows all the dangers of a 
man who seeks to rule people as a complete stranger to them. Th e quality 
Milch associates with Hearst is abstraction. He has one goal in life—to fi nd 
and extract gold from the land—and Milch acknowledges that this ability 
to abstract from all other considerations gives remarkable energy to Hearst’s 
economic endeavors. But it also means that he is blind to all ordinary human 
concerns and tramples over anyone standing in his way. Unlike Swearen-
gen, Hearst does not know the men he has killed and he always acts through 
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intermediaries. He tries to keep as much distance as possible between him 
and the dirty deeds that make his business empire possible. For Milch, 
Hearst stands for the tyranny of abstraction, and symbolizes everything 
that is questionable about the modern nation-state, which places the seat 
of power remote from the communities it rules.
Deadwood begins as a small town, and the locus of small business, with 
impoverished men trying to make their fortunes in mining, accompanied 
by entrepreneurs like Bullock and Starr, who hope to make their living by 
providing necessary goods and services to the miners. Milch shows much 
that is questionable about the economic behavior that goes on in the isola-
tion of this small town. Yet he seems to fi nd it preferable to what happens 
when Big Government and Big Business invade Deadwood. As we have seen, 
there is something self-regulating about economic life in Deadwood, where 
everybody knows everybody else and people deal with each other face-to-
face. It is the facelessness—the abstraction—of Big Government that Milch 
seems most to question. Big Business presents the same problem. Hearst 
represents corporate interests, and therefore Swearengen and others see 
no point in killing him when other shareholders in his corporation would 
simply take his place. Hearst’s almost magical invulnerability in the third 
season symbolizes the implacable power of corporate—or what might be 
better called state—capitalism. What troubles Milch is the alliance between 
Big Government and Big Business that generates, and is in turn generated 
by, the nation-state. In the modern nation-state, power is simply too abstract 
and too remote from the people.
Government as a Necessary Evil
Deadwood is fi lled with antigovernment comments that are almost liber-
tarian in spirit. Th e federal government especially comes in for criticism, 
because it is the furthest removed from the people it tries to rule and there-
fore lacks the crucial knowledge of local circumstances needed to rule well. 
With regard to the United States’ treatment of the Indians, Swearengen 
sarcastically remarks: “Deep fucking thinkers in Washington put forward 
that policy” (1, 3). Even one of the corrupt politicians from Yankton, Hugo 
Jarry (Stephen Tobolowsky), speaks with contempt of the federal govern-
ment, specifi cally its attempts to hide its own corruption and incompetence: 
“Washington harasses us for our diffi  culties in distribution to the Indians, 
thereby distracting the nation at large from Washington’s own fi scal turpi-
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tudes and miasms” (3, 9). Jarry also complains about the ignorance of his 
fellow federal bureaucrats in Yankton: “Th ey’re too busy stealing to study 
human nature” (2, 5). Milch clearly shares his characters’ skepticism about 
the federal government: “I’m always amazed when people say, ‘Congress 
has adjourned and they have accomplished nothing.’ A congressional term 
that accomplishes nothing is what the Founding Fathers prayed for. Th ey 
wanted to keep the government canceling itself out, because it’s in the nature 
of government to fuck people up.”38
Deadwood shows how predatory government is on all levels. Nothing 
Swearengen can do on his own to rob the people of the camp can match the 
ambitious plans of the new municipal government to fl eece them. Th e lead-
ing citizens get together under Al’s leadership to raise the money to bribe 
offi  cials in Yankton to let their mining claims stand. Th e fi rst thing that the 
newly “elected” mayor, E. B. Farnum (William Sanderson), proposes is a 
scheme to extract money from the unwitting townspeople: “Couldn’t our 
informal organization lay taxes on the settlement to pay the bribes?” Far-
num hits the nail on the head when he defi nes the nature of government: 
“Taking people’s money is what makes organizations real, be they formal, 
informal, or temporary” (1, 9). With government activity being epitomized 
by raising taxes to pay bribes, it is no wonder that politicians acquire a dubi-
ous reputation in Deadwood. Wolcott is the most repulsive character in the 
entire series, and yet even he insists on dissociating himself from the public 
sector: “I am a sinner who doesn’t expect forgiveness, but I am not a gov-
ernment offi  cial” (2, 10).
Perhaps the most eloquent discourse on the nature of government in 
Deadwood is delivered by Swearengen’s rival saloon keeper, Cy Tolliver (Pow-
ers Boothe), on the occasion of Yankton’s attempt to question the validity of 
the town’s mining claims: “Who of us here didn’t know what government 
was before we came? Wasn’t half our purpose coming to get shed of the 
cocksucker? And here it comes again—to do what’s in its nature—to lie to 
us, and confuse us, and steal what we came to by toil and being lucky just 
once in our fuckin’ lives. And we gonna be surprised by that, boys, govern-
ment being government?” (2, 5). Despite such negative views of govern-
ment in Deadwood, Milch seems to acknowledge its necessity, and even the 
idea that the town must be incorporated into the nation-state. Civilization, 
aft er all, requires some sacrifi ces, even of our natural freedom. In the most 
Rousseauian comment in the series, Swearengen tells his henchman Dority: 
“From the moment we leave the forest, Dan, it’s all a givin’ up and adaptin’ ” 
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(3, 2). But even with this concession, Milch, like Swearengen, gives a less 
than ringing endorsement of the power of government: “Th e politicians will 
always screw you, but there are circumstances in which we would rather 
have them around.”39
Th is quotation from Milch seems to sum up the attitude of Deadwood 
toward government, especially the nation-state. Government is at best a 
necessary evil, but we must be skeptical about its claims to serve the pub-
lic interest, and always remain vigilant to resist its perennial tendency to 
increase its power and encroach upon personal freedom. Th e closer power 
can be kept to a local level, the better. We see how Milch’s faith in order with-
out law ultimately puts him in the camp of those, like Locke, who believe in 
limited government, perhaps radically limited government. Whether or not 
one agrees with these conclusions, one must acknowledge the sophistica-
tion of the economic and political thinking that went into Deadwood. We 
have seen that the show is Hobbesian in the way that it analyzes the sources 
of violence in human interaction. We have seen that the show is Lockean 
in the way that it portrays property and the commerce that fl ows from its 
establishment as civilizing forces in society, which refl ect its self-organizing
power. And we have seen that the show is Rousseauian in the doubts it raises 
about the standard narrative of the triumph of the nation-state as progress. 
In combining elements of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, Deadwood exem-
plifi es the seriousness and thoughtfulness of the western at its best. And 
Deadwood represents the western at its very best.
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ORDER WITHOUT LAW
Th e Magnifi cent Seven, East and West
Aeon J. Skoble
Chris: We took a contract.
Vin: It’s sure not the kind any court would enforce.
Chris: Th at’s just the kind you’ve got to keep.
—Chris and Vin, Th e Magnifi cent Seven
In John Sturges’s 1960 western Th e Magnifi cent Seven, a small farming com-
munity suff ering from the constant predation of a bandit gang hires seven 
gunslingers to defend it. Th is fi lm is, of course, a remake of Akira Kurosawa’s 
1954 samurai epic Seven Samurai, in which a small farming community 
suff ering from the constant predation of a bandit gang hires seven ronin 
to defend it.1 Sturges and other post-Kurosawa directors of westerns (most 
notably Sergio Leone) were infl uenced by the samurai fi lm, but it turns out 
that Kurosawa was himself infl uenced by earlier generations of westerns. So 
each genre can remake or borrow from the other. Why should this be suc-
cessful? Separated by half a world and three centuries, it might seem odd 
that the same story can be told eff ectively in such diverse settings.
Part of what makes this work is the analogous social conditions that 
arose in both the post–Civil War American West2 and feudal Japan. In 
both cases, areas remote from the centers of power experienced a lack of 
governmental administration, and this combined with other factors to 
produce the “gunslinger” familiar to us from westerns and the ronin phe-
nomenon, respectively. In the American West, former soldiers from both 
sides of the Civil War found themselves with combat skills but no organized 
combat. In feudal Japan, samurai whose clans had been defeated no longer 
had masters to serve but were still committed to a warrior ethic. In both 
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cases, an absence of governmental law enforcement led fi rst to predatory 
raiding and then to private enforcement of law. Th e story, in either setting, 
aff ords an opportunity to examine the fundamental nature of authority, 
the justifi cation of government, and the nature of contracts. John Locke 
argues that a necessary condition of entering civil society is giving up the 
right of private justice, but here private enforcement of law seems to be 
the only option. Is this, then, the “state of nature” made famous by Locke 
and his predecessor Hobbes? Is it an example of the “spontaneous order” 
made famous by Friedrich Hayek? Is it both? Th is essay will examine these 
questions and discuss how the fi lms dramatize them. While the majority 
of my discussion will use Th e Magnifi cent Seven as a reference point, most 
of what I talk about is true of both fi lms, though I will mention interesting 
diff erences as appropriate.
Th e basic structure of both fi lms is the same: the bandit gang approaches 
the village but decides not to raid it until aft er the harvest. Th e villagers, 
weary of being victimized, decide that they ought to fi ght back, but lack 
the resources to do so. In the samurai fi lm, a contingent of villagers is dis-
patched to a city in hopes of hiring ronin with suffi  cient skills to be capable 
of helping. Th e villagers are hoping to appeal to a combination of honor and 
desperation in the ronin—all they can off er in compensation are food and 
shelter. Aft er receiving several curt refusals, they observe Kambei (Takashi 
Shimura) perform a heroic rescue, and, realizing he is a man of honor and 
virtue, they approach him. He agrees to help. In the western version, the 
villagers’ initial plan is simply to buy guns.3 Aft er observing Chris (Yul 
Brynner) perform a heroic task with the assistance of Vin (Steve McQueen), 
the villagers come to the same conclusion: here is an honorable man who 
doesn’t mind taking a risk for the sake of what he thinks is right. Th ey 
ask him for help procuring guns, and he tells them that while they do not 
have nearly enough money to buy guns, they might be able to hire men 
(who would have their own guns), for here, too, out-of-work gunslingers 
might be willing to work for food. In both fi lms, we then see the leader 
recruit additional help, and then the group goes home to make prepara-
tions to defend the village.
Why is there a problem in the fi rst place? Why do the villages need 
defending? Interestingly, the banditry is primarily made possible by the 
same conditions that aff ord a solution: the existence of men with combat 
skills and training who have no formal combat missions to undertake and 
no ties to the community they happen to be living in. Th e Mexican bandit 
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leader, Calvera (Eli Wallach), recognizes that the seven gunslingers hired 
by the villagers are similar to (if more competent than) his own men when 
he invites them to join him, and again later when he lets them ride off . We 
never hear explicitly about how the seven received their training, but it is 
clear that they have some, and it was not uncommon in the American West 
to fi nd Civil War veterans working the ranches or seeking their fortune (hon-
estly or otherwise). (Th e parallels are even more explicit in Seven Samurai: 
the bandits would have to have been in the army of some clan or other in 
order to have received training in swordsmanship and horsemanship.) Why 
would some gunslingers become bandits while others tried to fi nd honest 
work? Th at is clearly a function of individual moral choice making on their 
parts, although it is exacerbated by desperation: the bandits, we’re told, are 
close to starving. Th eir predatory ways are less successful than they might 
have thought. Th e gunslingers, too, are down on their luck; that’s why they’re 
willing to work for food. So the lack of money cannot explain the choice 
of banditry over honest work, although it does amplify the motivation for 
all the parties.
Th at explains why there are bandits. But why are the villages vulnerable 
to predation by bandits? Aft er all, raiding farming communities is against 
the law. But law requires some mechanism of enforcement. Th e police can-
not be everywhere. When asked this very question by Chris, the villagers 
explain that they have tried summoning the authorities, but Calvera sim-
ply waits until they leave before commencing his next raid. Similarly, in the 
Japanese context, the local lord who technically has jurisdiction over the 
area has limited numbers of samurai; he can’t be expected to leave a contin-
gent in every small farming community. So “calling the cops” is not a viable 
option here. And self-defense is not an option, either: the Mexican farmers 
think they would be incapable of fi ghting back, since they do not have guns 
and Calvera’s men do, and the Japanese villagers are legally prohibited from 
bearing arms, as well as being untrained in swordsmanship. Hence these 
farming communities are essentially lawless, in the sense that their rights 
go unenforced. A climate has come to exist in which it is attractive to some 
to prey on the farmers, and there are no legal authorities that can protect 
them. Let us examine the various circumstances that combine to yield the 
“lawless” situation that calls for the presence of the heroes.
Th e conditions in which the farmers (in both stories) fi nd themselves 
seem to represent a scenario out of Hobbes, a state of nature in which the 
law of the jungle prevails and might makes right. Indeed, Calvera expresses 
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a sort of Hobbesian view when he explains that “if God didn’t want them 
sheared, he would not have made them sheep.” According to Hobbes, this 
unfortunate condition, in which the farmers are incapable of enjoying their 
productivity, is precisely why there needs to be strong centralized authority, 
a sovereign.4 Only then would people cease being, or fearing, predators. But 
the problem isn’t that nineteenth-century Mexico or sixteenth-century Japan 
had no sovereigns. It’s that their sovereigns were not off ering the farmers 
adequate protection against bandits. If we think of the villages as geographi-
cally isolated units of de facto anarchy, then the Hobbesian solution would 
be to form a state with a sovereign ruler. But actually, this would not solve 
the problem. For the threat to the farming community is not internal strife 
and distrust, it is invasion from outside the community. Th e internal gov-
ernance of the community is not why the farmers are victims.
In fact, the villages are not little anarchies. Th ey may be lawless in the 
sense that the laws of the political authorities are unenforceable there, but 
they do have governance, order. Th is seems to present a problem for the 
concept of sovereignty, at least as imagined by Hobbes. In Hobbes’s theory, 
it is the power of the sovereign, not just the title, that keeps the peace and 
thereby ensures justice. Th e sovereign need not be in physical proximity, 
but his infl uence must be real, must be felt and feared, and must be capable 
of being enforced. In a sense, the offi  cial government of Mexico doesn’t 
exist in this village (nor does the shogun in the Japanese village), creating a 
vacuum of “authority” occupied by the bandits, without consent of course. 
Geography therefore can play a role in the sovereign’s ability to maintain 
order, and therefore actually be sovereign.
Th at’s not to say that there is no “authority” in the village prior to the 
arrival of the predators. Th e social order in the farming community is one 
that has evolved independently of the villagers’ nominal rulers. Families have 
been farming here for generations, and the demands of the ecosystem play 
a greater role than any edicts from the capital in determining the rhythms 
of their daily lives. In addition to the agricultural realities, the community 
has evolved its own social order in ways that facilitate their living together 
peaceably and cooperatively. Th e actual farm work is shown being carried 
out according to some plan, some strategy that is every bit as complex as 
the battle plans formulated by Kambei or Chris. But unlike the battle plans, 
which are the product of intentional design, the plan for the farming, and 
indeed for the farmers’ social living, is not the product of anyone’s inten-
tional design, although it is of course the result of the villagers’ actions and 
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their attempts to live and work together. Th is is an example of what Nobel 
laureate Friedrich Hayek calls a “grown” (as opposed to “made”) order.5
Hayek defi nes “order” generally as “a state of aff airs in which a multi-
plicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may 
learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole 
to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations 
which have a good chance of proving correct.”6 Hayek observes that every 
society needs to have order, and that moreover, such order will oft en exist 
without having been deliberately created. Th e fi rst observation of that pair 
seems uncontroversial: social living depends on our having stable expec-
tations regarding how to act and how to anticipate the actions of others. 
Hayek notes that part of the very function of social living is to enable us to 
meet one another’s needs. We need other people partly because we cannot 
do everything by ourselves. We cannot live above a subsistence level with-
out a division of labor. Plato makes this observation in the Republic, and of 
course economists since Smith and Ricardo have discussed the advantages 
of division of labor. But for society to realize a division of labor, we must be 
capable of cooperation, and this requires order as Hayek has defi ned it.
But more interesting is his follow-up observation that there are two 
possible sources of order: planned order and spontaneous order. Hayek 
notes that both biologists and economists have examined the development 
of orders that are not the result of deliberate planning. Spontaneous orders 
may also be understood as “self-generating orders” or “grown orders” or 
“endogenous orders,” but he thinks that the most felicitous way of express-
ing the concept is via the English expression “spontaneous orders,” for which 
he uses the classical Greek word kosmos. Similarly, planned order may be 
understood as “construction” or “artifi cial order” or “exogenous order,” but 
is best expressed, according to Hayek, as “planned order” or “made order,” 
for which he uses the Greek word taxis.
A paradigm case of planned order might be the order of a battle, such 
as the plans set up by Chris and his counterpart Kambei. Any organization 
that is the result of deliberate design is taxis. But what Hayek fi nds exciting 
is the “discovery that there exist orderly structures which are the product of 
the action of many men but are not the result of human design.”7 He cites 
as a relatively uncontroversial example language: there was no historical 
moment when some past genius invented language, yet languages do have 
an order. Th e farming villages in both fi lms demonstrate order of just this 
sort, the lack of sovereign political authority notwithstanding.
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Despite their functional social order, however, the farmers are vulner-
able to the predatory bandits. What are their options? Th ere already is a 
political authority in place, but it is one that cannot protect them. Th ey 
have all the authority they need to facilitate their sociality locally. What 
is lacking is a reliable means of self-protection. Th is places the farmers in 
the state of nature not as it is imagined by Hobbes but as it is imagined by 
John Locke.8 According to Locke, the state of nature may well allow for 
Hayekian evolved orders governing moral and social relations and mutu-
ally benefi cial economic arrangements. But it might be subject to certain 
“inconveniences,” among which he includes the lack of reliable protection 
of these orders. Th us, it’s not so much that the community lacks “law,” but 
that it lacks enforcement.
Locke argues that one aspect of joining civil society is empowering 
the authorities to mete out justice—members must eschew private pursuit 
of justice on the grounds that impartiality is compromised when it’s your 
case. But in these remote farming communities, it’s not clear what “soci-
ety” or “the authorities” mean. It cannot mean the emperor of Japan or the 
Mexican (or American) president. As we’ve seen, these authorities cannot 
(or will not) protect the farmers. It isn’t really a matter of “private” justice, 
either—the farmers want protection of their entire community from preda-
tion and theft . Th e remaining answer seems to be self-defense. Locke argues 
that all humans are naturally the owners of themselves, and therefore also of 
the fruits of their labor. No legitimate social arrangement can negate that. 
Th erefore, inasmuch as it is a functioning society, the village is entitled to 
defend itself against attacks from the bandits. And the farmers are, it turns 
out, mistaken when they conclude that they lack the resources to do so.
First of all, although they lack combat training and weapons, they have 
resourcefulness.9 Indeed, this is what enables the story to get going in the 
fi rst place. Th ey come up with a plan to counteract their weakness. Second 
of all, they’re farmers. So they do have resources—food—that may be traded 
for other resources, in this case protection. Th e farmers have food but no 
protection; the gunslingers and samurai have weapons and combat skill but 
no food. Th e farmers can thus use trade to obtain what they need and what, 
in a Lockean analysis, they have every right to secure, their self-protection. 
Th eir hiring protectors is thus not contrary to Locke’s injunction against 
private justice; it is in fact an example of Locke’s prescription for remedying 
the inconveniences of their natural condition. Th ey are using the resources 
of their society to secure their rights and protect themselves.
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In both cases, the farmers show some ambivalence toward their hired 
protectors. In both fi lms, the farmers are literally in hiding when the war-
riors arrive. Th eir distrust is partly paranoia, but partly, we’re led to believe, 
based on real past experience with such people. Th e crucial diff erence is 
that the gunslingers or samurai who had come to town earlier were not 
connected to the village. Th ey had come to prey on, or to seek refuge in, 
the village, but not to protect and defend it. Gradually, the farmers see that 
they can in fact trust the seven, and that the seven will not prey on them. 
In Th e Magnifi cent Seven, this initial ambivalence is amplifi ed, as we see 
some of the villagers so afraid of the fi ghting, or perhaps of Calvera’s ret-
ribution if the seven aren’t successful, that they collaborate with the ban-
dits to undermine Chris’s plan. When Chris and the others nevertheless 
persist in trying to help, the last vestige of distrust is swept away, and, as 
in the Japanese fi lm, the farmers realize that they can fi ght back, and they 
join in the battle.
In both fi lms, the hired warriors face poor odds, ambivalent clients, 
and desperate foes. Th ey are risking their lives to help farmers with whom 
they have no prior connection for very little reward. Th eir motives for doing 
so vary, but one thing they have in common is their integrity. Th ey are as 
poor as the bandits are, yet they prefer to live as honestly as possible rather 
than as thieves.
We see their integrity in other ways also. For example, when the Mexi-
cans fi rst arrive in the border town, they witness a funeral procession that 
cannot proceed: some bigoted (and armed) residents of the town object to 
an Indian being buried alongside whites in the town cemetery. Th e funeral 
has been paid for, but the hearse driver refuses to risk being shot. Chris and 
Vin volunteer to drive the hearse, and succeed. Th e bigotry seems distasteful 
to them, but so too, and perhaps to an even greater degree, does the intimi-
dation of the townspeople by a small number of residents. Th is shows us 
something of their character—and we see more of it in their later interac-
tions. When the situation looks bleak in the village, and there is some talk 
among the seven of abandoning the mission, Chris points out that they have 
in fact entered into a contract with these farmers, and that, not “the law,” 
is why they must see it through. Aft er the exchange quoted in this essay’s 
epigraph, Vin agrees with Chris, and there is no more talk of quitting. Th e 
gunslingers are in fact updated ronin: they have some background in honor 
and integrity, and even though they no longer have a “master” to serve, they 
still have their own sense of ethics—otherwise they, too, would have turned to 
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banditry. Obedience to the ostensible political authorities could not compel 
such men to live up to their agreements—only their own existential choice 
to maintain their integrity could do that. Whether their code is the formal-
ized Bushido of the samurai or the less structured one that Chris and Vin 
live by, these warriors are all using their honor to maintain their sense of 
self in the face of an apparent loss of purpose. 
Here we see a cross-cultural ethical connection between the two fi lms 
that parallels the cross-cultural social/political connection. Both Buddhism 
and existentialism can be interpreted as suggesting that there is no self apart 
from the actions one takes. Th e Bushido code isn’t explicitly Buddhist, but 
Buddhism, particularly Zen Buddhism, was certainly an infl uence on the 
mores of the aristocratic warrior caste that eventually became codifi ed as 
the Bushido code.10 In the Bushido code, it is vitally important to pursue 
the good and avoid evil. A warrior who fails to do so is not truly a warrior, 
and hence not fully a person. A samurai may enact this through service to 
his lord, but what is a ronin to do? For Kambei and his comrades, honor 
must be maintained at all times—this is why Kambei rescued the child at 
the beginning of the fi lm, and it is why all of them fi ght valiantly to save 
the village. (And, arguably, why Chris volunteers to drive the hearse.) By 
opposing the wicked and predatory, these warriors establish both their 
own honor and their own humanity. Similarly, one way of reading exis-
tentialism comes out the same way: you are what you do, so acting with 
valor and honor is constitutive of the honorable life, a way of avoiding “the 
abyss.” Chris and Vin may not have read Nietzsche, but they nevertheless 
seem to conduct their lives according to a self-created code of ethics. Like 
the ronin, they are not bound in service to any particular master but are 
nevertheless striving to maintain their integrity because their sense of self 
depends on it.11
In both fi lms, when the bandits are vanquished and four of the seven have 
been killed, life in the farming community goes on as before: the rhythms 
and patterns of social living and agricultural work revert to the way they 
had naturally become prior to interruption by bandits and warriors. In Th e 
Magnifi cent Seven, Chris says (as Kambei says in Seven Samurai), “Only 
the farmers have won. We lost. We always lose.” In one sense this is true: 
four of their comrades died. But in another sense, one might argue that by 
keeping their honor and preserving the village, they achieved a victory. Th ey 
reminded themselves (and us) that one does not need to have a “master” in 
order to have a purpose.
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Notes
I am very grateful to Jennifer L. McMahon and B. Steve Csaki for their valuable sugges-
tions and comments on this essay.
 Th e epigraph is taken from Th e Magnifi cent Seven, directed by John Sturges 
(1960).
 1. Ronin roughly means “masterless samurai,” that is, samurai who were no longer 
bound to a clan or a lord, typically because the lord had been killed or deposed.
 2. Th e village being protected in Th e Magnifi cent Seven is south of the border in 
Mexico, not in U.S. territory, but the frontier conditions in both make this fact negli-
gible in my discussion.
 3. Obviously, one big diff erence between the two fi lms is the weaponry. Th is is not 
merely of aesthetic signifi cance. In feudal Japan, not only were the samurai the only 
people permitted to own swords, they would be the only ones with the training to use 
them eff ectively. On the other hand, in the western setting, one could easily obtain a 
gun, and learning to wield the weapon was considerably easier.
 4. See, for instance, Th omas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).
 5. As I will explain, Hayek uses Greek terminology to further elucidate this distinc-
tion: kosmos for the grown or evolved orders, taxis for man-made orders. See his Law, 
Legislation, and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).
 6. Ibid., 36.
 7. Ibid., 37.
 8. John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1960).
 9. In the Japanese movie, it turns out that the villagers actually do have a supply 
of weapons, which they had taken from murdered ronin in the past, but they literally 
have no idea how to use these weapons. Th ey may also have internalized the law stating 
that only a samurai could go armed (which I suggest is an anti-Lockean precept, partly 
responsible for their predicament). In any case, functionally, the Japanese farmers are 
as “unarmed” as the Mexican farmers in the western.
10. A good English translation can be found in Th omas Cleary, trans., Code of the 
Samurai  (North Clarendon, VT: Tuttle, 1999).
11. I should acknowledge that one of the seven, Harry Luck (Brad Dexter), does 
seem more motivated by fi nancial gain than a latter-day Bushido, although he also dis-
plays personal loyalty to Chris.
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FROM DOLLARS TO IRON
Th e Currency of Clint Eastwood’s Westerns
David L. McNaron
We thought about it for a long time: “Endeavor to persevere.” And when 
we had thought about it long enough, we declared war on the Union.
—Lone Wati, Th e Outlaw Josey Wales
Expansive in scope, geographically, historically, and thematically, Th e Out-
law Josey Wales (1976) is a unique western. It has some of the best gunplay, 
most poignant dialogue, most colorfully vile minor villains, and most fully 
developed Indian characters in the genre. A fi lm about vengeance, recon-
ciliation, and community, Josey Wales extends Eastwood’s western character 
and resolves problems in the adult western concerning the individual and 
the community even as it raises others. It is Eastwood’s culminating west-
ern: to appreciate it, we must become acquainted with his others and tease 
out their themes.
Josey Wales, an antigovernment fi lm, advances a sort of transcendental 
argument about the conditions necessary for the possibility of community.1 
Th ese include virtues of the western hero such as self-respect, strength, and 
the capacity to use violence to exact vengeance or enforce rights. Th e fi lm 
also deals in speech—and explores the counterfeit and genuine varieties. 
Consciousness heightens as Josey acquires companions and has his purpose 
diverted along the way, even as the landscape and times change dramati-
cally, becoming ever more western, out of the Civil War experience, into 
what becomes a sprawling epic.
I will apply points from Will Wright’s structural analysis of westerns in 
Six-Guns and Society.2 In Wright’s view the western hero mediates between 
the competing claims of wilderness and civilization, usually represented by 
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two groups. Th ere are four types of western plot: the classic, the vengeance 
variation, the transitional, and the professional. For Wright the plot types 
generate functions for social action in diff erent phases of capitalistic society 
as well as illuminate possibilities for action in the present. John Cawelti criti-
cizes Wright’s analysis as reductionist and narrowly ideological.3 However, 
an analysis is not incorrect simply because it is reductionist: each attempt 
must be evaluated on its merits. Wright does allow for the autonomy of 
culture. He selects the highest-grossing fi lms each year for discussion but 
notes that big stars and big money do not always equal box offi  ce success. 
Th ere have been spectacular big-budget/big-star failures as well as low-
budget smash hits. Th e key is the extent to which the fi lm’s mythic structure 
conforms to social expectations. Wright abstracts away from particulars to 
provide accurate descriptions and explanations. Th is is a valuable strategy; 
however, sometimes the matter—the particulars—of a fi lm becomes as 
important as the form. A prime instance is the sheer screen presence of Clint 
Eastwood—his physically imposing nature—and the tonal changes it has 
wrought. I will also draw on (pardon the pun), among others, Peter French 
and his thoughtful treatment of westerns in Cowboy Metaphysics and Th e 
Virtues of Vengeance.4 Let us now turn to a discussion of Eastwood’s place 
in the adult western.5
Th e Man with No Name
Th e creation of an anonymous Hollywood marketing executive,6 “Th e Man 
with No Name” is a fi tting moniker for Eastwood’s characters in the Dollars 
trilogy, but the character may have begun with Shane (1953), the prototypical 
classic western. When Starret introduces himself to the Stranger, Alan Ladd’s 
character replies: “You can call me Shane.” (Compare the narrator’s “Call me 
Ishmael” in Moby Dick.) Shane thus began the archetype that lasted through 
Once upon a Time in the West (1968) with Charles Bronson’s character Har-
monica. Actually, two of Eastwood’s characters in the fi lms directed by Sergio 
Leone do have proper names: Joe in A Fistful of Dollars (1964) and Manco 
in For a Few Dollars More (1965) (the name Manco means “one-handed” in 
Spanish; originally it was Monco, Italian for “monk”).7 In Th e Good, the Bad 
and the Ugly (1966), he is called Blondie. In what sense does Blondie qualify 
as the Good? He thwarts the law from carrying out a sentence on Tuco (Eli 
Wallach), a serious criminal, and he reneges on their partnership, abandon-
ing Tuco in the desert. So the Good is not so good. But the Bad is very bad
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 indeed, in the character of Angel Eyes (Lee Van Cleef). Tuco is the Ugly. 
Yet he becomes more sympathetic as we learn about his past. As Carl Plant-
inga notes, Blondie’s is an “ironic ‘goodness’ which emerges only against a 
backdrop of chaotic depravity and greed.”8 Aft er Blondie kills Angel Eyes 
in the fi nal shootout, he splits his share of the gold with Tuco—something 
Tuco would not have done—and without leaving him literally hanging, lets 
him live. Maybe that’s as good as we can hope for in a barren moral land-
scape. Such characters, which blur Wright’s good/bad dichotomy, refl ect an 
“uncertainty about values and the nature of heroism.”9
What is distinctive about these no-name characters? Th ey seem more 
myths than human beings. Th e Magnifi cent Stranger rides in from nowhere, 
and though strong, has a divided sort of identity. He lacks a (known) past—
though we gather that past is military—and possessions other than his char-
acter and gun. Oft entimes the westerner of these fi lms has suff ered some 
sort of loss (“a long story” that he rarely relates).10 But he cannot be “outside 
society” simpliciter; nor is it true that he “needs no one” (Wright’s character-
izations), since he knows language and depends on armaments manufac-
turers. Shane is a gentleman. He dances well, has exquisite manners, and is 
exceedingly gentle. By comparison, Joe Starret and the other homesteader 
males appear coarse. Shane seems the ideal husband—and father, thus the 
underlying psychosexual drama. At the end Little Joey, pleading for Shane 
to “Come back!” cries out, “Mother wants you! I know she does!” Wright’s 
strong/weak dichotomy applies: Shane and the Rikers are strong, while the 
good homesteaders are weak. Of course, they could join together and stop 
the aggressors. One rifl eman could pick off  the entire group. People wanting 
others to fi ght their fi ghts for them becomes a central concern of the East-
wood westerns. Shane’s skill with a gun is an ultra-refi nement of civilization, 
a fact that complicates the simple equation between the hero and wilderness 
so popular in the secondary literature. But let’s be clear: Shane’s aretē is gun-
fi ghting. Following Wright, Shane is a classic western, while the Leone fi lms 
refl ect the professional plot, in which heroes seek fi nancial gain.
As Little Joey says, Shane is “so good.” But with the arrival of Eastwood 
the western hero is transformed into a morally ambiguous fi gure, an anti-
hero. Perhaps the “heroes” of these fi lms represent what Harvey Mansfi eld 
calls “manly nihilism.”11 On this view, men legislate whatever values are 
realized in the world, since no objective values exist. Th e goodness of the 
hero is reduced in the professional plot generally. Why then do we favor 
some as heroes? Wright claims that in the professional plot we are simply 
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more sympathetic to some characters than others, period. But no western 
antihero would ever do what Edward Fox’s consummate professional assas-
sin does in Day of the Jackal (1973), that is, kill the woman he slept with 
simply to eliminate someone who can identify him. Th ough not amoral, the 
western hero was never a do-gooder altruist. He doesn’t draw fi rst, but he 
fi nds his completion in the act of violence, which can be “graceful, aesthetic, 
and, even, fun.”12 Th e hero’s violence is generally treated as redemptive and 
restorative. Shane becomes true to himself once again by strapping on his 
gun and taking on Wilson and the Rikers.
Aft er Joe observes the cruel scene at the beginning of A Fistful of Dol-
lars, he simply rides off . Eastwood stated he’d always wanted to do that in 
a western.13 However, Joe gives away his money to the family and enables 
them to fl ee. Eastwood was responsible for the dialogue in this scene. Leone 
had Joe making a long-winded explanation when the woman asks why he 
is doing this for them. Joe replies, with characteristic westerner brevity: 
“Because I knew someone like you once and there was no one there to help.”14 
Th e western is spare,15 especially in the hero’s distrust of language.16 As for 
the people he helps, the weak are merely weak, no better because of their 
innocence.17 In fact, their lack of strength enabled the bad thing to happen 
to them in the fi rst place.
Perhaps the spaghetti westerns performed an experiment in moral 
reduction, to see how much goodness could be drained from heroes and 
still have them retain that status.18 Eastwood reveled in the new role: “I was 
one of the people who took the hero further away from the white hat. In 
A Fistful of Dollars, you didn’t know who was the hero till a quarter of the 
way through the fi lm, and even then you weren’t sure; you fi gured he was 
the protagonist, but only because everybody else was crappier than he was. 
I like the way heroes are now. I like them with strengths, weaknesses, lack 
of virtue.”19 French lists several kinds of false courage: one is Torrey’s fool-
hardy bravado in Shane. Kane in High Noon (1952) seems the truly brave 
man; he is less certain in his abilities with a gun than a Shane or Manco, and 
acts for a noble purpose: to save the town (from itself). But which is better, 
true courage or the “false courage” of professional confi dence?20 To answer 
a question with a question, which is more likely to keep one alive—and 
protect those one loves?
Bud Boetticher, fuming over the Leonesque direction of Two Mules for 
Sister Sarah (1970), said, “My men have become tough for a reason.”21 By 
comparison, the heroes in the Anthony Mann and Leone westerns are mor-
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ally ambiguous and act somewhat mysteriously, for their own reasons, usually 
unstated. Supplying the reason is precisely where Boetticher goes wrong.22 
Th e true adult western deals in shades of gray, not black and white. It also 
elevates style above moral considerations. According to Schickel, “Clint’s 
work for [Leone] always suggested that when there are no reliable values to 
resort to, heroes must fall back on personal style.”23
However morally ambiguous the antihero is, he still has virtues, includ-
ing self-control, strength and style, and a sense of justice. In Aristotle’s ethics 
self-control (sōphrōsyne) and moral insight (phronēsis) are master virtues. 
Th e good person possesses all the excellences of character. Excellence is 
uncommon, since there are many ways to miss the target and fall short of 
a virtue, and only one way to hit the bull’s-eye and achieve it. For Aristotle 
the conclusion of a practical syllogism was an action. Th e morally perceptive 
person “sees” how to act. Th is seems consonant with the westerner’s ability 
to see what should be done and act accordingly. As J. B. Books says in Th e 
Shootist (1976), “Some men hesitate. I won’t.”
Nietzsche endorsed strength and style as virtues. He denied Plato and 
Kant’s attempts to know reality “in itself ” and base moral values on this meta-
physical foundation. According to Nietzsche’s perspectivism, the value judg-
ments “good and bad” were basic for master morality, while “good and evil” 
characterized slave morality. Th e aristocratic person bestows the appellation 
“good”—meaning noble, proud—on himself. He uses “bad” to refer to what 
is other: the common, base, or weak. But the person of slave morality desig-
nates the powerful other as evil. He then declares himself good by contrast. 
Th is leaves such “virtues” as humility and meekness, as well as an altruistic 
conception of morality, to count as “morality in itself,” whereas this stance 
refl ects only a certain perspective or form of life. Th us Nietzsche thought a 
“slave rebellion in morals” had occurred, in which Christianity stood ancient 
aristocratic value judgments on their head. He sought to “revaluate values” 
and restore master morality.24 Th e person of master morality will be per-
ceived as evil. “Yes, he’s suave, confi dent, and charismatic. But what really 
makes every man want to be 007 is that he’s dangerous.”25 Th e western hero 
oft en shares qualities with those he opposes and thus appears inexplicable 
or evil to the weaker parties.
Concerning style, we might say the western agrees with Nietzsche against 
Kierkegaard and places “the aesthetic level” above “the ethical level” (and 
certainly above the religious). Kierkegaard thought the ideal order of pro-
gression was from the aesthetic to the ethical to the religious. For Nietzsche, 
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the higher person transcends the religious and ethical stages to the aesthetic. 
Further, it’s not so much what one does as who one is that matters in west-
erns. We are willing to grant greater moral latitude to the hero. Th is is in 
keeping with both Aristotle’s and Nietzsche’s ethics, which stress character 
and self-development over principles of right conduct.
However morally ambiguous he is, the western antihero always falls 
on the good side of the good/bad dichotomy. It is interesting to consider 
Eastwood’s remarks above about the hero in light of his negative reaction to 
the later Leone fi lms, in which his character’s importance would be dimin-
ished.
“Not a Symbol”: Hang ’Em High and the Rule of Law
In the script for Hang ’Em High (1968), Eastwood found “a certain feeling 
about injustice and capital punishment” that intrigued him. In this, his fi rst 
American western, Eastwood remarked that he would “not be a symbol, 
but a rather troubled fi gure, questioning both his own motives and those 
of the system he served.”26 In Hang ’Em High Eastwood played Jed Cooper, 
a man cut down from a lynching tree by a passing marshal (Ben Johnson). 
Th e perpetrators were “just men,” upstanding members of the community, 
who mistook Cooper for the murderer of their friend. A local sheriff , Cal-
houn, who has a “bad back” (lazy, weak-willed, morally shallow), intercedes 
on the men’s behalf and tries vainly to protect them against Cooper. Th e 
fi lm is a variation on the vengeance and transition plots. Th e hero seeks 
vengeance, but does so through the offi  ces of law; part of the community 
is villainous.
Th e fi lm makes an excellent case for the rule of law. Cooper forgoes ven-
geance and agrees to work for the judge in the Oklahoma Territory, where 
nineteen marshals and one judge are responsible for seventy thousand square 
miles. But the legal order comes at a price. Th e stench of justice pervades 
its administration: literally, in the overcrowded stinking jail, metaphori-
cally in various ways. Crucial distinctions from the point of view of justice 
are overlooked. Th e law is arbitrary in the acts it criminalizes, such as for-
bidding whiskey peddling but allowing prostitution. It imposes the death 
penalty for a variety of off enses. It violates a rule of justice—that only those 
who commit a wrongful act should be punished for it—by employing the 
murder/felony rule, still found in a number of states. Th e judge sentences 
to death two misguided young men who fell in with a violent older outlaw, 
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Miller (Bruce Dern), to rustle cattle. Miller committed the murder yet all 
three face the gallows. Cooper saves them from a lynching in a near-repeat 
scenario of his own lynching. However, Cooper fi nds the judge’s legal hang-
ings equally repugnant, a carnival-like atmosphere surrounding a mass hang-
ing, Christianized, with whitewashed gallows. Nevertheless, the law does 
bring killers to justice. In so doing it replaces vigilantism, which is wholly 
lacking in impartiality and evidence-sift ing ability.
Th e western takes place either during a time prior to a fully function-
ing legal order or during its lapse: a period marked by a rough transition. 
In Hang ’Em High Eastwood plays the western hero as lawman. Th e judge 
adduces utilitarian arguments for using people “as kindling in my fi re of 
justice.” If the law doesn’t hang them, the next time a cattle rustling occurs, 
people will say, “Hang ’em, and hang ’em high.” Cooper must perform a 
limited role in the system. Justice is the sole province of the judge until the 
arrival of statehood, when “no one man can call himself the law.” Th e rule of 
law, though imperfect, is preferable to seeking vengeance. Judicial hanging 
makes people just as dead, but, as the judge says, there’s a diff erence between 
being lynched and being judged. Cooper and the judge pass the badge back 
and forth during their arguments. So, the fi lm is about a symbol—the badge: 
much is gained, and much lost, in the transition to the mechanical system 
of justice it represents.
In a brilliant move, this western lawman reappears in contemporary 
times, carrying an enormous revolver, as Detective Harry Callahan in the 
Dirty Harry fi lms. Th e society is a legal order, though one in which crime has 
become rampant and in which there exists a general breakdown of respect. 
Crime has been given permission—it fl owers in an ethos of 1960s narcis-
sism disguised as antiauthoritarianism. Th e legal system, which impedes the 
police offi  cer’s functioning and bestows all rights on criminals, becomes the 
villain. Th e western situation reemerges in uncivil society. How can the hero 
walk the line between extrajudicial violence and adherence to an ineff ectual 
system? In the sequel, Magnum Force (1973), Harry says—as if in response 
to the censure Dirty Harry received—to the vigilante police offi  cers who 
confront him with the now-infamous “You’re either with us or against us”: 
“I’m afraid you’ve misjudged me.” Why?
A fair guess is because Callahan is acting in good faith to protect life 
in emergencies, not to carry out extrajudicial punishment for its own sake, 
although it appears that he dispenses substantive justice.27 In homage to 
High Noon, Callahan tosses his badge into the water at the end of Dirty 
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Harry, the legal system having failed the citizenry. Although the morality 
of westerns is usually deontological, the only arguments the judge in Hang 
’Em High and Callahan in Magnum Force can muster against vigilantism are 
utilitarian. If we let them do it this time, what will they do—whom might 
they kill—the next time? Th is leaves open the possibility that such acts are 
justifi able in individual cases.
In Between with Joe Kidd
Despite its undeservedly low reputation among critics (for example, Leonard 
Maltin and Richard Schickel) Joe Kidd (1972) is a well-wrought western that 
nicely illustrates the in-betweenness of the western hero. Th e fi lm is notable 
for its detestable subcharacters, one on one side, one on the other: paral-
lel sociopathic creeps. Joe is bailed out of jail by a ruthless land baron (Mr. 
Harlan, played by Robert Duval) bent on hunting (literally) a land-reform 
revolutionary named Luis Chama (John Saxon) to protect his six hundred 
thousand acres and stop Chama, who is “stirring up the Mexican popula-
tion.” Harlan seeks out Joe on the strength of his reputation as tracker and 
(former) bounty hunter. Joe initially declines, but upon returning to his 
ranch fi nds his workman wrapped cruelly in barbed wire, retribution for 
Joe’s having dispatched another nasty associate of Chama’s he met while in 
jail on a minor, erroneous charge. Sheriff  Bob Mitchell, a thickheaded but 
well-meaning imbecile, put him there.
When Joe returns to the hotel to accept Mr. Harlan’s off er, the loutish 
“associate” Lamar (Don Stroud) tries to block his way and Joe pulls him down 
the stairs by his belt buckle, hilariously sending him tumbling. Joe accepts 
Harlan’s off er for personal reasons—Chama, he supposes, has wronged him 
or someone close to him—and in ignorance of the nature of Harlan and his 
men, who turn out to be cold-blooded killers. Th e fi lm exposes the fl awed, 
human side of causes. Chama’s idealistic girlfriend becomes disillusioned 
when she discovers his baser side. He brings her along, he says, “for cold 
nights and when there is nothing else to do, not to hear you talk.” Chama 
is willing to let others die for him. Kidd is in between. He takes the legal 
way out in the end, convincing Chama to turn himself in (“straight up or 
draped over a saddle”) and plead his case in court. But Chama has tried 
this approach and failed. Th e land titles he depended on conveniently dis-
appeared in a courthouse “fi re.” Th e judge in the U.S. Territorial Court is 
hardly inclined to think that “land grants signed by the king of Spain or the 
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emperor of Mexico” will hold up against deeds on fi le with the court. But in 
its way the rule of law prevails, although with a good measure of assistance 
from a neutral party ensnared neither by ideology nor desire for gain. (Well, 
he does get the girl in the end.)
Resurrecting the Mythic with a Vengeance: High Plains Drift er
In the eerie vengeance western High Plains Drift er (1973), Eastwood’s mythic 
character found its ultimate expression. He has no name or mortal existence 
whatsoever and materializes out of nowhere. But he cuts a striking fi gure 
in his dusty range coat sitting atop a dappled horse. Th e townspeople gawk 
at him with blank incomprehension as he rides into town, as if they’d never 
seen a man before, being, as they are, mere simulacra of human beings. Here 
we fi nd the Magnifi cent Stranger at his most menacing. Th e whore Callie 
Travers (Marianna Hill), who intentionally crashes into him in the street, 
even says, as though she were the town itself projecting, “From a distance 
you’d even pass for a man.” Th e Stranger seems to be the reincarnation of 
the town’s murdered marshal, Jim Duncan, or his avenging angel. He is cer-
tainly the spirit of vengeance and purveyor of a creed that people should face 
their fears and stand up for themselves. He crosses out “Lago,” the name of 
the town, and scrawls “Hell” in its place.
Hell is moral cowardice, exemplifi ed by the venal hypocritical towns-
people who stood by and watched as their marshal was bullwhipped to 
death by killers hired by the town to protect its interest in illegal ownership 
of the silver mine, which the marshal was in a position to expose. Th e scene, 
recalled in fl ashbacks, is reminiscent of the murder of Kitty Genovese in 
New York. She was stabbed to death in front of dozens of onlookers who 
did precisely nothing.
Th e townspeople are bigots. Th ey refer to Mexican residents as “Mex,” 
and treat the Indians in the general store with contempt. Yet they claim 
to be “good Christian people” whose motto is to “forgive and forget.” It is 
quite evident that they do not practice what they preach. Th ey hold grudges, 
for example, beating up the midget for his newfound status as mayor. Th e 
Stranger treats the Indians to blankets and jars of candy for the children 
in his fi rst act once given “a free hand in this town”—the price tag for the 
cowards’ unwillingness to defend themselves—in exchange for protecting it 
against the killers, soon to be freed from prison. Th e hotel owner delivers a 
mercenary utilitarian argument for killing the marshal: “For the good of the 
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many. Th at’s progress.” Rachel, his wife, as if invoking Kantian deontology 
or natural law theory, replies: “What’s the price of a human life?” Accord-
ing to Kant’s categorical imperative, we ought never to treat a rational being 
merely as a means. Persons, unlike things, possess moral dignity as ends 
unto themselves and ought to be treated with respect. Th e theory of natu-
ral law, while teleological, holds that human lives are incommensurable. 
We ought never to perform a cost-benefi t analysis that trades off  individual 
lives for the sake of a greater good. Rachel tells the Stranger, “You’re a man 
who makes people afraid, and that’s dangerous.” He replies, “Well, it’s what 
people know about themselves inside that makes them afraid.”
Th is fi lm also presents a scathing critique of religion, positively heap-
ing scorn on it. When the Stranger orders the people to paint the town red, 
one asks, “Even the church?” to which he replies, “I mean especially the 
church.” Th e preacher hides behind fi ne words about brotherly love that 
belie his ignoble motives. As the Stranger leaves town, the midget says, “I 
never knew your name.” “Yes, you do,” he replies.
Enter Josey Wales
Th e Outlaw Josey Wales is a vengeance/transition western with a twist: 
government, rather than “society” or the community, becomes the villain. 
Josey, the hero, not the past-less drift er of classic westerns, comes with a 
backstory: his family has been killed by Union redlegs from Kansas at the 
outbreak of the Civil War. Th e audience knows his motivations, which are 
apolitical: he joins the Confederate forces to avenge the murders of his wife 
and son. Th e war concludes in montages while the credits roll. Th e fi lm’s 
action begins with the deception at the holdouts’ surrender to Union forces, 
a senator and Josey’s commander, Fletcher (John Vernon), having brokered 
the deal for “full amnesty.” All but Josey accept. Fletcher sees redlegs in the 
camp—“the worst enemies these men have got”—commanded by Captain 
Terrill (Bill Kenny), who led the murder raid on Josey’s farm. During their 
oath-taking the Rebs are mowed down by Gatling gun fi re. Josey rides in 
and prevails in a gunfi ght, escaping with a mortally wounded young soldier, 
Jamie (Sam Bottoms). Th ey ride off  to take refuge in the Indian Nations. 
Later, as Jamie lies dying, he sings a song, “Th e Rose of Alabama,” whose 
sweetness resonates throughout the fi lm, becoming its musical signature. 
Unbeknownst to them, Fletcher, who, along with Terrill, survives, was not 
party to the betrayal. Th e senator charges Fletcher to “hound this Wales to 
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kingdom come. . . . Send him to hell.” Fletcher replies that Wales will be 
waiting for them there. Fletcher is never really “with” the pursuers; he ridi-
cules Terrill along the way for constantly underestimating Josey. In his fl ight 
from Terrill, Josey takes on a number of dispossessed individuals whom 
he rescues, somewhat unwittingly, including an elderly Cherokee man, 
Lone Wati (Chief Dan George), a young Navajo woman, Little Moonlight 
(Geraldine Keams), an elderly Jayhawker woman, Grandma Sarah (Paula 
Trueman), and her “odd” granddaughter, Laura Lee (Sondra Locke), and a 
“mangy redbone hound.”
Josey’s relation to the Indian characters is one of the most important 
aspects of the fi lm. Th e scene is this: we see an elderly Indian in a top hat 
exiting a cabin. He aims a rifl e at Josey’s horse galloping through a glade. 
Josey, standing behind the Indian (Chief Dan George), cocks his pistol and 
says, “Howdy. My name is Josey Wales.” “Howdy. I have heard of that name.” 
Th e Indian says he has heard that there was reward money coming to any-
one who would kill him. Josey says, “Seems you were looking to gain some 
money here.” “I was looking to gain an advantage. I thought you might be 
someone who would sneak up on an Indian.” “It’s not supposed to be easy 
sneaking up on an Indian.” Th e humor begins a tonal shift  in the fi lm, some 
sort of rising consciousness. Lone explains that as the “civilized tribe,” the 
Cherokee have now become easy to sneak up on. “Th e white man has been 
sneaking up on us ever since.” Josey turns away and wryly replies, “Seems like 
we can’t trust the white man.” He then falls asleep, aft er listening politely for 
awhile as Lone drones on with a long-winded but revealing story about his 
trip to Washington and the government’s betrayal. Th e Union took the Cher-
okee’s lands, saying they would not be happy there, and forced them onto the 
Trail of Tears where Lone’s woman and two sons died. His speech shows the 
government’s hollow words, which culminate in “Endeavor to persevere.”
Robert Sickels comments: “Both men have lost their families to the 
forces of the Union, and that turns into a bond, thus reversing the situation 
in Th e Searchers.”28 True, but the main point of the exchange is diff erent. 
Josey’s sardonic response indicates he has caught Lone uttering an empty 
abstraction. Josey hardly seems a “politically correct Ethan Edwards.” His 
response exposes a victim’s statement that lacks force or “iron.” Th roughout 
the fi lm Josey and Lone verbally play off  one another and take turns saying 
too much and having the other walk away. Th e fi lm explores speech gener-
ally, and in particular genuine versus counterfeit varieties.
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Th e following columns contain examples of genuine and counterfeit 
speech from the fi lm.
Counterfeit Speech Genuine Speech
Fletcher (at the surrender): “You said 
regular federal authorities would be 
handling this.”
Th e senator: “Captain Terrill is a regular, 
federal authority now.”
“Fletcher, there’s an old saying, ‘To the 
victors belong the spoils.’ ”
“Th ere’s another old saying, Senator: 
‘Don’t piss down my back and tell me it’s 
rainin’. ’ ”
(During massacre): “Damn you, Senator. 
You promised me those men would be 
decently treated.”
“Th ey were decently treated. Th ey were 
decently fed, and they were decently shot.”
Terrill: “Doin’ right ain’t got no end.”
Granny Hawkins: (Laughs 
contemptuously.) Earlier, to Josey: “I say 
that big talk’s worth doodly-squat.”
Carstairs (the ferryman): He curries favor 
with each side and sings “Dixie” and “Th e 
Battle Hymn of the Republic” “with equal 
enthusiasm, depending on the company.”
Th e Carpetbagger: He touts his panacea of 
an elixir, which just happens to equal the 
cost of a ferry ride.
Josey: “Works wonders on just about 
everything, huh?” (Spits on his lapel.) 
“How is it with stains?”
(Aft er the ferry crossing): “Th ere is such a 
thing in this country called justice.”
“Well, Mr. Carpetbagger, we got somethin’ 
in this territory called a Missouri boat 
ride.”
From Dollars to Iron 161
Lone (quoting U.S. politicians): “You 
boys sure look civilized” (dressed up like 
Lincoln). “Endeavor to persevere.”
“And now the white man is sneaking up 
on me, again.”
Josey: “Guess we can’t trust the white 
man.”
Carpetbagger (words to Lone Wati in 
Texas town about the benefi ts of his elixir): 
“For those who can’t handle their liquor.”
Lone: “What’s in it?”
“Well, I don’t know . . . various things. I’m 
only the salesman.”
“You drink it.”
“What do you expect from a nonbeliever!”
Bounty hunter: “You’re wanted, Wales.”
Josey: “Reckon I’m right popular.”
“Man’s got to do something to make a 
living nowadays.”
Josey: “Dyin’ ain’t much of a livin’, boy.”
Grandma Sarah (to Lone): “We’re sure 
gonna show them redskins tomorrow. No 
off ense meant.” Lone: “None taken.”
Lone: “Th ey won’t miss you. Maybe they’ll 
forget you.”
Josey: “You know there ain’t no forgettin’. ”
Josey (beginning a fl accid explanation): 
“Sometimes trouble just follows a man . . .”
(Lone walks away, leaving an empty 
doorway.)
Lone (to Grandma): “Yawee, we’re really 
gonna show these palefaces somethin’. No 
off ense.” Grandma Sarah: “None taken!”
Josey: “I guess everybody died a little in 
that damn war.”
Th e senator’s words are full of equivocations. Grandma Sarah’s overblown 
words about Josey having been a “murdering bushwhacker on the side of 
Satan” and her son Tom Turner as having “served proudly with Senator Jim 
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Lange’s Redlegs on the side of justice” are not treated contemptuously and 
should not appear in the counterfeit column. Some of her remarks are fac-
tually mistaken, but honestly spoken. She alters her views in light of experi-
ence. Th e Carpetbagger’s words are moralistic but he’s a crook and a bigot. 
Terrill, a murderer and plunderer, wraps himself in zealotry.
All of Josey’s and Ten Bears’s words to each other are genuine; they hold 
the iron. Each year Ten Bears (Will Sampson) meets with the generals: they 
make promises and he is pushed farther back. Now he will move no more. 
Th e fateful encounter between Josey and Ten Bears encapsulates the politi-
cal theme of the fi lm. Josey rides into Ten Bears’s camp, to die with him or 
to live with him: “Dyin’ ain’t so hard for men like you and me. It’s livin’ that’s 
hard, when all you’ve ever cared about’s been butchered and raped.” Josey 
continues: “Governments don’t live together; people live together. With 
governments you don’t always get a fair word or a fair fi ght. Well, I’ve come 
here to give you either one, or get either one from you.” He off ers his “words 
of death” and “words of life” and promises Ten Bears numerous things in 
exchange for peace.
Ten Bears: Th ese things you say we will have, we already have.
Josey Wales: Th at’s true. I ain’t promising you nothin’ extra. I’m just 
giving you life and you’re giving me life. And I’m saying that men 
can live together without butchering one another.
Ten Bears: It’s sad that governments are chiefed by the double 
tongues. Th ere is iron in your words of death for all Comanche 
to see, and so there is iron in your words of life. No signed 
paper can hold the iron. It must come from men. Th e words of 
Ten Bears carry the same iron of life and death. It is good that 
warriors such as we meet in the struggle of life . . . or death. It 
shall be life.
What of Josey and Ten Bears’s enthymeme: “Only when there is iron in 
a person’s words of death can there be iron in that person’s words of life”? 
What does this mean, and is it true? True strength is honest in word. Verbal 
commitments that issue from weakness might fail to hold up. Th e Union 
lied, cloaking its deadly purposes—like the Gatling guns—under deceptive 
words. Government is treated diff erently in the fi lm than men. Men put 
themselves at risk to guarantee their side of the bargain. But governments 
can remain aloof and make empty promises.
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COMMUNITY
Th e distinction between genuine/counterfeit speech corresponds to authen-
tic/false kinds of community. Th is bears some analogy to Plato’s political 
philosophy. Plato exposed parallels between various psychologies and phi-
losophies and corresponding types of regimes. For instance, the Sophists’ 
outlook and method of argumentation, the eristic, correspond to regimes in 
which appetites are the “ruling element.” In the dialogue Gorgias, Socrates 
defi nes rhetoric, like cookery and makeup, as a branch of one pursuit: fl at-
tery. Th is branch refl ects a certain type of politics: a foul and ugly politics 
that aims at pleasure and gratifi cation, not the good. Rhetoric is an impos-
ter art (technē). True arts carry an expertise or knowledge, while false ones 
foster belief without regard to knowledge, pleasure without regard to what 
is really good. In the fi lm counterfeit, fl attering speech implies deceptive 
government serving exploitative, criminal purposes.
Robert Sickels views Josey Wales as refl ecting 1970s liberalism in light 
of its views on Indians and multicultural community. While I don’t wish to 
deny this as an element of the fi lm, there is a tension between this interpre-
tation and the fi lm’s strongly antigovernment thrust. Liberalism embraces 
the state. But Josey and Ten Bears thoroughly distrust government for its 
deceit and duplicity. When Josey Wales was made, the United States had just 
emerged from the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the civil rights struggle. 
Despite that movement’s legal victory and forced social reforms, govern-
ment failed to alleviate racial enmity and produce social harmony. How will 
we live together in a pluralistic society? Josey Wales is not so much a liberal 
fi lm as a questioning of political assumptions. Th e state alone cannot secure 
peace and justice: living together is a human aff air. It requires individuals 
of a certain sort, who are capable of entering into honest agreements—and 
backing them up. Th e unfolding logic of the Eastwood western culminates 
in Josey Wales.
Th e pact that Josey and Ten Bears form to establish peace between their 
communities is founded on the words of men who possess the strength to 
guarantee life or death, a bargain one cannot get from government. Th is 
echoes the westerner’s hatred of lying and raises the specter of a com-
munity in which self-respecting individuals do not forswear violence. In 
Once upon a Time in the West, Cheyenne (Jason Robards) tells Jill McBain 
(Claudia Cardinale) not to count on Harmonica staying: “You don’t under-
stand, Jill. People like that have something inside . . . something to do with 
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death.” Loss is at the center of the western hero’s identity. Anything that 
denies its reality is a lie. But Josey Wales implies that the hero rides back 
to a community of persons whose lives are marked by the knowledge loss 
bestows, who have demonstrated their ability to defend themselves and 
others. Such a community diff ers radically from those in High Noon and 
High Plains Drift er. Th e Indians are strong and independent characters, 
not mere obstacles for the hero. Th ey are “persons of substance,” to use 
English Bob’s (Richard Harris) words from Unforgiven, though he spoke 
them in a very diff erent context.
Th e western generally and Josey Wales in particular demonstrate points 
about knowledge, understanding, and identity. What is known is knowable, 
in principle, by anyone. An Italian can understand the most American of art 
forms. A white southerner can understand an Indian. Nor is it necessarily 
about what side one is on. In the montage sequence we see Josey and his 
men presiding over hangings; it is possible they committed injustices in their 
lust for vengeance. Likewise, Josey befriends Grandma Sarah, the mother 
of redleg Tom Turner, and understands that Turner must have been a fi ne 
man. Grandma takes sides against the redlegs who attacked her home, and 
sees what they—or this faction of them—are like aft er all, and thus fi nally 
comprehends Josey’s point of view. Ten Bears understands the meaning of 
Josey’s spitting: an expression not of contempt but of confi dence and indif-
ference to danger. And we understand that he understands; and so on. Josey 
doesn’t at fi rst understand Moonlight’s language—Lone translates—but he 
comes to understand, and like her, very well. Little Moonlight says early on 
that she in a way belongs to Josey because he saved her, which he denies. In 
the end, though, as in Breakfast at Tiff any’s (1961), people do belong to one 
another. Community is possible because understanding is possible: cultural 
solipsism is false.
So, membership in a community need not consist merely in staying 
true to one’s “own kind” (as Josey says in his brief eulogy of Jamie), if that 
is construed in some narrow way. In the fi nal analysis, it is people of integ-
rity—of any age and of any ethnic, regional, or linguistic variety—who are 
to be counted among the western hero’s own kind. Th e individualism of the 
western gives way a little bit in this fi lm, which looks beyond drift ing to liv-
ing a settled life. But we can bargain away too much in the social contract. 
Government cannot be trusted to hold up its end; nor can it ameliorate 
human confl ict.
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VENGEANCE
Having made peace with the Comanche, Josey must square accounts with 
Terrill. But Terrill’s posse awaits him. “You’re all alone now, Wales,” Terrill 
says. “Not quite,” replies Lone from the window. Josey wins the battle with 
the help of his partners inside the house, who follow the get-tough advice 
Josey gave them in case the Comanche attacked. A wounded Josey rides 
off  in hot pursuit of a wounded Terrill. When he fi nds him, alone outside a 
barn, he walks toward him, pulling the trigger on each empty chamber of 
four pistols, “killing” him over and over as Terrill fl inches. Josey holsters his 
weapons and looks at Terrill with a self-satisfi ed grin. Has Josey’s desire for 
vengeance been satisfi ed—has he given Terrill the choice of life or death? 
Terrill draws his sword. Josey turns it against him and runs him through.
French argues that vengeance is justifi ed under certain conditions, one 
being that the vengeance seeker wishes his act to communicate the wrong-
ness of the perpetrator’s transgression. According to French, “Th e call to 
forgive is the call to forswear resentment, and that is the call to relinquish 
one’s self-respect. . . . Th e westerner would prefer to remain unforgiven and 
unforgiving, rather than to accede to the Christian’s code.”29 Compare the 
ending of Once upon a Time in the West, when Harmonica and Frank (Henry 
Fonda) have their duel. It is Frank who comes to Harmonica, seeking knowl-
edge. When Frank asks what it is that he wants, Harmonica answers, “Only 
at the point of dyin’. ” Frank replies with “I know.” Aft er the draw, Frank shot 
through the heart, Harmonica reveals who he is by jamming his harmonica 
between Frank’s teeth. Frank seems to nod in recognition before falling dead 
in the dirt, much as Harmonica had “died” the day Frank orchestrated the 
bizarre hanging of his brother. It may be that ultimately Josey doesn’t feel 
he needs to kill Terrill, that he has made his point already, and Terrill forces 
him to act in self-defense. Some people can acquire the knowledge that ven-
geance can bestow only a posteriori.
RECONCILIATION
Th e fi nal scene occurs back at the Lost Lady Saloon. Josey enters to fi nd 
Texas Rangers taking an affi  davit from Rose and one of the men stating they 
witnessed Josey’s death at the hands of fi ve pistoleros in Mexico. Fletcher is 
there, emerging from shadow. Something about his face when he was with 
the posse earlier in town, framed by a window, indicated he had broken 
completely with Terrill. Fletcher addresses Josey indirectly as “Mr. Wil-
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son,” the name his friends called him inside to protect his identity, observ-
ing the blood dripping onto Josey’s boot. Fletcher doesn’t believe that “no 
fi ve pistoleros could kill Josey Wales.” He thinks he’s still alive, and will go 
down to Mexico to look for him. “And then?” asks Josey. Fletcher says he’s 
got fi rst move—“I owe him that”—and he’ll “try to tell him the war is over.” 
Josey reckons so, pauses, and adds, “I guess we all died a little in that damn 
war.” Enough said.
In the ending Josey rides off  wounded in Shane-like pose; but probably 
toward “the valley,” instead of the mountains. Th e valley in Josey Wales now 
symbolizes a community based on words that hold the iron. Josey Wales 
ends on a note of reconciliation, healing, and hopefulness. Josey may have 
even killed Tom Turner, whose daughter he will likely marry. From death 
comes life. Rose had said of Josey, “Oh, he is dead. Dead, all right.” Josey 
and Fletcher seem transformed or reborn. Th rough the crucible of war and 
strife they have worked through to a place of earned forgiveness where they 
can live with themselves—and thus with others.
Implications for the Western
“Th e crowd,” Kierkegaard wrote, “is untruth.” When responsibility is aban-
doned or diff used throughout a group or organization, bad things happen.30 
But Josey Wales illustrates that not all communities are crowds. Th e western 
off ers complex moral dilemmas and an array of characters for refl ection. Vio-
lence in the western serves as metaphor for confronting confl ict and moral 
cowardice in our own lives. Wright is right. Westerns show how individuals 
have opportunities for courageous action now, in (mostly) settled society, by 
exercising nerve and boldness, having a sense of decency and justice, and 
giving style to their character.
While there are numerous explanations for the demise of the western—
changes in racial and gender consciousness, as well as the genre perhaps 
having simply run its course31—this fact bears notice. Adulthood and seri-
ousness are no longer the ideals they once were. Th e United States during the 
era when westerns fl ourished was, though fl awed, both more innocent and 
more mature. Th e 1960s replaced the ideal of adulthood with a counterideal 
of perpetual adolescence. My parents’ high school yearbooks from the late 
1930s are fi lled with pictures of students who look like men and women. Isn’t 
the purpose of child rearing to raise children to become adults? It’s hard to 
make a western today. Its sensibility has all but vanished. Although the genre 
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has enjoyed something of a revival, most attempts since Unforgiven have been 
failures: “westernlike” or pseudo-westerns. Exceptions include Lonesome Dove 
and Deadwood. Leone thought that faces were all-important: do any of our 
male actors look enough like men to carry westerner roles? Th ere is more 
violence in society today than in the heyday of TV westerns, World War II 
series, and mock-violent cartoons, and a rise in incivility is apparent.32 Clearly, 
the way to instill virtue in children is to raise them on the likes of Have Gun, 
Will Travel, Rawhide, Combat! and Th e Bugs Bunny Show.
Th e inspirational western characters are killers, but there is iron in their 
words and deeds. Th ey have a certainty about themselves, of their potency 
and being equal to their task—as well as awareness of their limitations, which 
a person’s got to know. Harvey Mansfi eld, who maintains that women, too, 
can be manly, writes: “Manliness seeks and welcomes drama and prefers 
times of war, confl ict, and risk. Manliness brings change or restores order at 
moments when routine is not enough, when the plan fails, when the whole 
idea of rational control by modern science develops leaks. Manliness is the 
next-to-last resort, before resignation and prayer.33 Th e ancient Greeks said 
that while other cities produced poems and statues, Sparta produced men.34 
So does the western, by showing people of integrity—men like Josey Wales 
and women like Little Moonlight—who are worthy of emulation.
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THE DUTY OF REASON
Kantian Ethics in High Noon
Daw-Nay Evans
Besides receiving numerous Academy Awards and making the American 
Film Institute’s list of the top ten westerns of all time, High Noon (1952) is 
the most requested fi lm by American presidents.1 In his autobiography My 
Life, former president Bill Clinton writes:
I saw a lot of movies, and especially liked the westerns. My favor-
ite was High Noon—I probably saw it half a dozen times during 
its run in Hope, [Arkansas], and have seen it more than a dozen 
times since. It’s still my favorite movie, because it’s not your typical 
macho western. I loved the movie because from start to fi nish Gary 
Cooper is scared to death but does the right thing anyway. When I 
was elected President, I told an interviewer that my favorite movie 
was High Noon. . . . Over the long years since I fi rst saw High Noon, 
when I faced my own showdowns, I oft en thought of the look in 
Gary Cooper’s eyes as he stares into the face of almost certain de-
feat, and how he keeps walking through his fears toward his duty. 
It works pretty well in real life too.”2
Clinton’s remarks highlight the central theme of this essay and of Kant’s moral 
theory, namely, doing the right thing requires us to do our duty despite any 
unintended or negative consequences that might follow. In this essay, I argue 
that Marshal Will Kane (Gary Cooper) is Kant’s ideal moral agent.
Kant’s Moral Th eory: Good Will and the Concept of Duty
In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant argues that the most 
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basic requirement for doing the right thing is the possession of a good will. 
You have a good will if you are internally motivated to act in accordance 
with what you know you ought to do. In Kant’s view, a good will is “good 
without limitation” and “good in itself.”3 Having a good will precedes attain-
ing happiness or any of the virtues and is an end in itself, rather than a mere 
means to acquire some other good (4:393–94). To have a good will one must 
carry out moral obligations befi tting a rational being. All human beings have 
the ability to be rational ones; however, some choose to do what is socially 
acceptable instead of what is morally right. As rational beings whose actions 
spring from a good will and thus from duty, we should seek to do what rea-
son dictates rather than what our instincts desire (4:395–96). For example, 
Kant argues that we have a duty to nurture our natural talents rather than 
letting such “talents rust” by engaging in “idleness, amusement, [and] pro-
creation” (4:421–24).4 Reason, then, is a practical faculty whose aim is to 
both cultivate a good will and ensure that we will engage in right conduct 
by governing the operation of that will (4:396).
As mentioned above, we have to be morally motivated in the right way 
to do our duty and thus be able to claim that our actions have moral worth. 
Before delving into what it means to act from duty, it’s crucial to know what 
it means to fall short of doing so. In Kant’s view, actions that include “lying, 
cheating, [and] stealing” are contrary to and directly confl ict with duty 
(4:397). Be that as it may, there are three conceptions of moral motivation 
that are in conformity with duty, but are not done from duty (4:397–98). 
According to Kant, only actions done from duty can have moral worth. First, 
there are actions that conform with duty but ones we have no immediate 
desire to perform (“one pays [one’s] taxes not because [one] likes to but in 
order to avoid penalties set for delinquents, one treats [one’s potential voters] 
well not because one really likes them but because [one] wants their votes 
when at some future time [one] runs for public offi  ce, etc.”). Second, there 
are actions that conform with duty and that we have an immediate desire 
to perform (“one does not commit suicide because all is going well. . . , One 
does not commit adultery because [one] considers [one’s partner] to be the 
most desirable creature in the whole world, etc.”). Finally, there are actions 
that accord with duty but are contrary to some immediate desire we might 
have (“one does not commit suicide even when [one] is in dire distress, 
one does not commit adultery even though [one’s partner] turns out to be 
[exceptionally disrespectful], etc.”).5 Th ese last actions are the only ones of 
the three conceptions of moral motivation that have moral worth, because 
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they not only conform with duty but are actually done from duty (4:399). To 
be sure, Kant argues, “[If one] does the action without any inclination, sim-
ply from duty; then the action fi rst has its genuine moral worth” (4:398). In 
short, all three conceptions of moral motivation challenge us to be the kind 
of morally righteous beings Kant argues we have the potential to become.
THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY
Aft er determining how one runs afoul of doing the right thing by engaging 
in actions that only conform with duty, I will now give an account of what 
Kant calls the “supreme principle of morality” to determine what it means 
to act from duty. In his preface to the Groundwork, Kant claims that the text 
is “nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme prin-
ciple of morality” (4:392). Kant also refers to this principle as the categori-
cal imperative and the moral law. As laws and imperatives tend to do, this 
principle obligates us to act in a manner consistent with what reason com-
mands. Specifi cally, reason commands us to abide by principles rather than 
consequences. To deliberate about the consequences of one’s actions, Kant 
holds, is to use means-end reasoning as the sole criterion for right action. 
In so doing, consequentialists focus on a particular means to achieve a par-
ticular end. Th is type of reasoning is based on experience and, for Kant, one’s 
experiences are an insuffi  cient means to determine right action (4:407–9; 
cf. 4:416). Such experiences are subjectively contingent, while the categori-
cal imperative is objectively necessary (4:415–20). Subjectively contingent 
actions cannot establish an objectively necessary and morally obligatory 
principle such as the categorical imperative. To sum up, particular actions 
cannot demonstrate that something is universally good.
As an alternative to the means-end reasoning of the consequentialist, 
Kant emphasizes reasoning about the categorical imperative as an end in 
itself. In other words, we should adhere to the categorical imperative because 
it is a creation that is distinctively human, namely, our ability to choose right 
actions over wrong ones.6 In order to accomplish this task, Kant off ers us 
three formulations of the categorical imperative (4:421; cf. 4:429, 440). Th e 
fi rst formulation, the Formula of Universal Law, demands that one “act only 
in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law” (4:421).7 A maxim, Kant holds, is a “subjective 
principle of volition” (4:401). To be clear, maxims are thoughts formulated 
as statements that precede those actions to which they directly correspond. 
Th e second formulation, the Formula of Humanity, instructs one to “act so 
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that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (4:429). 
Finally, the third formulation of the categorical imperative, the Formula of 
Autonomy, directs one to abide by the principle that views the “will of every 
rational being as a will giving universal law” (4:431; cf. 4:439–40).8
One example will suffi  ce to explain all three formulations of the cate-
gorical imperative simultaneously. Th ere is a severe fi nancial crisis, and you 
must borrow money from a friend to survive. As far as your unsuspecting 
friend is concerned, you have every intention of repaying your debt within 
one week; however, the maxim you formulate to yourself is as follows: “I will 
make a false promise to my friend to acquire her money.” In other words, 
you have made a false promise to receive money you have decided never to 
repay. In so doing, you have violated all three formulations of the categori-
cal imperative.
First, you have formulated a maxim that cannot become a universal 
law binding for all rational beings. According to Kant, all maxims should 
be formulated in a manner such that every rational being could conceivably 
act on the same maxim. Yet, if the above maxim were to become a universal 
law, it would create, according to philosopher Christine M. Korsgaard, “a 
straightforward logical contradiction in the proposed law of nature. One 
might argue, for instance, that universalization of the maxim of false prom-
ising would undercut the very practice of making and accepting promises, 
thus making promises impossible and the maxim literally inconceivable.”9 
For that reason, your action does not arise from duty and certainly has no 
moral worth. Second, by asking a friend for money you have no intention 
of repaying you have, in eff ect, used your friend as a means to your own 
end, thus violating the Formula of Humanity. By deceiving your friend in 
this way, you have demonstrated that you have no respect for her humanity. 
Th ird, you have failed to act autonomously. To be autonomous, you must 
formulate maxims that can become universal laws. An autonomous agent 
is one who is morally motivated to do her duty because she knows it’s the 
right thing to do. On the other hand, one who has chosen to disregard the 
directives of reason is motivated by his own desires or external infl uences 
to do things that confl ict with or are contrary to duty. Indeed, Kant argues 
that when we follow these motives, we act pathologically, namely, in accor-
dance with motives that are not fundamentally human. Instead of abiding 
by the principle of autonomy, those motivated by their own desires or exter-
nal infl uences abide by the principle of heteronomy. Kant explains: “If the 
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will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fi tness 
of its maxims for its own law giving of universal law—consequently if, in 
going beyond itself, it seeks this law in a property of any of its objects—het-
eronomy always results” (4:441). To put it briefl y, one’s will is heteronomous 
rather than autonomous when one permits someone or something other 
than oneself to give one the moral law.
Welcome to Hadleyville: “Do Not Forsake Me, Oh My Darlin’!”
Kant’s moral theory is a fi tting lens through which to analyze High Noon, 
particularly when one considers the circumstances surrounding the city of 
Hadleyville and the choices of its citizenry. Although Marshal Kane has just 
married his Quaker bride Amy (Grace Kelly), the news that Frank Miller 
(Ian MacDonald) and his minions are returning to Hadleyville brings an end 
to the festive occasion. Arguably, what is more troubling than the return of 
Frank Miller is the reaction of Hadleyville’s citizens themselves. Almost no 
one, with the exception of a drunk named Jimmy (William Newell) and a 
fourteen-year-old kid named Johnny (Ralph Reed), wants to assist the mar-
shal with the very unenviable task that lies ahead. Kane searches in vain for 
volunteers to help him fend off  the Miller gang. He visits the courtroom, 
the church, the Ramirez Saloon, and the barbershop, only to discover that 
many of those who were initially willing to do the right thing have now been 
persuaded to do otherwise. Indeed, it’s not only members of the general 
public who wish to circumvent their moral duties, but also the marshal’s 
own friends, colleagues, and even his new wife. Judge Percy Mettrick (Otto 
Kruger), former marshal Matthew Howe (Lon Chaney Jr.), and Hadleyville 
mayor Jonah Henderson (Th omas Mitchell) are sympathetic to Kane’s plight 
on a personal and professional level, but wish he would forget about Frank 
Miller and concentrate on his future as a husband and storekeeper. As the 
man who originally sentenced Frank Miller to prison, Judge Mettrick is con-
cerned for his own life and thus is eager to leave Hadleyville. Th e arthritic 
former marshal is disillusioned by what he views as a defective legal system, 
the fi nancial instability that plagues a lifetime civil servant who upheld jus-
tice, and his own physical infi rmity. Of the three, Mayor Henderson has the 
best understanding of and appreciation for Marshal Kane’s dedication to the 
moral law. He tells his constituents that Kane is the best marshal Hadleyville 
has ever seen and that they need to do the right thing. Even so, the mayor 
then proceeds to convince them that the fi nancial interests of the city out-
176 Daw-Nay Evans
weigh what they owe themselves as rational beings. His impromptu speech 
privileges fi nancial gain over morality. In Kant’s view, this is equivalent to 
having no interest in morality. As previously mentioned, morality requires 
us to act in accordance with the moral law rather than the kind of conse-
quentialist reasoning that characterizes the mayor’s proposal. All in all, his 
moral intuitions were correct; however, he permitted external factors to 
deter him from the path of right action. In so doing, he failed Kant’s test to 
determine whether his actions have moral worth.
Given her commitment to pacifi cism, Amy thinks it best that she and 
the marshal depart Hadleyville promptly to begin their new life together. 
Her decision is shaped by both her religious views and the danger the Miller 
gang poses to her and her new husband. Despite her allegiance to Quakerism, 
Amy is, at least at one point during her conversation with Helen Ramirez, 
ready to reject morality altogether if only it will bring an end to all forms 
of violence. From a Kantian standpoint, neither one’s religious doctrines 
nor one’s personal anxieties about the human condition are an appropriate 
means for determining right action. In the realm of morality, Amy’s loyalty 
should have been to her own capacity for moral reasoning. Had she relied 
on her own rational nature to guide her actions rather than her religious 
beliefs, Marshal Kane would not have had to wait until the fi nal moments 
of his skirmish with the Miller gang for his wife’s support. Th ey would have 
both independently reached the conclusion that the right course of action 
is to postpone their matrimonial bliss, stay in Hadleyville, and confront the 
Miller gang regardless of the consequences.
Besides Amy Kane, Marshal Kane’s deputy sheriff  Harvey Pell (Lloyd 
Bridges), as well as his former lover Helen Ramirez (Katy Jurado), make 
questionable moral decisions. Far from being concerned with his duty as 
one of the two deputy sheriff s of Hadleyville, Harvey Pell is preoccupied 
with careerism and his own jealousy.10 Pell struggles, more or less unsuc-
cessfully, to negotiate the space between being Marshal Kane’s friend, his 
subordinate, and the current lover of the marshal’s former lover Helen 
Ramirez. To contend with these unruly emotions, Pell turns not to the cat-
egorical imperative but to alcohol and, in his drunken stupor, instigates a 
fi ght with Marshal Kane. Even if he has not convinced the majority of the 
Hadleyville citizens that he is a suitable replacement for Kane, he has nev-
ertheless deceived himself about the matter. Th at is to say, Pell is convinced 
that his actions arise from duty when, in actuality, his actions only conform 
with duty. Th is is confi rmed when one considers the means-end reasoning 
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he employs as a justifi cation for resigning from his post as deputy sheriff . 
Pell warns Kane that without a proper recommendation for the job as the 
new marshal of Hadleyville he will leave Kane to deal with the Miller gang 
on his own. With fi ft y-eight minutes until Frank Miller’s arrival to take his 
revenge, Pell relinquishes his badge and gun belt. It never occurs to him that 
by abiding by the supreme principle of morality—that is, by simply doing 
what he knows he ought to do—he would very likely convince the towns-
people and Marshal Kane that he is an autonomous agent whose actions 
have moral worth. Unfortunately, he is unable to stand up for himself or 
the townspeople when it counts the most.
Besides being romantically linked to Marshal Kane and Deputy Sheriff  
Harvey Pell, Helen Ramirez is Frank Miller’s former lover. Aft er Frank was 
arrested and sent to prison by the marshal (supposedly for life), Helen had 
a love aff air with Kane. Following a brief deliberation, Helen reasons that 
there are no benefi ts to being in town once Frank Miller returns, especially 
since he might very well know of her previous relationship with the man 
responsible for depriving him of his freedom. For Kant, doing the right thing 
is not a cost-benefi t analysis. Contrary to consequentialist philosophers 
such as John Stuart Mill, Kant is uninterested in a “creed which accepts as 
the foundation of morals ‘utility’ or ‘the greatest happiness principle’ [and] 
holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happi-
ness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness 
is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the 
privation of pleasure.”11 Helen’s tentative desire to escape Frank’s rage over 
her past deeds would allow her to avoid the embarrassment and guilt one is 
sure to feel in a face-to-face confrontation with a jilted lover. More impor-
tant, she would also avoid the seemingly unavoidable emotional and pos-
sibly physical abuse to be had at the hands of Frank Miller. In addition, she 
helps Ed Weaver (Cliff  Clark) by selling him her remaining interest in the 
general store. By doing so, Helen would have brought about the “greatest 
happiness” for all those aff ected by her actions. Despite the allure of some 
of these consequences, neither Helen nor her would-be defenders should 
view them as good reasons for abnegating her moral obligation as a rational 
being to do the right thing.
As previously mentioned, Kant claims there are actions “that are already 
recognized as contrary to duty even though they may be useful for this or that 
purpose; for in their case the question whether they might have been done 
from duty never arises, since they even confl ict with it” (4:397). Following 
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Kant, it seems uncontroversial that Frank Miller’s desire to exact revenge on 
Marshal Kane and those whom he considers responsible for sending him 
to prison is one that “never arises” from duty. To be sure, a maxim based 
on Frank’s thirst for revenge is, like the maxim of false promising discussed 
earlier, doomed to fail. A maxim of action based on revenge can be willed, 
but one cannot will that a maxim of revenge become a universal law binding 
for all rational beings. In other words, one can formulate, if one so chooses, 
maxims whose content would bring about contradictory results if willed not 
only by oneself but also by other similarly situated rational beings, but such 
actions have no moral worth.
MILDRED’S SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE 
Mildred’s (Eve McVeagh) choice to lie to Marshal Kane about the where-
abouts of her husband, Sam (Henry Morgan), directly confl icts with what 
she knows she ought to do. Despite the fact that she acts at the behest of 
her husband, the motivations underlying her actions are just as immoral as 
those of the Miller gang. Mildred had a choice between (1) telling Marshal 
Kane a lie to spare her husband moral guilt; or (2) telling Kane the truth, 
thus putting Sam in a very agonizing position. Mildred’s dilemma is similar 
to issues that arise in a dispute about the conditions under which lying may 
be warranted. Kant addresses the matter in his 1797 essay On a Supposed 
Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns.12 In the essay, Kant responds 
to an article written by Benjamin Constant, a Swiss-French liberal philoso-
pher, in which the latter claims that we have a duty to tell the truth as long 
as such truth telling does not bring harm to the one who has a right to hear 
it. Constant criticizes Kant for arguing that we have a moral duty to tell a 
murderer who knocks at our door the whereabouts of his intended victim, 
a friend who is hiding in our house. In Constant’s view, then, Mildred does 
the right thing by lying to Kane about Sam leaving for church without her. 
Although Marshal Kane is no murderer, Sam is certain that he will be killed 
in a shootout with the Miller gang if he answers the door himself and agrees 
to assist the marshal. Strangely, aft er having his wife lie for him, Sam blames 
her for his inability to take moral responsibility for his own inaction.
Not surprisingly, Kant disputes Constant’s analysis and therefore we can 
extrapolate the conclusion he would likely reach regarding Mildred’s actions. 
Kant’s reply to Constant involves moving the debate from talk of truth to 
that of truthfulness: “Truthfulness in statements that cannot be avoided is 
the formal duty of man to everyone, however great the disadvantage that 
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may arise therefrom for him or for any other” (4:426). Regardless of whether 
Sam would have taken his last breath that day in a gunfi ght with the Miller 
gang, Mildred should have been honest with the marshal. We must uphold 
our duty to truthfulness rather than truth, because talk of truth gives the 
false impression that truth is a personal artifact to be disclosed or concealed 
on a whim. Kant claims that truth is not a “possession” to be “granted to one 
person and refused to another” (4:428–29). Mildred has a duty to be truthful 
and the marshal has a right to her honesty. Also, Mildred’s duty to truthful-
ness is an “unconditional” one. Kant’s stance is unequivocal: “To be truthful 
(honest) in all declarations is, therefore, a sacred and unconditionally com-
manding law of reason that admits of no expediency whatsoever” (4:427). If 
she is actually dedicated to truthfulness, then she cannot tell the truth only 
in advantageous circumstances that serve as a means to her desired end. She 
has to tell the truth even when truth telling could do “harm” to herself or her 
husband (4:428). Mildred was only thinking of her husband when she lied, 
but as Kant sees it, “Whoever tells a lie, regardless of how good his inten-
tions may be, must answer for the consequences, resulting therefrom even 
before a civil tribunal and must pay the penalty for them, regardless of how 
unforeseen those consequences may be” (4:427). Assuming the marshal was 
killed by Frank; Ben Miller (Sheb Wooley), Jack Colby (Lee Van Cleef), and 
Jim Pierce (Robert J. Wilkes) went on a rampage through Hadleyville ter-
rorizing its mostly timid citizens; and Frank had his way with Kane’s widow, 
Amy; Mildred Fuller would have far more to contend with than merely an 
angry husband had these potentially tragic events transpired.
MARSHAL WILL KANE: DEAD MAN WALKING
Ultimately, the protagonist of High Noon, Marshal Will Kane, is Kant’s ideal 
moral agent. To begin with, the marshal’s moral intuitions are quite diff er-
ent from those of the other townsfolk, his friends, and even those of his 
wife, Amy. For this reason, they do not understand him. Amy claims that 
she does not want to wait to fi nd out if she will be a “wife or a widow”; his 
friends think he is foolhardy to risk losing the new life that awaits him for, 
as Judge Mettrick puts it, “a dirty little village in the middle of nowhere”; 
the townspeople view his seeming stubbornness as harmful to the city; and 
his other colleagues and friends have abandoned him. Arguably, there has 
to be something more profound than one’s professional duties as a marshal 
that justifi es putting one’s life in danger when one has so much to lose. He 
explains to his wife that he will not be run out of town by the Miller gang. 
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In fact, the marshal states: “I never run from nobody before.” He knows that 
“they’ll just come aft er us. Four of them and we’d be all alone on the prairie.” 
Despite his reasoning, Amy proposes moving to an out-of-the-way town-
ship that will be diffi  cult for the gang to locate. For the marshal, standing up 
for what’s right takes priority over one’s marriage, friendships, and even the 
interests of the city he is charged with protecting. In other words, his moral 
intuitions produce an obvious distinction between professional duties and 
moral ones. His professional duties are those of a marshal of Hadleyville, 
while his moral duties arise from his autonomy as a rational being who 
shows respect for the moral law.
Th ere are several ways in which Kane displays respect for the moral law. 
As we learned earlier, the fi rst formulation of the categorical imperative, 
the Formula of Universal Law, tells us to “act only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a uni-
versal law.” From the beginning to the end of the fi lm, the marshal’s actions 
are guided by a maxim of standing against lawlessness. Th e marshal’s maxim 
can be articulated as follows: “When morally unjust threats against my life 
are made by outlaws, I will stand against them to achieve justice regardless 
of the consequences to my person, my friends, and my family.” Th is is the 
maxim in its subjective form. Since maxims and the universal law are not 
synonymous, one has to inquire as to whether the maxim in its subjective 
form can be stated objectively. In its objective form the maxim reads as 
follows: “When morally unjust threats are made by outlaws, everyone will 
stand against them to achieve justice regardless of the consequences to their 
person, friends, and family.” It still has to be considered whether or not the 
marshal’s maxim can be willed to become a universal law. If it can pass the 
test of universalizability, then it can be said to have moral worth. And indeed, 
the marshal’s maxim is universalizable. One could certainly imagine a world 
in which others stand against the moral injustice of outlaws whose moral 
norms include assaulting innocent people, rape, robbery, and murder.
Th e marshal’s maxim of standing against lawlessness can also be viewed 
from the perspective of the second formulation of the categorical imperative, 
the Formula of Humanity. Again, it states that we should “act so that you use 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always 
at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” When we treat oth-
ers as ends in themselves rather than as a means to an end, we show them 
respect as rational beings. Th is principle holds not only when dealing with 
others but also when dealing with ourselves. Th e marshal’s actions satisfy 
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both requirements. Regarding others, he does not attempt to deceive anyone. 
Th at is, he never tells Amy they could simply elude Frank and everything 
will work itself out; he never tells Herb he has more special deputies than 
he actually has (which are none); he never tells Deputy Sheriff  Pell he will 
recommend him for a job he does not think the deputy deserves; he never 
makes use of sophistic arguments to dissuade patrons at the Ramirez Saloon 
or the church from their skeptical concerns; he never takes advantage of the 
sincerity of people such as Jimmy the drunk and fourteen-year-old Johnny; 
he never tries to manipulate what remains of Helen Ramirez’s aff ection for 
him as a means to call off  the Miller gang; and he does not come up with a 
clever ploy to inveigle Mildred as a means to determine whether or not Sam 
is actually home and, as a result, lure him out of hiding. Had he engaged in 
such consequentialist reasoning, the marshal may have benefi ted greatly. 
Be that as it may, his actions would not have had moral worth. Regarding 
showing respect for himself, the marshal never lies to himself about what 
he is doing. Even so, he does have moments of weakness and even admits to 
Pell that he is scared. His fear may have less to do with indecisiveness and 
more to do with the marshal’s own explanation: fatigue. It would be diffi  -
cult to argue that the marshal is indecisive about his moral duty when he is 
steadfast in his commitment to what he knows to be right.
By choosing not to deceive others, we show them respect and give them 
the opportunity to exercise their autonomy as rational beings. Kant refor-
mulates the categorical imperative to refl ect this idea when he argues, in his 
Formula of Autonomy, that we should treat “the will of every rational being 
as a will giving universal law.” Th e marshal is the lone Kantian in Hadleyville. 
He is the only person who gives himself the moral law such that he can will 
maxims that are universalizable. Th e marshal’s ability to be a moral agent 
is due to his autonomy and his autonomy is due to his rational nature. To 
elaborate further on what it means to be autonomous and how autonomy 
itself is possible, Kant tells us that there are two types of freedom. Positive 
freedom is freedom to act as an autonomous rational being who gives one-
self the law. Negative freedom is freedom from external infl uences. As an 
autonomous moral agent, the marshal has freedom from doing things others 
would like him to do as well as freedom to do what he considers to be mor-
ally necessary.  In doing so, the two types of freedom logically entail each 
other. For example, the marshal decides to stay in Hadleyville to confront 
Frank Miller when he could very easily have made Amy happy and ridden 
out of town in their horse-drawn carriage. By making the choice he does, 
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he is exercising his freedom to do the former, while, at the same time, exer-
cising his freedom from doing the latter.
As an autonomous moral agent who formulates maxims that are uni-
versalizable, the marshal is, as I have been arguing, Kant’s ideal moral agent. 
As such, he should view himself as part of a “systematic union” of rational 
beings who give themselves the moral law. Kant writes: “A rational being 
belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when he gives universal laws 
in it but is also himself subject to these laws” (4:433). For this reason, the 
marshal has to picture himself as a member of a hypothetical community in 
which rational beings formulate maxims that are universalizable and from 
which, Kant tells us, “he can appraise himself and his actions” (4:433). By 
utilizing the kingdom of ends as a thought experiment, the marshal can 
judge whether or not he is living up to the moral demands of the categori-
cal imperative.
In the end, High Noon not only presents us with an exemplary Kantian 
moral agent in the character of Marshal Kane but also shows us how dif-
fi cult it is to be one. On a daily basis we are confronted with, among other 
things, an internal battle with our own desires, unsettling moral dilemmas, 
plain bad luck, and pressure to conform to social norms. For these reasons, 
it’s worth repeating the words of former president Clinton with which this 
essay began: “When I faced my own showdowns, I oft en thought of the look 
in Gary Cooper’s eyes as he stares into the face of almost certain defeat, and 
how he keeps walking through his fears toward his duty. It works pretty well 
in real life too.” Perhaps, like Clinton, we also can learn from Marshal Kane, 
Kant’s ideal moral agent, about how to keep our heads high and moral char-
acter intact when we face what appear to be insurmountable diffi  culties that 
lie at the heart of human experience.
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THE COST OF THE CODE
Ethical Consequences in High Noon and 
Th e Ox-Bow Incident
Ken Hada
A common perception associated with the classic western suggests char-
acters welded to their notions of right judgment, characters who will not 
deviate from their code of honor, regardless of consequences. Th e honor 
implied in such deliberate devotion to duty is characteristically celebrated, 
at least on the surface, in the acts and speeches of typical heroes. It follows 
that the unyielding posture of the hero suggests a certain understanding of 
ethics. A strong hero is committed to his course of action because he sees 
the necessity to choose in a particular way, as the right thing to do, regard-
less of public opinion or even the law. However, a close examination of two 
important western fi lms, High Noon (Fred Zinnemann, 1952) and Th e Ox-
Bow Incident (William Wellman, 1943), might lead to the conclusion that 
the fi lms undermine the very codes set up by the leading voices in those 
fi lms. Th is essay, following the neo-Aristotelian ethics of contemporary phi-
losopher Martha Nussbaum (1947–),1 will demonstrate that an unfl inching 
devotion to an absolute code is challenged and undermined by the greater 
context of the fi lms themselves. Such subversion is primarily demonstrated 
by the tremendous personal cost paid by the hero, family structures, and 
fi nally society at large as a consequence of following the codes. Ironically, 
in the most unfortunate situations, injustice may result from a blind abso-
lute devotion to a perceived code of duty. Given these concerns, High Noon 
and Th e Ox-Bow Incident illustrate that a qualifi ed understanding of duty 
seems worthy of consideration. As will be demonstrated, Nussbaum’s posi-
tion suggests that literature (I include fi lms in this category) is essential to 
moral philosophy because it fl eshes out the consequences of holding vari-
ous theoretical positions.
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Immanuel Kant and Duty
If a sense of duty is common in westerns, and if western characters are 
judged to be heroic in part because of their stubborn allegiance to a code of 
conduct, then it is worthwhile to consider why this has become formulaic 
in our popular culture, particularly in the western genre. What is the ideo-
logical foundation upon which this notion rests? Th ough several factors, no 
doubt, contribute to this psychological stance, a primary infl uence may be 
found in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). One of history’s 
most prominent philosophers, Kant is famously associated with the notion 
of duty. For Kant, duty is absolute, a virtue associated with rational, willful, 
good men. Kant’s ethics of duty has a singular emphasis, and thus it overrides 
claims of utilitarian ethics (acts based on the maxim of what produces the 
most good for the most people) and disputes the concerns of empiricism.2 
For Kant, morality is a matter not of analyzing the situation, but rather of 
applying the law. For him, “A good man is one who acts on the supposition 
that there is an unconditional and objective moral standard holding for all 
men in virtue of their rationality as human beings.”3
Kant’s view of duty represents an ideal, one that helps to affi  rm the 
Enlightenment ideal of rational man making right choices on the basis of 
objective knowledge. Much of the social context for a western hero may 
be associated with Manifest Destiny, a concept popularly realized in the 
nineteenth century when Americans felt that the expansion of the West 
and Southwest was divinely ordained. In order for this sense of destiny to 
become manifest, however, two signifi cant challenges had to be overcome. 
First, room had to be made for new Americans moving west, settling on the 
ancestral lands of native peoples. Second, in these territories where expan-
sion occurred, oft en there was competition for resources and land. Many of 
these places tended to be lawless vacuums where victimization could occur. 
In these contested places and situations, popularized in western fi lms, it 
became necessary, then, perhaps even natural, that there be someone strong 
enough to rise to the level of hero, someone able to bring a sense of order to 
the oft en chaotic world of the American West. In fact, much of the confl ict 
so dominant in American westerns features an idealized, rational hero in 
confl ict with opportunistic antagonists who live only for material gain and 
sensual pleasure—enemies who justify their behavior simply on the basis 
that they are strong enough to get away with their lawless deeds.
Kant’s idealism provides a foundational absolute for so-called civilized 
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humanity, and his insistence that duty is necessary, even to the sacrifi ce of self-
interest, seems to be a notion that western heroes routinely attempt to imitate. 
Typically, a western hero seems to be motivated by a sense of “oughtness.” He 
feels honor-bound to live according to some sense of duty that becomes codi-
fi ed within a culture. For Kant, duty is a supreme calling, an action that a good 
man must take regardless of the cost to his self-interest or happiness.4
Kant’s famous formula, the categorical imperative, argues that one “ought 
never to act except in such a way that [one] can also will that [one’s] maxim 
should become a universal law.”5 Any action must pass this test in order to 
be ethical. He asks: “Can you also will that your maxim should become a 
universal law? Where it cannot, it is to be rejected, and that not because of a 
prospective loss to you or even to others, but because it cannot fi t as a prin-
ciple into a possible enactment of universal law.”6 Th ough western heroes 
frequently exhibit this absolutist position, other ethical philosophers take 
exception to these absolute and universal aspects of Kant’s ethics.
Nussbaum: Particulars, Social Context, and Emotion
Moral duty, as frequently expressed in westerns, is familiar and appealing 
to audiences. We expect the code of the hero to be in play. We expect it to 
be challenged by dishonorable antagonists in the confl icts of the plot, but 
we also anticipate it will be upheld in some honorable manner. Assumed in 
this formula is the expectation of justice. Routinely, a western hero affi  rms 
the ideals of justice even if he must go beyond the parameters of law for 
justice to be realized.
Th e lack of ambiguity, the clear call to sacrifi cial duty on the part of the 
hero, is appealing to audiences. Part of the appeal is the visceral delight audi-
ences experience watching the bad guy reap what he has sown. Audiences 
may suspend reality and vicariously participate in the fi nal overcoming of 
injustice. In this process, a predictable, unambiguous code is comforting. A 
clear call to sacrifi cial duty is celebrated, yet it is oft en true that the results 
are not as clean as the formula might predict.
Martha Nussbaum claims that despite its appeal, a Kantian approach 
to moral duty is insuffi  cient, precisely because of the generality of the cat-
egorical imperative. She interprets and contemporizes Aristotle, applying 
his ethics to fi ction and society. Her view concerning moral inquiry calls 
for a particularized, contextualized, and social approach. Following her 
lead, one might well conclude that an absolute allegiance to duty can in fact 
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bring about injustice. Duty ethics may neglect individual concerns said to 
be served by the would-be hero bound to his absolute code. Moreover, since 
Kant’s call to moral duty does not allow for exceptions, particular nuances 
may be overlooked. Such an appeal to duty may in fact sacrifi ce anyone or 
anything for absolute principle. In certain western fi lms, a call to duty may 
sacrifi ce the well-being of the individual hero and related family and soci-
etal members, and may even cause (at least indirectly) injustice to occur in 
the guise of moral duty.
Nussbaum, following Aristotle’s lead, argues that Kantian ethics are not 
suffi  ciently just because they fail to do justice to particulars.7 Because there 
are no exceptions to the Kantian imperative, there can be no sensitivity to 
context, such as when individuals struggle with ethical dilemmas found in 
race, class, and gender relations. Nonetheless, a rational, absolutist ethic 
persists in western fi lms, and is oft en presumed to be ideal. Upon exami-
nation, however, it is possible to understand that the tension between an 
Enlightenment ideal and frontier confl ict results in a tremendous price for 
the one committed to an idealistic code. Th e price is evident in any number 
of popular westerns, including Lonesome Dove (Simon Wincer, 1989), 3:10 to 
Yuma (James Mangold, 2007), and the recent Appaloosa (Ed Harris, 2008). 
In each of these fi lms, signifi cant refl ection occurs on the part of the heroes 
about the ultimate worth of living by an absolute devotion to honor. Similar 
refl ection and uncertainty are also found in westerns set in the twentieth 
century, such as Lonely Are the Brave (David Miller, 1962), Legends of the 
Fall (Edward Zwick, 1994), and All the Pretty Horses (Billy Bob Th ornton, 
2000). Here, too, in these more modern extensions of the previous era, the 
heroic ideal is assumed. In each fi lm, despite the appeal of the hero types, 
the audience is left  with profound doubt concerning the value of their ide-
alistic postures. In so-called postmodern westerns that employ antiheroes 
or intentionally subvert the notion of honor, fi lms such as Th e Wild Bunch 
(Sam Peckinpah, 1969), Unforgiven (Clint Eastwood, 1992), and No Country 
for Old Men (Ethan and Joel Coen, 2007), the notion of absolute honor is 
either parodied or reduced to complete ineff ectiveness by certain important 
characters. If we were to recognize the continuing infl uence of the western 
in contemporary areas of popular culture, for example, the military code 
demonstrated in A Few Good Men (Rob Reiner, 1992), there, too, we would 
see the lingering eff ect of misplaced honor.
Nussbaum identifi es and expands upon three dimensions of Aristo-
tle’s attack on absolute rationalism: “An attack on the claim that all valu-
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able things are commensurable. An argument for the priority of particular 
judgments to universals. A defense of the emotions and the imagination as 
essential to rational choice.”8 Contrary to the absolutist approach, Nussbaum 
argues that not every ethical inquiry or situation has the same value. Some 
choices are more important than others when considering action based on 
moral motivation. All consequences are not equal, nor are the assumptions 
of motive, perception, or expectations similar in all participants. And, as 
is usually precluded in a rationalist system, the emotions, not just reason, 
should determine moral choosing.
Nussbaum’s understanding of moral duty requires a relative and practi-
cal social component rather than an absolute ideal.9 What good does it do to 
uphold a code of honor in an attempt to be morally correct if that very code 
causes oppression or injustice to others in a related context? Th e collateral 
damage to those directly involved and to those peripherally aff ected should 
also be considered, rather than appealing stoically and stubbornly to an idea 
and willfully refusing to consider mitigating, confl icting circumstances. Her 
starting point for ethical inquiry begins with the question: “How should one 
live?”—which is quite diff erent than the Kantian question: “What is my moral 
duty?” Nussbaum argues that the Kantian question “assume[s] that there is 
a sphere of ‘moral’ values that can be separated off  from all the other prac-
tical values that fi gure in a human life.” She contends that one who chooses 
morally does so based on practical concerns. An act of choosing, she argues, 
is not a priori; it is not based on motives intrinsic to humankind (as Kant 
believes). Rather, its foundation lies in concert with a concern for one’s “own 
practical ends.” She argues that people making moral choices
do not inquire in a “pure” or detached manner, asking what the truth 
about ethical value might be as if they were asking for a description 
of some separately existing Platonic reality. Th ey are looking for 
something in human life, something, in fact, that they themselves 
are going to try to bring about in their lives. What they are asking 
is not what is the good “out there,” but what can we best live by, and 
live together as social beings? Th eir results are constrained, and 
appropriately constrained, by their hopes and fears for themselves, 
their sense of value, what they think they can live with.10
A critical tension exists, then, between the supposed oughtness sensed by 
important fi gures in many western fi lms, and how the undoing of that value, 
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resulting from idealistic presuppositions and implications, violates the very 
clarity assumed by the moral code. Since humans are capable of rational 
deliberation, a rationalist, idealistic approach to ethics is oft en presumed, 
but the simplifi cation of human rationality fails to consider the broader, 
complex constitution of human behavior. An ethics based on this broader 
understanding becomes, in the end, a preferable, more just conclusion.
“I’ve Never Run Before; I’ve Got to Go Back”
High Noon is, for many people, the ultimate western. In the fi lm, an aging 
Will Kane (Gary Cooper, in an Oscar-winning role) marries his Quaker 
sweetheart (Grace Kelly) on the same day he resigns his duties as sheriff . At 
the celebration among his friends, Kane is declared to be a free man. Before 
the newlyweds can leave, however, word arrives that Kane’s nemesis, Frank 
Miller (Ian MacDonald), has been released from prison and is to arrive on 
the noon train and join his gang to seek revenge against Kane, who was 
responsible for sending him to prison. Kane is assured by the elders of the 
town that everything will be fi ne, that they can handle the situation. Kane 
is free to go. In fact, he is encouraged to leave by his former employers and 
constituents. Technically, the town is no longer his responsibility. A poten-
tial confl ict in this town is not his fi ght anymore.
Surely the lasting appeal of this movie is grounded in Sheriff  Kane’s defi -
ance against criminals bent on revenge. Kane has the easier option of leaving 
town and avoiding confl ict, yet when he is just a few miles out of town the 
plot reverses itself. Deep in troubled thought, Kane stops his carriage, turns 
around, and returns to town, determined to meet one last challenge. He can-
not leave town knowing of Frank Miller’s presence there. As he explains to 
his protesting wife: “I’ve never run before. I’ve got to go back.” He believes 
that Miller would just follow them anyway, so it is better to confront him and 
be done with it. Kane’s refusal to run, his stoic appeal to duty, then, becomes 
the primary theme that drives the movie. Th is ultimate hero, honor-bound 
to uphold justice, renounces pleasure as well as safety to defend a town that 
no longer employs him. Kane’s sense of duty is absolute.
Apparently Kane assumes the town really needs him and truly wants 
his protective leadership, but back in town, he is surprised and disappointed 
to discover that no one will help him. Th is fact leads Kane to recognize the 
dilemma confronting him. Despite his disappointment and the resulting 
intensifi ed anxiety, he chooses to face the Miller gang anyway—alone—
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regardless of potential cost. For Kane, his personal safety and the well-being 
of the town are one and the same, but his fellow citizens, in refusing to help 
him as he had anticipated they would, apparently do not read the situation 
in that manner.
Despite the kind gestures of those attending his wedding ceremony, evi-
dently there is no unanimous aff ection for Kane, though people grudgingly 
recognize that he was a good sheriff . In fact, several of those whom he served 
seem almost happy to see him desperately squirm under the imminent threat. 
Some feel that he is acting out of fear; others believe he is simply vindictive. 
No one, friends, enemies, or detached bystanders, believes that his eff orts 
will have a positive outcome. Kane’s sense of duty, however, is undeterred. 
On this fateful Sunday morning, he appeals to citizens in the saloon and 
in the church. In both places, he is met with a resistance that seems to be 
motivated by fear and a desire for self-preservation, but is rationalized as 
right by the individuals involved. Th e response of the citizens forces Kane’s 
hand, and in a Kantian sense of duty, he chooses to stand alone despite 
personal cost. Kane’s solitary and heroic stand is dramatically pronounced 
when one of Kane’s enemies, one of the Miller brothers, is toasted in the 
saloon. His popularity is strikingly contrasted with disapproval and even 
disdain for their former sheriff . Th e offi  cial deputy, Harvey (Lloyd Bridges), 
is overcome with jealousy of Kane. His contrasting image is demonstrated 
in several ways in the fi lm. Th e opposite of Kane, Harvey craves attention 
and material reward though he is a coward and has no real sense of moral 
duty. As the clock hauntingly ticks toward high noon and the arrival of the 
train, Kane’s resolve is galvanized, though the chances of survival for this 
aging lawman seem remote.
Kane risks his life, and to his way of thinking, he is not acting out of 
petty self-interest. He is desperately trying to guarantee the safety of this 
town. He cannot distinguish his personal confl ict with Miller from the good 
of the community. Presumably, he might also feel personal obligation based 
on the assumption that he is responsible for bringing danger to the town. 
Sheriff  Kane’s decision, then, illustrates Immanuel Kant’s sense of moral 
obligation, namely, the rational duty to act on the basis of the categorical 
imperative and not on the basis of self-interest. Even if death is likely, one 
is bound to exercise one’s sense of the absolute. Kant does recognize one’s 
duty to preserve one’s own life, but such self-preservation is secondary, not 
primary, and properly speaking is not a moral concern. One may protect 
one’s life “in conformity with duty, but not from the motive of duty.”11 In the 
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case of Sheriff  Kane, the motive of duty, protecting a town and preventing 
a criminal from revenge, calls him to risk his happiness and his life. In this 
unfortunate instance, duty does not conform with self-preservation, so the 
motive of duty takes precedence.
In the end, his new wife breaks her religious vow of pacifi sm and shoots 
one of the gang members in the back, helping Kane survive. But at what 
cost? In the concluding scene, Kane throws the offi  cial sheriff ’s star in the 
dirt, suggesting his disgust for his fellow citizens who failed to act. But this 
act also suggests self-contempt, frustration that this day had to occur at all. 
It is appropriate to ask why so many citizens in the town are disinclined to 
help Kane. Why do so many of them hold some type of grudge against Kane? 
Could it be that his absolutist ethics have caused unnecessary strife and divi-
sion? At least this much is certain: there is no celebration in his triumph 
over Miller. Th e hero maintains his status, as demanded by his code. He acts 
heroically, but clearly he is dissatisfi ed with the whole process of trying to 
do right, of trying to protect people who won’t help themselves.
“I’ll Have No Female Boys Bearing My Name”
In Th e Ox-Bow Incident, a similar homage to absolute duty is evident. It 
could be argued that despite the personal and familial toll, Kane’s actions in 
High Noon generally help a society, and that a sense of justice results. In Th e 
Ox-Bow Incident, however, clearly an absolute sense of duty leads to a gross 
injustice. In this story, a herd of cattle is stolen, which is a hanging off ense. 
Circumstantial evidence points to three unsuspecting cattlemen who have 
recently purchased a herd. Th e circumstantial evidence stirs a mob mental-
ity. Th e sheriff  and judge are not immediately available, so citizens decide 
to take matters into their own hands. Refusing to wait for the offi  cial rep-
resentatives of law and order, they form a vigilante posse, but in their rush 
to judgment three innocent men are hanged.
Contrary to Kane’s dilemma in High Noon, in which he could not fi nd 
any legitimate help against Miller, in Ox-Bow, the citizens are all too eager to 
involve themselves in a misguided, vigilante posse. Th e mob comes to order 
only when Major Tetley (Frank Conroy) arrives on the scene. Before Tetley’s 
arrival, Arthur Davies (Harry Davenport), a merchant, speaks passionately 
against the hastily and illegally formed posse, but it is Tetley who provides 
authoritative leadership to the mob. Based on his clearly articulated rational 
sense of duty, he demands that the vigilantes be functionally democratic. 
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He requires that the men listen to a variety of arguments before proceeding 
with the hanging. Most citizens do not resist Tetley; they are either afraid 
of him or they are convinced in their own minds that the accused are guilty 
and feel that the hanging is right and necessary.
Tetley convinces his fellow citizens in no small part because of his appeal 
to honor. In his diatribes he emphasizes the duty of this citizen posse to hang 
these cattle thieves, despite the arguments against rushing to judgment. More 
than once he is sarcastically referred to as “God-Almighty-Tetley”—yet in 
his attempt to play God, that is, to administer fi nal justice, clearly he fails 
in what Nussbaum refers to as the particulars of a situation.
Even if Tetley had been proven to be right and the three suspects truly 
had been guilty, several violations of others occur in this miscarriage of due 
process. Foremost, the end does not justify the means. In his fervor, Tetley 
viciously attacks anyone who doubts the process he has initiated or ques-
tions the tactics of how to pursue the accused men, or even those who sim-
ply want more than circumstantial evidence before hanging them. What is 
true of Tetley is also true of several others in the posse. When mob action 
occurs, the collective attitudes and acts of individual members who fear 
being labeled as dishonorable only cause the chaos to be increased expo-
nentially. In other words, idealistic allegiance to a code deteriorates into an 
indulgent rampage to pacify egos propped up by a false ideology. To be fair, 
Tetley’s behavior is not the sort of duty that Kant endorses. Tetley’s actions 
may well demonstrate Nietzsche’s view that reason is a tool of the will, not 
an autonomous entity. Kant is aware, however, that human will can be put 
in the service of self-interest. With Tetley, the problem seems to be that self-
interest and emotion may masquerade as reason. Another uncomfortable 
possibility is that Tetley honestly thinks that he is being reasonable and fair 
and in fact not operating on the basis of self-interest. Whether he is hid-
ing his true intentions or whether he is simply blinded by his allegiance to 
an absolutist code, in either case, the same unfortunate miscarriage of jus-
tice results. Th is possibility of enabling injustice or even the failure to fully 
appropriate actual justice, inherent within a limited, codifi ed behavior, is 
precisely what concerns Nussbaum.
Tetley posits himself as just and fair, allowing for things to be done 
“regular” in accordance with what the judge would approve (had the judge 
been available). He prides himself on his ability to cross-examine the three 
accused men. In a methodological manner, he considers the defendants’ 
claims before dismissing each one based on his understanding of contrary 
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evidence. His matter-of-fact method terrorizes the defendants, humiliates 
the handful of riders who disagree with his tactics, and even irks the mem-
bers of the posse who are eager to hang the accused. Nonetheless, Tetley 
successfully argues that as leader of the posse, he is doing what the major-
ity of the community desires and demands. Ironically, it is his view that his 
manner and process protect them all against anarchy.
Among Tetley’s several fl aws, one of the most grievous is his harsh rela-
tionship with his son Gerald (William Eythe). He forces his son not only 
to ride with the posse against his will, but also to actively participate in the 
details of executing the men. Whenever Gerald falters, Major Tetley is quick 
to insult his son in front of the other men. It is his futile attempt to make 
his son into a masculine authority worthy of typical western iconography, 
and to eradicate what he believes to be his son’s weak, feminine traits. Of 
course, his parental approach comes crashing down when his son later kills 
himself. Tetley’s manner with Gerald has proved to be an ongoing sacrifi cial 
rite to protect his own public image, an image polished with the blood of 
honor. In the end, facing the devastating consequences of this projection, 
Tetley kills himself, suggesting that his public demeanor of strength belied a 
desperation deep within. Perhaps no clearer picture could be painted of the 
potential perils associated with the blindness of one obsessed with honor in 
an absolute, idealistic sense.
Tetley assumes a false dichotomy, pitting a skewed view of masculinity 
against anything that does not fi t the prototype, such as women, minorities, 
or men who are physically weaker or who lack the taste for blood that Tetley 
seems to enjoy. Secure in his code of honor, he mistakes neighbors for sub-
ordinates, and like all arrogant types who cling to false notions of honor, he 
is apparently blind to the extent of his hubris, all the while suppressing his 
self-destructive inclinations or transferring them onto weaker victims, like 
the three men unjustly hanged or like his son. Th e result of Tetley’s action 
is darker than that of Sheriff  Kane, yet his methods illustrate the frighten-
ing potential inherent within an absolute, rational methodology. Nussbaum 
argues: “Frequently a reliance on the powers of intellect can actually become 
an impediment to true ethical perception, by impending or undermining 
those responses.” Reason can become a “dangerous master” because of its 
“incomplete perception.”12
Tetley’s character must also be considered within the context of his 
most outspoken critic, Arthur Davies. Th e physical and emotional contrast 
between the two principals is signifi cant. Tetley is cool and calculating while 
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Davies is emotional, though not irrational. Both men appeal to their fellow 
riders as a jury, each trying to convince the others of the rightness of his 
position. Finally, in a gesture of democracy, in mocking deference to Davies, 
Tetley allows a majority vote, but as he predicted, most of the riders are too 
intimidated to vote against him, despite a growing uncertainty about the 
ugly business before them. Davies off ers a diff erent approach, one that is not 
absolute, not preoccupied with honor for honor’s sake in a detached, foren-
sic sense. Rather, he is capable of reading the particular situation even as he 
understands the varying levels of potential guilt. As Nussbaum’s discourse 
suggests, Davies is informed—and, more important, cautioned—by emo-
tions, rather than driven by abstract ideology. She states, “Emotions may 
aft er all in many cases be an invaluable guide to correct judgment. . . . [Th e] 
general and universal formulations [like Kant’s categorical imperative] may 
be inadequate to the complexity of particular situations . . . immersed par-
ticular judgments may have a moral value that refl ective and general judg-
ments cannot capture.”13 Admittedly, Davies is not absolutely certain of the 
guilt or innocence of the accused, but in his thoughtful deliberations, clearly 
he fi nds it more humane and just to err on the side of caution. His honor, 
to use that term, demands that the men not execute the accused until every 
lead has been thoroughly—that is, empirically—investigated and verifi ed. 
Tetley and most others are quite satisfi ed that they have enough evidence 
and that the process of investigation has been suffi  ciently fair. Unfortunately, 
the line between honor and vengeance is drawn too fi nely, too fi ne to be of 
practical use in a democracy. Tetley and his eager comrades should cause 
us to consider the contaminating eff ect of lust for power emerging within 
the call to duty.
Th e unjust hanging validates some of Nussbaum’s concerns about abso-
lutist duty-bound ethics. First, consider the notion of commensurability. All 
three men who are hanged are considered equals in their transgression, but 
the dialogue in the fi lm clarifi es that mitigating situations should be con-
sidered. One old man is nearly senile. Another is openly defi ant, while the 
third is heartbroken by the fact that his wife and children will suff er. One is 
the boss of the outfi t, who either paid for the cattle or ordered them to be 
stolen. Tetley’s view assumes they all are equal coconspirators. Tetley’s honor-
bound pursuit of these men, likewise, casts a wide net against women, his 
son, and the black minister. Also, consider the emotion of Davies. Ironically, 
like western iconic heroes, he has the courage to stand alone, yet his convic-
tions do not stem merely from a detached code that threatens to simplify the 
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nature of law and order. Rather, they are alive and arise out of the complex 
situation before him. He derives his conclusions not merely from a sense 
of duty, but from a careful and deliberate reading of the particulars of the 
situation. In Nussbaum’s words, the “universalizable does not . . . determine 
every dimension of choice.”14
High Noon and Th e Ox-Bow Incident suggest another important, oft en 
overlooked consequence of living strictly by code. When something goes 
wrong, that is, when the ideal formula fails in a complex, real-life situa-
tion, scapegoating the hero becomes an easy way for citizens to deny their 
individual responsibility. It is too easy to blame Kane or Tetley or others of 
their kind, when, in fact, a democracy would demand justice on the part of 
all its citizens. Perhaps an absolute allegiance to honor and duty lends itself 
to scapegoating because the code is easily recognizable and unequivocally 
associated with the actions of the supposed isolated hero, whereas a social 
question raised by Nussbaum would emphasize a communal approach 
toward the responsibility of discovering and implementing justice.15
Th e western hero, bound to his sense of duty, is so entrenched in our 
popular culture that it routinely recurs in fi lms such as A Few Good Men. In 
this fi lm, two Marines are court-marshaled for the death of a fellow soldier. 
Th eir defense is that they obeyed the code of honor intrinsic to their unit. 
In the end, the code is proven to be not only ineff ective but also destructive 
and unjust. At the conclusion of the trial, one convicted Marine (James Mar-
shall), relying on his indoctrination into an absolute code, exclaims: “What 
did we do wrong? We did nothing wrong.” His friend, superior offi  cer, and 
fellow dishonorably discharged Marine (Wolfgang Bodison) answers him: 
“Yeah, we did. We were supposed to fi ght for the people who couldn’t fi ght 
for themselves.” In this fi lm, clearly, the allegiance to a code not only fails to 
fulfi ll any possible intention of justice, it signifi cantly contributes to injus-
tice. Lest anyone think such a discussion is merely academic, even a casual 
understanding of recent political debate concerning water-boarding, Abu 
Ghraib, and detainees at Gitmo should remind us of the consequences of 
attempting to substitute the implementation of a code for true justice.
Concluding Questions and Implications
Ethical choice is rarely easy. Determining the right course of action out of 
several possibilities or truly knowing the role self-interest plays in a choice 
can be perplexing. It is precisely because of such diffi  culty that the complexi-
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ties involved in ethical inquiry should be all the more appreciated rather 
than simplifi ed.
Questions remain, however, concerning the role of honor. Moral courage 
is necessary, but is a heroic posture always admirable? How do we determine 
the line between bravery, courage, and heroism and pride, vindictive fool-
ishness, or immorality posing as a legal process? Bertrand Russell (1872–
1970), like Nussbaum, argues that the consequences of moral choice (not 
merely abstract principles) must be considered. He, too, doubts the practi-
cal effi  cacy of a pure Kantian ethic. He argues, “Kant . . . states emphatically 
that virtue does not depend upon the intended result of an action, but only 
on the principle of which it is itself a result; and if this is conceded, noth-
ing more concrete than his [categorical imperative] maxim is possible. . . . 
If taken seriously, it would make it impossible to reach a decision whenever 
two people’s interest confl ict.”16 In the case of Will Kane, we will never know 
what might—and more important, what might not—have happened had he 
moved on with his newly married life and avoided the confl ict with Miller. As 
the fi lm’s text says, Kane believes that Miller would have pursued him, but that 
is not absolutely certain. It could be argued that his dramatic return to town 
is, in eff ect, a preemptive act that in fact keeps the old confl ict alive. Given his 
isolation, Kane seems forced to act as he does, but it is to be remembered that 
his return to the town contributes directly to this life-or-death showdown. His 
return to face Miller is not completely devoid of self-interest.
Perhaps a satisfying balance to this discussion can be found in the les-
sons that fi ction teaches. David Novitz (1945–2001), in Knowledge, Fic-
tion and Imagination, explains that fi ction informs its audiences of various 
types of knowledge, including propositional, factual events, practical skills 
of survival and coping, acquiring values and new perspectives on familiar 
dilemmas or new perceptions regarding aspects of our environment.17 Most 
important, and very much in line with the traditional Aristotelian idea of 
catharsis and pathos, Novitz suggests that fi ction teaches empathetic knowl-
edge: “Fiction enables its readers to acquire beliefs about, indeed knowledge 
of, what it feels like to be in certain complex and demanding situations.”18 
Empathy for individuals within complex situations may be the highest good 
fi ction can off er. Perhaps fi ctive situations provide at least some semblance 
of understanding for one who resorts to a code to demonstrate honor. In 
the two fi lms discussed here, the results of moral choosing off er a strong 
contrast. Kane’s decision, it could be argued, turns out with some degree 
of satisfaction (though it is debatable what degree and kind of satisfaction 
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fi nally is established). Tetley’s action, of course, represents gross injustice. 
Yet, as I have attempted to demonstrate, both Kane and Tetley operate 
from a similar assumption of duty. Given the stories, it is certainly easier 
to sympathize with Kane rather than Tetley, but, more important, perhaps 
it would be well to consider Novitz’s claim of empathy. How might any one 
of us act when faced with a perceived threat to our personal and communal 
well-being? It is this fact of potential misperception and shared human vul-
nerability, however, that argues most persuasively for Nussbaum’s approach 
to contextualized ethics. We must consider the possibility that our leaders, 
even we ourselves as individuals in a functioning democracy, potentially 
run the risk of unnecessary trauma, oppression, or miscarriage of justice 
by relying all too readily on a seductive, one-dimensional approach when 
faced with moral choices.
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“BACK OFF TO WHAT?”
Th e Search for Meaning in Th e Wild Bunch
Richard Gaughran
Th e Year of the Bunch
Much has been written and said about Sam Peckinpah’s Th e Wild Bunch 
(1969) and the way it departs from the western genre in its violence and in 
its disruption of expectations concerning the moral stature of its heroes. Th e 
most sympathetic characters in the fi lm, to be sure, are outlaws who do their 
share of killing and more, to paraphrase a line from the fi lm. In fact, they 
do a lot more than their share. However, the disturbing aspects of Th e Wild 
Bunch should not cause viewers to dismiss the fi lm as dishing up gore for 
its own sake, labeling Peckinpah “Bloody Sam,” as some have done.
In fact, the philosophical movement that has come to be called exis-
tentialism, with roots in the nineteenth century but most fully articulated 
in the twentieth by writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, 
opens ways of understanding Peckinpah’s violent masterpiece. Th e fi lm, to 
be sure, is disturbing. But its unsettling qualities suggest a world that has 
become unhinged in the ways existentialist thought asserts and to which it 
provides a response. As philosopher Gordon Marino puts it in his anthol-
ogy of existentialist writers, “Th e existential movement is a response to the 
disenchantment of the world, that is, to the sense that the history and social 
structure of the world are not God-sanctioned.” Marino further points out 
that the movement’s popularity can perhaps be attributed to “the abattoir 
of the twentieth century.”1
To lay a foundation for examining the ways existentialist thought aids 
our understanding of Th e Wild Bunch, it is useful to examine the era in which 
the action of the fi lm takes place, since the political and cultural changes 
of the time were cataclysmic, reverberating around the world, and these 
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transformations impinge upon the fi lm’s view of human identity, human 
freedom, and the characters’ options.
Most westerns are set in the second half of the nineteenth century. Viewers 
expect the stars to be riding on horses, not in cars. Th e railroad appears oft en 
within examples of the genre, of course, and steamboats are likewise permissible. 
But no automobiles, and certainly no airplanes. Peckinpah’s masterpiece takes 
place not in the nineteenth century, however, but in 1913. And it prominently 
features an automobile, just as does the director’s follow-up, Th e Ballad of Cable 
Hogue (1970), in many ways a comedic counterpoint to Th e Wild Bunch.2 Fur-
thermore, the appearance of the automobile in the earlier fi lm occasions a brief 
discussion among members of the Bunch about airplanes, with Pike Bishop 
(William Holden) declaring that “they” plan to use them in “the war.”3
Th is reference to war implies that these new machines possess destruc-
tive power. Indeed, the cars that appear in both Th e Wild Bunch and in Th e 
Ballad of Cable Hogue are instruments of harm. Th e car in Th e Wild Bunch 
drags the battered Angel (Jaime Sanchez) through Agua Verde, and in the 
later fi lm Hogue (Jason Robards) is fatally injured when a car rolls over 
him. Machines represent a serious threat to human life as it has been lived 
till this time. Cecilia Tichi, commenting on the rise of new technologies in 
this period, says, “Machine technology . . . sometimes comes to represent 
uncontrolled, destabilizing power.”4
Peckinpah introduces the automobile in Th e Wild Bunch quite sud-
denly, without preparing the audience. Paul Seydor cogently comments on 
the director’s impulses in this regard: “Th e fi lmmaking itself is . . . made to 
convey what it must have felt like to see this strange thing for the fi rst time. 
No one prepared the people in this village for the automobile—suddenly it 
was there, and suddenly life was diff erent.”5 It may be more than coincidence 
that 1913, the year of the action of Th e Wild Bunch, was also the year that 
Henry Ford fi rst introduced the moving assembly line for the manufacture 
of automobiles.6 It was also the year the Lincoln Highway was dedicated, 
the fi rst highway to link the nation’s two coasts.7
Th e period that provides the setting for Th e Wild Bunch introduced 
more than technological change, however. Th e Mexican Revolution was at 
a crucial stage; the fi lm itself depicts members of the Wild Bunch as play-
ing a role in the confl ict. On another continent, war was rapidly changing 
national boundaries on the Balkan Peninsula. And war on an even greater, 
unprecedented, scale was imminent, with Gavrilo Princip’s 1914 assassi-
nation of Archduke Franz Ferdinand about to ignite the First World War. 
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(Th e appearance of German advisors in Agua Verde encourages viewers of 
Th e Wild Bunch to think of the impending war.) Within a few years, great 
empires—the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman—would cease to exist, and 
the Bolsheviks would seize power in Russia.
Accompanying these technological and political transformations were 
new ways of thinking, new philosophies. Karl Marx spearheaded just one 
of these. Although Marx had written in the previous century, his ideas con-
cerning economic determinism and the progression of history found a foot-
hold in the 1910s. Th e ideas of Charles Darwin, another nineteenth-century 
thinker, were being digested in this period, presenting a challenge to the 
traditional understanding of human origins. Sigmund Freud, for his part, 
presented compelling but disturbing new ways of understanding the inter-
nal world of the individual.  His central work, Th e Interpretation of Dreams, 
though it had been published in German over a decade earlier, appeared in 
English for the fi rst time in the year of the Bunch: 1913.
Th ere were also important new artistic developments in this period—
again, more threats to the established order. In 1913, while members of the 
Bunch were shooting up south Texas and northern Mexico, in Paris Igor 
Stravinsky presented his Th e Rite of Spring for the fi rst time. Th is shocking 
departure from traditional musical form was met with hostility from crit-
ics and the audience; the police were fi nally called to quell a riot.8 In New 
York, again in 1913, the infamous Armory Show art exhibition took place, 
provoking ridicule and abuse in speech and print. Th e show included works 
such as Marcel Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase, scandalous not for 
showing the naked female body, but for seemingly being devoid of any form 
other than a cascade of numerous fl esh-colored geometrical shapes—far 
diff erent from traditional depictions of the human body.
In 1913, the modern was being born.
Th is barrage of changes, these new ways of thinking about the universe 
and a human being’s place in it—or lack of place in it—resulted in a general 
feeling of anxiety in American lives. Tichi appropriately uses terms such as 
“agitation, restlessness, frenzy” to describe the “undisciplined, destabilizing 
energies loosed throughout American life.”9
“Maybe a Few Hymns Would Be in Order”?
Th is dizzying assortment of changes accompanied, if not caused, changes 
in traditional religious and spiritual orientation, with concomitant disrup-
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tion to views of morality. In the 1880s Friedrich Nietzsche—a precursor of 
twentieth-century existentialists—declared “God is dead,” meaning, of 
course, not that God had once existed and then expired but that “the belief in 
the Christian God has ceased to be believable.” Writing in the late nineteenth 
century, Nietzsche acknowledged that this realization had not yet come to 
the masses, but soon, he wrote, in “the coming century,” a new dawn would 
reveal a free horizon, “even granted that it is not bright.”10 If there is no God, 
then there is no Truth, at least not one with a capital T: “To acknowledge 
untruth as a condition of life: this clearly means resisting the usual value 
feelings in a dangerous manner; and a philosophy that risks such a thing 
would by that gesture alone place itself beyond good and evil.”11
Nietzsche refers to this new state of aff airs as “dangerous,” because with-
out God, or without an agreed-upon set of moral standards such as those 
established by Christianity, values, or truths in the lowercase, derive from the 
individual alone, opening up any number of possibilities: “Th e dangerous 
and uncanny point has been reached when the greatest, most diverse, most 
comprehensive life lives past the old morality. Th e ‘individual’ is left  standing 
there, forced to give himself laws, forced to rely on his own arts and wiles of 
self-preservation, self-enhancement, self-redemption. Th ere is nothing but 
new whys and hows; there are no longer any shared formulas.”12
In this context, a close look at the opening scenes of Th e Wild Bunch 
reveals just how thoroughly the fi lm discredits traditional religious belief 
and observance. In particular, Christianity and Christian pieties are subject 
to parody and ridicule. For one thing, the fi lm opens as the Bunch rides into 
Starbuck, a curious name for a town in south Texas, given that the town 
also seems to bear the perhaps older name San Rafael, a name inscribed 
on a building shown in the opening sequences. Th e name Starbuck seems 
strange, until one recalls that Starbuck is chief mate on the Pequod in Her-
man Melville’s Moby-Dick. He is the representative Christian man, the 
resident democrat, embodying ideals said to derive from God. But the self-
righteous Starbuck is ultimately ineff ectual, and he must submit to—and 
die under—a more primitive form of authority wielded by Captain Ahab. 
Likewise, this sleepy town in south Texas is ill equipped to handle pitiless 
power and unrestrained grasping, whether exercised by Pike and his men 
or by Harrigan (Albert Dekker) and his railroad.
Still, Christian references and imagery abound in Starbuck. Th e South 
Texas Temperance Union is engaged in a tent meeting as the Bunch rides 
in, and the fi lm’s opening credits roll against the cutting back and forth 
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between this meeting, presided over by Mayor Wainscoat (Dub Taylor), and 
the advance of the outlaws. Two philosophical approaches are juxtaposed: one 
Christian and traditional, one lawless and adrift , searching for new meanings 
with which to fi ll the void. Th ose who attend the tent meeting are uniformly 
old, or if not, then they look old. Th eir time has passed, and the fi lm’s irrever-
ently comic treatment of this meeting, with the self-righteous mayor inton-
ing a pledge that his audience tries unsuccessfully to repeat, underscores the 
ineff ectual nature of this set of values. When Pike suggests that his men fall 
into step with the marching Temperance Union, Dutch Engstrom’s (Ernest 
Borgnine) incredulous reaction again emphasizes the fi lm’s point that tradi-
tional belief and observance have been rendered obsolete. He reacts with an 
impish giggle. Crazy Lee’s (Bo Hopkins) mocking march with his hostages, 
to the tune of “Shall We Gather at the River,” has a similar eff ect.
To further emphasize the point, one of the bounty hunters, Coff er 
(Strother Martin), sports a cross around his neck. But in place of Christ’s body 
he has fastened a bullet. Coff er has taken the central symbol of one set of val-
ues and defaced it to signify a new reality. Th is new reality announces itself 
with the command Pike Bishop delivers just as the opening credits end and 
the director’s name is about to fl ash on the screen: “If they move, kill ’em!”
It becomes clearer as the fi lm continues that moving is the Bunch’s 
modus operandi. Th e outlaws, now diminished in number, retreat across 
the desert, along with a member who, shot in the face, can no longer see to 
ride. Aft er briefl y expressing his desire to persevere, he despairs, pleading 
with Pike to “fi nish it.” Aft er Pike complies, he poses a question to the others: 
“You boys wanna move on? Or stay here and give him a decent burial?” He 
pauses before the word decent. Th en he spits it out, almost contemptuously. 
Pike is asking the others to choose between his pragmatic decision to keep 
moving without delay and a traditional response to death, namely, Chris-
tian ritual. When Tector Gorch (Ben Johnson) refers to their dead comrade 
as “a good man” who deserves respectful treatment, Dutch intervenes with 
the appropriate sarcasm: “Maybe a few hymns would be in order, followed 
by a church supper. With a choir.” Th e world of 1913 is no longer the world 
of nineteenth-century poet Robert Browning’s character Pippa, who sings, 
“God’s in his heaven— / All’s right with the world!”13 Any meaning will have 
to come from a diff erent source, namely, as mentioned earlier, the individual, 
upon whom the responsibility for all values now rests.
A problem arises, or a danger, to again use Nietzsche’s language, in that 
actions originating from a purely subjective source might be destructive, 
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even murderous. Since life is absurd, an individual might decide upon any 
action at all, shrugging off  traditional qualms with a simple “Why not?” Sartre 
refers to this seeming diffi  culty by quoting Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s character 
Ivan Karamazov: “ ‘If God didn’t exist, everything would be possible.’ Th at 
is the very starting point of existentialism.”14
“Th ose Days Are Closin’ Fast”
Th e members of the Wild Bunch, however, are not thoroughly nihilistic. Th ey 
too cling, albeit tenuously, to values from the past. Tector’s impulse to dignify 
his fallen comrade’s death with a ritual, for example, reveals that a vestige of 
belief remains. And Pike in particular oft en forcefully professes his belief in 
certain values and a code of behavior that springs from those values. Aft er 
he stops Tector from dispatching Freddie Sykes (Edmond O’Brien), who 
has become an annoyance to the impatient Gorch brothers, Pike delivers a 
speech: “When you side with a man you stay with him. And if you can’t do 
that you’re like some animal. You’re fi nished. We’re fi nished. All of us.”
Pike himself, however, demonstrates how diffi  cult it is to remain faithful 
to such a code. Th e scene that follows fi nds him riding alongside Old Man 
Sykes, who starts a conversation by referring to Pike’s speech: “Hey, uh, that 
was a mighty fi ne talk you gave the boys back there about sticking together.” 
He then asks about his grandson, Clarence “Crazy” Lee: “Say, back there in 
Starbuck, how’d my boy do?” A fl ashback to the scene in Starbuck then inter-
rupts the conversation between Pike and Sykes, forcefully underscoring Pike’s 
betrayal. In Starbuck Pike gave Crazy Lee the meaningless task of guarding a 
small group of citizens and abandoned him to die, seemingly forgetting about 
him—or, perhaps, deliberately using this situation as a way of eliminating this 
mentally unstable and therefore unreliable member of the gang.
Sykes’s reminder of the values that Pike has just espoused comes just 
before the reminder that Pike hasn’t really been living by these values. Th e 
expression on Pike’s face in this scene communicates awareness of failure 
to live by his own codes. Yet he feebly attempts to excuse himself, saying 
to Sykes, “Why didn’t you tell me he was your grandson?” He is saying, in 
eff ect, I may not be living by my own rules, but I could have resorted to 
favoritism or nepotism if I had only known.
But the abandonment of Crazy Lee is only one of Pike’s failures. In fact, 
Pike will abandon Sykes himself—the very person he defended with his 
sticking-together speech—aft er the old man is wounded in the leg, a wound 
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recalling Pike’s own injury. Moreover, Pike and his men are running from 
a posse of bounty hunters because of Pike’s previous abandonment of Deke 
Th ornton (Robert Ryan), revealed, again, in fl ashbacks. Pike’s former part-
ner was captured and sent to prison aft er Pike reassured him that a knock 
on a door signaled nothing more than the delivery of champagne, not the 
law. He proclaims his certainty with a boast: “Being sure is my business!” 
But he is being careless, not sure, just as he is careless in getting wounded in 
the leg and getting his lover Aurora (Aurora Clavel) killed by her husband, 
again an event revealed in fl ashback.15
To reiterate, Pike knows he has failed in these instances. He tells Dutch 
about the loss of Aurora and how he was wounded—and viewers see the 
fl ashback to the episode—just as the outlaws are riding off  to rob an army 
supply train. Aft er talking about Aurora, Pike abruptly says to Dutch, “Th is 
is our last go-round, Dutch. Th is time we do it right.” His resolute tone here 
functions as a confession of past failures and an expression of his determina-
tion to make amends. Yet, as we shall see, he will be careless again, and he 
will abandon another member of his close circle, Angel—a failure addressed 
only in the bloody climax of the fi lm.
Pike’s failures deserve further scrutiny. To be sure, he fails to live up to 
his code. But the code itself has been rendered obsolete. It belongs to a pre-
vious era, the “Old West,” and the code is probably best exemplifi ed (within 
the Peckinpah canon, at least) in the character Steve Judd (Joel McCrea) 
from Ride the High Country (1962), who, nearing the end of his life, says, 
“I want to enter my own house justifi ed.” Th e manner in which Peckinpah 
chose to fi lm Judd’s death in that earlier fi lm is telling. Th e fallen hero sinks 
slowly to earth, like a setting sun, fi nally dropping below the screen. In this 
manner the fi lm suggests that the myth of the Old West has died, and with 
it a set of values—if that era and its values ever existed in the fi rst place. As 
critic Richard Whitehead says, Ride the High Country “is not only a celebra-
tion of the myth, it is also a requiem.”16
Signifi cantly, when we fi rst see Deke Th ornton—played by an actor with 
considerable experience in old-style westerns—he is waiting in ambush on 
a Starbuck rooft op, but he has dozed off , his aged, wrinkled face seeming 
to belong to an old man taking his aft ernoon nap rather than to a seasoned 
outlaw or bounty hunter. Th e leader of the bounty hunters, the members 
of the Temperance Union, the members of the Bunch—they are old, out 
of time. Aft er the botched robbery in Starbuck, Old Man Sykes point-
edly reminds the Bunch of the passing of time: “You boys ain’t gettin’ any 
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younger.” Pike then acknowledges the fact: “We gotta start thinkin’ beyond 
our guns. Th ose days are closin’ fast.” But the doors to those days are not 
closing; they are closed. Only the speeches and gestures remain. As Paul 
Schrader says, “Th e Westerners of Th e Wild Bunch have only the remnants 
of the code. Th ey mouth many of the familiar platitudes but the honor and 
the purpose are absent.”17
Several of the discussions among members of the Bunch reveal a group 
of men groping in the dark for meaning, as they engage in debates, albeit 
laconic ones, about values. One of the most pointed of these occurs aft er 
Sykes is shot by one of Th ornton’s men. Dutch curses Th ornton, to which 
Pike replies, “What would you do in his place? He gave his word.” When 
Dutch dismisses this consideration because Th ornton gave his word to a 
railroad, Pike stands by his absolutist position: “It’s his word.” He has no 
answer to Dutch’s impassioned relativistic response: “Th at’s not what counts; 
it’s who you give it to!”
Peckinpah’s previous fi lms similarly address the theme of adhering to 
one’s word. In Ride the High Country, Gil Westrum (Randolph Scott) tempts 
Steve Judd by saying, “You gave your word to a bank. Th e deal doesn’t 
count.” In this case, Judd doesn’t budge. His word is his word, and standing 
on it will keep him justifi ed as he enters his “own house.” In the follow-up 
to High Country, Major Dundee (1964), Captain Tyreen (Richard Harris) 
keeps his word to Dundee (Charlton Heston), a man he despises. In Dundee, 
however, the ground has shift ed somewhat, since Tyreen’s adherence to the 
code is complicated, as Deke Th ornton’s is, by a practical consideration: in 
both cases the keeping of one’s word keeps the character out of prison, and 
in Tyreen’s case most likely saves him from execution for the murder of a 
guard. In High Country the code remains in place, though relativist doubts 
lurk just over the horizon; in Dundee these doubts have begun to erode the 
code; by Th e Wild Bunch the erosion is complete, as Pike has no response 
to Dutch’s statement other than to internalize its implications, squinting his 
eyes and tightly pursing his lips.
Dutch and Pike engage in a similar exchange about values when the out-
laws sit at a table in Agua Verde, within sight of General Mapache (Emilio 
Fernandez). Dutch says the general is nothing more than a common ban-
dit, “grabbing all he can for himself.” When Pike jokes, “Like some others I 
could mention,” referring to himself and his men, Dutch takes off ense, again 
trying to make relativist distinctions: “Not so’s you’d know it, Mr. Bishop. 
We ain’t nothin’ like him; we don’t hang nobody.” Here again, the characters 
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are searching for moral clarity. Dutch’s point is arguable, of course. Pike and 
his men may not hang people, but they do plenty of indiscriminate killing, 
beginning in Starbuck and ending in Agua Verde. So the debate is unre-
solved, just as is the discussion of whether the inviolability of one’s word 
changes with the context.
But the unresolved nature of the debate is precisely the point: in this world 
no one can be certain what’s right and what’s wrong, whether one action has 
any more meaning than another. Seydor, in his intricate study of Peckinpah’s 
marriage of form and content in fi lm, mentions the frequent explosions, the 
collapsing bridges, the race against lit fuses and the like, as literal, concrete 
examples of what happens on an abstract plane. He paraphrases W. B. Yeats: 
“It is a world where things really do fall apart and the center does not hold 
for very long.”18 It is, in short, the world as Nietzsche describes it: “this mad 
chaos of confusion and desire.”19 Seydor further suggests that the unstable 
nature of Peckinpah’s fi lm world, on the concrete and abstract planes, speaks 
to an uncertain worldview: “Th e multiple perspectives that are the organizing 
principle of his fi lms suggest a mind dissatisfi ed with all absolutes, discontent 
with all certainties, disinclined to settle upon any simple explanations.”20
“You Have No Eyes”
Besides these pointed debates concerning moral issues, the dialogue of Th e 
Wild Bunch oft en involves disputed interpretations of the objective world, 
further implying that reality is uncertain, the world unstable. Aft er the failed 
robbery in Starbuck, the outlaws meet at their rendezvous point to discover 
that they have robbed the railroad offi  ce of simple washers. But at fi rst one 
of them, Tector Gorch, believes they are silver rings. For a brief moment 
he sees what he wants to see. But Tector’s vision gives him a less optimistic 
interpretation of Mexican vistas when the outlaws approach the Rio Grande. 
Angel, for his own subjective reasons, sighs, “Mexico lindo,” to which Tector’s 
brother Lyle (Warren Oates) says, “I don’t see nothin’ so lindo about it,” with 
Tector chiming in, “Just looks like more of Texas far as I’m concerned.” Angel 
counters, “Ah, you have no eyes,” both a romantic’s defense of his homeland 
and the fi lm’s suggestion that reality is purely subjective.
In eff ect, when these characters question each other about the nature 
of the world and its possible meanings, they implicitly illustrate Sartre’s 
notion of “forlornness,” which results, he says, from the awareness “that 
God does not exist and . . . we have to face all the consequences of this.”21 
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Individuals cannot refer to meanings provided beforehand, since there is 
no one outside of them to provide them: “If God does not exist, we fi nd no 
values or commands to turn to which legitimize our conduct . . . we have 
no excuse behind us, nor justifi cation before us.” Explaining existentialist 
philosophy’s emphasis on the subjective nature of reality, Sartre continues, 
“Th e existentialist does not think that man is going to help himself by fi nd-
ing in the world some omen by which to orient himself. Because he thinks 
that man will interpret the omen to suit himself.”22
Th e Wild Bunch’s characters illustrate the uncertain nature of their inter-
pretations in various other exchanges, some of them seemingly mundane, and 
these exchanges further underscore the fi lm’s general atmosphere of insta-
bility and uncertainty. When Deke Th ornton and his men arrive at the river 
crossing and stare across into Mexico, Th ornton, learning that Agua Verde is 
the closest substantial settlement, asks Coff er, “What’s in Agua Verde?” Cof-
fer replies, reasonably, “Mexicans. What else?” Coff er no doubt deliberately 
mishears the intent of Th ornton’s question for the sake of humor, but the 
exchange again hints that meanings are uncertain, words themselves fl uid.
Similarly, characters oft en misunderstand or misread what they are see-
ing, and sometimes they act upon these misunderstandings. When Angel 
shoots Teresa (Sonia Amelio), Zamorra (Jorge Russek) demands, “Why did 
he try to kill His Excellency?” When members of the Wild Bunch uncouple 
a section of the army supply train, the bewildered army offi  cer, who slept 
through the robbery, concludes that “the railroad deputies have robbed the 
train.” Because Th ornton and his men (the deputies in question) leave the 
train before the army contingent does, the offi  cer makes a faulty assump-
tion. He, too, has no eyes. In the ensuing gun battle, the misunderstanding 
becomes lethal, as the bounty hunters/deputies briefl y turn their guns on the 
pursuing army. “You stupid bastards! Why did you fi re at those soldiers?” 
asks an incensed Th ornton aft erward. His men lack an adequate answer. 
Viewers, however, are left  with the realization that the world has become 
unmoored and that reality is unfi xed. Individuals have a limited fi eld of 
vision, and their knowledge of the world around them is greatly restricted. 
Th ey see only what they are able to see or what they want to see. Indeed, 
reality has never been absolute, but the modern era brings this realization 
to the fore. As Sartre says, meaning does not originate from outside the 
individual. Instead, “it can only come from subjectivity.”23 As Peckinpah 
has remarked, referring to his characters in Th e Wild Bunch, “In a land for 
all intents and purposes without law, they made their own.”24
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Angel is the one member of the Bunch who consistently clings to a set of 
beliefs, and he fi nally dies for them. His very name suggests connections to 
an invisible realm, and his “Mexico lindo” quickly reveals his romanticism, if 
not his chauvinism. As the scene shift s to Mexico, particularly as the Bunch 
visit Angel’s village, Angel’s character comes into clearer focus. We learn that 
he idealizes women, viewing them, notably his Teresa, as chaste and incor-
ruptible. When he learns that Mapache has killed his father and that Teresa 
willingly left  with the general, he is especially concerned that Teresa’s purity 
might be compromised. Th e village elder, Don Jose (Chano Urueta), diag-
noses Angel’s idealism: “To him Teresa was like a goddess, to be worshipped 
from afar. Mapache knew she was a mango, ripe and waiting!”
In the steam bath scene in Agua Verde, Angel’s belief system collides 
with the other outlaws’ plans. He is unwilling to rob the supply train and 
thereby supply guns to the Mexican army, his people’s enemy. Dutch, who 
previously expressed sympathy for the revolutionary cause Angel supports, 
here mocks his friend, saying, “Noble, noble, very noble.” When Sykes then 
reminds Angel that he had no qualms about participating in the bloodlet-
ting in Starbuck, Angel says, “Th ey were not my people. I care about my 
people, my village, Mexico!”
Needless to say, Angel’s beliefs and his resulting actions put the Bunch 
in considerable danger in Agua Verde. His shooting of Teresa could easily 
have gotten him and all his companions killed. His insistence on redirecting 
some of the stolen guns to his village eventually does get him killed, and it 
provides the catalyst for the fi lm’s climactic bloodbath. But it is a mistake to 
conclude, as critic Michael Bliss does, that Th e Wild Bunch ultimately sanc-
tions Angel’s beliefs. Bliss argues, “It should be apparent that through our 
fi nal identifi cation with the Bunch, the fi lm virtually compels us to accept 
these ideals, thus making us over in its own image.”25 On the contrary, Angel’s 
beliefs are unrealistic regarding women, as we’ve seen. Furthermore, Angel’s 
privileging of his family, his village, and his country—however customary 
and widespread similar allegiances might be—still derives from an arbitrary, 
invented value system.
“Let’s Go!”
To be sure, some of Angel’s fellow outlaws express nostalgic sympathy for his 
worldview. Dutch wants the cause of Angel’s villagers to succeed—mostly, it 
seems, because he sees the repulsive contrast in Mapache and his kind. And 
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Pike, especially, harbors notions of hearth and home. He says he wanted to 
marry Aurora, and in the bathhouse scene he argues that Angel should get 
over his qualms about assisting Mapache by using his cut to buy distant 
ranches for his villagers. Yet even in this scene, Pike, when challenged by 
Angel to consider what he would do in Angel’s situation, says, “Ten thou-
sand cuts an awful lot of family ties.”
Angel’s ideals, in fact all ideals or notions of absolute value, are most 
forcefully undercut fairly early in the fi lm, on the night of the Starbuck 
debacle, as Dutch and Pike talk and sip whiskey while lying in their bed-
rolls. Pike declares, “I’d like to make one good score and back off .” Dutch 
poignantly asks, “Back off  to what?” Th e answer to this question comes in 
the form of approximately ten seconds of palpable silence, as the camera 
cuts from face to perplexed face. Clearly, these men are asking themselves 
about ultimate meanings, about what’s possible in the world in which they 
fi nd themselves. For a few seconds, they gaze into the abyss.
Pike seems to assume, with his “back off ,” that an a priori ground of 
meaning exists, whether it involves buying a ranch and raising a family, 
supporting a revolution that will lift  villagers from sadness and depriva-
tion, or ascending to a home on high reserved for those who remain faith-
ful to God. But the times in which they live, as well as experience, show the 
Bunch that no fate has been predetermined. God is dead, and the characters 
of Th e Wild Bunch demonstrate through their actions that they know that 
this is true, whether they say so or not. Th ere is nothing to affi  rm except 
that humans exist on the earth. Th ere are no answers to the question why 
except ones human beings provide for themselves. And when members of 
the Bunch commit themselves to action by saying “Why not?”—as Pike 
and Lyle do at diff erent key moments—they acknowledge that no ground 
of absolute value exists. Sartre puts it this way: “All possibility of fi nding 
values in a heaven of ideas disappears along with Him [God]; there can no 
longer be an a priori Good, since there is no infi nite and perfect conscious-
ness to think it. Nowhere is it written that the Good exists, that we must 
be honest, that we must not lie; because the fact is we are on a plane where 
there are only men.”26
Th ornton’s frustrated declaration to his incompetent, undisciplined men 
(“egg-suckin’, chicken-stealin’ gutter-trash”) about the Wild Bunch—“We’re 
aft er men, and I wish to God I was with them”—takes on new resonance in 
this context. Th ornton has this wish partly because his former partner and 
his men still have choices left  to them, whereas Th ornton has been given 
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an ultimatum by Harrigan (“thirty days to get Pike, or thirty days back to 
Yuma”), and Th ornton has sealed the ultimatum with his “word.” In eff ect, 
Th ornton has freely chosen to have limited choice, and Harrigan himself 
implies that such is the case when he worries that his “Judas goat” might 
exercise other options in running off  with the other bounty hunters or in 
rejoining the Bunch. “You’d like that, wouldn’t you?” he says to Th ornton, 
who acknowledges that he would but that his “need” takes precedence over 
his desires. Nevertheless, he remains envious of the Bunch, of whom Pike 
can say with some justifi cation, “We’re not associated with anybody.”
In their fi reside conversation about backing off , Dutch and Pike are 
merely talking. But talk or good intentions count for nothing in a universe 
that provides no ground for meaning. Only in action can they affi  rm mean-
ing. As Sartre puts it, “Action is the only thing that enables a man to live.”27 
Robert Culp, in an appreciation of Peckinpah published shortly aft er release 
of Th e Wild Bunch, echoes this theme:
Finally, in the least creature on this earth, only the quality of his 
behavior is important to survival, to establish intrinsic value. Th at’s 
all there is. Th e rest is literally only talk. And talk is a trick of the 
mind, not very reliable: Th e Bunch spits in death’s eye (for us), 
embraces the fi nal knowledge of every man (for us), that he must 
at the end go down alone and must do it well. Th ey don’t talk about 
it, they just do it. For us. . . . All that Sartre and Camus have done 
from their massive, agonized intelligence, Peckinpah attempts em-
pirically from his guts.28
Th e Wild Bunch announces the theme of action very early, in a remark 
by an offi  cial in the Starbuck railroad offi  ces that the Bunch is about to 
rob. Th e scene provides no context for the remark, no information about 
the person to whom it is addressed. Rather, the fi lm includes this speech, 
delivered before the fi nal opening credits, solely to announce a theme. Th e 
offi  cial is scolding an employee: “I don’t care what you meant to do; it’s what 
you did I don’t like.”
Furthermore, the fi lm repeatedly reminds viewers of this theme of action 
in the refrain “Let’s go!” Pike barks it out more than the other characters 
do, but Th ornton and Coff er use it, as does even Mapache, albeit in Span-
ish. In this brief exhortation, the characters establish themselves as Camus’ 
rebels, those who recognize their absurd condition. Th ey reside in a world 
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without intrinsic meaning. Death is the only certain future. Yet the rebel 
refuses to surrender. “Rebellion,” Camus says, “is one of the essential dimen-
sions of man. It is our historic reality. Unless we choose to ignore reality, 
we must fi nd our values in it.”29 Peckinpah’s instincts, or his deliberations, 
were correct in having the phrase spoken in isolation, brief and undiluted 
by longer speech. (Admittedly, Pike adds, “ . . . you lazy bastard” on a couple 
of occasions.) Walon Green, Peckinpah’s cowriter of Th e Wild Bunch, has 
commented on the brevity of the phrase: “Th at was the place in the fi lm for 
a speech, you know, that’s where the guys should’ve said what their whole 
thing was about. . . . It did just say ‘Let’s go,’ and it was really Sam’s direction 
that made the line work.”30
Th e line works, as Seydor has said, because it expresses Peckinpah’s 
notion of character, which “views people not as fi xed and limited but as fl uid 
and dynamic.” Furthermore, the line encapsulates the Bunch’s “fundamental 
dialectic, which is drawn not between life and death, but between movement 
and death defi ned as stasis.”31 If we think back on the good citizens of sleepy 
Starbuck, we can see them as in stasis. Harrigan might not be far wrong in 
referring to the place as he does, and his barnyard imagery includes a refer-
ence to the citizens’ penchant, not for action, but for speech and speechify-
ing (for example, the Temperance Union meeting): “How long do you think 
anybody in this manure pile could keep his mouth shut?”
Not all the occurrences of “Let’s go!” have equal force. Some of them 
are evasions, as is Pike’s “Why not?” in reference to choosing a romp with 
Agua Verde whores rather than the pursuit of further attempts to rescue 
Angel. He off ers to buy him from Mapache but then doesn’t insist when the 
general refuses to part with him. Earlier, before the Bunch returns to Agua 
Verde for the last time, Dutch reveals that Sykes has said the Bunch should 
go aft er Angel. Pike dismisses that suggestion quickly: “No way in hell.” He 
clearly would like to free Angel from being tortured, but, as we have seen, 
intentions have no meaning. Only actions count. An external reality will 
not provide Pike with authentic meaning. He can’t hope for outside inter-
vention, any more than he can expect a retreat to Agua Verde will solve the 
problem of Deke Th ornton’s pursuit. Pike’s inaction with regard to Angel 
reveals the hollowness of his earlier code speech about loyalty to those with 
whom one sides. Sartre argues against quietism, “the attitude of people who 
say, ‘Let others do what I can’t do.’ ” He then approvingly imagines the words 
of those with the opposite view: “ ‘Th ere is no reality except in action. . . . 
Man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfi lls 
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himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing 
less than his life.’ ”32
Sartre’s words here clarify Pike’s enigmatic remark to Dutch during their 
fi reside chat about backing off . When Pike refers to plans for new heists, 
Dutch reminds him, “Th ey’ll be waitin’ for us,” referring, of course, to those 
empowered to carry out the law. Pike replies, “I wouldn’t have it any other 
way.” Dutch’s answer doesn’t come until the close of their talk, as the two 
are drift ing into sleep: “Pike? I wouldn’t have it any other way either.” Th eir 
position expresses more than mere machismo. Th ey implicitly know that 
only in testing themselves in action can they bring themselves into being.
Pike, as we have seen, is haunted by accumulating acts of carelessness 
and, in particular, his abandonment of those with whom he has sworn 
to stand. By the time he reaches his fi nal decision—whether to confront 
Mapache over the fate of Angel—his options have narrowed. True, he has 
gold buried in the desert. He could presumably ride out of Agua Verde 
without being stopped. But such a choice would be an evasion, a further 
postponement of his need to claim genuine meaning for his life, to create a 
unifi ed center. As Seydor pointedly says, “Walk away, his life’s a fraud; stay 
and fi ght, his life is over.”33 Camus speaks about those who reject traditional 
structures of meaning because they don’t honestly address the human con-
dition: “Th ere is not one human being who, above a certain elementary 
level of consciousness, does not exhaust himself in trying to fi nd formulas 
or attitudes that will give his existence the unity it lacks. . . . Th is passion 
which lift s the mind above the commonplaces of a dispersed world, from 
which it nevertheless cannot free itself, is the passion for unity. It does not 
result in mediocre methods to escape, however, but in the most obstinate 
demands.”34
Th e many repetitions of “Let’s go” throughout the fi lm prepare us for 
Pike’s choice and for the decisive utterance of the phrase. Pike pays a whore, 
leaves her chambers, and confronts the Gorch brothers, who are haggling 
with a whore in an adjoining room. “Let’s go!” he says. Th e Gorches look at 
each other, saying nothing, but they evidently fi ll in the blanks. “Why not?” 
Lyle says, thereby giving his and Tector’s assent. Likewise Dutch, outside the 
door idly whittling a stick, says yes to this decision, this created meaning, 
simply by exchanging a smile with Pike and repeating one of his patented 
giggles. As Walon Green has said, these exchanges require little speech, and 
on fi lm the moment is perfect. It’s time for decisive action, not talk.
Th is crucial decision does not proceed from the Bunch’s agreeing to 
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a preordained system of meaning, nor are these men reclaiming obsolete 
frontier codes. Instead, by heroically marching to their deaths they are par-
adoxically choosing life over death, spitting in death’s eye, as Culp says. It 
is true that the revolutionary cause and that of Angel’s village benefi t from 
the bloodbath that decimates Agua Verde. Presumably, Angel’s people now 
have not merely one case of the stolen rifl es with which to advance their 
aims but all sixteen. And scores of their enemy perish. But the four men 
who confront Mapache, his troops, and the German advisors are not think-
ing about balancing an arms race, or about revolution and other abstract 
principles. Th ey intuitively realize that absolute value does not exist, but 
they know they have failed Angel, just as they failed in similar ways in the 
past. Th ey express not revolutionary zeal in this moment but “fi delity to the 
human condition.”35
In this decisive year, the year in which traditional systems of meaning 
have been put on trial and have been found wanting, the members of the Wild 
Bunch recognize the absurdity of the human condition, but they say “Let’s 
go!” Th ey refuse to surrender to the deathward drift . Th ey no longer resort 
to deceit or evasion. Instead they act, albeit belatedly. Th eir tragic choice 
constitutes a creative act that asserts authentic meaning. Th ey act, and in 
acting they create values where none existed before, creating, as Sartre says, 
“an image of man as [they] think he ought to be.”36 Th ey address a question 
Camus raises: “Is it possible to fi nd a rule of conduct outside the realm of 
religion and its absolute values?”37 As an answer, the members of the Bunch 
decide to be fully human themselves and to make a stand for humanity.
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NO COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN
Th e Decline of Ethics and the West(ern)
William J. Devlin
“You Can’t Help but Compare Yourself against the Old Timers”
Th e “Wild West,” as depicted in the cinematic genre of the western, is “wild” 
not only in the sense that it is portrayed as an untamed land of lawlessness, 
but also in the sense that the fi lms present us with a variety of “wild” but 
colorful characters, some of whom are considered notorious, while others 
are treated as role models. From charismatic individuals and brave groups 
of pioneers who sharply depict moral dispositions in their pursuit of law and 
order to villains, bandits, and gangs of outlaws who seek to challenge such 
order, the western ethos is built on stories of moral duty, friendship, loyalty, 
and camaraderie. “Good guys” like Marshal Will Kane (Gary Cooper) in 
High Noon (1952) and Shane (Alan Ladd) in Shane (1953) exhibit rugged 
masculinity and moral commitment. Th ey are courageous and righteous, 
strong in their fi rm belief in justice and morality, and ready to save the day 
(and the town) from evildoers. Th eir moral qualities are clearly emphasized 
by their polar opposites: the “bad guys.” Villains, gunslingers, cruel mer-
cenaries, and greedy gold hunters—from the cold and selfi sh Jack Wilson 
(Jack Palance) in Shane to the powerful Coy LaHood (Richard Dysart) in 
Pale Rider (1985)—pose as the moral counterparts to the heroes, as they are 
driven by their own selfi sh desire for power.
Together, these two kinds of characters suggest that there is one over-
arching theme to the characters of the western genre. Namely, they are 
either good or bad; they are either heroes or villains. Th ey either terrorize 
a small community of families striving to live the American dream, or they 
are called to heroically save it. In short, the moral poles of good and bad in 
the western cinematic society are very clearly defi ned. Th e lines are clearly 
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drawn so that the viewer can easily see who is good, who is bad, and the 
reasons for such a distinction.1 
Th is moral framework helps to provide stability and order to the west-
ern fi lm. With the dualism between good and bad implicit in the fi lm, the 
narrative is able to interweave these two components in such a way that the 
good always triumphs over the bad. But we fi nd that notions of the hero, 
the villain, the narrative, and hence the moral framework and the stabil-
ity of the western fi lm are shattered in the Coen brothers’ No Country for 
Old Men (2007). In this chapter, I argue that when we examine this fi lm as 
an example of the western genre, we will fi nd that No Country for Old Men 
demonstrates a decline, or decay, of the traditional western ideal. First, there 
is decay, in the sense that the old western style of living has come to an end. 
Second, there is decay in the sense that the moral map that was used in the 
traditional western narrative has faded, leaving viewers without a clear moral 
compass to determine what is right and wrong, thereby forcing the western 
tradition to collapse into moral nihilism. I will show how this decline takes 
place by examining two of the central characters in the fi lm, the hero, Sher-
iff  Ed Tom Bell (Tommy Lee Jones), and the villain, Anton Chigurh (Javier 
Bardem), looking at how their characters develop in a way that is expressive 
of the decline of the western genre.
Th e Moral Frontier: Mapping Out the Terrain of Good and Bad 
in the Western Narrative
Films of the western genre have at least three central features that help to 
make them properly western fi lms. First, each fi lm has a hero who displays 
morally good qualities. Th e hero is the good guy who always makes the right 
decision, can always be understood as acting with moral justifi cation, and 
always saves the day through his actions. Second, each fi lm has a villain who 
serves as the antagonist to the hero. Th e villain is the bad guy who acts from 
selfi sh motivations and desires, can always be understood as acting immor-
ally, and is always thwarted by the hero. Finally, each fi lm follows a narrative 
in which the confrontation between the hero and the villain, between good 
and bad, is inevitable, and the hero triumphs in the end. My analysis of No 
Country for Old Men will show that this fi lm, as a neo-western, degener-
ates each of these key ingredients of the western fi lm. But in order to see 
how the Coen brothers’ fi lm achieves this, it is important to examine each 
of these features more closely.
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Let us start with the fi rst ingredient of the western fi lm, the hero who 
always does the right thing, whose actions are morally justifi ed, and who ends 
up saving the day. Here we can use the fi lm Shane as a paradigm case. Shane, 
the hero, rides into a small community of homesteaders in Wyoming, where he 
discovers that the settlers are in a battle with a cattle baron, Rufus Ryker (Emile 
Meyer), who is trying to force them off  their land. Shane decides to defend 
the ranchers against Ryker and his henchmen—gunslingers he has hired to 
help bully the homesteaders off  their land. But Shane’s decision to do what is 
right (defend the ranchers) develops only gradually in the fi lm, in the course 
of four separate encounters with Ryker and his gang in the local saloon. First, 
he is confronted by Ryker’s henchman Chris Calloway (Ben Johnson); Shane 
walks away. Second, he is again confronted by Calloway, and this time Shane 
fi ghts and wins. Th ird, Shane is challenged by fi ve of Ryker’s henchmen, and 
Shane chooses to fi ght all fi ve, holding his ground well (refl ecting his skills as 
a fi ghter) until Ryker jumps into the fray and helps his gang subdue him. It 
isn’t until Joe (Van Hefl in) intervenes to help Shane that the two together are 
able to hold off  Ryker and his men. Finally, Shane kills both Ryker and Jack 
Wilson, thereby ending the battle between Ryker and the homesteaders.
Ultimately, we can say that Shane did the right thing and saved the day. 
But what makes his actions to fi ght Ryker and his gang moral? How do we 
justify his actions as good and thereby see Shane as the hero? Th ere are at 
least two moral theories that are important for us to examine, not only to 
help explain Shane’s moral worth as the hero of the fi lm, but also to see the 
moral degradation in No Country for Old Men. Th e fi rst theory is known 
as virtue-ethics.
Presented by Aristotle (384–322 BCE), virtue-ethics is a system of nor-
mative ethics that is concerned primarily with the acquisition of virtues, 
such as courage, modesty, temperament, and so on, designed to promote 
the good life. Following Aristotle, we can say that virtue is “a state of char-
acter concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, 
this being determined by a rational principle.” In other words, it is a state 
of character that involves the individual making a decision to act, with 
the correct decision leading to the action that is the moderation or “mean 
between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends 
on defect.”2 For example, the character trait of courage is considered a vir-
tue when it is exemplifi ed in an action that lies in between two extremes: 
the excess of courage (recklessness) and defi ciency, or lack, of courage 
(cowardice). Using Aristotle’s example of courage, we can use virtue-ethics 
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to trace Shane’s development in acquiring the virtue of courage. In Shane’s 
fi rst encounter, where he is bullied out of the saloon, Shane does not defend 
himself. Rather, he leaves the saloon quietly, without any fuss. Following 
virtue-ethics, this can be treated as an example of cowardice. Shane acted 
with a defi ciency of courage: he had an opportunity to defend his and the 
homesteaders’ honor, but he chose not to. Shane grows into his role as the 
virtuous character by the second encounter, when he chooses to fi ght Cal-
loway. Th en, when Shane confronts the fi ve members of Ryker’s gang, he 
decides that he must fi ght. Even when Joey (Brandon DeWilde) begs him 
to not fi ght, pleading, “But Shane, there’s too many,” Shane decides that he 
must still perform the courageous act: “You wouldn’t want me to run away, 
would you?” Furthermore, Shane is courageous in his showdown with Ryker 
and his gang. Even though he is outnumbered, and even though he is risk-
ing his life, Shane is not reckless, since he is aware of his own abilities and 
the abilities of his enemies. He thus acts with the virtue of courage when he 
decides to confront the villains alone, without the assistance of Joe. From 
the perspective of virtue-ethics, then, Shane is the good guy of the fi lm who 
saves the day because he grows into his role of courageous hero.
On the other end of the moral spectrum is deontological ethics, most 
famously presented by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Deontology is a system 
of ethics that maintains that an action is considered good or bad in and of 
itself, without any appeal to the consequences or ends to which that action 
may lead. For Kant, an action is considered to be good so long as it conforms 
to, and is motivated by, our moral duties or specifi c moral obligations, such 
as being honest, developing one’s talents, helping others in need, and so on. 
To help determine our moral duties, Kant introduces a principle to guide 
our decision making, which he refers to as the categorical imperative. Th e 
most famous formulation of this imperative states that “I should never act 
except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a 
universal law.” Th at is, you should follow your personal, or subjective, voli-
tion for action (your maxim) only if it is an action that everyone can fol-
low at the same time (a universal law). If your maxim cannot be rationally 
comprehended as a universal law, it is morally prohibited.3 Following Kant, 
the deontologist would examine Shane’s actions according to whether or not 
they are good in themselves. In Shane’s fi rst encounter with Calloway, Kant 
would argue that Shane fails to follow his moral duty, which is to defend 
the homesteaders. But in the remaining three encounters with the gang in 
the saloon, Shane acts morally since he chooses to defend the homestead-
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ers. From the deontologist’s perspective, Shane is a morally good person 
because his decision to fi ght is not only in accordance with his duty, but his 
motivation stems from his duty. Shane does not look at the consequences of 
his actions as his motivation to act. Even in the fi nal showdown with Ryker 
and Wilson, Shane confronts his enemies fully aware that his decision to fol-
low his duty may lead to his death. In this sense, then, the deontologist can 
accept Shane as the moral hero insofar as he recognizes his moral duties, is 
motivated to follow such duties, and fi nally acts accordingly.
Whether we look at Shane’s actions from the moral theory of virtue-
ethics or of deontology, we can understand that he is the good guy of the 
fi lm, insofar as he does what is right and these right actions can be explained 
as having moral worth. But the goodness of the good guy must also be 
understood and measured against his counterpart, the bad guy. Th e villain 
is the second ingredient essential to the western, and we can see this exem-
plifi ed in Shane’s counterparts, Ryker and Wilson. Ryker fi ts the paradigm 
of the powerful businessman. He is motivated by an unconditional drive 
for power, which is represented in his unadulterated desire to acquire land, 
even if that land is owned by the innocent and wholesome homesteaders. 
Meanwhile, Wilson fi ts the paradigm of the other kind of villain—the cold-
hearted, rough and tough, skilled gunslinger who is hired by Ryker to help 
drive out the homesteaders.
Ryker and Wilson are considered the villains of the fi lm because we 
can understand their actions as immoral. First, from the analysis of virtue-
ethics, neither individual exemplifi es virtuous characteristics. Ryker’s actions 
are driven by an extreme drive for excessive power and wealth. He doesn’t 
choose a moderation of such acquisitions, and therefore exemplifi es the 
vice of excess. Likewise, Wilson exemplifi es the vice of excess insofar as he 
callously guns down a rancher in cold blood. Here, Wilson acts with reck-
lessness. Second, in the deontological analysis, both Ryker and Wilson are 
immoral insofar as neither acknowledges his moral duties, either in moti-
vation or in action. Both choose to ignore their moral duty to help those in 
need (the homesteaders), and instead choose to act according to their own 
greedy ends: Ryker seeks power obtained through land, no matter what the 
means, while Wilson seeks power obtained through killing others, whether 
they are innocent or not. Finally, we can generally see that both are immoral 
characters in the sense that they follow a position known as moral egoism. 
According to moral egoism, one’s actions are rooted in one’s self-interests. 
Ryker acts as an egoist insofar as all of his actions are centered on his selfi sh 
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desire for power. It is this unconstrained drive for power that leads Ryker to 
hurt the lives of the homesteaders. Wilson, too, acts according to his own 
self-interest. Driven by money and his reputation as a notorious gunslinger, 
he is ready to kill anyone around him, so long as he gets paid and accrues 
the power of notoriety.
Every western has the ingredients of a hero and a villain. But these ingre-
dients, even together, cannot meet the criteria of a western fi lm without the 
third ingredient: the narrative that weaves the hero and villain together for 
a showdown. Th ere is a general structure that western fi lms follow in this 
respect, in one form or another. First, the western fi lm moves forward with 
a moral dilemma, typically brought out through human situations. In Shane, 
the dilemma is presented in the context of the war between Ryker and the 
homesteaders. Th e homesteaders are represented as good, innocent families 
seeking a better life for themselves through hard work and honest living. 
Ryker and his gang are represented as immoral and evil individuals who act 
only out of selfi shness. Second, we fi nd that the hero must face this moral 
dilemma and determine how to act. Shane is represented as the lone rider 
who comes upon this dilemma, and though he initially backs down from 
defending those in need, he eventually comes to see that the right thing to 
do is fi ght Ryker and his gang. Th ird, in many westerns, there is an occasion 
when the hero and the villain meet—this occasion serves as the precursor to 
the ultimate showdown. For instance, Shane meets both Ryker and Wilson 
several times. When he runs into Ryker in the saloon, Ryker is impressed 
with Shane’s fi ghting skills. He off ers Shane double the pay that Joe is paying 
him (which, unbeknownst to Ryker, is nothing), but Shane refuses. Like-
wise, Shane meets Wilson on Starrett’s ranch. Th ere, while Ryker and Joe 
debate, Shane and Wilson confront each other, stare eye to eye, each with-
out saying a word, but each aware that they will have a showdown in the 
future. Finally, as suggested, every western has a fi nal showdown between 
the hero and the villain, a showdown that will leave the villain dead and the 
hero triumphant. Th e hero must be able to save the day so that the moral 
dilemma is fi nally resolved and all is set right in the western country. We 
see such a showdown at the end of Shane, when Shane kills Ryker and Wil-
son. Even though he himself is shot, he wins the shootout, tells Joey to let 
his mother know that “everything’s all right and there aren’t any more guns 
in the valley,” and rides off  into the night. Th e western narrative is thus able 
to weave the hero and the villain(s) of the fi lm together in such a way that 
good always triumphs over evil.4
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Th ere’s an Old Sheriff  in Town
Having carefully explored three essential ingredients of the western fi lms, 
we can now examine how No Country for Old Men, a fi lm set in Texas in 
1980, deconstructs the western genre by shattering each of the ingredients, 
one by one. Th e fi lm opens with a narration of the traditional western hero, 
portrayed by Sheriff  Ed Tom Bell. Bell relates the following about himself 
and his life in the West: “I was sheriff  of this county when I was twenty-fi ve. 
Hard to believe. Grandfather was a lawman. Father too. Me and him was 
sheriff  at the same time, him in Plano and me here. I think he was pretty 
proud of that. I know I was. Some of the old-time sheriff s never even wore 
a gun. A lot of folks fi nd that hard to believe. I always liked to hear about 
the old-timers. Never missed a chance to do so. You can’t help but compare 
yourself against the old-timers. Can’t help but wonder how they would’ve 
operated these times.” Here, Bell acknowledges that he is part of a tradi-
tion—and not simply that of generations of lawmen in his family. From 
the view of the western genre, Bell is part of the tradition of generations of 
western heroes. Like his forefathers, Shane, Blondie, Ringo Kidd, and the 
like, Bell is a good guy. Bell recognizes both traditions, as he honors those 
heroes (in his case, the “old-time sheriff s”). Like Joey in Shane, he looks up 
to the hero as a role model. We can even say that Bell himself has become 
such a hero in his life insofar as he has carried out his moral duties as sheriff  
since he was a young man.
But it is now 1980, and times have changed in at least three signifi cant 
ways. First, the western frontier is no longer characterized as the “Wild West,” 
where the land is unpopulated and unsettled, power-hungry tycoons domi-
nate the innocent, and legal order is yet to be established. Second, though 
the “Wild West” has been “tamed” in one respect, the modern West has a 
new breed of lawlessness. As Bell explains in his opening narrative:
Th ere’s this boy I sent to Huntsville here a while back. My arrest 
and my testimony. He killed a fourteen-year-old girl. Papers said it 
was a crime of passion but he told me there wasn’t any passion to it. 
Told me that he’d been planning to kill somebody for about as long 
as he could remember. Said that if they turned him out he’d do it 
again. Said he knew he was going to hell. Be there in about fi ft een 
minutes. I don’t know what to make of that. I surely don’t. Th e crime 
you see now, it’s hard to even take its measure.
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In other words, the moral framework of the West—or the country, or the 
world—is changing. Th e traditional western framework that contained inno-
cent and wholesome westerners striving to live out the American dream, 
typical villains driven by greed and power, and the heroes who fought for 
what is right, is fading. Th e villains, or the criminals, act in such a way that 
the traditional hero cannot make sense of their criminal behavior. While 
the traditional villains, such as Ryker or Wilson, are immoral and clearly 
“bad guys,” we can understand them because their actions are rational. We 
can see their actions are based on moral egoism, measured by their own 
self-interests. But in the world of No Country for Old Men, the “bad guys” 
act irrationally. Th ey don’t even act with criminal passion. As such, Bell 
cannot comprehend the enemies he should be confronting as the hero of 
today—for him, “it’s hard to even take measure.”5
Th ird, the hero of the West has grown old. Bell is no longer a young, 
twenty-fi ve-year-old sheriff , ready and willing to act according to his moral 
duties with courage and without hesitation, not regarding the consequences. 
Instead, he is now weary and cautious: “It’s not that I’m afraid of it. I always 
knew you had to be willing to die to even do this job—not to be glorious. 
But I don’t want to push my chips forward and go out and meet something 
I don’t understand. A man would have to put his soul at hazard. He’d have 
to say, okay, I’ll be part of this world.” Th ough the western frontier has been 
tamed so that towns have been settled and cities have developed, a new kind 
of wildness has now spread and ravaged the world. Bell, part of the tradi-
tion of the “old-timers” in the western genre of fi lm heroes, is confused as 
to how to handle this new immoral wildfi re, because he cannot understand 
the motives the villains today act upon. In other words, he cannot get into 
the mind of the current villain—he cannot fathom the depths of evil that 
exist in the West—and therefore, he is now hesitant about abiding by the 
traditional moral justifi cations that underlie the actions of the hero.
We can see these changes unfold in the fi lm, as Bell investigates and 
follows the trail of Chigurh. He initially exhibits similar traits to the west-
ern hero. He still rides a horse as he’s investigating the crime scenes. He 
still wears the white hat. Similar to Marshal Kane in High Noon, Bell acts 
according to his duty as sheriff  to fi ght the bad guys and defend the inno-
cent citizens of the western community. For instance, aware that Llewelyn 
Moss (Josh Brolin) is in danger, he meets with Llewelyn’s wife, Carla Jean 
Moss (Kelly McDonald), telling her that Llewelyn “needs help, whether he 
knows it or not.” Th is example further suggests that, like his western coun-
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terparts, he acts with wisdom. Highly experienced with trailing the bad guy, 
Bell is sharp enough to put the pieces of this criminal puzzle together. How-
ever, though his experience and wisdom are part of his moral worth as the 
hero of the fi lm, they are also his downfall. Since Bell relies on his ability to 
know the villain, he is at a loss when he cannot understand him. Th is lack 
of comprehension is caused by his method of analyzing the bad guy from 
the traditional framework of the western genre; as such, Bell is unable to 
even imagine the horrors of the new bad guy.
When Bell manages to put together the pieces to track the criminal, 
it is done only incidentally. For instance, Bell is able to infer that Chigurh 
uses a cattle gun to kill his victims only aft er he refl ects on how one used 
to slaughter livestock. Th is method reveals that Chigurh dehumanizes his 
victims, treating them as animals to be brutally slaughtered. As such, there 
is a cold detachment to his character. But such revelations don’t inspire Bell 
to carry out his moral duty as sheriff ; rather, they haunt him so that he is 
afraid to confront Chigurh. Th e more Bell learns about Chigurh’s “methods,” 
the more frightened he becomes, as he sees how horrible Chigurh’s actions 
really are. Th ough he recognizes the horror, he remains in the dark as to com-
pletely understanding his enemy. As he tells Sheriff  Roscoe (Rodger Boyce), 
Chigurh is a “ghost” to him, one who represents the “signs and wonders” of 
the horrors of today’s world. And thus Bell remains afraid. Th is fear of the 
unknown is encapsulated when Bell returns to the El Paso Motel, the crime 
scene where Moss was killed. Th ere, Bell steps up to the motel room but 
hesitates to open the door (knowing not only that Chigurh was there, but 
that he may still be in the room) with a fear reminiscent of a child’s terror of 
the boogeyman. Bell is drawing up the courage required to face his greatest 
fear—the fear of that which he does not understand, the fear that his ghost 
will gun him down and take his life. Th ough Bell is courageous enough to 
eventually enter the motel room, there is no confrontation with Chigurh, 
and Bell decides to retire from his role as sheriff . As he tells his friend, for-
mer deputy Ellis (Barry Corbin), he retires because he feels “overmatched” 
and “discouraged.” In other words, Bell acknowledges that the country has 
changed, and though in his youth he had the moral integrity to be “willing 
to die” in performing his duty as sheriff , he has now come to terms with the 
idea that he doesn’t really want to be part of this world.
Bell thus walks away. His fi nal opportunity for confrontation is like 
Shane’s fi rst. While Shane grows and develops into a moral hero, Bell has to 
face the loss of his moral integrity. Th ough he swore an oath to uphold the 
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law, and though he promised Carla Jean that he would protect her husband, 
he fails on both counts. He walks away from a live case, and he arrives just a 
bit too late (perhaps slowed down by his age) to save Moss. Bell is no longer 
courageous like Shane, no longer a real deputy of the law like Kane. Bell, the 
hero, has grown old and cannot make sense of the world today, and so he 
cannot carry on with the same courage and proud dedication to his duties 
as the heroes of the western genre. But this aging, this idea of growing old, 
is not simply physical—it is also a metaphorical and philosophical claim 
about the moral impetus behind the western genre. Th e moral messages of 
heroes and role models of the western genre are now inapplicable to today’s 
standards. Th e world has changed so drastically that the hero of yesterday 
can no longer survive as the hero. Whether it be Bell, or Shane, or Kane, or 
another, No Country for Old Men tells us that this world, this country, today 
is no longer a place for the western hero.
“He’s a Peculiar Man”: Th e Face of the New Villain
Just as the hero of the western genre has changed in No Country for Old Men 
(in the sense that he can no longer do the right thing), so, too, has the villain 
changed. Perhaps the most striking change between Chigurh and the vil-
lains of the old westerns is that Chigurh cannot be understood. While it is 
true that the traditional villain is immoral and we don’t like him for acting 
that way, we can still understand him. We understand him as selfi sh, greedy, 
driven by money and power. Th is is the fi rst characteristic of the traditional 
villain from which Chigurh unchains himself. We know he does bad things, 
but we cannot understand why he does them. In the fi lm, several diff erent 
people characterize him diff erently because he is so elusive. He is “a ghost,” 
“a homicidal lunatic,” “a loose cannon,” and the “ultimate badass.” And yet 
none of these labels seem to fully capture the essence of Chigurh.
Perhaps the closest analysis of Chigurh’s character in the fi lm is pre-
sented by Carson Wells (Woody Harrelson). As we learn from Wells’s meet-
ing with his boss (Stephen Root), the man who hired Chigurh in the fi rst 
place, Wells is familiar with Chigurh: “I know him every which way.” From 
Wells’s perspective Chigurh is “a psychopathic killer” as dangerous as the 
“bubonic plague.” More important, as he tells Llewelyn, he is “a peculiar man,” 
in the sense that “he has principles . . . principles that transcend drugs and 
money. He’s not like you. He’s not even like me.” Wells’s analysis provides 
us with an insight into Chigurh’s character as the villain of No Country for 
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Old Men. Let’s take the last point fi rst—Chigurh is not like Wells. But who 
is Wells? Wells is a hired hand sought by a wealthy businessman, a perceived 
“gunslinger” who is driven by self-interest and the thirst for money. We can 
see these characteristics during his visit to Llewelyn, where he off ers to save 
him from Chigurh for money: “Look. You need to give me the money. I’ve 
got no other reason to protect you.” In short, Wells is the traditional villain 
of the western genre, in the spirit of Wilson from Shane. As such, he is the 
closest to Chigurh’s character, and so thinks that he knows him.
But ultimately, not even Wells completely understands the face of the 
new villain. In Wells’s fi nal scene, he attempts to persuade Chigurh to spare 
his life by off ering him a deal: Wells will let Chigurh know where the money 
is if and only if he lets him live. But Chigurh has no interest in making such 
deals. Th e traditional villain of the western genre would take such a deal 
(as we imagine Wilson did to work for Ryker), as it serves his own greedy 
egotistical self-interest. But Chigurh is not the traditional villain; in fact, he 
suggests to Wells that such a justifi cation for one’s actions is ultimately a poor 
way to make decisions: “If the rule you followed brought you to this, of what 
use was the rule?” Th is line of thinking, however, is foreign to Wells, and 
we fi nd that he, too, really doesn’t understand Chigurh. He refers to him as 
“goddamn crazy,” and when Chigurh misunderstands him to be referring to 
“the nature of this conversation,” Wells replies, “I mean the nature of you.” 
In Wells’s last moments, we fi nd that not even he, the personifi cation of the 
traditional western villain, understands this new villain. But Wells does 
understand himself in light of this new villain. As he pleads with Chigurh to 
take the deal he’s off ering him, Wells refers to himself as just a “day trader.” 
Here, the image of the traditional villain is defl ated. In today’s world, the 
bad guy of the western genre is an immoral businessman, nothing more. 
He’s just in it for the money. All he can do is keep giving Chigurh the same 
pitch—he can keep the money, and Wells will just “go home.” But of course, 
this method of reasoning with Chigurh, the new villain, fails, leaving Wells 
dead in cold blood.
Chigurh’s decision to murder both Wells and his own “boss” reveals two 
things about Chigurh. First, Chigurh’s character as the villain shatters the 
traditional notion of the villain in the western genre. He literally kills the 
two characters of the fi lm who represent the traditional villain: Wells as the 
hired gunslinger and the “boss” as the immoral business tycoon. Second, 
as suggested in the previous paragraph, Chigurh’s actions cannot be under-
stood as moral egoism. Wells is correct to say that he has “principles that 
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transcend drugs and money.” But these principles are twisted in the sense 
that although he acts with moral consistency (to a degree), he applies this 
consistency in horrible ways. For instance, upon killing his boss, Chigurh 
explains to his boss’s accountant (Trent Moore), that the boss was wrong to 
hire more than just Chigurh to look for the money, since “you pick the one 
right tool,” and then rely only on that tool. Another example of Chigurh’s 
principled reasoning occurs when he off ers a deal to Llewelyn. Chigurh tells 
Llewelyn: “So this is what I’ll off er. You bring me the money and I’ll let her 
[Carla Jean] go. Otherwise she’s accountable. Th e same as you. Th at’s the best 
deal you’re going to get. I won’t tell you you can save yourself because you 
can’t.” Llewelyn implicitly refuses this off er. Chigurh thus tracks down Carla 
Jean at her mother’s home and tells her that though he has no reason to hurt 
her, “I gave my word. . . . Your husband had the opportunity to remove you 
from harm’s way. Instead, he used you to try to save himself.” Together, these 
two scenes provide us with an insight into Chigurh’s twisted moral consis-
tency. First, Chigurh does not appeal to money or power as the greatest end 
for which one should strive. Second, Chigurh does not appear to be acting 
purely out of self-interest. By murdering his boss and Carla Jean, he gains 
nothing for himself. Th ese two points help us to see why the traditional vil-
lain couldn’t make sense of Chigurh. His actions are not motivated by what 
normally drives the bad guy; he is not selfi sh and egotistical. Th ird, Chig-
urh’s own justifi cation of his actions doesn’t appeal to the consequences that 
are produced; rather like Kant’s deontology, he justifi es his actions insofar 
as they are “good” in themselves. He kills his boss on the principle that his 
boss made a wrong decision. He did not stick with the one right tool, and 
so this bad decision entails the act of Chigurh murdering him. Likewise, 
Chigurh admits that there is nothing he gains from killing Carla Jean. But 
he must do it because he gave his word. Th at is, he made a promise, and, as 
Kant would argue, we are morally obligated to keep our promises (whether 
we like it or not) because it is part of our moral duty. Th us, Chigurh seems 
to be morally consistent insofar as he follows a deontological line of reason-
ing to justify his actions.
Chigurh’s deontological reasoning helps to place him on a new level of 
immorality. To an extent, his actions are grounded on what appear to be 
moral principles, similar to the moral justifi cations made by the hero of the 
western genre. But when the bad guy of the fi lm uses the good guy’s line of 
reasoning, the polarity between good and bad begins to weaken. Th is polar-
ity is weakened even further by Chigurh’s other twisted behavior: fl ipping a 
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coin to determine whether or not his next potential victim lives or dies. Th e 
“coin-fl ip scenario” occurs twice in the fi lm on separate occasions: Chigurh 
invites the gas station attendant in one scene and Carla Jean in another to “call 
it” when he fl ips a coin. Th e threat of what’s at stake is obvious to the viewer 
and obvious to Carla Jean (though not to the attendant): correctly calling the 
coin means that Chigurh will not kill the person, while incorrectly calling it 
entails the person’s death. Here, Chigurh’s behavior implicitly suggests two 
important points about his beliefs. First, at the moment his potential victim 
calls the coin toss, he believes that his victim has a fi ft y-fi ft y chance of living 
(or dying). Second, Chigurh believes that he himself is not responsible for 
the outcome. We can infer this from his conversation with the attendant, 
as he tells him: “You need to call it. I can’t call it for you. It wouldn’t be fair. 
It wouldn’t even be right.” With this, Chigurh is acknowledging that since 
this is a life or death decision, it is only morally right for the person whose 
life is at stake to roll the dice of chance. Furthermore, Chigurh cannot make 
the call because he would then be held accountable insofar as he chose 
what would lead to the attendant’s life or death. By abstaining from calling, 
Chigurh detaches himself from the situation and its results. Carla Jean sees 
this reasoning in Chigurh and attempts to challenge his move to distance 
himself, as she tells him, “Th e coin don’t have no say. It’s just you.” But for 
Chigurh, it is not his say at all, as he tells Carla Jean, “Th is is the best I can 
do . . . [because] I got here the same way the coin did.” As such, Chigurh 
portrays himself as a disinterested force, free from accountability.
Together, these two points suggest a further point about Chigurh’s use 
of the coin fl ip, namely, he introduces the philosophical issue of moral luck 
into the equation of evaluating an individual’s behavior. According to Th omas 
Nagel (1937–), moral luck occurs “where a signifi cant aspect of what some-
one does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat 
him in that respect as an object of moral judgment.”6 For example, suppose 
we have two cases of drivers that are identical in nearly all respects: both 
are driving down a road and run a red light due to a brief lapse of focus. 
But let’s suppose further that in one case, the driver hits a child crossing 
the street as he runs the red light, thereby killing the child; meanwhile, in 
the other case, there is no child crossing the street. Both drivers have equal 
responsibilities as drivers and both are guilty of lapsing in their duty to 
pay attention as they drive. But we would like to say that the fi rst driver 
is also responsible for the death of the child, even though the fact that the 
child happened to be crossing the street at the exact same moment when 
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the driver failed to focus is something that was out of the driver’s control. 
Instead, it was bad luck.
Since moral luck concerns conditions that are beyond one’s control, we 
may wonder how one can be held morally responsible for such conditions. 
One way to respond to the notion of moral luck is to treat those condi-
tions as restrictions to moral evaluation. From this perspective, as Nagel 
explains, we have a “view which makes responsibility dependent on con-
trol” and which thereby concludes that the phenomenon of moral luck “is 
absurd.”7 Th at is, we need to eliminate those chance occurrences from our 
moral evaluations or judgments of individuals, as they are not responsible 
for those conditions. Th is response to moral luck is Chigurh’s response. By 
off ering his potential victims the coin fl ip, Chigurh sees himself as intro-
ducing a chance occurrence into the equation. Th eir fate is now a matter of 
luck, and since it is only a matter of luck, he does not see himself as morally 
accountable for his actions, whether they are to murder the person (because 
he or she made the wrong call) or to let the person live (because he or she 
made the right one). Chigurh is thus a disturbing character who twists the 
notion of the villain in the sense that he utilizes some of the moral justifi -
cations traditionally used by the hero, and he introduces the notion of luck 
and chance occurrences into his decision making, thereby negating, in his 
own estimation, any moral responsibility for his actions.
“You Can’t Stop What’s Comin’ ”: A Nihilistic Country
Th e distortion of the fi rst two ingredients of the western fi lm, the moral decay 
of the hero and the moral complexity of the villain, contributes to the distor-
tion of the third ingredient, the traditional narrative in the western genre. No 
Country for Old Men begins in a similar vein as the traditional western in the 
sense that what sets the fi lm in motion is a moral dilemma. But this initial 
dilemma is not a dilemma that Bell, the hero, faces; rather it is a dilemma 
that Llewelyn faces: should he return to the scene of the botched drug deal 
to give the dying Mexican water? His decision to do the right thing and help 
a person in need helps to pull Llewelyn into the world that Bell ultimately 
decides to leave. Bell’s moral dilemma doesn’t arise until the end of the fi lm: 
having failed to save Llewelyn, and having learned more about the villain, 
should he choose to have the fi nal showdown with Chigurh and try to save 
the day? Ultimately, Bell says no. Instead of giving himself the hero’s trium-
phant ride off  into the sunset, Bell retires and heads home (much like Moss, 
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the traditional villain, wanted to do). Th us, by failing to follow the hero’s 
path in the traditional western framework, the character of Bell brings into 
question the moral simplicity embedded in the classic western. It is not the 
case that good will always triumph over the bad. Furthermore, Bell never 
meets his enemy face-to-face: there is no meeting prior to a showdown, and 
there is no showdown. Th e closest we get to a cinematic image of the two 
fi gures being brought together for the precursor to the showdown occurs in 
Llewelyn’s trailer. Th ere, Chigurh sits down, drinks milk, and stares at the 
turned-off  television, allowing the viewer to see his dark silhouette. A brief 
time later, we fi nd Bell doing the exact same thing—sitting down, drinking 
milk, and staring into the television so that we see his dark silhouette. Th e 
traditional meeting will not take place in the normal sense of the word; rather, 
at best, it will occur through passing images on the TV screen.8 Meanwhile, 
the closest we get to a showdown occurs during Bell’s nonconfrontation with 
Chigurh in the El Paso Motel room. Th ough dreadfully afraid, Bell enters 
the room alone. Like Shane, he does not call for backup; he does not bring 
in a posse or the cavalry. For that moment, he is like the lone hero. But he 
is older. He has fear in his eyes, and he hesitates. And, in the end, it is his 
fear that wins out, compelling him to avoid any future opportunities to have 
the real fi nal showdown with Chigurh.
By eliminating the three central ingredients of the western fi lm, No 
Country for Old Men shatters both the moral framework and the stability 
that westerns have provided us. First, the moral framework is dismantled in 
the sense that duality between the ideal good fi gure and the ideal bad fi gure 
has been erased. Th e hero is no longer a hero. At worst, from the traditional 
standards of the hero, he is a coward who could not stand up to the lone vil-
lain. At best, he is a former hero who has grown old and is now unfi t for this 
new world of lawlessness and chaos. Of course, if he is unfi t, then the fi lm 
begs the question of who could fi ght the villain. Who could be a new hero? 
Th e closest we have to a hero is Llewelyn, but even he doesn’t live up to that 
ideal because not all of his actions are morally justifi able. For instance, he 
never once considers giving up the money. He has at least two opportuni-
ties to give up what does not rightfully belong to him. Th e fi rst opportunity 
occurs when Wells off ers to help him handle Chigurh. But whether it is from 
greed (in wanting the money for himself) or excessive pride (in wanting to 
kill Chigurh himself), Llewelyn rejects the off er. Th e second opportunity, 
to hand the money over to Chigurh, will not save his own life but will save 
his wife’s. And so, whether it is from greed, his pride, or the love of his own 
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life, he once again refuses to give up the money. Ultimately, it is his exces-
sive pride and infl ated conception of his strengths that lead to his death. 
Unlike Shane, Llewelyn is outmatched, and so he mistakes his recklessness 
in wanting to fi ght Chigurh and the Mexicans as a sign of his own courage.9 
Th e villain, meanwhile, is now more horrible, more twisted, and more dis-
turbing than ever before. Rather than acting out of selfi shness, Chigurh is 
detached from his own self-gain. He sees himself as a tool, guided by moral 
principles that dictate what he ought to do. But such principles, though 
deontological in spirit, can be understood only in the context of chance, so 
that Chigurh can absolve himself (at least in his own eyes) of any personal 
moral responsibility for his actions.
Second, the stability of the western fi lm collapses in the sense that we 
lose the order of the western narrative that provides us with the happy end-
ing in which good triumphs over evil. In No Country for Old Men, without 
the fi nal showdown between the hero and the villain, good cannot triumph. 
And so we see that the good either is killed (Llewelyn) or runs away (Bell). 
But does this mean that evil triumphs over good? Not necessarily. Bad guys, 
such as Wells and Chigurh’s boss, are killed, but it takes an even worse per-
son to do it. Th ough that may seem to suggest that in the end evil wins, the 
fi lm ultimately suggests something even worse: what is good and what is bad 
is all a matter of chance. Whether it is the attendant who lives by correctly 
calling the coin fl ip, Carla Jean who dies, Bell who ends up not confronting 
Chigurh, or Chigurh getting into a car accident—all of these events occurred 
by some degree of chance. Th is suggests that the question of good versus 
bad is no longer a signifi cant question since these values can no longer be 
applied to individuals. We can no longer apply the terms “good” and “bad” 
to the “guys” opposing one another—and this shatters the order we recog-
nize and assume in every western fi lm. Th is leads to nihilism in the west-
ern frontier. As Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) explains, nihilism occurs 
when one infers “that there is no meaning at all”; “everything lacks meaning.” 
According to nihilism, life and the world are meaningless because there are 
no inherent structure, stability, order, or framework to them. As such, all 
the values that were once held to be signifi cant are now seen as empty. Or, 
as Nietzsche puts it, “Th e highest values devalue themselves.”10
We can see the sense of nihilism opening up toward the end of No Coun-
try for Old Men when we compare the dialogue between Bell and Ellis to 
the dialogue between Shane and Joey in Shane. Aft er Shane has saved the 
day, Joey pleads with him to stay. But Shane explains that he can’t since “a 
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man has to be what he is. . . . Can’t break the mold.” Even though he tried to 
break the mold, he found it didn’t work for him. Instead, the moral frame-
work remains intact: “Right or wrong, it’s a brand. A brand sticks. Th ere’s no 
going back.” But this moral framework has branded him as the hero of the 
fi lm. Th e discussion Bell has with Ellis is much darker. Ellis, an old man in 
a wheelchair (which we can infer was caused by a criminal who shot him as 
deputy), learns that his shooter died in prison. When Bell asks him, hypo-
thetically, what he would have done if the criminal had been released, Ellis 
cynically responds, “Nothin’. Wouldn’t be no point to it.” He explains to Bell, 
“All the time you spend tryin’ to get back what’s been took from you, there’s 
more goin’ out the door. Aft er a while you just try and get a tourniquet on 
it.” Th at is, Ellis suggests that there is no meaning, no value, to our actions in 
life. Acting according to moral justifi cations of justice, duty, courage, and so 
on is pointless. Further, as Bell explains his feelings of being “overmatched,” 
he is disturbed by the thought that God hasn’t helped him: “I always thought 
when I got older God would sort of come into my life in some way. He 
didn’t.” For Bell, God’s presence in his life would help him to see his life as 
meaningful; without God, Bell falls into nihilism and is discouraged. Finally, 
Ellis summarizes the situation to Bell: “What you got ain’t nothing new. Th is 
country is hard on people. Hard and crazy. Got the devil in it yet folks never 
seem to hold it to account. . . . You can’t stop what’s comin’. ”
Ellis concludes with a nihilistic evaluation of the West. Th e country is 
“crazy” in the sense that it is irrational. Th ose who were once seen as good 
and heroic are now old and feeble, unable to uphold the standards of moral-
ity that were ingrained in the traditional western genre. Meanwhile, those 
who are lawless today have become more maniacal, more twisted, making 
the villains incomprehensible in their behavior. As such, the West is now a 
world where there is no rhyme or reason, and those within it are never held 
accountable. It has become a country without meaning and without any 
inherent value. Th e country, in short, has collapsed into nihilism.
Notes
 1. Perhaps the most salient depiction of these moral lines can be found in the fi lm 
Th e Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (1966). First, we have “the good,” Blondie (Clint East-
wood). He doesn’t need a name—his actions, his look, his measured speech, his entire 
essence stand for nothing but good (at least, “good” as the western genre understands 
it). Second, we have “the bad” in Angel Eyes (Lee Van Cleef). He, too, doesn’t need a 
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name. Dressed in black, his demonic eyes and his greed (which is essentially no diff er-
ent than that of the other characters) are associated with torture, and his entire essence 
is summed up as “the bad.” Finally, there’s Tuco (Eli Wallach). He is the only one with a 
real name, the only one who is too weak and stupid to be either good or bad. He’s “sit-
ting on the moral fence,” as it were. Hence, his indecisiveness, his lack of integrity and 
of a clear and cohesive moral stand earn him the soubriquet “the ugly.” But even if there 
are ugly characters in classic westerns (and there are!), their ugliness is defi ned only in 
light of the polarized reality of good versus bad.
 2. It is important to note that Aristotle maintains that there are certain actions 
and dispositions that do not admit of a mean between vices, but are instead always 
immoral. Such actions include murder, adultery, and theft . See Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics: Th e Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 
1941), book 2, chap. 6, p. 959.
 3. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Hack-
ett, 1993), 7–15. For both a further presentation of Kant’s deontology and an analysis 
of such moral themes in High Noon, see Daw-Nay Evans’s chapter in this volume, “Th e 
Duty of Reason: Kantian Ethics in High Noon.” 
 4. It is interesting to note that Shane may have actually died due to his decision to 
confront Ryker and Wilson. In Th e Negotiator (1998), Lieutenant Danny Roman (Samuel 
L. Jackson) debates with Lieutenant Chris Sabian (Kevin Spacey) about whether the fi nal 
scene of Shane depicts Shane’s death aft er his showdown with Ryker and Wilson.
 5. Another example of Bell’s bewilderment regarding today’s villains occurs as he 
tells Wendell (Garret Dillahunt), “My Lord, Wendell, it’s just all-out war. I don’t know 
any other word for it. Who are these people? I don’t know. Here last week they found 
this couple out in California they would rent out rooms to old people and then kill ’em 
and bury ’em in the yard and cash their Social Security checks. Th ey’d torture them 
fi rst, I don’t know why. Maybe their television set was broke. And this went on until, 
and here I quote, ‘Neighbors were alerted when a man ran from the premises wearing 
only a dog collar.’ You can’t make up such a thing as that. I dare you to even try. But 
that’s what it took, you’ll notice. Get someone’s attention. Diggin’ graves in the back-
yard didn’t bring any.”
 6. Th omas Nagel, “Moral Luck,” in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1979).
 7. Ibid., 26. See also Bernard Williams, “Moral Luck,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 31.
 8. It may be the case that the Coen brothers are saying more with Chigurh and Bell 
as images on the TV screen; perhaps these two scenes serve as a cinematic reminder 
that the classic westerns are fi lms. Th at is, they provide us with a narrative of good ver-
sus bad, and good always triumphs. But, as No Country for Old Men attempts to show, 
this traditional narrative is too simplistic and so fails to capture the moral complexities 
and subtleties of life.
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 9. It is interesting to note a further reason why Llewelyn is not the hero of the fi lm 
in the traditional sense. He is akin to the normal member of a western community, 
such as Joe, the homesteader, in Shane. Like Joe, Llewelyn is trying to make a good life 
for himself and his wife. Unlike Joe, however, he is not purely moral, and he is neither 
weak nor hopeless. But the playing fi eld has been leveled so that the hero and the home-
steader are no longer diff erent by the degree of their moral character. Th e homesteader 
was originally seen as good but weak, and so had a lesser degree of moral strength com-
pared to the hero. Llewelyn displays heroic features because he stands up for himself, 
but it is his own ego that leads to his downfall.
10. Friedrich Nietzsche, Th e Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hol-
lingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), book 1.
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THE NORTHWESTERN
McCabe and Mrs. Miller
Deborah Knight and George McKnight
An End-of-Genre Western
Set near the Pacific Ocean in a heavily forested, frequently overcast 
corner of Washington State that is alternatively rain-soaked and muddy 
or snow-covered and cold, Robert Altman’s McCabe and Mrs. Miller 
(1971) is not a classic western in the way that, say, John Ford’s My Dar-
ling Clementine (1946) and George Stevens’s Shane (1953) are classic. 
The setting is a first clear indication that McCabe and Mrs. Miller differs 
from classic westerns. Gone are the familiar landmarks we convention-
ally expect to see, the open wilderness and frequent wide-angle shots 
of a sun-drenched landscape. Nothing is to be seen here remotely like 
Utah’s Monument Valley (John Ford’s She Wore a Yellow Ribbon, 1949) 
or the scenic grandeur of Wyoming’s Grand Teton Mountains (Shane) 
or the Nevada desert landscape in The Stalking Moon (Robert Mulli-
gan, 1969). McCabe is an end-of-genre western, a film made toward the 
end of a variety of different but related stories that had celebrated the 
settlement of the American wilderness within this most central genre of 
American filmmaking. The classic western tells the story about expan-
sion westward.1 McCabe tells what happened when the idealization of 
western expansion and the mystique developed around the figure of the 
western hero faltered in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This is not a film 
centrally featuring cowboys, soldiers, sheriffs, or homesteaders, or the 
need to protect the new and developing community from incursions 
from lawless individuals, cattle barons, or Native Americans. It is not 
a film whose central protagonist has a clear moral commitment to the 
community he is either already a member of or that he enters in order 
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to take on duties such as enforcing the law or defending the innocent. 
McCabe is set in the extreme northwest, not the open west of the clas-
sic western, and the central characters and conventional features of the 
classic western as a genre have been completely rethought by Altman, 
who not only directed the film but cowrote the screenplay.
Th e westerns that emerged aft er World War II were ultimately tales of 
moral optimism developed around moral confl ict between western heroes 
and those who challenged them (My Darling Clementine). During the 
1950s, westerns were much more morally cautious, introducing protago-
nists with questionable pasts such as we fi nd in Th e Gunfi ghter (Henry King, 
1950) or Th e Naked Spur (Anthony Mann, 1953). At this time, too, we fi nd 
protagonists with possibly morally objectionable plans of action directed 
toward the future, although, in the end, these protagonists came through 
with morally laudable conclusions to their endeavors (Th e Searchers, John 
Ford, 1956). Th e group of fi lms that we place in the category of “the end-
of-genre western” are those in which the initial values of the classic west-
ern, even though challenged to some degree by the late-classic westerns 
of the 1950s or early 1960s, have broken down. While there were end-of- 
genre westerns made prior to McCabe, for instance, Th e Left  Handed Gun 
(Arthur Penn, 1958), as well as since McCabe, notably a group of fi lms 
from Clint Eastwood’s Unforgiven (1992) through to the Coen brothers’ 
No Country for Old Men (2007), Altman’s fi lm merits attention for at least 
three philosophically interesting reasons. First, McCabe is a western in the 
ironic mode. Th us, it asks us to look at what Northrop Frye, developing 
ideas central to Aristotle’s Poetics, might have called the mythos of the clas-
sic western from a very diff erent perspective.2 Second, it asks us to align 
ourselves with characters who are marginal in classic westerns. McCabe 
(Warren Beatty), for example, is the antithesis of a Wyatt Earp (Henry 
Fonda in My Darling Clementine) or an Ethan Edwards (John Wayne in 
Th e Searchers). Earp and Ethan are heroes; McCabe is not. Th e western 
as a genre has featured whores principally in secondary roles from early 
days—consider Dallas (Claire Trevor) in Stagecoach (John Ford, 1939) or 
Chihuahua (Linda Darnell) in My Darling Clementine. Mrs. Miller (Julie 
Christie), by contrast, is not a secondary character at all but a protagonist 
in her own right, yet hardly the nurturing and virtuous female protagonist 
of the classic western, such as Clementine Carter (Cathy Downs) in My 
Darling Clementine or Marian Starrett (Jean Arthur) in Shane. Th ird, this 
is a fi lm that manifests its ironic perspective aesthetically as well as nar-
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ratively. In particular, and as we oft en see in Altman’s oeuvre, key aspects 
of the fi lm’s style—including its general stylistic self-consciousness, its 
use of wide-screen, the sound track featuring several haunting songs by 
Leonard Cohen3—contribute to the philosophical signifi cance of irony 
in this fi lm.
Our focus, then, is on the aesthetics of the western as well as the central 
ethical themes that characterize, in particular, the classic and late-classic 
westerns. Th ere has been a lively debate in philosophical aesthetics in recent 
years centering around the ethical criticism of literature and other works of 
narrative fi ction. Martha C. Nussbaum and Wayne C. Booth have been two 
of the most committed proponents of ethical criticism. Nussbaum focuses 
on the major novels of Henry James, for example, Th e Golden Bowl, in her 
Love’s Knowledge.4 Booth likens our relationship with authors to a kind 
of morally benefi cent friendship in Th e Company We Keep.5 Interestingly, 
neither gives particular attention to works that are ironic—or, if it were 
claimed that James occasionally writes from an ironic perspective, this is 
a feature of his works that Nussbaum does not address. Yet irony is, argu-
ably, a moral position. It is a position of detached and refl ective scrutiny 
that readers or viewers are invited to share. Irony occurs when the moral 
axis of a work or genre has collapsed, where the moral compass has fallen 
away. Th is is the situation for the characters and actions of McCabe and 
Mrs. Miller with respect to the classic western. And this is why the fi lm 
has to be examined in relation to the classic westerns that are organized 
around clear and normative moral axes. Nussbaum’s ambition is to extol 
literature that makes us “fi nely aware and richly responsible,” hence her 
focus on the works of authors such as James.6 Irony doesn’t work this way. 
Despite its seeming preference for works of so-called high literature and 
its general disregard of generic fi ctions, ethical criticism might claim that 
the heroes of the classic westerns could serve as models of laudable moral 
action. Th ere is nothing about the character of McCabe to be lauded from 
a moral perspective. But that is really the point about creating a western 
in the mode of irony. Nussbaum says, prophetically, that “obtuseness and 
refusal of vision are our besetting vices.”7 McCabe and Mrs. Miller shows 
us obtuseness and the refusal of vision, most obviously through the char-
acter of McCabe himself. We are not asked to condone the lack of any 
moral basis for individual or community actions. We are asked to think 
about the implosion of the moral vision conventionally at the heart of the 
western.
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Th e Mythos of the Classic Western: Narrative Conventions and 
Generic Motifs
Frye, and following along from him, Paul Ricoeur,8 adopts the term mythos 
from Aristotle to designate the overarching plot structure characteristic of 
particular generic works of narrative fi ction. Aristotle, of course, was inter-
ested in dramatic tragedy. His Poetics has come down to us as something of 
a handbook for the creation of successful and coherent Greek tragedies.9 But 
as Frye and Ricoeur both note, the plot structure—the mythos—Aristotle 
derived from the tragedies of his time is something we can also abstract from 
other works of generic fi ction. In particular, and this is a point on which 
Aristotle, Frye, and Ricoeur would all agree, the western as a narrative genre 
must be considered fi rst in terms of plot structure. Only then can we con-
sider the role played by the characters who participate in plot action.
As a means of identifying the mythos of the western, we begin with a 
survey of some key features of the classic western—features that serve as 
ironic reference points for McCabe. And by “classic,” we mean those fi lms 
that have emerged as classics, as examples of the western fi lm as art.10 Th ese 
are the fi lms by the likes of Ford and Stevens and not, for instance, the B-
westerns featuring actors such as Tex Ritter and Roy Rogers. Th e governing 
mythos of the classic western has several recognizable features: the fi gure 
of the male hero who helps bring order to the oft en lawless West, the tale of 
progress in the expansion westward, the beginnings of settlement and the 
establishing of community, and a plot that ultimately leads to a confronta-
tion between good and evil, namely, between those who defend and those 
who threaten the order and stability of the community. Th e classic west-
ern hero represents justice and morally appropriate action, and in the end 
acts to protect members of the community from lawless villains, even if in 
some cases he is initially reluctant to involve himself in local troubles. Con-
sider Wyatt Earp, who agrees to become sheriff  of Tombstone only aft er his 
brother’s murder, and even Ethan Edwards, although Ethan’s relationship 
to these key aspects of the classic male hero’s character is darker and less 
obviously “heroic” than Earp’s.
Some of the binary oppositions around which classic westerns are tra-
ditionally constructed have just emerged: hero/villain, good/evil, lawful 
community/lawless wilderness.11 Another binary opposition at the heart of 
classic westerns occurs in the depiction of central female characters. Again 
citing My Darling Clementine, we see the opposition between the proper 
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and virginal Clementine and the oft en unscrupulous, disloyal, and sexually 
available saloon girl Chihuahua. When it comes to the representation of 
gender, in other words, classic westerns tend to uphold moral conventions 
and gender norms characteristic not so much of the time the fi lms are set 
but the time the fi lms are made and initially exhibited.12 Chihuahua’s death 
might be sentimentalized, but it is the whore who dies, not Clementine, the 
nurse who will become the fi rst schoolteacher in Tombstone.
Th e classic western frequently begins with a protagonist (usually male 
and oft en alone) located in or initially identifi ed with a wilderness land-
scape.13 Such scenes establish the male protagonist as someone separate from 
community or home, as self-reliant and self-suffi  cient, as someone who may 
eventually be of help to the emerging community but who is uneasy about 
becoming integrated into it. Th e protagonist’s identity is quickly established 
in relation to courage, skill with weapons, and a reputation from the past: 
for instance, he is known as a former soldier, sheriff , or gunfi ghter. Th e pro-
tagonist emerges, so to speak, from the landscape into a community. Some-
times, the community is represented as little more than a few isolated farms 
(Th e Searchers), although we see the settlers join together in the search for 
Debbie (played fi rst by Lana Wood then by her older sister Natalie Wood) 
and Lucy (Pippa Scott). Sometimes, it is the disorder of a young frontier 
town (My Darling Clementine). Sometimes, it is represented by a group of 
homesteaders who band together to go into the town that has no law and is 
controlled by a self-interested cattle baron (Shane). By contrast, the action 
of High Noon (Fred Zinnemann, 1952) takes place within a settled town. Th e 
only problem is that the townspeople are moral cowards, unwilling to help 
or defend their departing marshal Will Kane (Gary Cooper), who is being 
hunted by gunmen. A signifi cant point here is that in virtually all cases in 
the classic western, the central male protagonist’s actions will involve com-
mitments to the fl edgling community as well as the need to take action for 
personal reasons to avenge lawlessness: the slaughter of Ethan’s brother and 
his brother’s family; the murder of Wyatt’s brother, James (Don Garner), by 
the Clantons; Shane’s sense of personal responsibility for the well-being of 
the Starrett family when Joe Starrett (Van Hefl in) decides to confront Ryker 
(Emile Meyer) and the gunfi ghter Wilson (Jack Palance). In High Noon, even 
though he is no longer marshal, Will Kane returns to the town, having left  
aft er his marriage, knowing that Frank Miller (Ian MacDonald) and his men 
will eventually hunt him and his new bride, Amy (Grace Kelly), down. Even 
in a western where a community is yet to be established and settlement is 
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little more than a stagecoach junction or an isolated railway station, such as 
in Th e Stalking Moon, Sam (Gregory Peck) off ers to protect Sarah (Eva Marie 
Saint), a former Apache captive, and her half-Indian son against the threat 
of the renegade Apache leader Salvaje (Nathaniel Narcisco). Th e actions of 
the classic western protagonist have a clear ethical dimension to them.
Finally, and signifi cantly, the narrative closure of the classic western typi-
cally involves the hero’s triumph over adversity and the successful comple-
tion of his goal: Ethan exacts revenge against Scar and rescues his abducted 
niece; Wyatt avenges the death of James and also the death of Chihuahua 
during the shoot-out at the OK Corral; Will Kane and his bride face and kill 
Miller and his men when the townsfolk fail to help; Shane kills the Ryker 
brothers and Wilson, the villains who have been trying to run the Starretts 
and other settlers off  their homesteads; and Sam kills Salvaje, who has left  a 
trail of innocent victims in his attempt to fi nd his son. In each of these clas-
sic westerns, with the exception of Th e Stalking Moon, where there is not yet 
an established community, the protagonist pointedly does not remain in the 
community he has defended. Th e very qualities that make these protago-
nists able to act on behalf of the community against those who threaten its 
stability make them fi nally unable to integrate themselves into it. So Wyatt, 
Will Kane and his bride, and Shane ride off  at the end of these fi lms. In one 
of the most striking closing shots in the history of the genre, having rescued 
his niece Debbie and brought her to the Jorgensens’ farm, Ethan stands at 
the farmhouse doorway. For this extended take, the camera is positioned 
inside, with the inside of the house in darkness and Ethan silhouetted against 
the bright sky in the door frame. Th e closing shot is a reference back to the 
opening shot, which establishes the fi lm’s polarities: inside/outside, home/
wilderness, and family/the outsider. Rather than crossing the threshold, 
Ethan turns and walks away as the door swings slowly shut. In sum, regard-
less of the stage of development of the community in the western, action to 
ensure order and some form of justice lies fi nally in the hands of the cen-
tral hero, who acts out of a sense of moral right although he is fi nally never 
integrated into the community.
Earlier it was mentioned that the classic westerns to which McCabe is 
a calculated and ironic response have achieved the status of fi lm art. Th is 
is not to minimize the fact that, like their cousins, the B-westerns, classic 
westerns are members of a genre, and are to be understood in terms of the 
use to which governing generic conventions are put. In this section, we have 
outlined several of the most central generic conventions of the western. 
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Th ese conventions include identifi able characters, recognizable patterns of 
narrative action, a range of generically relevant locations, and conventions 
of narrative closure. Th ere are four more thematic plot-points characteristic 
of the genre that bear mentioning. Combined, the way these generic con-
ventions are implemented will tell us a great deal about the moral/ethical 
perspective of the particular fi lm in which they appear.
Th e fi rst plot-point or thematic motif concerns what we refer to gener-
ally as the threat to innocence. Th is threat can take a variety of forms. An 
obvious example occurs in Stagecoach, in which a newborn baby is inside 
the coach attacked by Indians while it makes its way across the desert. 
Another version is the death of the innocent, as we see in the murder of 
Wyatt’s younger brother, James, by the Clantons. Yet another version is the 
violation of innocence, which is a theme central to Th e Searchers, since plot 
action involves not just the murder of Ethan’s brother, Aaron (Walter Coy), 
and the rape and murder of Ethan’s sister-in-law, Martha (Dorothy Jordan), 
but also the abduction, rape, and murder of Ethan’s niece Lucy, as well as the 
abduction into sexual servitude of Ethan’s other niece, Debbie, at the hands 
of “Scar” (Henry Brandon), the Nawyecky Comanche chief Cicatrice. In Th e 
Stalking Moon, Salvaje’s killing of innocent victims during his search for his 
son includes the Mexican family who are Sam’s only neighbors. Th e threat 
to innocence in the western represents the loss of order and stability when 
it occurs early in the narrative or underlines the threat of lawlessness that 
precedes the fi nal shoot-out.
Th e second thematic motif to mention is the funeral or graveyard scene. 
Deaths happen oft en in classic westerns—deaths of villains, certainly, but 
also deaths of ordinary citizens at the hands of villains, and of course deaths 
of characters who count, whether literally or metaphorically, as innocents. 
Th ese latter are the cases of interest. In its classic formulation, the graveyard 
scene or burial scene embodies the particular western’s statement of moral 
idealism. In Clementine, the moral idealism is captured by Wyatt’s words 
over the grave of James when he looks forward to a time when “kids can 
grow up safe.” Th is is important not only in itself, but also because it fore-
tells Wyatt’s desire to eliminate the lawless element that killed James and to 
restore to the community the innocence that was lost with James’s murder. 
In Shane, Torrey’s (Elisha Cook Jr.) funeral is set on a hilltop with the lawless 
town in the distance. From this vantage, the settlers at the funeral can see the 
smoke from the farm of Lewis (Edgar Buchanan) and his family, who were 
about to leave the valley, which Ryker’s men have set ablaze, causing Lewis 
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to decide to remain in the community and, with the promise of help from 
his fellow settlers, to rebuild. Th ings are somewhat diff erent in Th e Search-
ers. Th ere, at the funeral of his brother, sister-in-law, and their younger son 
(the whereabouts of his nieces Lucy and Debbie not yet having been discov-
ered), Ethan disrupts the Reverend Captain Samuel Clayton (Ward Bond), 
saying, “Put an amen to it!” Ethan’s point in walking away from the funeral 
is that time is valuable if he is going to search for his nieces, and the nice-
ties of a public observance come second to fi nding his nieces and avenging 
his dead family members.
Th e third additional motif to mention is the depiction, in the classic 
western, of romantic love. Interestingly, romantic love—within appropri-
ate social boundaries, of course—is a sign of socialization and settling into 
the community. Wyatt attends a church dance early in Clementine, where 
he asks Clementine (whom he addresses as “Miss Carter”) to dance. Despite 
his awkward dancing style (reminiscent of how Henry Fonda dances in 
Ford’s Young Mr. Lincoln, 1939), it is clear that the two are interested in one 
another. At the end of the fi lm, Wyatt promises Clementine that he will 
return to Tombstone, where she stays on as the schoolteacher, but neverthe-
less rides out of town to visit his father. In Shane, following the shoot-out, 
Shane rides out of the valley back into the mountains where we fi rst saw 
him and does not return to the homestead, where there is obviously a strong 
mutual attraction between him and Mrs. Starrett. In Th e Searchers, a main 
reason for Ethan not to stay is that his true love, his sister-in-law Martha, 
is dead. But the future of the wilderness community can at least look hope-
fully toward the forthcoming wedding of Ethan’s nephew, Martin (Jeff rey 
Hunter), to the Jorgensens’ daughter, Laurie (Vera Miles).
Th e fi nal point about the thematic signifi cance of community in the clas-
sic western underlines the spiritual dimension of expansion and settlement. 
Whether it is an isolated homestead or a developing town, the essence of the 
community involves selfl ess and future-oriented cooperation among settlers 
and citizens. Th at said, community is oft en defi ned by what is absent or by 
what has yet to be achieved. For example, in Shane, Joe Starrett foresees “a 
town and churches and a school.” In Th e Searchers, Mrs. Jorgensen (Olive 
Carey) talks about Texicans being “way out on a limb. Th is year and next. 
Maybe for a hundred more. But I don’t think it will be forever. Some day 
this country’s gonna be a fi ne good place to be.” Th e symbol by which this 
community is represented in many classic westerns is the church, even when, 
as we see in Clementine, it is still under construction. Th e dance mentioned 
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earlier occurs as part of the fi rst social gathering to raise money to fi nish 
the construction of Tombstone’s church even though it does not yet have a 
regular preacher. One of the settlers, John Simpson (Russell Simpson), leads 
the singing of the hymn “Shall We Gather at the River” as well as playing 
fi ddle for the dancing. Even when there is no church, the western has oft en 
celebrated how spiritual and moral values have been part of the settlement 
of the West and the establishment of a law-abiding community. In a tell-
ing conjunction of the spiritual and the civic in Th e Searchers, the Rever-
end Captain Samuel Clayton both leads the Texas Rangers and offi  ciates at 
funerals and weddings (“Shall We Gather at the River” is sung at both the 
funeral and the interrupted wedding ceremony). He also observes proper 
behavior on all occasions, from not permitting alcohol during the wedding 
ceremony to allowing the attacking Comanche Indians to carry out their 
dead and wounded unhindered during a break in the fi ghting. In Shane we 
again see a conjunction of the civic and the spiritual during the Indepen-
dence Day celebration at one of the homesteads. With the American fl ag 
fl ying in the background, the homesteaders sing the hymn “Abide with Me,” 
dance to the folk song “Goodbye, Old Paint,” and in a more comic moment 
tease the former Confederate soldier Torrey with a few bars of “Dixie.” As in 
My Darling Clementine, the civic and the spiritual is bound into family and 
more particularly into personal and community relationships. Th e home-
steaders in Shane also celebrate Joe and Marian Starrett’s wedding anniver-
sary just as the settlers make way for “the marshal and his lady fair” in My 
Darling Clementine. Even in westerns with an established town setting, such 
as High Noon, the church remains a symbol of community. Following the 
opening credits, we see three gunmen ride into town on the right side of the 
image, with the church prominent on the left  side. When Will Kane seeks 
the support of the community he goes to the Sunday service, although the 
townspeople fail him—again underlining the need for the western hero to 
demonstrate the courage and moral will to defend the community.
Th e Western in Ironic Perspective
Th e optimistic classic western—our central examples have been My Dar-
ling Clementine and Shane—are, narratively speaking, examples of what we, 
following Northrop Frye, call the master genre of romance. Th e narrative 
structure of the classic western is that of a quest, with a hero who sets out 
to accomplish some goal that is both a social and a moral good. Many later 
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and darker westerns—our example is Th e Searchers—are explicitly quests. 
Ethan and Marty’s search to fi nd Debbie and punish Scar lasts, literally, for 
years, and takes them all over the American Southwest and also north into 
Colorado. Central to the quest plotline is the basic ambition of turning the 
western desert into a garden, making the community safe from internal or 
external threats, and introducing key civilizing aspects to the lawless frontier, 
notably law enforcement (the sheriff  or marshal), religion (the church and 
its preacher), and education (the schoolteacher). What the classic western is 
not, even in its darker moments, is ironic. McCabe and Mrs. Miller is a self-
consciously ironic examination of the paradigmatic conventions and motifs 
of the western. We have already discussed the fi lm’s setting in Washington 
State. Let us turn to the central protagonists.
Th at McCabe is a western presented in the ironic mode might not be ini-
tially apparent to viewers. Th is is partly because the fi lm might not initially 
look like a western at all. Th e rain-soaked forest, through which a hooded 
man dressed in an oversized fur coat rides a horse, muttering to himself, 
while on the sound track Leonard Cohen sings the melancholic “Th e Stranger 
Song,” is obviously not how westerns typically present themselves. Rain and 
mud and overcast hillsides are not the sorts of markers that western view-
ers typically expect. Nor do we conventionally fi nd mutterers transformed 
into western protagonists. Th e rider enters a small town very much under 
construction, as is the town’s church, which is the fi rst structure we see as he 
approaches. Once inside the town (later identifi ed as Presbyterian Church), 
the rider shakes off  his huge fur coat, dismounts, and takes out of a box 
being carried by his saddle pony a bowler hat, which he carefully puts on. 
Th en, in a long shot fi lmed from inside the door of Sheehan’s Saloon and 
Hotel, the initial social center of the community, the man who will shortly 
be identifi ed as McCabe walks through the dark and muddy town center, 
across a wooden footbridge, and into the bar.
As might be expected, the arrival of a stranger arouses the interest of 
many at Sheehan’s, including Sheehan (Rene Auberjonois) himself. Ques-
tions about whether the stranger is wearing a gun are quietly voiced by 
those in the bar. Putting together bits of information while McCabe sets up 
a game of poker with the locals, Sheehan is led to believe that the stranger is 
none other than John “Pudgy” McCabe, the man who shot Bill Roundtree. 
McCabe never confi rms or denies Sheehan’s guess. Virtually no one in the 
bar has heard of either John McCabe or Bill Roundtree, but Sheehan insists 
that the card player is McCabe and that he has “a big rep.” Trying to draw 
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him out, Sheehan suggests that McCabe is a gunfi ghter. McCabe replies, 
“Businessman, businessman.” So while we seem to have here the conven-
tion that establishes McCabe’s reputation as a gunfi ghter, he is unwilling to 
acknowledge who he is. Invariably, the classic western hero’s identity and 
reputation are enhanced by his subsequent actions, but McCabe’s actions 
will continually raise doubts about his reputation. Th e fi lm’s genuine gun-
man, Butler (Hugh Millais), will eventually declare of McCabe, “Th at man 
never killed anyone!”
What do we learn about McCabe in the opening sequences of the fi lm 
up to the arrival of Mrs. Miller? Several things, none of them remotely likely 
to identify him as a western hero. He is vulgar. He drinks to the point of 
drunkenness. He is incompetent in his various professional undertakings, 
as is obvious from the brothel he sets up in three canvas tents, not to men-
tion his inability to even fathom how to organize and manage his prostitutes. 
When Mrs. Miller arrives, it is clear that, as she says, she is a whore and 
knows a lot about whoring. (We see her twice, briefl y, inside the brothel in 
Bear Paw where McCabe goes to buy “chippies,” as he calls them.) She will 
be the organizer and the manager of the new brothel. Compared to Mrs. 
Miller, McCabe is shown not only to be a bad businessman—his saloon is 
mostly always empty—but also to be singularly unimaginative. She sees 
the potential that Presbyterian Church off ers for a whorehouse with proper 
linen and high-class girls brought in from Seattle. McCabe seems not to have 
thought beyond buying the most unfortunate whores available from the 
brothel in Bear Paw. If all this were not bad enough, McCabe doesn’t even 
have the vision of Sheehan, who is himself represented as being not par-
ticularly bright. Yet even Sheehan can anticipate the day when Presbyterian 
Church might have not two saloons, but four or more. He has the foresight 
to propose striking up a partnership with McCabe to ensure that anyone 
who opens a saloon aft er the two of them is forced to give them a cut of the 
profi ts. In response to Sheehan’s proposal, McCabe can off er only the inane 
remark that “if a frog had wings, he wouldn’t bump his ass so much” before 
having to intervene as one of his psychologically frail prostitutes attacks a 
client with a knife.
Th e fi rst main arc of narrative action, then, runs from McCabe’s arrival 
in Presbyterian Church to getting his tent brothel up and running. Th e sec-
ond main arc begins with the arrival of Mrs. Miller on the steam engine with 
Ida (Shelley Duval), the mail-order bride sent for by Bart Coyle (Bert Rem-
sen). Archetypally speaking, Ida is the virgin and Mrs. Miller is the whore, 
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but ultimately both women understand that if they are to have livings at 
all, it will be as the result of an exchange for sex. With Mrs. Miller’s arrival, 
the town’s central institution shift s from being Sheehan’s saloon to McCabe 
and Mrs. Miller’s whorehouse. Th e church, aft er which the town is named, 
seems to be the only building under construction with which no progress 
is made, short of lift ing the cross to the top of the steeple during the fi lm’s 
most beautiful sequence, as McCabe brings the Bear Paw whores to town 
while on the sound track Leonard Cohen sings “Th e Sisters of Mercy.”
Conventionally, while the saloon might in some westerns be a place for 
relaxation and interaction with fellow settlers or townspeople, the moral 
epicenter of the community is the church and if there is no physical church, 
then in the ceremonies that are related to the church, including weddings 
and funerals. Th e church is central even if, as we see in Clementine, it is in 
such early days of construction that it is little more than a fl oor and the 
framework for the steeple. Nevertheless, in Clementine, the church represents 
the unifying aspects of the community. It combines the personal, the civic, 
the social, the spiritual, and the patriotic (as seen, for instance, by the fl ags 
fl ying on the framework for the steeple). Th ere is even community support 
in the fi nal shoot-out, as the settler John Simpson, who presides over the 
gathering at the church, and the mayor (Roy Roberts) serve as decoys for 
Wyatt’s brother, Morgan (Ward Bond) and Doc Holliday (Victor Mature) 
as Wyatt walks to the OK Corral, adding a civic and a spiritual sanction to 
the gunfi ght. Th e church serves no such function in McCabe. It is a mere 
shell, and the minister, Mr. Elliot (Corey Fisher), is an unnervingly cold, 
awkward individual, unable to converse with the townspeople even when he 
has to make his way through Sheehan’s crowded bar to the small store at the 
back to buy food. (In a lovely moment, Sheehan’s door is thrown open and 
someone shouts, “Close the goddamned door,” only to see who has come 
in and then sheepishly add, “Evening, Reverend.”) Th e place of relaxation, 
fellow feeling, conviviality, and social cohesion is the whorehouse. While 
the social dance takes place at the church in Clementine, it takes place at 
the whorehouse in McCabe.
Earlier it was mentioned that McCabe couldn’t be more diff erent from 
classic western heroes like Earp and Ethan. Shortly aft er Mrs. Miller’s arrival, 
and due to her initiative, McCabe can boast not only a saloon (although 
McCabe notes at one point that he hasn’t sold a bottle of whiskey all day), 
but also a bathhouse and a whorehouse, and at least the two businesses 
run by Mrs. Miller are turning a profi t. None of the heroes we have consid-
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ered—Earp, Ethan, Shane, Will Kane, or Sam—is motivated by profi t. Th ey 
represent clear moral positions with respect to other characters and ongoing 
narrative action. Th ey are each on moral quests. McCabe, however, represents 
no clear moral stance or position, and is certainly not on any sort of moral 
quest. Th e western heroes have a lively sense of the various threats that will 
confront them. McCabe has no comparable sense, since he simply does not 
understand how vulnerable he is when, as shortly happens, bigger corporate 
interests see what he has accomplished and want to buy him out.
Worse yet, McCabe does not have the imagination to recognize the 
economic imperative of big business in the settlement of the West. In its 
ironic perspective, McCabe and Mrs. Miller off ers a dark vision of expan-
sion in which a fl edgling community is overtaken by institutional capital-
ism. Th e Harrison Shaughnessy Mining Company represents the expansion 
of big business at the expense of small businessmen and entrepreneurs like 
McCabe and Sheehan. It also represents the lawlessness of the frontier, since 
what big business cannot achieve by negotiation, it achieves by force. Two 
of the mining company’s representatives, Eugene Sears (Michael Murphy) 
and Ernie Hollander (Antony Holland), come to Presbyterian Church to 
buy McCabe’s holdings. McCabe is simply foolish trying to impress them 
with his jokes and one-liners. For instance, aft er Sears introduces himself, 
McCabe quips, “I’m Roebuck. Who’s watching the store?” Understandably, 
Sears and Hollander dismiss him as a “smart ass,” especially aft er the story 
McCabe tells about the frog that is swallowed by an eagle, a story that ends 
with the punch line, “You wouldn’t shit me now!” While they say that they 
understand he is “the town’s leading citizen,” they see clearly that he lacks 
their sophistication and their ability to negotiate. While trying to work out 
a better off er than Sears and Hollander are authorized to endorse, McCabe 
makes a serious social gaff e by trying to entertain them at the whorehouse. 
Th at they have already bought out Sheehan’s holdings ought to cause McCabe 
to take seriously the nature of their off er, but he does not, claiming he has 
already received a better off er from “Monkey Ward,” that is, Montgomery 
Ward, the mail-order store chain. He also fails to recognize the threat of 
violence barely concealed in the off er to buy his holdings, violence that will 
become evident when, to McCabe’s surprise, Sears and Hollander simply 
leave, turning the matter over to the company’s hired gunman, Butler, and 
his associates. Even Mrs. Miller realizes immediately the risk McCabe runs 
by not capitulating to the deal proposed by Sears and Hollander. In amaze-
ment at his recklessness, she exclaims, “You turned down Harrison Shaugh-
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nessy? You know who they are?” And then she adds, “You better hope they 
come back. Th ey’d as soon put a bullet in you as look at you.”
Th e evening Sears and Hollander arrive in Presbyterian Church, they 
witness the attack on Bart Coyle, whose funeral, which takes place aft er 
Sears and Hollander leave, is the next major turning point of the narrative. 
On a hillside, with the townsfolk in attendance and the whores leading the 
singing of the hymn,14 the minister conducts the service in a fast, fl at voice 
devoid of feeling or conviction. Mrs. Miller, from several yards away, intently 
scrutinizes Coyle’s widow, Ida, sizing up her possibilities as a future whore. 
Ida returns Mrs. Miller’s look, and not long later she takes up her new place 
in the whorehouse. During the funeral, McCabe—who has been edgy since 
the departure of Sears and Hollander—sees a horseman approach in the 
distance. Th inking this is a gunman sent to resolve the situation with Har-
rison Shaughnessy, McCabe goes up to him. Stylistically, this is set up as if 
McCabe is about to participate in a classic showdown confrontation, with 
McCabe preparing his gun. It turns out not to be a gunman at all, but a youth-
ful cowboy (Keith Carradine) in an oversized hat, who tells McCabe that 
he’s heard about “the fanciest whorehouse in the whole territory up here.” 
He adds, “It’s so long since I had a piece of ass!” Th e solemnity of the tradi-
tional graveside scene in the classic western is thus totally disrupted, while 
at the same time, the absolute centrality of the whores and the whorehouse 
to the community of Presbyterian Church is underlined.
McCabe, as it happens, has not been wrong to anticipate the arrival of 
gunmen representing Harrison Shaughnessy. Th e leader, Butler, is a bear of 
a man, and looks even larger in an oversized fur coat. He dwarfs McCabe, 
but also confounds him. McCabe off ers him a cigar and Butler counters, 
“Have one of mine.” As might have been anticipated, McCabe still doesn’t 
understand the precariousness of the situation he has put himself into. Th us, 
he wrongly believes that Butler and his men have come to continue negotia-
tions. Th ey have not. As Butler wryly puts it, “I don’t make deals.” Shortly 
aft er this, in a moment that captures forcefully the motif of the death of the 
innocent, Butler’s teenage gunman, the “Kid” (Manfred Schulz), deliberately 
murders the young cowboy who, from his arrival in Presbyterian Church, 
has spent his entire time running around the whorehouse, and is simply 
looking to buy a pair of new socks, having worn his threadbare.
Th e brutal murder of the cowboy, who has been deliberately lured into 
drawing his gun by the Kid, brings into sharp focus both the potential vio-
lence of the men hired by Harrison Shaughnessy and the lack of a sheriff  or 
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anyone representing the law in Presbyterian Church. Th e idea of the law, 
so prominent in classic and late-classic westerns, is represented in McCabe 
by a lawyer (William Devane) whom McCabe visits aft er he is told that Sears 
and Hollander have left  Bear Paw. Representing himself as someone who can 
help the “little guy,” including McCabe, the lawyer talks about his own future 
as “the next senator from the state of Washington” and how he can imagine 
that he and McCabe will sit down to dinner with William Jennings Bryant. Th e 
lawyer’s rhetoric is fi lled with the idealism of western expansion, for example, 
“When a man goes into the wilderness and with his bare hands gives birth to 
a small enterprise . . . I’m here to tell you that no sons of bitches are going to 
take it away from him.” He also off ers words of reassurance: “Harrison Shaugh-
nessy. Th ey have stockholders. Do you think they want their stockholders and 
the public thinking their management isn’t imbued with fair play and justice, 
the very values that make this country what it is today?” Less than reassured, 
McCabe can only respond, “Well, I just didn’t want to get killed.”
Th e classic western oft en ends with a fi nal shoot-out. Something rather 
like this happens in McCabe, but it is stripped of any suggestion of a heroic 
showdown in which the protagonist faces his antagonists face-to-face. Th e 
shoot-out in McCabe and Mrs. Miller pits McCabe against Butler and his 
associates, who are hunting him in order to kill him, while also featuring 
the church and its minister (who conventionally represents the moral and 
spiritual center of community), as well as most members of the community, 
but it brings them together in a quite surprising manner. Taking place uncon-
ventionally in a heavy snowstorm, the shoot-out occurs at various locations 
throughout Presbyterian Church, ironically highlighting the growth of the 
town and the fresh-cut lumber of the new bridge and the buildings that 
have replaced the tumbledown shacks we saw when McCabe fi rst arrived. 
Seeking a vantage point, if not a refuge, in the church, which stands iso-
lated from the town, McCabe fi nds the interior not a place of worship but a 
dark space cluttered with tools, wagon wheels, the minister’s bed in a cor-
ner, wood shavings and bits of discarded wood. It is quite clear that no one 
in Presbyterian Church attends church. In addition, McCabe is confronted 
by the minister who, now carrying McCabe’s shotgun and acting without 
any sign of charity, forces him out with the words, “Th is is God’s house,” 
ignoring McCabe’s pleas for his safety. An unexpected consequence is that 
the minister, who is holding McCabe’s gun, is shot by Butler when he kicks 
open the church door. In turn, the minister drops the lamp he is holding, 
starting a fi re in the church. Alerted by the call, “Fire! Fire! Th e church is 
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on fi re!” and a later cry, “Jesus Christ, the church is on fi re!” the majority of 
the townspeople, including the whores, work together to save the church 
they do not attend.
Again, in an unconventional representation of the traditional shoot-out, 
where the classic western hero traditionally faces the villains in a face-to-
face confrontation, the fi nal shoot-out is crosscut with shots of the towns-
people, who are completely unaware of McCabe’s circumstances while they 
are fi ghting the fi re. And while there may be suspense in McCabe’s attempt 
to elude his enemies, McCabe’s actions and the deaths of Butler and his 
accomplices are all unheroic. McCabe is simply running for his life, and will 
ultimately die alone. Butler’s gunman the Kid is shot in the back although 
he wounds McCabe before falling into the tub in the bathhouse where he 
drowns. Butler’s other gunman, known as “Breed” (Jace Van Der Veen), is 
shot in the back and dies in the snow. Wounded, and at the very moment 
that he appears to have found an isolated shack where he can take refuge, 
McCabe is shot in the back by Butler, and then slides down a snow-covered 
slope. Butler, making his way through thigh-deep snow, stands above the 
prostrate fi gure of McCabe who, unexpectedly, raises his hand and shoots 
Butler in the forehead with a derringer, the gun he reportedly shot Bill 
Roundtree with. If our expectation was that the townspeople would discover 
McCabe’s plight and save him, it is not fulfi lled, as everyone is totally caught 
up in the celebration aft er putting out the church fi re, unaware of the fate of 
the minister and the fate of McCabe, who dies from his wounds, completely 
alone and increasingly covered by the falling snow. Th e fi nal sequence of 
shots intercut the body of McCabe, now without his bowler hat and with his 
face obscured by snow and the warm, red glow of Mrs. Miller’s face as she 
lies drift ing into oblivion in the opium den, as on the sound track Leonard 
Cohen sings, “Traveling lady, stay awhile, until the night is over. I’m just 
a station on your way, I know I’m not your lover.” Th e fi nal extended shot 
of McCabe’s body represents not only his death but also Altman’s way of 
delineating the death of an ideal of moral action as well as the death of a 
symbolic triumph over lawlessness and evil that the genre had heretofore 
invested in the western hero.
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Th e Encounter with the Other
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SAVAGE NATIONS
Native Americans and the Western
Michael Valdez Moses
Todorov and Columbus: Th e Indian as “Other”
It is a commonplace of contemporary fi lm criticism that Native Americans 
have historically been ill served by the American western, a genre in which 
they have been misrepresented and demeaned.1 For those who regard an 
honest and impartial portrayal of historically oppressed minorities as a 
moral if not an aesthetic imperative, the American western will off er little 
in the way of spiritual uplift . But if the American western fails to off er an 
objective ethnological depiction of indigenous peoples (assuming that such 
a thing were both possible and desirable), it nonetheless invites a philo-
sophic consideration of the problematics of alterity, an analysis of the ways 
in which cinematic representations of the cultural Other have been invented 
and manipulated, and an examination of the various political ends to which 
those representations have been put.
In his seminal work, Th e Conquest of America: Th e Question of the Other, 
the Bulgarian-born French philosopher and literary theorist, Tzvetan Todo-
rov (1939–) investigates “the discovery the self makes of the other” by means 
of a historical and philosophical analysis of “the Spaniards’ perception of the 
Indians” during the century that followed Columbus’s fi rst voyage in 1492.2 
Todorov notes that Columbus’s attitude toward the Indians veers between 
two incompatible views. At times the explorer describes them as perfectly 
good: beautiful, virtuous, generous, peaceable, brave, and entirely innocent; 
at other times he depicts them as supremely wicked and cowardly, fabulously 
cruel and violent, given to all manner of vices, especially lust, greed, and 
thievery. Columbus conceives of the Indians either as perfect prelapsarian 
Christians and potentially ideal Spanish subjects or as corrupt and debased 
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creatures, natural slaves who must be dealt with by force and systematic 
coercion. According to Todorov, Columbus
either conceives the Indians (though without using these words) 
as human beings altogether, having the same rights as himself; but 
then he sees them not only as equals but also as identical, and this 
behavior leads to assimilationism, the projection of his own values 
on the others. Or else he starts from the diff erence, but the latter 
is immediately translated into terms of superiority and inferiority 
(in his case, obviously it is the Indians who are inferior). What is 
denied is the existence of a human substance truly other, something 
capable of being not merely an imperfect state of oneself. Th ese two 
elementary fi gures of the experience of alterity are both grounded 
in egocentrism, in the identifi cation of our own values with values 
in general, of our I with the universe.3
Todorov off ers a theoretical explanation of Columbus’s incompatible 
representations of the Indians: “How can Columbus be associated with 
these two apparently contradictory myths, one whereby the Other is a ‘noble 
savage’ (when perceived at a distance) and one whereby he is a ‘dirty dog,’ 
a potential slave? It is because both rest on a common basis, which is the 
failure to recognize the Indians, and the refusal to admit them as a subject 
having the same rights as oneself, but diff erent. Columbus has discovered 
America but not the Americans.”4
For Todorov, a fully humane relationship between the Self and the 
(exterior) Other depends upon the willingness of the Self to accept both the 
equality and the diff erence of the Other. “On the ideological level . . . we are 
trying to combine what we regard as the better parts of both terms of the 
alternative; we want equality without its compelling us to accept identity; 
but also diff erence without its degenerating into superiority/inferiority. We 
aspire to reap the benefi ts of the egalitarian model and of the hierarchic 
model; we aspire to rediscover the meaning of the social without losing the 
quality of the individual.”5
For Todorov, the mere acceptance by the Self of the equality of the Other 
is not suffi  cient to establish a properly humane and just relationship between 
them, for egalitarianism may easily slide over into an insistence that the 
Other is or should become identical with the Self, that the Self and the Other 
must share identical values. In his analysis of the controversy in 1550 at Val-
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ladolid between two sixteenth-century priestly scholars, Bartolomé de Las 
Casas, who famously argued on behalf of the rights of the Indians, and his 
intellectual adversary, the philosopher and theologian Ginés de Sepúlveda, 
who maintained that the Amerindians were naturally and culturally infe-
rior, and hence could be legitimately enslaved and violently coerced into 
accepting the Catholic faith, Todorov points out that Las Casas’s defense of 
the Indians crucially depends upon his representation of them as devoid 
of all defects: the Indians are models of humility, patience, peaceableness, 
and obedience, singularly free of cupidity, in short, “veritable Christians.” 
Although Todorov explicitly praises Las Casas for his eff orts to treat the 
Indians with greater humanity and justice, he nonetheless faults him for his 
idealized (mis)representation of the Indians, which, from an ethnographic 
point of view, is even more unsatisfactory than Sepúlveda’s, and paradoxi-
cally, no less complicit in the colonial eff orts of the crown and the church 
to subject the native peoples of the New World to Spanish imperial rule and 
the Catholic faith. He writes, “We must acknowledge that the portrait of the 
Indians to be drawn from Las Casas’s works is rather poorer than that left  
us by Sepúlveda: as a matter of fact, we learn nothing of the Indians. If it is 
incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to 
knowledge, we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is a still greater 
one, for it consists in identifying the other purely and simply with one’s own 
‘ego ideal’ (or with oneself).”6
Todorov notes that the originality of Las Casas’s defense of the Amerin-
dians “proceeds from the fact that he attributes the ‘valued’ pole to the other 
and the rejected pole to ‘us’ (the Spaniards). But this inverted distribution 
of values, incontestable proof of his generosity of spirit, does not lessen the 
schematism of his vision.”7 Las Casas off ers no more accurate an understand-
ing of the Other, since he merely inverts Sepúlveda’s moral evaluations of 
the Spaniards and Indians; for Las Casas, it is the Indians who are the true 
Christians and the Spaniards the demonic savages.
In what follows, I shall argue that representations of Native Americans in 
the Hollywood western have much in common with those generated by the 
sixteenth-century Spaniards whom Todorov criticizes: such wildly inconsis-
tent conceptions of Native Americans, for all their apparent diff erences, are 
almost always (egocentric) projections of the culturally delimited and histori-
cally specifi c values and desires of both the makers of Hollywood westerns 
and their (chiefl y American) audiences. But in contradistinction to many 
contemporary critics of racial stereotyping of Indians in American westerns 
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(and in accord with Todorov’s critique of Las Casas), I will also maintain 
that the (mis)representations of Native Americans in the Hollywood western 
are as likely to be exaggeratedly “positive” and idealized as “negative” and 
degrading. As Jonathan Rosenbaum has pointed out, the American western 
almost never “assumes [or] addresses Native American spectators.”8 Th e fact 
that Hollywood westerns have not historically been aimed at a Native Ameri-
can audience (which would at best comprise a negligible percentage of any 
fi lm’s projected market) necessarily suggests that the chief cultural impor-
tance and primary ideological function of their portrayals of the American 
Indian oft en have little to do with modern America’s attempt to discover, 
control, or relate to its “exterior Other,” the Amerindian.9
Even when Hollywood westerns have manifested a conscious desire to 
revise and compensate for earlier unenlightened portrayals of the Native 
American in American cinema, the cultural and ideological energies of these 
fi lms have typically been directed elsewhere. To put this in a more provoca-
tive fashion: given that the near annihilation of the indigenous populations 
and the widespread (but by no means complete) destruction of Amerindian 
culture that accompanied the imperial expansion of the American regime 
westward was completed before the advent of the Hollywood western, mis-
representations of “Indians” in the American western were hardly neces-
sary to ensure the hegemonic subordination and political marginalization 
of those native peoples who managed to survive. Subsequent attempts to 
correct these misrepresentations likewise had less to do with altering or 
improving the Native Americans’ material conditions or social status than 
with other cultural and political objectives deemed more pressing. Accord-
ingly, I argue that the varied (but always constructed) portrayals of Native 
Americans in the Hollywood western, whether idealized or demonized, 
served a variety of oft en contradictory and mutable ideological and cultural 
aims, chief among them the critique of perceived defects and shortcomings 
of modern American society.
In what follows I discuss several fi lms: a postwar western “classic,” Fort 
Apache (1948), the fi rst in John Ford’s so-called Cavalry Trilogy; three “revi-
sionist” westerns from the 1970s, Little Big Man (Arthur Penn, 1970), A Man 
Called Horse (Elliot Silverstein, 1970), and Th e Return of a Man Called Horse 
(Irvin Kershner, 1976); and two new-wave westerns from the 1990s, Dances 
with Wolves (Kevin Costner, 1990) and Dead Man (Jim Jarmusch, 1995). 
While focusing on the cultural signifi cance of the historically specifi c repre-
sentations of Native Americans in these fi lms, I also aim to place their varied 
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and contradictory portraits of the American Indian within a larger western 
literary and philosophic tradition concerned with how the “civilized” is to 
be defi ned with respect to the “savage” or the “barbarian.”
Postwar Fordism and New Deal Savages
If many fi lm critics have insisted that the American western consistently 
portrays the American Indian in a negative light, a number of prominent 
cultural historians of the genre have insisted that its long history reveals a 
striking number of exceptions, not least the early silent classic Th e Vanishing 
American (George Seitz, 1926) based on Zane Grey’s novel.10 In any event, 
there is general agreement that the Hollywood western, which had been 
mainly a “B-fi lm” genre before World War II, assumed greater complex-
ity and depth in the postwar period, an accomplishment credited in large 
measure to the eff orts of John Ford. Defenders of Ford argue that among 
the director’s contributions to America’s only homegrown cinematic genre 
is a more informed and sympathetic portrayal of the American Indian (at 
least when compared to prewar Hollywood fi lms). For if Ford had portrayed 
Geronimo’s warriors as mere savages intent on killing the white protago-
nists in Stagecoach (1939), in his 1948 Fort Apache, the director presented 
the Apache people as not only the outraged victims of illiberal and high-
handed federal government policy, but also as the military superiors of the 
U.S. Cavalry’s elite West Point–educated offi  cers.
In a crucial scene in Fort Apache, Captain York (John Wayne) explains to 
his commanding offi  cer, Lieutenant Colonel Th ursday (Henry Fonda), that 
the Apache “uprising” (the refusal of the Indians to stay on the reservation) 
is due to their ill treatment and exploitation by a chartered U.S. government 
agent, Silas Meacham (Grant Withers). York explains that Apache women 
have been “degraded” and that the Indians have been regularly “cheated” in 
their commercial dealings and knowingly corrupted by Meacham’s illegal 
sale of whiskey. Sold shoddy goods and denied their proper rations of food, 
the Apache have become desperate. Given the failure of the U.S. govern-
ment to honor the terms of its treaty with the Indians, and the malfeasance 
and dishonesty of the government’s representative, the Apache are justifi ed 
in taking up arms. In fact, it is Meacham himself who has (illegally) sup-
plied the Apache with the very rifl es that enable their rebellion. In a later 
scene, the Apache chief, Cochise (Miguel Inclán), tells Colonel Th ursday 
that his people will return to the reservation peaceably, provided Meacham 
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is removed as government agent. Cochise insists that the Apache have only 
looked “for protection” from “the great white father” in Washington, DC, 
and have resorted to arms only when that promised protection was not 
forthcoming. Colonel Th ursday’s high-handed dismissal of the Apache’s rea-
sonable demands—Th ursday insists that the Indians agree unconditionally 
to return to the reservation or face immediate attack—and his gratuitous 
public insult of Cochise (Th ursday tells the Apache leader he is “without 
honor”) reinforce the view of the Apache (and Ford’s audience) that native 
“rights” are being arbitrarily violated by both civilian and military repre-
sentatives of the U.S. government. In sum, Cochise and his people demand 
justice, while Meacham seeks personal profi t, and Th ursday proclaims that 
the Apache have only the “right” to obey.
Th e corruption, dishonesty, and injustice of the American government 
are matched by the manifest incompetence of its commanding military offi  -
cer at Fort Apache. “Th ursday’s Charge,” the ill-conceived attack on Cochise’s
warriors that leads to the gratuitous massacre of Th ursday and many of 
his men, becomes in the newspapers and commemorative paintings of the 
“battle” another legendary example of the outstanding bravery of the U.S. 
Cavalry. In the fi nal scene of the fi lm, a reporter comments that Colonel 
Th ursday, a Custer-like fi gure, “must have been a great man” and a “great 
soldier.” York, like Ford’s audience, knows better. Colonel Th ursday, however 
courageous in his last moments, was every bit the “martinet” whose igno-
rance of local conditions in the fi eld, overweening professional ambition, 
and ill-founded faith in the superiority of “classroom” tactics learned at West 
Point contributed directly to the near annihilation of his troops that provides 
the dramatic climax of Fort Apache. Ford dramatizes Th ursday’s unfounded 
presumption that, as an elite graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he has 
nothing to learn from the fi eld-tested offi  cers and soldiers on the frontier 
whom he commands. Th ursday repeatedly fails to heed considered advice 
from his staff  (most pointedly Captain York), knowingly manipulates and 
misleads his offi  cers (allowing York to negotiate with Cochise in good faith 
even while the colonel plans a “surprise” assault on the Apache), and places 
his own glory and professional advancement before the safety of his own 
men. Ford’s unfl attering portrayal of Colonel Th ursday doubtlessly stems 
in part from his experience as a documentary fi lmmaker serving in the 
armed forces during World War II. Having shot thousands of feet of footage 
during the war, Ford came to share the ordinary GI’s skeptical view of the 
incompetence and self-interested motives of the ranking military brass. Fort 
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Apache, like Ford’s contemporaneous war fi lms such as Th ey Were Expendable 
(1945), off ers a populist perspective, in which the real, if unsung, heroes are 
the enlisted men and junior offi  cers oft en needlessly sacrifi ced by conceited 
and vainglorious senior commanders.
Colonel Th ursday chronically underestimates the military skill of the 
natives. Captain York informs Th ursday that the Apache have regularly 
beaten the Sioux and Cheyenne. Captain Collingwood (George O’Brien), 
whom Th ursday relieves of command, warns the colonel that the U.S. Cav-
alry has been bested in six previous campaigns against the Apache. Because 
he dismisses out of hand the notion that a ragtag band of “savages” is to be 
taken seriously as a military adversary, Th ursday blunders his way into a 
debacle. Th ough no graduate of West Point, Cochise proves to be Th ursday’s 
superior when it comes to fi eld tactics; whereas the colonel’s troops are 
nearly annihilated, Cochise’s braves incur few casualties. Moreover, while 
Th ursday treats the Apache leader contemptuously, Cochise proves an hon-
orable soldier sensitive to the niceties of “civilized” warfare: aft er the defeat 
of Th ursday’s troops, the Apache leader publicly returns the captured com-
pany “colors” to (his trusted friend and adversary) Captain York.
Ford’s portrait of Cochise as a man of principle, resolute courage, martial 
ability, unyielding honor, and magnanimity fi ts neatly into a long tradition 
in modern Western culture of the celebration of the “noble savage.” Th e con-
cept is customarily taken to originate with Rousseau’s Second Discourse on 
the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, although as we shall 
see, Rousseau conceives of “the savage” as a creature more pacifi c and inde-
pendent than warlike and civic-minded.11 However, the eighteenth-century 
philosopher Adam Ferguson, sometimes referred to as the “Scottish Rous-
seau,” provides an apt characterization of this archetype in his most infl u-
ential work of political philosophy, An Essay on the History of Civil Society. 
“If the savage has not received our instructions, he is likewise unacquainted 
with our vices. He knows no superior, and cannot be servile; he knows no 
distinctions of fortune, and cannot be envious; he acts from his talents in 
the highest station which human society can off er, that of counselor, and the 
soldier of his country. Toward forming his sentiments, he knows all that the 
heart requires to be known; he can distinguish the friend whom he loves, 
and the public interest which awakens his zeal.”12
According to Ferguson, “the virtues” among “all simple nations” (includ-
ing the Native American tribes) are “contempt of riches, love of their coun-
try, patience of hardship, danger, and fatigue.”13 Savage people most admire 
268 Michael Valdez Moses
fortitude and courage, while despising the commercial arts.14 Th ough they 
will follow a successful chief into battle, and honor his martial skill, rude 
nations are, by Ferguson’s account, fundamentally egalitarian, admitting “of 
no distinctions of rank or condition,” or at any rate of no fi xed distinctions.15 
Th ough blessed with fortitude, these savages are nonetheless addicted to war, 
easily divided, unsophisticated, uncultured, and liable to face defeat in battle 
by better-organized opponents and more advanced civilizations. As much as 
Ferguson admires his virtues, the Savage is ultimately only a remote proto-
type of the modern republican citizen-soldier. Rude nations must undergo 
a long political education. Only through the rough travails of political his-
tory do they pass from the “savage” to the “barbarian” state and then to the 
condition of “polished nations.”16 While Ferguson argues on behalf of good 
laws, a demanding civic education, and active participation in public life as 
the necessary basis for a free republican citizenry, he remains wary of even 
the best and most gift ed of political leaders. Rulers, especially successful 
ones who seek the public good, are likely to augment their power, and in so 
doing threaten those very civic virtues and political freedoms they initially 
aimed to protect and preserve. According to Ferguson, “Liberty is never in 
greater danger than it is when we measure national felicity by the blessings 
a prince may bestow, or by the mere tranquility which may attend on equi-
table administration.”17 Political liberty cannot be guaranteed by a profes-
sional army, by well-made laws and institutions, and much less by capable 
leaders who promise freedom. Ferguson insists, “Liberty is a right which 
every individual must be ready to vindicate for himself, and which he who 
pretends to bestow as a favour, has by that very act in reality denied.”18 If the 
“polished” citizen of the modern republic is to retain his liberty, something 
of his original savage independence and martial fortitude must remain.
Ferguson’s typology of savage society helps to sharpen the contrast 
between the simple martial and civic virtues of Cochise, devoted to the 
preservation and welfare of his people, and the commercially and profes-
sionally self-interested characters of Meacham and Th ursday. Th roughout 
his Essay, Ferguson warns against the potentially enervating and corrupting 
eff ects of a modern commercial ethos. For Ferguson, excessive love of gain 
and an unhealthy tendency in modern society for the material self-interest of 
individuals to prevail over the public good threaten to undermine the basis 
of a free society; a people overly interested in their commercial well-being 
are inclined to be servile and ill prepared to defend their liberties when a 
political crisis requires of them heroic self-sacrifi ce.19 Ford certainly doesn’t 
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portray Th ursday, much less his offi  cers, as lacking in bravery (if anything, 
Th ursday is recklessly courageous), but he strongly suggests that the cor-
ruption that bedevils relations between the Apache and the government 
arises from the latter’s collusion with Meacham, whose greed and fi nancial 
corruption precipitate the Apache uprising. Moreover, Ford implies that 
Th ursday’s failings stem from his willingness to risk needlessly the lives 
of his men for the sake of professional advancement and the prospect of a 
more glamorous military posting. Ferguson insists that in savage societies, 
the paramount goal of a chief is not a chivalric conception of honor but “the 
preservation and increase” of the members of the tribe; consequently, “the 
American [by which Ferguson means the Indian] rates his defeat from the 
numbers of men he has lost, or he estimates the victory from the prisoners 
he has made; not from his having remained the master of a fi eld, or from 
his being driven from a ground on which he encountered his enemy.”20 
Although Th ursday is courageous, his dramatic last stand needlessly sacri-
fi ces both his life and those of many of his men in a vainglorious attempt to 
salvage his personal honor.
As noted, Ferguson highlights the essentially egalitarian basis of “rude 
nations”; the savage virtues are linked explicitly in Ferguson’s account to an 
unwillingness to bow down before others: the savage “knows no superior, 
and cannot be servile.” In contrast to the fundamentally egalitarian spirit 
that prevails among rude nations, Colonel Th ursday insists upon the privi-
leges of his rank and demands public displays of homage and obedience 
not only from Apache, civilians, rank-and-fi le soldiers, and friends, but also 
from his staff  of fellow offi  cers. To be sure, Th ursday is never in violation of 
military protocol, nor does he exercise greater authority than that to which 
his rank entitles him. But Ford’s unfl attering portrait of Th ursday, an invet-
erate social snob, reminds his audience that the structure of the army is at 
odds with a popular American democratic sensibility. Th ursday’s military 
blunders stem in no small part from the fact that he neither brooks criticism 
nor accepts guidance from the common soldier or lower-ranking offi  cer, 
even when their combat experience and knowledge of the local theater are 
greater than his own.
Th e reading we have pursued of Fort Apache invites a consideration of 
the larger cultural signifi cance of Ford’s 1948 western. Despite its celebra-
tion of savage independence and martial valor, Ford’s portrait of the much-
aggrieved Apache Indians, betrayed and exploited by a civil and military 
administration that fails to keep its promise to protect and provide for the 
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native population, ultimately depends for its moral and dramatic eff ect upon 
the questionable premise that the Apache would (and should) be perfectly 
content to live on the reservation, if only the federal government were a better 
steward of its wards. In keeping with the “New Deal” ethos that characterizes 
many of Ford’s fi lms in the 1930s and 1940s, Fort Apache suggests not that 
paternalistic government is inherently fl awed, but rather that the American 
government of the late 1940s needs to make good on its promise to manage 
the lives of its citizens. For all their diff erences over how the Apache upris-
ing should be handled, Captain York and Colonel Th ursday are in agree-
ment that the Indians must be returned to the reservation where they can be 
looked aft er by civilian and military authorities. If the Apache are morally 
justifi ed in challenging federal authority, it is only because incompetent gov-
ernment agents and rapacious business interests have abused their powers 
and mismanaged the domestic aff airs of the reservation. Neither Cochise 
nor the members of his war council (which includes Geronimo) ever sug-
gests in Ford’s fi lm that the incarceration of the Apache on a desolate strip 
of federal land is at odds with a traditional Indian way of life or inconsistent 
with a native conception of freedom and autonomy. In fact, Ford’s fi lm treats 
Cochise and the Apache sympathetically precisely insofar as they remain 
willing to lay down their arms if Th ursday will only replace Meacham and 
see that business dealings on the reservation are more rigorously regulated. 
Th e “untamed” ferocity of the Apache is thus merely the fl ip side of their 
docility. Rebels against the U.S. government, the Apache would be the most 
peaceable, long-suff ering, and obedient of peoples, if only they were given 
adequate rations, forbidden access to fi rearms, and prohibited from imbibing 
strong liquor. In sum, Ford’s Indians are an image of “the common people” 
as envisioned by New Dealers of the 1930s (although the Apache are not 
credited with suffi  cient self-control to handle the end of prohibition). In the 
end, Ford’s native peoples are not in essential respects much diff erent from 
Las Casas’s conception of the docile and virtuous Indian.21
Ford’s portrait of the civil and more especially the military government in 
Fort Apache is likewise a refl ection not of a radical (or conservative) critique 
of those institutions, but rather a kind of populist plea for their reform. In 
the fi nal scene, York, now promoted to colonel, has taken command of Fort 
Apache and is about to embark on a major campaign against the recalcitrant 
Indians. But unlike the insolent and overbearing Th ursday, he is steeped in 
the language and lore of the local tribes and intimately familiar with their 
military tactics and strategies. To be sure, he likes and admires Cochise and 
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the Apache, and we know that they admire and trust him in return. But for 
all that, he is as determined as Th ursday to see that the Apache are forcibly 
removed to the reservation. It is hinted that York is also a graduate of the 
U.S. Military Academy, and he promises to be a better commanding offi  cer 
than Th ursday in no small measure because he knows and fraternizes with 
the rank-and-fi le soldier, just as he knows and socializes with the Apache. 
But at the end of the fi lm, what we see is not a demonstration that York is 
a more eff ective offi  cer in the fi eld, but instead an exhibition of his master-
ful manipulation of the press. Off ered a chance to explode the myth of the 
“great man,” the late Colonel Th ursday, York allows the popular legend to 
stand and uses the interview to propagandize on behalf of the U.S. Army. 
Albeit a much shrewder and media-savvy commander than his rash and 
overbearing predecessor, York is no less convinced that the Indians must be 
forced to accept the sovereignty of federal authority, regardless of the costs 
to the soldiers and native peoples on the frontier. One might say that Fort 
Apache refl ects Ford’s liberal reformist and populist conception of America. 
In this view, America emerged from the Great Depression and overcame its 
adversaries in World War II in spite of the machinations of corrupt busi-
ness interests and the incompetence of an antiquated and hidebound East 
Coast political and social elite. In this powerfully mythic version of Ameri-
can history, the Republic (indeed the West itself) is saved through the for-
bearance and courage of the common man, who, for all his patriotic love 
of personal liberty and individual autonomy, has the good sense to put his 
trust in the paternalistic governance and superior political skills of his new 
“populist” leaders.
Th e Sixties Generation: Savage Nobles and Indian Hipsters
If John Ford’s Fort Apache implicitly expresses a postwar populist view of the 
Native American as the common man, who threatens to become a violent 
menace to civil order if his rights are contravened by a corrupt fi nancial or 
authoritarian political elite, but who, if properly fed, housed, clothed, regu-
lated, and policed by the “great white father” will be a willingly obedient 
and docile subject of the state, then the revisionist westerns of the early and 
mid-1970s represent the American Indian as a countercultural ideal. Th e 
cinematic image of the Native American that emerges in the wake of the 
cultural revolution of the 1960s is less akin to Adam Ferguson’s primitive 
proto-“republican” warrior than it is to Rousseau’s idealized description of 
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the “savage” in the Second Discourse or to the free-spirited “solitary walker” 
of his Reveries.
According to Rousseau, the savage or barbarian (he uses these terms 
interchangeably) occupies a happy middle stage or “just mean” in the his-
torical development from the state of nature to civil society:
Although men now had less endurance, and natural pity had already 
undergone some attenuation, this period in the development of hu-
man faculties, occupying a just mean between the indolence of the 
primitive state and the petulant activity of our amour propre, must 
have been the happiest and the most lasting epoch. Th e more one 
refl ects on it, the more one fi nds that this state was the least subject 
to revolutions, the best for man, and that he must have left  it only 
by some fatal accident which, for the sake of the common utility, 
should never have occurred. Th e example of the Savages, almost all 
of whom have been found at this point, seems to confi rm that Man-
kind was made always to remain in it, that this state is the genuine 
youth of the World, and that all subsequent progress has been so 
many steps in appearance toward the perfection of the individual, 
and in eff ect toward the decrepitude of the species.22
Rousseau waxes eloquent in his celebration of the simple life of the savage:
So long as men were content with their rustic huts, so long as they 
confi ned themselves to sewing their clothes of skins with thorns 
or fi sh bones, to adorning themselves with feathers and shells, to 
painting their bodies diff erent colors, to perfecting or embellishing 
their bows and arrows, to carving a few fi shing Canoes or a few 
crude Musical instruments with sharp stones; In a word, so long as 
they applied themselves to tasks a single individual could perform, 
and to arts that did not require the collaboration of several hands, 
they lived free, healthy, good, and happy as far as they could by their 
Nature be, and continued to enjoy the gentleness of independent 
dealings with one another; but the moment one man needed the 
help of another, as soon as it was found to be useful for one to have 
provisions for two, equality disappeared, property appeared, work 
became necessary, and the vast forests changed into smiling Fields 
that had to be watered with the sweat of men, and where slavery 
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and misery were soon seen to sprout and grow together with the 
harvests.23
To be sure, the Native Americans (chiefl y the Cheyenne and the Yellow 
Hand Sioux) portrayed in Little Big Man, A Man Called Horse, and Th e Return 
of a Man Called Horse don’t precisely conform to Rousseau’s description of 
the savage. For one, the Cheyenne and Sioux comprise tight-knit and highly 
evolved communities. Th e native tribes of these fi lms do not suff er from the 
anomie, alienation, and loneliness that characterize the “white” societies that 
their protagonists, Jack Crabb (Dustin Hoff man) and John Morgan (Richard 
Harris) reject. Lord John Morgan rejoins the Yellow Hand tribe in America 
because he fi nds the formal rituals of aristocratic English society—foxhunts, 
church services—oppressive and meaningless. In an early scene in Th e Return, 
Morgan abandons his companion (an unnamed fi ancée) at the chapel during 
a Sunday service and returns to the vast emptiness of the ornate sitting room 
in his country house. Th e camera zooms to a close-up of the elegantly attired 
but obviously agonized Morgan, who lets loose an existential howl of rage and 
dread. In the very next scene he tells a servant he will go back to America. 
Th ough the tone of Little Big Man is rather more satiric and mock-heroic, 
its image of white society is hardly more appealing; it consists of a dysfunc-
tional assemblage of gamblers, drunks, snake-oil salesmen, bombastic puri-
tanical preachers and their sexually hypocritical wives, paranoid gunslingers, 
prostitutes, dishonest and bankrupt merchants, and vainglorious soldiers, 
a mere aggregate of isolated and self-interested individuals with no lasting 
ties to one another, much less an organic sense of community. By contrast, 
the Cheyenne of Little Big Man and the Yellow Hand Sioux of A Man Called 
Horse and Th e Return of a Man Called Horse welcome the white heroes into 
small organic communities founded upon intricately complex ties of blood 
and marriage and unifi ed by common religious rituals and social customs. 
While white society is comprised almost entirely of alienated individuals 
and loners, the Native American tribe is an extended family: though merely 
adopted by the tribe, Jack regards Old Lodge Skins (Chief Dan George) as 
his beloved “grandfather,” while seeming to bear the separation from his bio-
logical sister, Caroline (Carol Androsky), with equanimity and even indif-
ference. Th ough both Crabb and Morgan initially become members of their 
respective tribes as a consequence of being taken captive in an Indian raid, 
ultimately each comes to embrace the choice of the “dropout” who rejects 
“respectable” bourgeois society for a walk on the wild side.24
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All three revisionist westerns portray the simplicity and indeed the 
relative poverty of the Native Americans: a small handheld mirror, one of 
Morgan’s gift s to the Yellow Hand tribe, is considered by its members an 
unheard-of luxury. But in the tradition of Rousseau, this simplicity is pre-
sented as one of the most appealing features of savage society. Visually, the 
identifi cation of the white protagonists, Crabb and Morgan, with the “simple” 
lifestyle of the Indians is most clearly established by their rejection of the sar-
torial fashions of “uptight” white society and their adoption of native dress. 
Oft en appearing in little more than an animal-skin loincloth and headband, 
the trimly muscular and well-tanned Morgan, with his long fl owing blond 
hair, is at once the consummate brave and quintessential hippie. Manifest-
ing a countercultural rejection of modern commercial and consumer soci-
ety, these revisionist westerns celebrate the antimaterial ethos of the Native 
Americans. In a pivotal scene in Th e Return, Morgan tries to convince the 
chief of a neighboring tribe to join with the Sioux to resist the encroach-
ments of white settlers who have come to take possession of the land; the 
chief angrily dismisses Morgan’s request; he knows that no one can “own” the 
land, so clearly Morgan must be a liar. It is no accident that the native tribes 
presented sympathetically in Th e Return of a Man Called Horse are nonma-
terialistic communitarians who cannot conceive of the private ownership of 
land, while those tribes who work for and trade with the white trappers are 
depicted as corrupt traitors to their race. Th ough contemporary economic 
historians have exploded the myth that Native Americans had only a com-
munal sense of property ownership, the Indians of the revisionist western 
remain within a Rousseauian utopia in which “property” is a crime.25
As presented in revisionist westerns of the 1970s, Native American life 
subsumes the energies and allurements of the contemporaneous sexual 
revolution. Ostensibly faithful to an ethnologically accurate depiction of the 
alternative sexual mores of Native Americans, Little Big Man and A Man 
Called Horse are clearly meant to titillate their 1970s audience. Morgan’s 
fi rst dalliance with Running Deer (Corinna Tsopei), features soft  natural 
lighting, luxurious animal-skin rugs, and Corinna Tsopei’s carefully shaved 
and amply endowed physique. Th e love scene seems more akin to a Hugh 
Hefner fantasy than a gritty and anthropologically scrupulous depiction of 
Sioux tribal customs of the 1820s. Likewise, the local sexual politics of the 
Yellow Hand tribe approximates those of a free-love commune: Black Eagle 
was Red Th orn’s “fi rst man,” but she has married Yellow Hand, only to take 
up again on a sometime basis with Black Eagle aft er he is rejected by Run-
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ning Deer, who prefers to give herself to Horse (John Morgan). Little Big 
Man takes comparable liberties in its presentation of the sexual rites of the 
natives. Th ough his “grandfather,” Old Lodge Skins, tells Jack that “human 
beings” (as the Cheyenne call themselves) take only one wife, Crabb never-
theless ends up with four. Aft er many Cheyenne braves have been killed by 
U.S. troops, Crabb’s Indian wife, with the ever-so-fashionable 1960s moni-
ker of “Sunshine” (Aimée Eccles), urges him to take on her three widowed 
sisters as additional wives. Suggestively, they don’t need food or protec-
tion, simply sexual gratifi cation. In a seriocomic scene, Jack dutifully drags 
himself about his tepee and satisfi es each of his new wives in turn while the 
pregnant Sunshine cheerily goes off  to bear Jack’s son in the woods. Nor is 
sexual liberation just for the straights among the Cheyenne; Younger Bear 
(Cal Bellini), who dresses in squaw’s clothes and aff ects a lisp, puts in an 
appearance for gay liberation when he proposes that Jack take him as his 
“wife.” While anthropological evidence would suggest that the Cheyenne 
did maintain a ritualized role for homosexual males within the tribal struc-
ture, the fi lm’s selective attention to this practice is no accident; it refl ects 
a desire to criticize contemporary “straight” society as sexually repressive 
and intolerant.
If the Native Americans of the revisionist western do not routinely use 
drugs (other than tobacco), they are nonetheless blessed by the most vivid 
hallucinations and visions. Old Lodge Skins tells Jack about his dreams, 
which, no matter how outlandish, invariably come true. In the most famous 
scene of A Man Called Horse, during a violent initiation ritual in which Mor-
gan is suspended for a prolonged period from ropes attached to his body 
by means of horn (or bone) blades forcibly inserted behind his pectoral 
muscles, the white-man–cum-Indian is granted a vision of his destiny. His 
hallucination takes the form of a psychedelic montage in which Morgan 
sees in quick succession images of a bald eagle descending, a white buf-
falo charging across the plains, himself and Running Deer running naked 
through a stream in order to embrace each other, a mounted chief with a 
feathered war bonnet and lance, and fi nally an image of himself facing a 
powerful wind that blows away his western clothes to reveal him in loin-
cloth and headband. Th e vision is accompanied by a voice-over, spoken in 
Morgan’s voice, but purportedly providing a mystical message of greeting 
from Tatonka, the divinity of the Yellow Hand Sioux, identifi ed as the “spirit 
of the buff alo.” Th is montage provides one of the most embarrassing scenes 
in the fi lm, conjoining almost every cliché of the 1960s counterculture in a 
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sequence that, at just over a minute, is at least sixty seconds too long. But 
the montage reveals as vividly as any scene in the fi lm that the “view” of 
the Indian in the revisionist western is oft en less an image of the historical 
Native American of the nineteenth century than of the countercultural rebel 
of the 1960s who drops out of white bourgeois society in order to fi nd his 
roots, get his head together, and live free.
One fi nal but especially signifi cant way in which these revisionist west-
erns comment upon America of the late 1960s and early 1970s is by means of 
a dramatic confl ation of the plight of the Indians with that of the Vietnam-
ese. Such an identifi cation of Native Americans with a foreign adversary was 
nothing new in the history of the Hollywood western; the Apache of Ford’s 
Rio Grande (1950)—which appeared just months aft er MacArthur’s Inchon 
invasion—would appear to stand in for the North Koreans and Chinese. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Kirby Yorke (John Wayne), anticipating (if not echoing) the 
pronouncements of General MacArthur, bitterly resents offi  cial U.S. policy 
that prevents him from crossing the Rio Grande (the Yalu River) to pursue 
the Apache bands that have taken refuge in bases in Mexico (China). But 
in the case of the revisionist westerns of the early and mid-1970s, when we 
meet the enemy, “they are us.” In one of the most talked about and fi ercely 
debated scenes in Little Big Man, Lieutenant General George Armstrong 
Custer leads his troops in the slaughter of the Cheyenne people at their 
winter camp at Washita River. During this scene, the U.S. Cavalry troops 
under Custer’s command indiscriminately kill Indian women and children 
along with unarmed braves before shooting the Indian ponies and setting 
fi re to the tepees (thus ensuring that the Cheyenne will have the utmost 
diffi  culty surviving the winter). Th is scene, in which Jack’s wife, Sunshine, 
and their child are mercilessly shot to death by a U.S. soldier, is based on a 
real historical incident that took place on November 27, 1868: the “Battle of 
the Washita,” as the U.S. National Park Service offi  cially refers to it, or the 
“Massacre of Washita River” as Native American activists and antiestablish-
ment historians are wont to call it. Th e incident still provokes considerable 
controversy and not all the facts are agreed upon (in a grimly ironic twist, 
Custer himself appears to have overestimated the number of Cheyenne and 
Arapaho killed at Washita River as a way of ingratiating himself with his 
superior, General Sheridan, while native witnesses insisted that far fewer 
of their number were killed than offi  cially reported by the army); but the 
historical “massacre” or “battle” nonetheless generated a political fi restorm 
even in the 1870s. However, what is signifi cant about this violent scene as 
Savage Nations 277
presented in Little Big Man is the way in which Custer’s attack is meant to 
evoke an atrocity that occurred one hundred years later, the My Lai massa-
cre of March 16, 1968, in which U.S. Army soldiers killed several hundred 
Vietnamese civilians, including women, children, and elderly individuals, 
along with their animals, before setting fi re to their dwellings.26
No doubt the makers of Little Big Man hoped to win sympathy for the 
contemporary plight of the American Indian and to correct an all-too-
sanitized popular understanding of the settlement of the American West that 
prevailed at the time. But just as certainly, the dramatization of the Washita 
River massacre is more pointedly meant as an antiwar statement at a time 
when the Vietnam War was still raging. A case can be made that Arthur 
Penn and his screenwriter, Calder Willingham, exaggerated the carnage at 
Washita River, occluded the offi  cial government pretext for Custer’s attack on 
the Cheyenne and Arapaho encampment (Indian war parties had attacked 
white settlements, killing women and children), and failed to make men-
tion of the fact that Custer released his Indian prisoners (a large number of 
women and children whose lives were spared in the assault). Likewise, one 
can question Little Big Man’s portrait of the Cheyenne as essentially peace 
loving: recalling the early days of his “captivity” among the Indians, Jack 
Crabb insists that the form of war preferred by the Cheyenne is “counting 
coup,” a ritualized form of combat in which the brave closes on his opponent 
and strikes but does not kill or wound him (the objective being to prove 
one’s bravery and humiliate the adversary). Th ough such ritualized forms 
of combat surely were part of Native American culture, Jack’s characteriza-
tion of Indian warfare is nonetheless misleading, as his grandfather’s subse-
quent display of a war trophy—the scalp of a fair-headed opponent—vividly 
attests. But surely such objections about the historical accuracy of the fi lm 
would miss the contemporary signifi cance of Arthur Penn’s depiction of the 
terrible violence done to these cinematic Cheyenne, who serve as symbolic 
stand-ins for their ill-fated civilian counterparts at My Lai.
To be sure, the two Man Called Horse fi lms dwell at length on the intense 
cruelty and violence of Native American life. But the latter fi lm also hints at 
an implicit identifi cation between Native Americans and the Vietnamese. 
In Th e Return, John Morgan organizes the ragtag remnants of the Yellow 
Hand tribe into an eff ective guerilla force. Relying chiefl y upon women and 
young boys as combatants, employing only primitive or improvised weapons, 
and depending upon the successful infi ltration of the enemy camp, Mor-
gan launches a successful raid upon the fort of the white trappers who have 
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invaded the land and set themselves up as an occupying power. If Little Big 
Man protests against the atrocities committed by American forces in South 
Vietnam, Th e Return of a Man Called Horse slyly invites its audience to exult 
in the heroic exploits of the Viet Cong.
Dances with Wolves: Revisionism Redux
Winner of seven Academy Awards including one for “Best Picture,” Dances 
with Wolves (1990) was hailed as marking the revival of the American west-
ern and off ering a new, more sympathetic representation of Native Ameri-
cans. Whatever its technical merits, Costner’s fi lm breaks little new ground 
in its portrayal of the American Indian, and is rather more derivative of ear-
lier westerns, especially A Man Called Horse and Little Big Man, than fans 
and early reviews sometimes acknowledged. Like the revisionist westerns of 
the 1970s, Dances with Wolves takes a dim view of white society; like Jack 
Crabb and John Morgan before him, Lieutenant Dunbar (Kevin Costner), 
another loner, fl ees the horrors of the white world (specifi cally the carnage 
of the Civil War, which pits one American against another) to fi nd peace and 
a more spiritually satisfying existence among the Plains Indians (the Sioux). 
Th e organic wholeness of Native American tribal society—its social rituals 
and elaborate customs, its intimacy and communal spirit—contrasts sharply 
with the dishonesty, fi nancial chicanery, ignorance, brutality, political oppres-
sion, militarism, and madness—manifested in the fi gure of Major Fambrough 
(Maury Chaykin), who commits suicide —that typify white American society. 
As in A Man Called Horse and Th e Return of a Man Called Horse, it is a white 
hero whose intervention in Indian aff airs saves “his” adoptive people from the 
depredations of their enemies, both the hostile Pawnee and the U.S. Army. 
Dances with Wolves thus highlights one of the less progressive motifs of the 
earlier revisionist westerns, the ultimate dependence of the Native Americans 
on their white saviors. Without the foresight, access to new (mainly military) 
technologies, greater knowledge of the political world, and personal courage 
of Morgan and Dunbar, the Sioux would not fare so well (though we know 
they are doomed in the long run). In this respect Dunbar, like Morgan before 
him, fi ts easily into a well-established romantic literary tradition that dates 
back at least as far as Walter Scott’s Waverley and continues through Conrad’s 
Lord Jim, in which a beleaguered and “backward” people (the Highland Scots, 
the islanders of Patusan) turn to their adoptive white son from the modern 
world to protect them from imperialistic enemies and interlopers.
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What Dances with Wolves adds to the formula of the revisionist western 
are slightly more up-to-date gestures toward the causes of feminism and 
environmentalism. To be sure, the women of the Yellow Hand tribe in A 
Man Called Horse choose their men (and may choose to leave them), but the 
ethos of the Sioux in the earlier fi lm is still decidedly masculine and mar-
tial; one proves oneself worthy of leadership through extraordinary acts of 
martial bravery and physical courage. While the tribal elders of the Lakota 
Sioux in Dances with Wolves are still the leading braves, one is struck by their 
unusual sensitivity to the emotional needs of their women. Th ough captured 
as a child (suggestively, by Pawnee braves, not Sioux) and presumably raped 
and then sold to the Sioux, Stands With A Fist (Mary McDonnell) seems 
utterly unaff ected by her ordeal; indeed, she seems perfectly at home among 
the Sioux, who treat her with the utmost delicacy and respect. Th ough he 
is fully authorized as her adoptive father to dispose of the marital fate of 
Stands With A Fist when she is widowed, Kicking Bird (Graham Greene), 
the nominal chief of the tribe, is eager to look the other way when she takes 
up with Dunbar, even though her aff air violates the traditional tribal customs 
governing mourning (and presumably dishonors the memory of her hus-
band). Masculine pride, tribal rites, and ancient custom unproblematically 
give way before the romantic yearnings of an independent woman.
Th e environmental note is struck during a scene in which Dunbar helps 
to save the Sioux from hunger by locating a herd of buff alo (one among many 
scenes in Dances borrowed directly from the Man Called Horse fi lms). But 
the tribal hunt of the buff alo is pointedly contrasted with a scene depicting 
the aft ermath of a gratuitous and wasteful slaughter of bison by a passing 
group of white settlers. Interested only in their hides and horns, the whites 
leave the plains littered with the bloody and rotting corpses of the animals. 
Unlike the Sioux, who hunt the buff alo to survive, and who conscientiously 
use every part of the few bison they kill, the whites are interested only in 
the profi ts they make from the sale of hides. Unlike their environmentally 
conscious Native American counterparts, the white pioneers prove poor 
conservators of land and wildlife alike.
If Dances with Wolves oft en off ers an early-1990s remodeling of themes 
already well established in the revisionist westerns of the 1970s, it also makes 
more concessions to the popular pro-market mood of the 1980s. In a comic 
scene depicting his slow acculturation to the ways of tribal life, Dunbar sud-
denly becomes the teacher rather than the student of the benighted Sioux. He 
pointedly schools one of the leading Sioux in the fundamental principles of 
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private property; the impetuous brave must learn not to claim Dunbar’s hat 
(lost on a battlefi eld) as his own. Instead, he must learn to “trade,” an English 
word Dunbar introduces into Sioux dialect with the offi  cial public approval 
of Kicking Bird. In Costner’s fi lm, the anticommercial and anticapitalist 
energies of the revisionist western have ebbed, as has the enthusiasm for the 
freewheeling sexual lifestyles of the late 1960s. Unlike Jack Crabb, Dunbar 
(which is to say, Kevin Costner, the romantic leading man of Bull Durham 
[1980]—he of the long, deep kiss) doesn’t sleep with several “wives” at one 
go in a feat of sexual bravado—indeed, he doesn’t even take up with a non-
white squaw. Th ere will be no interracial romance in this version of Native 
America. Instead, Dunbar respectfully courts the only white female in the 
tribe, Stands With A Fist, a woman of an appropriate age and experience, 
who will become his wife. Dances with Wolves thus off ers its audience the 
vicarious romance of “going native,” but in Costner’s new age western, the 
romance is very sensible and “straight.” A nice white (and mature) couple, 
both of whom have earlier failed in an attempt to end their lives, learn to 
love again, having undergone a therapeutic experience that only extensive 
travel and immersion in a foreign and exotic culture can provide.
Coda: Dead Man—“West of Everything”
Jim Jarmusch’s 1995 “post-western,” Dead Man, radicalizes the revisionist 
western, once more lending it an edginess that fi lmmakers of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s strove to bring to the genre (Alejandro Jodorowsky’s 1970 
cultish “acid” western, El Topo, comes to mind).27 As one of the fi lm’s most 
astute critics, Jonathan Rosenbaum, has argued, Dead Man can be read as 
“one of the ugliest portrayals of white American capitalism to be found 
in American movies,” indeed, one might say that it off ers one of the most 
scathing critiques of modern American society in general.28 Th e only truly 
independent and non-Hollywood western here considered, Dead Man, for 
all its heavy-handed anticapitalist and antiestablishment vehemence, off ers 
a novel and distinctive view of the Native American, one that is by no means 
predictably politically correct. It remains to be seen whether a Native Ameri-
can director will be off ered (or be interested in) the chance to make a big-
budget Hollywood western in the future.29 In the meantime, one might look 
to Dead Man for a distinctively novel portrait of the Native American.
Th e ostensible hero of the fi lm, William Blake (Johnny Depp), having 
been mortally wounded in the hellish mining town of Machine during an 
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early scene in the fi lm, travels westward across frontier America with a bul-
let in his chest, accompanied for much of his journey toward death by his 
Native American counterpart, Nobody (Gary Farmer), a half Blood and 
half Blackfoot Indian. Nobody had been captured as a boy and taken to 
England, where, before he returned to America, he read (and memorized) 
the verse of William Blake. Nobody mistakes the character played by Depp 
for the “real” William Blake, and takes the dying man under his wing, guid-
ing him toward his fi nal demise near a Makah village on the coast of the 
Pacifi c Northwest. Labeled a liar (He Who Talks Loud, Saying Nothing) by 
both Blood and Blackfoot, Nobody is an outcast from both his mother’s and 
father’s tribes. Jarmusch has characterized Blake and Nobody as “two guys 
from diff erent cultures who are both loners and lost and for whatever reasons 
are completely disoriented from their cultures.”30 Nobody ultimately arranges 
to borrow a canoe from the members of a Makah village on the Pacifi c coast, 
in which he places the expiring Blake and sets his friend adrift  toward the 
setting sun, sending him, in a phrase made famous by Louis L’Amour, “west 
of everything.”31 As he launches Blake on the fi nal stage of his mortal quest, 
Nobody is shot and killed by the bounty hunter Cole Wilson (Lance Henrik-
son), who has tracked Blake from Machine to the Pacifi c coast. In that same 
instant Nobody also succeeds in shooting and killing his assailant.
Dead Man reprises many of the criticisms of modern Western (particu-
larly American) society featured in the revisionist westerns of the 1970s. In 
the opening sequence of the fi lm, in which William Blake travels westward 
by train, we witness an episode in the ongoing U.S. government campaign 
to exterminate the herds of buff alo on which the Plains Indians depend; the 
train fi reman (Crispin Glover) tells William Blake that a “million [buff alo] 
were killed last year alone.”32 Nobody’s recounting of his life story to Wil-
liam details the systematic mistreatment, dehumanization, and attempted 
genocide of the American Indian by white civilization. Having been taken 
captive by British soldiers as a boy, Nobody has been caged and exhibited to 
white crowds in Europe like some sort of exotic animal.33 Upon his return 
to America, Nobody comes across Native American villages laid waste by 
whites: in two scenes in the fi lm we see the smoking ruins of an Indian vil-
lage (complete with the charred body of one of its murdered inhabitants). 
Nobody explains to William Blake that missionaries and traders have delib-
erately spread diseases such as smallpox and consumption to the Indian 
population by means of infected blankets.34 Accordingly, Nobody comes to 
see in Blake an avenging angel or (to employ a key phrase from Jarmusch’s 
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screenplay) a “scourge of God.” Nobody not only leads William Blake on his 
journey toward the next world, but also encourages him to become a “killer of 
white men.” By the fi lm’s end, Blake has fulfi lled the destiny Nobody proph-
esizes for him: he has killed Charlie Dickinson (Gabriel Byrne), two federal 
marshals—Lee (Mark Bringleson) and Marvin (Jimmie Ray Weeks)—a fur 
trapper (Todd Pfeiff er), a trading-post missionary (Alfred Molina), and two 
other unnamed men at the same trading post.
Jarmusch’s depiction of a Native American making use of a white man 
as the instrument for wreaking violence on white civilization reverses the 
historical and cinematic stereotype of the “good” Indian made use of by 
white settlers and soldiers to tame the “bad” (that is, rebellious) Indians. 
(Th e heroic Navajo cavalry scout decorated in the fi nal scene of Ford’s Rio 
Grande provides a typical example of this older stereotype.) Dead Man 
systematically works through an extended series of cultural role reversals 
to achieve its dramatic eff ect. In Jarmusch’s fi lm it is the white man (Cole 
Wilson), not the Indian, who proves to be the cannibal. Th e Indian who 
ominously looms over the wounded white man and thrusts a knife into 
his chest is not a savage killer, but his would-be healer and spiritual sav-
ior (Nobody is trying to remove the bullet from William’s body). It is not 
the oral culture of the Native American but the literate one of the white 
man that proves untrustworthy and undependable—as the train fi reman 
tells Blake, with respect to the written contract he’s received from Dickin-
son Metal Works, “I wouldn’t trust no words written down on no piece of 
paper.” It is not the idolatrous faith of “heathens and Philistines” (to cite 
the words of the trading-post missionary) that proves to be a religion of 
debauchery and death, but rather Christianity, which supplies the ideologi-
cal justifi cation for all manner of dishonesty, thievery, sexual rapacity, rac-
ism, and murder. Quite oft en, Jarmusch works these role reversals to comic 
eff ect. It is Nobody, the Indian, who has trouble telling one white man from 
another. In his account of his travels on the east coast of the United States 
and Canada, it is white, not Native American, civilization that turns out to 
be nomadic and unsettled: “Each time I arrived at another city, somehow 
the white men had moved all their people ahead of me. . . . Each new city 
contained the same white people as the last. And I could not understand 
how a whole city of people could be moved so quickly.” And in one of the 
slyest and subtlest role reversals of all, Jarmusch turns on its head the long-
established (though now roundly denounced) tradition of whites playing 
the parts of Native Americans in “red face” by casting Johnny Depp, whose 
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grandfather was a Cherokee Indian, in the role of the “stupid fucking white 
man,” William Blake.35
Jarmusch’s telling contrast between white and Native American societies 
(to the advantage of the latter) and his inversion of their respective worth 
is brought home by two parallel scenes, one occurring early and one late in 
Dead Man. In the fi rst scene, Blake, a newly arrived stranger in town, makes 
his way through the main street of Machine. In the second, William, once 
more a recently arrived stranger, but this time aided by Nobody and accom-
panied by the leading men of the tribe, slowly makes his way through the 
main street of a Makah village. A number of individual shots are “matched” 
in the two sequences, giving the impression that Blake is undergoing two 
versions of the same “event.” Tellingly, in Machine the main street leads to 
the hellish and brooding Dickinson Metal Works factory, a version of the 
poet William Blake’s “satanic mills,” the chimney of which belches smoke 
into the air. Th ough he is as far west as the train will take him, Blake fi nds 
that the blight of modern industrialism has preceded him; there is no pristine 
“frontier” for him to discover out west. In the words of Nobody, the white 
man’s “stench precedes him.” But in the Makah village, the main street leads 
to a beautifully adorned and wonderfully craft ed communal lodge where 
the elders of the village meet to discuss Blake’s fate. Th e streets of Machine 
feature drunks, prostitutes servicing their clients in broad daylight, any num-
ber of menacing and well-armed toughs more than willing to gun down a 
stranger who looks their way, a forlorn mother and child, and seemingly 
endless piles of bones, skulls, and animal hides, many of them mounted 
ostentatiously on the sides of buildings as trophies. In the Makah village, 
though the Indians are evidently poor and the streets muddy and grim, the 
inhabitants don’t greet Blake with hostility (but rather with something like 
curious indiff erence). Instead of being threatened, ridiculed, and summar-
ily driven away at gunpoint from the factory where he was promised work, 
Blake is helped along his way (he can’t walk on his own) and is welcomed 
by the leading men of the Makah village who grant the foreign stranger 
the gift  of a sea canoe that will carry him to his fi nal destination. While the 
streets of Machine appear to be a kind of open-air charnel house fi lled with 
the remains of the dead, those of the Makah village (which do sport more 
than a few animal bones) also display the rudiments of simple barter and 
native craft s (we see textiles being made and grain traded). Suggestively, in 
the Makah village, a mother holds her child to her breast, whereas her white 
counterpart in the earlier scene in Machine leaves her baby to swing in a 
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cradle and has no direct physical contact with her child. Most importantly, 
the streets of the Makah village prominently feature well-tended Indian 
“burial” grounds and gigantic totem poles, artistic representations of tribal 
heritage and identity, as well as symbols of a functioning religious life and 
of ongoing, intimate, and extensive relations with ancestors. No sign of a 
church or of religious or spiritual life is evident in Machine.
One might note that in Machine Jarmusch evokes the cinematic style 
of early German expressionist fi lms (this is especially true of the camera 
angles and obliquely cantilevered sets of the interior of the Dickinson Metal 
Works), while in the Makah village the none-too-steady handheld camera 
gestures toward Italian neorealism.36 Th e contrasting cinematic styles of the 
two scenes emphasize that while Machine represents a modern white civi-
lization characterized by aggression, industrial blight, alienation, and the 
culture of death, the Makah village, for all its relative poverty and bleak-
ness, is a “primitive” place where “real” communal relations, spiritual and 
religious practices, familial relations, and intimate human contact are still 
of vital importance. Machine may be the place where Blake is killed, but the 
Makah village is the place where he comes home to die.
Like A Man Called Horse, Jarmusch’s “post-western” dramatizes the 
transformation of a white man into someone resembling an idealized Native 
American. Blake and Nobody’s journey westward is more than a physical 
ordeal, it is also a spiritual quest. Nobody plays Indian shaman and sage to 
Blake’s well-meaning but uncomprehending white “outlaw.” Dead Man thus 
combines the revenge story with the spiritual quest narrative. Blake plays 
both the spiritual quester who seeks enlightenment and the revenger who 
scourges the white race for its crimes against the Indian people. Nobody 
plays the Mephistophelian mentor who teaches his student how his “poetry 
will now be written in blood.” But he also acts the role of the spiritual guide 
who, Virgil-like, leads the “poet” on a Dantesque journey back to the other 
world, which is also his homeland: “I will take you to the bridge made of 
waters, the mirror. Th en you will be taken to the next level of the world. Th e 
place where William Blake is from, where his spirit belongs. I must make sure 
that you pass back at the place where the sea meets the sky.” Th is spiritual 
quest is punctuated by the ceremonial use (what Nobody poetically terms 
“the loving ways”) of peyote. In a critical scene, Nobody ingests “the food of 
the great spirit.” When Blake asks to take part, Nobody refuses, telling him 
he’s not yet ready: “Th e powers of the medicine give sacred visions which 
are not for you right now.” Nobody’s hallucinations allow him to see Blake 
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as a skeleton, a dead man. Nobody shortly departs with Blake’s eyeglasses, 
painting his friend’s face with ritual marks and blessing him: “May the 
Great Spirit watch over you, William Blake.” Th ough Blake doesn’t partake 
of “grandfather peyote,” without his eyeglasses and suff ering from hunger 
and his festering wound, he soon has his own visions: he sees the faces of 
Indians in the dark woods, Indians who appear to turn into harmless forest 
animals (though Blake later sees evidence that they’ve ambushed whites in 
the woods).37 When Blake comes across a dead fawn shot through the neck, 
he uses the animal’s blood to add to the ritual marks upon his face and curls 
up next to its body to sleep. Blazoned like an Indian, he sleeps peacefully 
in the bosom of nature.
Th is bizarre, idiosyncratic, and improvised “ritual” seems to mark the 
point at which Blake enters into a kind of quasi-spiritual communion with 
Native America. Blake’s transformation, however, is not completed until 
journey’s end, when, shortly before he expires in the sea canoe, he fi nds 
himself newly dressed in the clothes of the Makah people, complete with fur 
cap, animal-skin robes (the latter decorated with the images of whales and 
dolphins), bead necklace, and a locket featuring the portrait of an Indian.
It’s worth considering in what ways Blake’s transformation diff ers from 
those of his predecessors such as Crabb, Morgan, and Dunbar. In the fi rst 
place, he does not fully enter into the tribal life of the Indians—he never 
becomes a member of the Makah (or any other tribe). Moreover, his meta-
morphosis requires the assistance of a “native” agent who is never dependent 
upon Blake. Neither Nobody nor the inhabitants of the Makah village ever 
ask anything from Blake (except tobacco—something exchanged as a token 
of friendship). Th ey remain entirely independent from him; his entry into 
the spirit world is eff ected by them, but it is a gift  freely given, with nothing 
asked in return. Unlike his white cinematic predecessors of the revisionist 
western, Blake will never be the hero or leader of an Indian tribe. Finally, 
Blake’s transformation is made possible only because he is dying. What he 
learns from Nobody is not how to live but how to die. Th ere will be no tri-
umphant masquerade of Indian life by a white man, only the enacting of 
an improvised ritual that enables Blake to fi nd his way to the next world. 
Indeed, Blake’s partial miscomprehension of this ritual provides welcome 
seriocomic relief even in the fi lm’s fi nal tragic scene. When Nobody tells 
the supine Blake, who lies amid cedar branches in the sea canoe that it is 
“time to go back to where you came from,” William responds, “You mean 
Cleveland?” Jarmusch suggests that Native America has something to off er 
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to white America, even if the latter does not quite understand what it is or 
how to “use” it. But if Nobody’s tears as he watches Blake fl oat away in the 
ebbing tide can be trusted, it is a gift  from a native heart untainted by the 
“white man’s metal.”
Th e simultaneous deaths of the seemingly ill-matched and oft en mutu-
ally uncomprehending Blake and Nobody (another in the long line of white-
native tandems beginning with James Fenimore Cooper’s Natty Bumppo and 
Chingachkook) play off  a number of archetypal motifs of the western: the 
tragic end of the hero who has nowhere left  to roam, the end of the vanish-
ing American, the end of the frontier, the death of the western itself. But 
what is particularly suggestive about the relationship between the two is 
that they meet as cosmopolitan individuals who, “alienated” and exiled from 
their respective peoples, form a relationship, however fraught with mutual 
incomprehension, that is haunted by—but not ultimately determined by—
their respective “social constructions.” Nobody, for all of his ancient wisdom, 
mystical insight, linguistic facility, and native lore, is no mere representative 
of a traditional and unchanging way of life. Like his white counterpart, he 
remains on the margins of the life of the Native American tribes with which 
he comes in contact. A speaker of Blackfoot, Cree, Makah, and English, 
Nobody is a polyglot, multiethnic cultural hybrid. What is perhaps most 
impressive about his verbal facility is his astonishing capacity to “naturalize” 
the verse of the English romantic poet William Blake to make his poetry 
seem as if it were rooted in the Native American soil. Briefl y annoyed with 
William’s (Depp’s) chatter, he responds: “Th e eagle never lost so much time 
as when he submitted to learn from the crow.” On another occasion he tells 
his friend, “Don’t let the sun burn a hole in your ass, William Blake. Rise 
now and drive your cart and plow over the bones of the dead.” As Jonathan 
Rosenbaum puts it, “According to the fi lm’s alchemy . . . the poetry of Blake 
becomes a form of Native American wisdom.”38 Unlike even his most sym-
pathetic Native American cinematic predecessors, Nobody does not repre-
sent the ways of a people, even less his own people (whether for good or evil). 
Instead, he stands forth as a refreshingly individual character who selects 
and mixes his cultural (and aesthetic) values from the many diff erent peo-
ples among whom he has lived and from the far-fl ung lands where he has 
wandered. He is intended, as Jarmusch puts it, to be not a stereotype but “a 
complicated human being.”39 Like his counterpart, William Blake, He Who 
Talks Loud, Saying Nothing is a kind of misfi t, an exceptional and unique 
individual who must constantly invent himself anew. His friendship with 
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Blake is founded not upon the unvarying traditions or sacred ways of a col-
lective, but rather upon his imaginative capacity to bridge the cultural divide 
between them through his own inventions and idiosyncratic creations. If his 
white friend has the name of a poet, he has the heart of one. Little wonder 
that no one knows what to call him—he is an Other, a Nobody.
If Dead Man in the end does not fully achieve the philosophic goal that 
Todorov sets for the representation of alterity—to portray the Other as both 
equal and diff erent—(and what fi lm could?), it nonetheless marks an advance 
upon earlier representations of the Native American in the western by virtue 
of its portrait of the Indian (and his white brother) as an individual rather 
than as merely an instance of a racial and cultural collective. Nobody is quite 
unlike any other “major” Native American character found in earlier cin-
ematic westerns. His distinctiveness derives not so much from Jarmusch’s 
more accurate or favorable representation of an Indian character as from 
the director’s attempt to depict Nobody as free to fashion his own identity 
as he sees fi t. Much like the Irish-Jewish hero of Joyce’s Ulysses, Nobody 
represents his people not because of his stereotypical “native” character 
but because of his atypicality, his idiosyncrasies and unique qualities. In 
the end, Jarmusch’s aff ecting portrait of the friendship of the red man and 
white man depends not upon their fi nding common ground between their 
peoples but upon their proto-philosophic willingness to meet and converse 
with each other outside the political boundaries and cultural traditions of 
their respective societies. By virtue of individualizing his protagonists, who 
cease to be pure types or ideal representatives of white and Indian society, 
Jarmusch has advanced the American western into new territory and pushed 
the frontier of the genre ever so much farther westward.
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REGENERATION THROUGH STORIES 
AND SONG
Th e View from the Other Side of the West in Smoke Signals
Richard Gilmore
What is it that makes a western a western? Is a western a western because of 
where it is situated? Is the West of a western a place or a plot or an attitude, 
or is it some still more vague concept that includes all of these but is reduc-
ible to none? By location, Smoke Signals (Chris Eyre, 1998) is certainly a 
western, but location seems an especially insuffi  cient criterion for identifying 
what makes a western a western. Richard Slotkin, in his book Regeneration 
through Violence: Th e Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860, argues 
that the myth of the West is the founding myth of the American identity. 
He speaks of the founding fathers in “the American mythogenesis” as those 
“who tore violently a nation from the implacable and opulent wilderness.”1 
Included in this “implacable and opulent wilderness” were the indigenous 
people of the land, and so they were part of the violence, the subjects of the 
violence, that brought forth the new nation. Slotkin says, “Myth describes 
a process . . . by which knowledge is transformed into power; it provides a 
scenario or prescription for action, defi ning and limiting the possibilities 
for human response to the universe.”2 Th e same could be said of stories in 
general. If the traditional westerns, novels and fi lms, are part of the found-
ing myth of the American identity, what role does, or can, a story from the 
other side of the myth, a story about indigenous people told by and from the 
perspective of indigenous people, play? Smoke Signals is just such a story, 
the fi rst feature fi lm that was written, directed, and coproduced by Native 
Americans. Th e question is a philosophical one, and it will take some phi-
losophy to answer it.
Bruce Wilshire, in his Th e Primal Roots of American Philosophy: Prag-
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matism, Phenomenology, and Native American Th ought, fi nds, as his title 
suggests, the roots of American pragmatism, the unique philosophical con-
tribution to world philosophy by America, in Native American thought. As 
Wilshire says of pragmatism, “It is original because it is aboriginal.”3 Both 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–82) and Henry David Th oreau (1817–62) had 
many encounters with Native Americans, and both were deeply impressed 
with Native American ways of regarding and thinking about nature. Insofar 
as Emerson and Th oreau are responsible for writing our founding intellec-
tual texts, as such contemporary philosophers as Cornel West and Stan-
ley Cavell have argued,4 they are also responsible for constructing some 
important elements of our American identity. Th at American identity as it 
is articulated in Emerson and Th oreau’s transcendentalism and then later 
in the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James 
(1842–1910), and John Dewey (1859–1952), is profoundly inclusive, strives 
always for ways to sustain a relationship with complexity, is nondogmatic, 
and always has as its aim the amelioration of pain and suff ering. At the same 
time, it is also an expression of the American character that has treated its 
indigenous people with such terrible violence and cruelty. Th is tension in 
the American identity comes to the fore when we consider the movie Smoke 
Signals as a part of the genre of the western.
Smoke Signals is composed of several overlapping and interweaving 
stories, but the core story is of the journey made by Victor Joseph (Adam 
Beach) and Th omas Builds-the-Fire (Evan Adams) to recover the truck and 
cremated remains of Victor’s father, Arnold Joseph (Gary Farmer). Th ey are 
Coeur d’Alene Indians living on the Coeur d’Alene reservation in Idaho. 
Arnold’s remains are outside Phoenix, Arizona, where Arnold moved when 
he abandoned his family. Neither Victor nor his mother, Arlene Joseph 
(Tantoo Cardinal), have enough money to pay for his trip down to Phoe-
nix, and that is how Th omas gets to go along. Th omas has saved enough 
coins and bills to pay for the trip for both of them and off ers it to Victor on 
the condition that he, Th omas, go along with him. Victor is resistant to that 
suggestion because there have been tensions between the two since early 
childhood, but he fi nally relents.
Th e movie begins and ends with fi re. Fire is the primary trope for the 
violence that is both perpetrated and suff ered by all the major characters 
in the movie. It is also the primary trope for the possibility of regenera-
tion. Although Victor seems to be the protagonist of the fi lm, it is Th omas 
Builds-the-Fire who is at the center of this trope of fi re, since it was his 
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parents who had the huge house party on the Fourth of July that ended in 
fi re, and it is Th omas Builds-the-Fire himself who, through his stories, will 
construct a narrative of redemption and regeneration that will be transfor-
mative for all.
Smoke signals are signals of distress, a form of communication that is 
designed to cross great distances. In the movie, of course, there are great 
distances to be communicated across: between Th omas and Victor, between 
Victor and his father, Arnold, between the reservation and the white world 
through which Victor and Th omas must travel to get to Arnold’s remains, 
and between the Native American world in general and the world of non-
tribal America, to which Smoke Signals is also meant to appeal.
Alexie says the following of his choice of “smoke signals” for the title 
of his screenplay:
Smoke Signals fi ts for a number of reasons, for me. On the surface, 
it’s a stereotypical title, you think of Indians in blankets on the plains 
sending smoke signals, so it brings up a stereotypical image that’s 
vaguely humorous. But people will also instantly recognize that, in 
a contemporary sense, smoke signals are about calls of distress, calls 
for help. Th at’s really what this movie is about—Victor, Th omas, 
and everybody else calling for help. It’s also about the theme of fi re. 
Th e smoke that originates from the second fi re brings about the 
beginning of resolution. So I just thought Smoke Signals worked 
very poetically.5
Th ere is a scene early in the movie with the young Victor and the young 
Th omas warming themselves around a fi re in a barrel. Th omas is talking 
to Victor, but Victor is not responding. Th omas is talking about the colors 
of things that are revealed in fi re, and then mentions that he has heard that 
Victor’s father is living in Phoenix. Cruelly, Victor says, “What color do you 
think your mom and dad were when they burned up?” In the screenplay, 
although not in the movie, Th omas continues on the theme of Victor’s father, 
and fi nally asks, “What does Phoenix, Arizona, mean?”6 Th e fi gure of the 
phoenix exactly captures this idea of fi re as element of both destruction and 
regeneration. In the voice-over Th omas describes Victor and himself as chil-
dren of fi re and ash. It is a reference to the violence that both have suff ered 
from and also to the regeneration that both will need and seek.
Th ere is a scene on the bus that Victor and Th omas are taking down 
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to Phoenix in which Victor becomes exasperated with Th omas’s constant 
storytelling: “I mean, you just go on and on talking about nothing. Why 
can’t you have a normal conversation? You’re always trying to sound like 
some damn medicine man or something. I mean, how many times have you 
seen Dances with Wolves? A hundred, two hundred times?”7 And part of 
the joke is that Th omas has seen the movie that many times. So, there is a 
tragicomedy right there, a young Native American man learning how to be 
Native American by means of a movie made by Kevin Costner. Th at tragi-
comedy is compounded when we understand Slavoj Žižek’s pointed critique 
of Dances with Wolves (Kevin Costner, 1990). Žižek compares Dances with 
Wolves to another movie from 1990, Awakenings (Penny Marshall). What 
the two movies have in common, according to Žižek, is a surface, offi  cial 
content and a latent, unoffi  cial (but the real) content, which Žižek explains 
in terms of a principle of symbolic exchange. Th e offi  cial content of the mov-
ies is, respectively, the relationship between a doctor and his coma-stricken 
patients (Awakenings) and the relationship between a Civil War lieutenant 
and a tribe of Lakota Sioux Indians (Dances with Wolves). Th e real content 
of these movies, according to Žižek, is the creation of the couple, so that 
the real signifi cance of the coma patients and the Indians is only to make 
possible the sexual relationships of the healthy white men. As Žižek says, 
“In Dances with Wolves, the role of the group of patients is taken over by 
the Sioux tribe which is also allowed to disappear in an implicit symbolic 
exchange, so that the couple of Kevin Costner and the white woman who 
has lived among the Indians since childhood can be produced.”8
On the one hand, it is a pretty sad state of aff airs, if also funny, when 
a young Indian man chooses to learn about being an Indian from a Kevin 
Costner fi lm. Whereas Dances with Wolves infl uenced Th omas, another Hol-
lywood movie made by non-Indians that infl uenced Sherman Alexie and 
Chris Eyre is the movie Little Big Man (1970), based on a novel by Th omas 
Berger and directed by Arthur Penn. Alexie has acknowledged the infl u-
ence of Little Big Man on his writing of Smoke Signals, and there are at least 
two explicit references to Little Big Man in the later movie. Th e fi rst is the 
repeated reference, with variations, to the phrase fi rst enunciated by Old 
Lodge Skins (Chief Dan George) in Little Big Man, “It’s a good day to die.” 
Th at phrase becomes, in Smoke Signals, “Sometimes it’s a good day to die. 
Sometimes it’s a good day to play basketball,” and “Sometimes it’s a good 
day to die, and sometimes it’s a good day to eat at Denny’s.”
Th e other clear reference is to the “contrary,” Younger Bear (Cal Bell-
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ini), in Little Big Man. Th e “contraries” among the Human Beings (what the 
Cheyenne called themselves in the movie) were ones who did everything 
backward, saying good-bye when they mean hello or hello when they mean 
good-bye, or washing with dirt and drying themselves off  with water. Th e 
contraries in Smoke Signals are Velma and Lucy, who drive all over the reser-
vation backward and at one point give Victor and Th omas a ride in exchange 
for a story. Th eir names, Velma (Michelle St. John) and Lucy (Elaine Miles), 
are themselves references to the movie Th elma and Louise (Ridley Scott, 
1991), a movie about two women who also do some crazy driving. I think 
Alexie and Eyre want us to laugh at the infl uence of Dancing with Wolves on 
Th omas, and with something like Žižek’s critique in mind, to see the posi-
tive infl uence of Little Big Man on Smoke Signals. Th is is a very pragmatic 
move. It is a form of cultural critique that is undogmatic and ameliorative. 
Th e point is that being infl uenced by non–Native American movies is not 
necessarily bad, or that all movies made by non-Indians are bad, but that 
some movies made by non-Indians may do a kind of unperceived violence, 
and that this violence may best be counteracted with humor. In general, 
Smoke Signals deals with violence through humor, a humor that is tinged 
with sadness, which seems to be very characteristic of Native American 
thinking in general.
Th e early Americans were infl uenced by Native American practices, 
according to Slotkin in Regeneration through Violence. “We know that the 
colonists adapted their ways of living, farming, hunting, and fi ghting in 
order to survive in the Indians’ world.”9 Suggesting that the colonists learned 
their adaptations from the Indians, Slotkin goes on to ask, “Did they [the 
colonists] also (to some degree) acquire an Indian-like vision of the New 
World?” Slotkin’s long, attenuated answer to this question seems to be, basi-
cally, no. Near the end of his book Slotkin provides this contrast between 
“the tribesman” and the “white hunter”:
For the tribesman, wilderness life, notwithstanding its requirement 
of hunting, was one of community rather than solitude. For the 
Indian the wilderness was home, the locus of the tribe that was the 
center of his metaphysical universe as well as his social existence. 
Even in moments of physical solitude, on a long hunt or a vision 
quest, the world community about him remained intact, for the 
gods and the wild animals were his fellows and kin. Th e border of 
tribal solidarity extended out from the village center to the edges of 
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creation. Th e white hunter was an alien, paradoxically achieving a 
sense of relation to the world through an ordeal of profound physi-
cal, moral, and psychological isolation from society. His destiny was 
personal rather than tribal; his moral obligation was to himself, his 
“gift s,” and his racial character, rather than to his fellows and his 
environment.10
In this passage, Slotkin refers to the center of the white hunter’s moral 
universe being “himself, his ‘gift s.’ ”  “Gift s,” and how one thinks about gift s, 
structures one’s view of the world, opening up a way of contrasting the two 
worldviews, that of the tribal Indians versus that of the white colonists (west-
erner and easterner alike). I want to argue that the westerner, in some ways, 
has more in common with the easterner than with the tribal Indians, and 
that he is, in fact, just a more “savage” form of the easterner.
One of the things that distinguishes tribal culture from nontribal culture 
is their economies. In his book Th e Gift , Lewis Hyde contrasts gift  econo-
mies with commodity or market economies. Tribal cultures tend to be ori-
ented around gift  economies, whereas nontribal cultures tend to be oriented 
around commodity or market economies. Ethical value in gift  economies 
is based largely on how much a person gives away, whereas ethical value in 
market economies tends to accrue to the person who is able to accumulate 
the most.11 Hyde associates gift  economies with the basic principle of eros, 
while commodity economies are associated with logos.12 Eros is a prin-
ciple of connection, relationship, attraction, whereas logos is a principle 
of autonomy, distance, distinction. Both of these economies are, according 
to Hyde, economies of exchange. Both of these two economies generate a 
surplus, a remainder. In the gift  economy, the remainder is the creation and 
sustaining of relationships, while in the commodity economy, the surplus 
generated is capital.13
Th e advantage of the gift  economy to the individual who lives within 
it is that one has a large, supportive network of relationships, which gives 
meaning to one’s life. Th e downside of the gift  economy is that living within 
a large network of relationships entails the attendant responsibilities and 
moral constraints that such relationships demand. Th e advantages of living 
within a commodity economy are several: one is able, through capitalis-
tic exchange, to secure a surplus of nonperishable capital that can provide 
security for the future. In addition, within the exchange relationship one’s 
autonomy is maintained. Th us, no burdensome attendant moral or relational 
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responsibilities are entailed other than the very basic ones that will guaran-
tee suffi  ciently good relations to continue the exchange relationship in the 
future. Th e downside of the commodity economy of capitalist exchange is 
that deep relationships are not formed, there is a consequent lack of con-
nection with other people, and one must live with a pervasive sense of alien-
ation from other people.
Th e moral consequences of these two ways of living will be that the tribal 
Indians will tend to value relationships above all else, whereas the nontribal 
whites will tend to value autonomy and the accumulation of capital over 
all else. Th is is part of the signifi cance of Th omas saying to Victor near the 
end of the movie, “Who needs money on the rez anyways.”14 Within com-
modity or market economies, there can be smaller gift  economies—social 
groups, such as family or church—and in tribal communities, people will 
frequently have more of a commodity economy relationship with people 
outside their tribe.
Hyde contrasts gift  property with commodity property in terms of move-
ment and stasis: “Th e only essential is this: the gift  must always move. Th ere 
are other forms of property that stand still, that mark a boundary or resist 
momentum, but the gift  keeps going.”15 Th at is, the gift  economy depends 
on a constant circulation of gift s. Hyde refers to gift s as “anarchist prop-
erty” because their possession is defi ned in terms of their being given up, 
recirculated, passed on to someone else. If one simply retains a gift  without 
recirculating it, it loses its status as a gift  and becomes a mere commodity. 
It is this despiritualization of gift s, of property, that, according to Hyde, the 
Indian wars were about. Th e war “that the American Indians had to fi ght 
with the Europeans” was “a war against the marketing of formerly inalien-
able properties. Whereas before a man could fi sh in any stream and hunt 
in any forest, now he found there were individuals who claimed to be the 
owners of these commons.”16
As Hyde points out, tribal people will not only have a gift  economy 
among themselves or with other tribes, they can also have a gift  economy with 
nature itself, where there are exchanges of gift s between, as it were, the tribe 
or certain tribal members and nature. Th e classic example of this that Hyde 
refers to is the hunt. Th e deer that is killed is considered a gift  from nature, 
and the hunter individually or the tribe communally will return some por-
tion of that gift  back to nature to maintain the health of the gift  cycle.17
Th e originating gift  in Smoke Signals is the potlatch-like supper party 
thrown by the parents of Th omas Builds-the-Fire. It is, not insignifi cantly, 
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I think, a Fourth of July celebration. Tribal wisdom about technology and 
change is, as Gregory Cajete explains, essentially conservative. “Because 
social value is gained by honoring mutual reciprocal relationships, spin-off s 
of Native science in technology are carefully applied. Adoption of technol-
ogy is conservative and based on intrinsic need, and care is taken to ensure 
that technologies adopted and applied do not disrupt a particular ecology.”18 
A wisdom that seeks relationship, harmony, and balance will be leery of the 
destabilizing eff ects of the intrusion of the new. It is hard to imagine more 
destabilizing intrusions of the new than those new things that the Fourth 
of July commemorates: the new government of the white Europeans (cre-
ating reservations for the Indians), gunpowder (fi reworks), and alcohol. 
Th e delicate balance that the potlatch is designed to uphold and celebrate 
is horribly destroyed by these intrusive “technologies” introduced by the 
white Europeans.
Th ere is a kind of alternate metaphysics that is associated with a gift  
economy that is well described by the American Indian Vine Deloria. In his 
essay “American Indian Metaphysics,” Deloria says, “Th e best description of 
Indian metaphysics was the realization that the world, and all its possible 
experiences, constituted a social reality, a fabric of life in which everything 
had the possibility of intimate knowing relationships because, ultimately, 
everything was related. Th is world was a unifi ed world, a far cry from the 
disjointed sterile and emotionless world painted by Western science.”19
Th is metaphysics of universal relationship is very similar to the prag-
matic vision of the universe in the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. 
In his essay “Th e Law of Mind,” Peirce describes the law of relationships in 
terms of the law of mind, which is “that ideas tend to spread continuously 
and to aff ect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of 
aff ectability.”20 Th e law of relationships, the law of mind, is the law of the 
spread of infl uence through relationships. Th e spread of infl uence occurs in 
nature and in natural systems as well as in human social systems, and so for 
Peirce, mind operates in nature as well as in human beings. To be aware of 
the directions of this spread is to understand what Peirce calls the “person-
ality” of a particular system, and so the world as a whole can be said, insofar 
as it manifests this spread throughout, to have a personality.21
Th ere is a continuum of relationships. Signs of this continuum are made 
manifest by the spread of infl uence, just as the continuous surface of water 
may manifest itself in the action of waves. Another sign of the continuum is 
the nature of time, the way there is a continuity in time between past, pres-
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ent, and future. Peirce represents this continuity in terms of the “insistence,” 
across time, of an idea. A past idea increases in its level of “insistence” as 
it more closely approaches the present. Similarly, the insistence of a future 
idea is most powerful the closer it is to the present, waning in power as it 
fades into the more and more distant future. Furthermore, there is continu-
ity between past and future ideas; as Peirce says, “Th e future is suggested by, 
or rather is infl uenced by the suggestions of, the past.”22
Th is idea of the real continuity of time is beautifully represented in Smoke 
Signals. Real, but latent or background, continuities between past, present, 
and future are powerfully made manifest and foregrounded via montage, 
the linking of one scene with the next. Th e general pattern is that a tempo-
ral portal is portrayed via a traditional spatial portal, a door or a window. 
Th e young Victor will walk into a doorway, and the adult Victor will walk 
out of a doorway, or the adult Victor will look out a window and the young 
Victor will appear outside that window. In this manner, the movie suggests 
that there are deep lines of connection between the past and the future. Th e 
present is the moment in which some kind of reconciliation, some kind of 
balance can be achieved between the events of the past and the potentialities 
of the future. Th e relationships that must be balanced are not just interper-
sonal, but intertemporal as well.
Th e primary mode of conveying important understanding about the 
universe for American Indians is through stories. In Western science knowl-
edge tends to be propositional, whereas native wisdom tends to be narrative 
in structure. Th e Western scientist will kill a bird and cut it open to see how 
it works.23 What the Western scientist is looking for are the general mecha-
nisms that explain how the bird functions. Th e American Indian will live with 
the bird, attentive especially to an individual bird’s anomalous behaviors, in 
order to understand the personality of a particular bird, as well as to learn 
some generalities about this bird species. Th is Indian way requires being 
responsive to anomalies, the particulars of things, special circumstances, 
and unusual events.24 Understanding is constituted narratively, which is to 
say, through descriptions of relationships, interactions, developments, and 
conclusions. Since these narratives are essentially about relationships, they 
inevitably carry a certain ethical weight. Th at is, the acknowledgment of the 
reality of these relationships demands a certain respect for them.
Th e awareness of an underlying relational element is especially rein-
forced in Native American thinking because of their social system of clans. 
A person is born not just into a family, but also into a clan. A person’s clan 
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connections are oft en quite far reaching, both in distance and in terms of the 
variety of people with whom a person is connected. From the very begin-
ning of one’s life, one is raised within a large system of underlying connec-
tions and relationships that one is taught to observe and respect. One’s very 
identity is relationally determined through one’s clan. Furthermore, there is 
always a story about the origins of a clan, and a clan’s origins will connect 
it to a specifi c animal—hence, there is a direct link between one’s identity 
and the natural nonhuman (that is, from the Western, scientifi c perspec-
tive) world and the relationships that exist there.
One of the distinctive features of gift  economies is that they are struc-
tured and maintained by stories. Th e fundamentally relational quality of 
these economies must be systematized and communicated among the 
economies’ members, and this is done via stories. So stories, in tribal gift  
economy societies, serve an absolutely necessary and essential function. 
Th ey are not mere entertainment; they also contain all the most important 
information and knowledge that sustain the community. Th e most impor-
tant knowledge in tribal societies is not propositional knowledge such as 
that produced by Western science, but accounts of networks of relations 
that situate and give meaning to each individual entity within that network. 
Th e “bad” is when the system of relations is disrupted or breaks down. Th e 
“good” is when the system of relations is maintained or restored. Stories are 
the primary means of repair.
Smoke Signals begins with, and is permeated by, stories. And, of course, 
it is itself a story. Th e stories are about underlying relationships. Th ey are 
about submerged narrative lines that are making their way to the surface. 
It is about latent stories becoming manifest stories, but for such stories to 
become manifest, someone has to listen. Part of the narrative of this story 
is how valuable stories are and how diffi  cult it is to get people to listen.
When Victor Joseph is confused about what to do because he has just 
learned that his father has died far away in Phoenix, and he has no money 
to go there, and Th omas Builds-the-Fire off ers him some money to go, but 
only on the condition that they go together, Victor does not like that idea. He 
goes to his mother, Arlene Joseph, for advice and she tells him a story: “You 
know, people always tell me I make the best fry bread in the world. Maybe 
it’s true. But I don’t make it by myself, you know? I got the recipe from your 
grandmother, who got it from her grandmother. And I listen to people when 
they eat my bread, too. Sometimes, they might say, ‘Arlene, there’s too much 
fl our,’ or ‘Arlene, you should knead the dough a little more.’ I listen to them. 
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And I watch that Julia Child all the time.”25 Th is story captures a lot of what 
I have been describing as core elements of American Indian philosophy. It 
is wisdom presented in a narrative form, as a story. It strongly emphasizes 
the ideas of connection, relationship, and respect. It has a defi nite ethical 
dimension. And, interestingly, amusingly, it points to an underlying holism 
with respect to the Julia Child reference. Wisdom and understanding can 
come from various sources. Wisdom is not an Indian thing or a white thing; 
it is a thing of the world and one must be responsive to it in all its forms, in 
all the ways it may come to one. Th is story is also very Peircean. For Peirce, 
truth does not belong to an individual, but emerges out of a community of 
inquirers. Th e essential components of that community are that the mem-
bers of the community are interdependent, and they must experiment, and 
they must communicate with each other. Arlene does not tell Victor what 
to do. She gives him a story.
Presenting the advice she has to give in the form of a story is both an 
eff ective way of conveying all of the complex information that she has to give 
(a whole worldview of information) and a gesture of respect toward Victor. 
It signals not just her respect for his intelligence—her assumption that he 
will understand the point of the story—it also respects his right to form his 
own judgment on the matter. A story is not coercive in the same way that 
“advice” usually is. Victor, in turn, will hold up his end of this relationship 
by understanding what the story is about and letting its wisdom guide him 
in making his decision.
A fi nal, but essential, component of this story Arlene tells her son is its 
humor. It is a very positive, inclusive humor that promotes intimacy and 
harmony in the relationship while it also warns and provides information 
about more eff ective (depending on others for help) and less eff ective (sign-
ing papers with white people) ways of going forward in the world. Humor is 
not just an interpersonal phenomenon, but a spiritual phenomenon as well. 
As Maureen E. Smith says in her essay “Crippling the Spirit, Wounding the 
Soul: Native American Spiritual and Religious Suppression,” “Many tribes 
saw the need for humor in all of their most sacred ceremonies. It was oft en 
an integral part of religious ceremonies.”26
Another aspect of Native American philosophy is an emphasis on being 
in harmony with one’s environment. Th is is not a diff erent aspect so much 
as a diff erent point of emphasis, since stories and song are ways of achiev-
ing that harmony. Th e idea of harmony here is not a notion of stasis, but is 
defi ned in terms of “completing relationships.” As Vine Deloria says, “Th e 
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spiritual aspect of knowledge about the world taught the people that rela-
tionships must not be left  incomplete. Th ere are many stories about how 
the world came to be, and the common themes running through them are 
the completion of relationships and the determination of how this world 
should function.”27
Deloria gives the equation: power + place = personality. Th is is essentially 
the same equation that Peirce gives for “personality.” Deloria goes on to say, 
“Th is equation simply means that the universe is alive, but it also contains 
within it the very important suggestion that the universe is personal and, 
therefore, must be approached in a personal manner.”28 Peirce comes to the 
same conclusion, and, in fact, insists that anyone who really lets his or her 
mind go, who lets the mind “muse,” will come to the same conclusion.29 Th is 
is not mysticism. It is the acknowledgment that power and place inevitably 
yield a kind of directional fl ow, yield a certain trajectory to a situation, and 
to know the direction of that fl ow, the general trajectory of that situation, 
is to understand the personality of that place. In this way, scientifi c method 
will continue to prove inferior to the methods of American Indian philoso-
phy as long as the methods of science refuse to acknowledge this personal-
ity aspect to the world.
Deloria goes on to say about the importance of completing relation-
ships, “Completing the relationship focuses the individual’s attention on the 
results of his or her actions. Th us, the Indian people were concerned about 
the products of what they did, and they sought to anticipate and consider 
all possible eff ects of their actions.”30 To be in a position to be so present to 
the moment, so alert to “all possible eff ects” of one’s actions requires that 
one be present to oneself. In addition to the power of stories to situate a 
person within a context and to make manifest the relationships that obtain, 
American Indians also make use of chants and song.
Smoke Signals is all about relationships that have been abandoned before 
they were completed. Victor’s dad runs out on his family, but his drinking 
had been an impediment to complete relationship with his family for years 
before he fi nally left . Th e young Victor most painfully feels the relationship 
with his father is incomplete and expresses his despair at this fi rst by respond-
ing to his dad’s question, “Who is your favorite Indian?” with “Nobody!” 
and later by breaking all of the remaining beer bottles against his father’s 
truck. Arlene, witnessing Victor’s despair, and in frustration and anger at 
her incomplete relationship with Arnold, all but drives him out. Victor, as 
a consequence, lives with the uncompleted relationship with his father, and 
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will not allow the completion of relationship with Th omas or anyone else. 
Arnold is a kind of “Nobody,” a man lost to himself as well as to those he 
loves, a man committed to making himself “disappear.”
In Smoke Signals gift s function within a worldview of interdependency. 
Th omas’s gift s are his stories, as Arlene’s gift  to Victor is her story about mak-
ing fry bread. Arnold, bereft  of himself, is bereft  of gift s, and can only leave 
and, in the end, leave the gift  of his own longing for home. Velma and Lucy, 
well versed in the ways of the gift  economy, will give the gift  of a ride for the 
gift  of a story, which Th omas promptly provides. Victor has learned only the 
version of being bereft  of gift s from his dad’s leaving, but with Th omas’s help, 
and with what Suzy Song (Irene Bedard) steers him to see in what his dad 
has left  for him, he learns the way of gift s as affi  rmations of relationships. 
He gives gift s of life. He saves the woman in the car accident by going for 
help. He shares Arnold’s remains with Th omas. And fi nally, when Th omas 
asks him if he ever found out why his dad left , he tells Th omas, “He didn’t 
mean to.” Th at is both the truth, which is a gift , and a withholding of a part 
of the truth: the information that Arnold had killed Th omas’s parents by 
starting the fi re that consumed their home. As Sherman Alexie says, “Th at 
is, by far, the greatest gift  Victor could give Th omas.”31
Th e scene on the bus when Th omas and Victor have been evicted from 
their seats—or rather, their seats have been co-opted by a couple of white 
men—recapitulates in miniature much of the history of white-Indian rela-
tions in America. Th ey relocate to the back of the bus. Th at is what they are 
forced to do; what they choose to do is begin a chant. Th e chant is about John 
Wayne’s teeth and how you never really see them, and what they may really 
be like. Th e chant functions to realign certain forces for the two characters. 
Th ey have been thrown into a situation in which they are in confl ict with their 
environment by the meanness of the two white men. Th ey achieve a kind of 
reattunement with their environment through song. It is an alternative to a 
direct confrontation, and yet reveals a remarkably sensitive insight into the 
dynamics of white-Indian confrontations. Th at is, their chant affi  rms their 
connection with an aesthetic, harmonic relationship with the world, while 
simultaneously observing the lack of a sense of the aesthetic in the unsmil-
ing white men, with John Wayne as the paradigmatic example. Th e chant 
works for Victor and Th omas not unlike the way the process of musement 
works in Peirce’s philosophy, that is, as a way of making oneself receptive 
to an understanding of the deeper lines of relationship and personality in 
a given context.
304 Richard Gilmore
A fi nal scene from the movie that I would like to consider is the fi nal 
poemlike monologue recited in a voice-over by Th omas as he pours the 
ashes of Arnold Joseph into the Spokane Falls. Th e theme of the poem is 
how we can forgive our fathers.
How do we forgive our fathers . . . ? Maybe in a dream?
Do we forgive our fathers for leaving us too oft en or forever
When we were little?
Maybe for scaring us with unexpected rage
Or making us nervous because there never seemed to be any rage 
there at all?
Do we forgive our fathers for marrying or not marrying our mothers?
For divorcing or not divorcing our mothers?
And shall we forgive them for their excesses of warmth or coldness?
Shall we forgive them for pushing or leaning? For shutting doors?
For speaking through walls or never speaking, or never being silent?
Do we forgive our fathers in our age or in theirs?
Or in their deaths saying it to them or not saying it?
If we forgive our fathers, what is left ?
As we hear these words we see the turbulent waters of the river as they 
fl ow beneath the bridge. I take this scene to be quite complicated, the 
river representing various diff erent fl uidities, manifesting various diff er-
ent currents and eddies of fl ow that correlate with various themes that 
occur within the movie as a whole. Time in the movie is certainly fl uid 
and full of eddies, with portions that turn back on themselves according 
to certain subliminal forces, according to certain latent narratives. Th ere 
is fl uidity in the alignment of relationships, relationships that come into 
existence and seem to fl ow out of existence only to emerge once again later, 
perhaps looking completely diff erent. All the relationships between the 
characters seem to take this form. Th omas and Victor seem inescapably 
bound to one another, but their acceptance of that connectedness ebbs 
and fl ows. Th e same could be said of the relationship between Victor and 
Regeneration through Stories and Song 305
his father. Th e same could be said of the emerging relationship between 
Victor and Suzy Song.
Th ose who are wisest are least susceptible to this ebb and fl ow, and so 
have the most stable relationships. Th is seems to be true of Arlene’s relation-
ship with her son Victor and of the relationship between Th omas and his 
grandmother. It also seems true of the relationship between the now-sober 
Arnold Joseph and Suzy Song. Th ere is a sort of stability, but not stasis. Th e 
strength of those relationships depends on the mutual acceptance of growth 
and change in those relationships, the ability “to anticipate and consider all 
possible eff ects of their actions” on the relationships.
Th e theme of fathers encapsulates all of these diff erent threads. Delo-
ria says,
Education in the traditional setting occurs by example and not as 
a process of indoctrination. Th at is to say, elders are the best living 
examples of what the end product of education and life experi-
ences shall be. We sometimes forget that life is exceedingly hard 
and that no one accomplishes everything they could possibly do 
or even many of the things they intend to do. Th e elder exemplifi es 
both the good and the bad experiences of life and witnessing their 
failures as much as their successes we are cushioned in our despair 
of disappointment and bolstered in our exuberance of success. . . . 
For some obscure reason, non-tribal peoples tend to judge their 
heroes much more harshly than do tribal people. Th ey expect a life 
of perfection.32
Th e wisdom of American Indian philosophy and of the philosophy of Peirce 
seem to converge on this ethical point, that life is an ongoing experiment 
in which failure is as necessary a part as any success that may be achieved. 
Th e proper attitude is not the expectation of perfection, or the expectation 
that failure can be avoided, but to see as well as one can the interrelations 
that tie all things together, to try to be responsive oneself to the fl ow of 
those relations, and to learn from the successes and failures of those that 
have gone before us.
Th is is the central teaching of pragmatism as well. We Americans are 
schizophrenic in the way we are torn between the demands of our market 
economy for autonomy and the constant acquisition of more commodities 
and the possibilities of relationship and amelioration that our own intel-
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lectual history of pragmatism promises. We, too, are versions of “Nobody” 
until we can fi nd some way of resolving these tensions within us. Th e ques-
tions raised in the fi nal voice-over of Smoke Signals are unanswerable, but 
the tensions they point out, the secret lines of narrative they suggest are not 
ones we can’t bear. Th ey are about dichotomies that, in their asking, point 
to greater achievable unities and resolutions. It is precisely through stories 
and song that these tensions can be transformed into wisdom, and what 
better place to get a little perspective on the fl ow of the world, to mix nar-
rative and song than in a movie like Smoke Signals.
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GO WEST, YOUNG WOMAN!
Hegel’s Dialectic and Women’s Identities in Western Films
Gary Heba and Robin Murphy
Th e myth of the Old West is rooted in a kind of nostalgia for the lure of the 
frontier and the freedom and challenges it presented, resulting in a quest 
focused on bringing order—western order—to an untamed world. More 
so than any other epoch in U.S. history, the American Old West has been 
mythologized in the collective unconscious of the country through the many 
iconic representations of this historical period in fi lm. Th e popularity of the 
western genre in U.S fi lm and television from the 1930s to the 1960s has 
left  an indelible set of images on the popular imagination—stark, rugged 
landscapes populated by rough-hewn men with horses and guns. Home-
steads were spare and devoid of any urban comforts. Th e heroes wore white 
hats, while the outlaws wore black. Native peoples were characterized as a 
cultural other who posed a threat that needed to be addressed, violently 
in most cases. Th e social contrasts represented in these fi lms were, by and 
large, clearly drawn and unambiguous and have been criticized for being 
simplistic morality plays. Noticeably missing, however, from the catalogue 
of immediately recognizable western images above are images of women.
Women certainly appeared in western movies, oft en in starring roles; 
but compared to their male counterparts, their representations have not 
had the same iconic immediacy and value. As a result, women’s identities 
in western movies remain to be constructed, not only through the narra-
tive of the fi lm, but through the minds of the viewers as well. In this study, 
we argue that although women’s identities in westerns do not have imme-
diately recognizable iconic status, their roles in these movies still provide 
markers of identity that characterize a certain cultural point of view, so that 
women’s roles in westerns function not only dramatically, but rhetorically 
as well. Because of this, in the western, women characters are oft en per-
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ceived to possess emerging identities—identities that are formed through 
contrast with other identities—that is, their identities are constructed by 
means of dialectic.
Th e specifi c dialectic applied to this analysis is Hegelian in origin. 
Although the terms thesis, antithesis, and synthesis are oft en associated with 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s (1770–1831) dialectic, they are originally 
derived from Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and Beiser notes that Hegel 
never, in fact, used this schema and opposed the use of any kind of schemata.1 
Th ough it was not a specifi c heuristic for him, Hegel was fond of thinking in 
threes, and his dialectic does, like the concept of thesis/antithesis/synthesis, 
have a tripartite structure and it functions in a similar way.2
Overall, the mission of Hegel’s dialectic is to provide a process whereby 
ideas, and ultimately truth, can emerge. According to Fox, Hegel referred 
to the result of the dialectic process as aufh eben, a term that has three dis-
tinct meanings important to this study: to preserve or maintain; to destroy 
or negate; and to elevate or transform. Th e complexity of meaning aff orded 
by the term aufh eben is a centerpiece of Hegelian thought, says Fox, because 
“the word itself is dialectical, in that it contains opposing yet coexistent and 
interdependent elements of meaning.” Th e three meanings of the term also 
provide some insight into the stages and functions of each part of Hegel’s 
dialectic: (1) the fi rst understanding—to preserve or maintain; (2) the dia-
lectical moment—to destroy or negate; and (3) the speculative moment—to 
elevate or transform. While Hegel’s dialectic provides these three distinct 
“stages” for identity construction, it does not provide a clear vocabulary for 
discussing the identities established within these stages. In order to discuss 
diff erences in identity as they are represented in fi lm, we have graft ed con-
cepts and terminology from Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1885–1975) theory of the 
social functions of language onto Hegel’s dialectic, as is explained below.3
Th e function of the fi rst understanding is to posit something absolute 
and unconditioned, conceived in itself and by itself as if it were an inde-
pendent entity, or a thing in itself.4 At this stage, the identity of something 
is formed in contrast to things it is not. It is a kind of mechanical stage in 
which one separates items according to types, like an inventory. Described 
another way, the fi rst understanding is analogous to Bakhtin’s idea of a mono-
glossic discourse. According to Bakhtin, monoglossic utterances contain 
“the forces that serve to unify and centralize the verbal-ideological world.”5 
Simply put, monoglossic discourse is the language of power that asserts its 
ideology uncritically, and its function is to reinscribe cultural myths of power 
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and their representations. Semiotically, monoglossic discourse is a stage of 
unmarked terms. As described by Jakobson, every “linguistic system is built 
on an opposition of two logical contradictories: the presence of an attribute 
(‘markedness’) in contraposition to its absence (‘unmarkedness’).”6 When 
the diff erence between marked and unmarked terms is morphological in 
nature, it is called formal marking, according to Chandler.7 For example, 
“uncivilized” is a marked term because its attribute is the prefi x “un.” Any 
word or image constructed by a process of adding something to an exist-
ing, unmarked term, in this case, “civilized,” becomes marked in this way. 
Although there are inherent cultural values attached to the terms civilized/
uncivilized, in the fi rst understanding value and evaluation are suspended 
for the time being. Th e function of the fi rst understanding is descriptive 
rather than evaluative and is “the moment of understanding whose specifi c 
virtue is to make hard and fast distinctions between things, each of which 
it regards as self-suffi  cient and independent.”8 Th e main point to be made 
here is that the fi rst understanding posits a kind of naive, tacit construction 
of knowledge and cultural identities. In terms of aufh eben, it is the sense of 
the term that means to preserve or maintain.
During the second stage of Hegel’s dialectic, the dialectical moment, 
what was posited to be absolute, unconditional, and self-suffi  cient in the 
fi rst understanding is now questioned in those same terms, resulting in a 
logical contradiction. If the thesis is unconditional and self-suffi  cient, then 
the antithesis is that it is conditional and dependent. Th e dialectic is a result 
of addressing the necessary contradiction in this stage—that the object 
of analysis is both unconditional and conditioned and self-suffi  cient and 
dependent; it is not merely one or the other. Th e sense of aufh eben invoked 
here is that of negation and destruction of the original thesis, much in the 
same way that Bakhtin’s concept of heteroglossic discourse exists to chal-
lenge the inherent dominant ideology of monoglossic tradition. According 
to Bakhtin, heteroglossia “permits a multiplicity of social voices.”9 Unlike 
monoglossic discourse, heteroglossic alternatives consist entirely of marked 
signifi ers; they are always situated linguistically as not part of the mono-
glossic territory.
Th e focus of the third stage of Hegel’s dialectic, the speculative moment, 
is to resolve the logical contradictions established in the fi rst two stages. 
Hegel attempts to resolve the contradiction by appealing to the argument of 
the whole, in which “speculative comprehension grasps and is the unity of all 
essential opposites.”10 By viewing the original proposition and its negation as 
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parts in a larger whole, “we avoid the contradiction if we ascend to a higher 
level, to the standpoint of the whole,” and the sense of aufh eben invoked here 
is that of the elevation or transformation of what appears originally to be a 
contradiction. Unfortunately, Bakhtin has no corresponding term for this 
stage of dialectic; he discusses polyglossia, a hybrid merging of two genres, 
like “dramedy,” but what occurs during the speculative moment goes beyond 
a simple combination of parts from two distinctly diff erent binary entities—
rather, it posits an identity that transcends and lies beyond the binary; that 
is, it creates something new, an identity that challenges traditional models 
of either/or identity construction.11 For the purposes of this study, we use 
the term x-glossic to describe the phenomenon by which new identities are 
constructed dialectically.
To review, the analysis we undertake in this study is layered, combining 
Hegel’s stages of dialectic, their parallels to Bakhtinian concepts of social 
language functions in creating identity and ideology, feminist perspec-
tives on fi lm, and analysis of audio/visual signs that stand as markers for 
codes of identity. Th e table below illustrates the interrelationships among 
the terms.
First Understanding Dialectical Moment Speculative Moment
Aufh eben—maintain Aufh eben—negate Aufh eben—transform
monoglossic heteroglossic x-glossic
settler women town women transformational women
language material revisional codes
infantilized sexualized mythologized
Th e First Understanding: Monoglossia, Language, and Settler 
Women
In terms of women’s roles and identities in mainstream western movies, 
the Hegelian dialectic can be easily merged with feminist fi lm theory, and 
it can be argued that Hegel’s philosophy correlates with what Ravenn calls 
“insights that are particularly important to feminists: (1) a descriptive analy-
sis of the family as a social system whose inherent oppressiveness needs to 
be transcended; and (2) a model of intrapsychic and social liberation and 
harmony as precisely the true path of emergence from and rational trans-
formation of the family.”12 First of all, in correlation to Hegel’s fi rst stage of 
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“preserving or maintaining the unconditional,” fi lm or cinematic codes for 
the use of a female in a western dictate that the female character, especially 
the settler woman, fi rst and foremost should be utilized as a narrative vehicle. 
When examining the relationship between the settler woman and the plot 
of the movie, it is obvious in most westerns that whatever her predicament, 
that situation, her dilemma and identity, is the central vehicle for the male 
character’s actions. Th is is not exclusive to settler women in westerns, but 
is used consistently in the roles of settler women. In West of Everything: Th e 
Inner Life of Westerns, Jane Tompkins identifi es the major roles women play 
in the western genre as victim; extension of man; motive for a man’s actions; 
essential; and controllers of the power of language.13 All of these roles can 
be said to be monoglossic in that they represent the most traditional roles 
available to women and act as tacit, or given, identities. Ultimately, they also 
all relate to a woman’s conventional roles in the most foundational unit of 
society—the family. As a monoglossic construction, a woman’s identity is 
most valued in terms of her ability to procreate. In addition to being the 
bearer of children, the monoglossic woman’s identity also carries with it 
expectations that she will be a reservoir of the most traditional cultural 
values regarding family, community, and faith. In this sense the settler or 
pioneer woman can be seen to most represent this stage of Hegel’s dialec-
tic—essentialized and unqualifi ed—as they are represented in western mov-
ies. Th ese essentialized social representations can be considered positive, 
for as Simone de Beauvoir says, “Th e role of pity and tenderness is one of 
the most important roles of all those which have been assigned to women. 
Even when fully integrated into society, woman subtly extends its frontiers 
because she has the insidious generosity of life.”14 Th ough these representa-
tions can arguably be considered positive, in regard to the cinematic codes 
of language, the tendency of the woman’s speaking part or dialogue is to 
be minimal, to be ignored by her male counterparts, and to be portrayed 
as cinematically superfl uous. In addition, she oft en needs a translator to 
understand narrative situations and in cases where she does speak, her 
linguistic purpose is oft en limited to asking for help, which in turn simply 
furthers the male character’s signifi cance. Laura Mulvey, in “Visual Plea-
sure and Narrative Cinema,” refers to this situation: “Woman then stands 
in patriarchal culture as signifi er for the male other, bound by a symbolic 
order in which man can live out his phantasies and obsessions through 
linguistic command by imposing them on the silent image of woman still 
tied to her place as bearer of meaning, not maker of meaning.”15 In this, 
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the essentialized linguistic value of the female western character “doing 
not talking” is maintained.16
Evidence of the cinematic language code for women being preserved in 
westerns can be found in a range of decades from the 1940s to the present. 
In Th e Ox-Bow Incident (William A. Wellman, 1943), set in 1885, the use 
of town women with speaking parts is limited to the character of Ma (Jane 
Darwell), who rides with the posse like a man to fi nd the murdering cattle 
rustlers, and the character of Rose (Mary Beth Hughes), who is on the trail 
through Ox Bow, riding in a stagecoach with her new husband, much to 
the chagrin of the lead male. Th ese two females have small but signifi cant 
speaking parts in terms of the male narrative. Ma, for instance, jokes with 
the men like a man; her other linguistic impact is primarily to laugh gar-
ishly through most of the fi lm, especially in the sequence of scenes leading 
up to the hanging. More signifi cantly, she ends up being one of the “men” 
with enough verbal courage to volunteer to whip a horse from under one 
of the hanging victims, thus not only advancing the male agenda, but also 
participating in it like a man. Rose’s dialogue is limited to announcing her 
marriage and return from California to visit and expressing her concern over 
the injured male who was shot. In this, she initiates the jealousy between 
the left -behind male lead and her newfound rich husband; however, in the 
long run, this speaking part makes no signifi cant plot diff erence, though it 
does emphasize the cultural idea that “a woman is defi ned by her relation 
to man.”17 
Th is idea is also evident in Appaloosa (Ed Harris, 2008), set in 1882. 
Th e fi rst time the fi lm shows a woman is at about seven minutes, and she is 
a servant who meekly interrupts a group of men with a one-line warning 
of coming danger, thus furthering the male characters’ purpose. Not until 
fi ft een minutes into the fi lm does the lead female, Mrs. French (Renée Zell-
weger), make her entrance. She gets off  a train in town only to immediately 
ask the male lead for assistance with fi nding room and board and work as a 
musician. Th e male lead’s sidekick does have a confi dante in the main whore 
character, whose lines are used to explain Mrs. French’s actions but not to 
notably progress the motives of the characters. Th is narrative insignifi cance 
of the female character is described by Mulvey:
Th e presence of woman is an indispensable element of spectacle in 
normal narrative fi lm, yet her visual presence tends to work against 
the development of a story line, to freeze the fl ow of action in mo-
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ments of erotic contemplation. Th is alien presence then has to be 
integrated into cohesion with the narrative. As Budd Boetticher 
has put it: “What counts is what the heroine provokes, or rather 
what she represents. She is the one, or rather the love or fear she 
inspires in the hero, or else the concern he feels for her, who makes 
him act the way he does. In herself the woman has not the slightest 
importance.”18
Likewise, neither of these two fi lms uses female character dialogue to sig-
nifi cantly advance the narrative.
Specifi cally in terms of the linguistic importance and role of the settler 
woman, in Th e Searchers (John Ford, 1956), set in 1868, the settler women 
are linguistically portrayed similarly to town women. Th e woman settler 
character dialogue is superfl uous or is used to move the male narrative along. 
Th ough the settler woman seems to initially have more speaking roles, start-
ing early in the fi lm, the mother speaks to her husband only to let him know 
someone is arriving or to scold or direct the children, and the female children 
speak only to each other or to the family dog, further debasing the female 
child. Th erefore, a linguistic hierarchy is established within the fi rst scene and 
the monoglossic identity is maintained. Later in the fi lm, when the motive 
for the male lead has been established, a female character, a mother of one 
of the boys who is joining the male’s search group, asks the male lead not to 
go and implores him to be logical about his motives. He simply responds 
with something like “Get to the point, woman.” Here, the language hierarchy 
is reinforced. Tompkins claims this “male silence suggests the inadequacy 
of female verbalization . . . it establishes male superiority and silences the 
one who would engage in conversation.”19 Th ough the woman is concerned 
about her son dying in the venture for revenge and wants to talk about the 
danger, the male lead dismisses her motive. Th roughout the fi lm, the male 
lead seems to hear what the female characters say, but fails to respond with 
anything more than a nod, if he responds to them at all.
At about forty-four minutes into Th e Searchers, the audience meets 
Laurie (Vera Miles), the love interest of a male character—the lead’s side-
kick Martin (Jeff rey Hunter). When Martin fi rst speaks in the presence 
of Laurie, he speaks to her mother about Laurie, in third person. Laurie 
speaks directly to him, but primarily about their relationship. Th is kind of 
womanly or monoglossic talk, for Laurie, represents the bulk of her lines. 
She even talks directly to Martin about her role as a settler woman: to wash 
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and mend. However, she also jokes with Martin about being bashful and 
warns him to watch out for her father’s response to their courtship. Th ough 
her lines are plentiful, their content is limited to maintaining and preserv-
ing the cultural role of the settler woman as helpless and insignifi cant. For 
instance, a major plot-moving technique is that of a letter Martin sends to 
Laurie. Th ough Laurie insists the letter is personal and private, her father 
and mother override her privacy and insist she read it out loud. However, 
though this adds to her total number of lines and therefore increases her 
perceived linguistic importance to the male and audience, she is reading a 
man’s words. Even further preserving the monoglossic dialectic, though the 
letter is addressed to Laurie, its content speaks more for Martin’s narrative 
and motive and indicates no true regard or love for Laurie, even closing with 
Martin signing his entire name. So, despite her linguistic capacity in this 
plot-moving device and sequence, her character’s linguistic signifi cance is 
actually reduced to the equivalent of town crier or male narrative vehicle. 
Tompkins claims this characterization is typical of the western: “Th ere’s 
nothing to [the women in westerns]. Th ey may seem strong and resilient, 
fi ery and resourceful at fi rst, but when push comes to shove, as it always 
does, they crumble.”20 For instance, at the end of the fi lm, the ultimate male 
motive—Debbie (Natalie Wood), the girl who was kidnapped by the Coman-
che—speaks from the identity of a native woman, not as a settler woman. 
She is depicted as a trickster through her ability to speak both the native’s 
language and “American.” Th is is interesting binary in relation to the men 
in the fi lm who can speak and understand Comanche or Spanish; they are 
portrayed as knowledgeable and competent while their male monolingual 
counterparts are considered dim-witted. Debbie speaks both languages, but 
it appears to be trickery, not competence, to the male lead, who ultimately 
questions her loyalty to her white family. Her linguistic capacity threatens the 
male lead’s power and dominance, so when the advantage moves to Debbie 
in this case, it challenges the control of the male lead, which results in the 
audience questioning her motives. Th ough her lines are minimal, instead of 
continuing the role of the settler woman/girl from the beginning, the end of 
the fi lm indicates the lack of character conviction in her language ability and 
reinforces her female position as merely an uncomplicated plot vehicle.
In Shane (George Stevens, 1953), a strong depiction of the traditional 
roles of women is evident in the language content of the role of Marian (Jean 
Arthur), the main female character and a settler woman. She is linguistically 
introduced through her singing as she works inside. Th en, without speaking 
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to Shane (Alan Ladd), she suggests, not demands, that her husband invite 
him to dinner. Th roughout the fi lm, her lines are limited to scolding her son, 
her husband, and later Shane. She also consistently reminds her husband 
and son to be polite. Later in the fi lm, her language signifi cance is raised to 
the level of imploring as she begs her husband and Shane not to go to town 
to fi ght with “Isn’t there anything I can say to change your mind?” In one 
stroke of vehemence, she adamantly tells Shane: “We all would be better off  
if there wasn’t a gun in this valley.” Of course, all of these elevated lines are 
disregarded by the men. Th e men cancel out her talk through action, which 
Tompkins says “always delivers the same message: language is false or at best 
ineff ectual; only actions are real.”21 Th erefore, the female character’s opinion 
on these matters, and thereby her infl uence on the narrative, is moot, but 
the monoglossic identity is preserved.
Th e Dialectical Moment: Heteroglossia, Material, and Town 
Women
Th e second stage of Hegel’s dialectic, “to destroy or negate,” is easily evident 
in the way women are materially identifi ed as the male spectacle in western 
fi lms. In this, they are portrayed through their dress as sexualized objects; 
their mythos is accentuated through material visual codes. Th e women set-
tlers of western fi lms dress in practical clothes that allow them to do their 
womanly tasks in a harsh environment. In stark diff erence to the settler 
women—a practical, working, traditional role—the town woman—a wife/
widow, a whore, or a servant—dresses diff erently in style and in fabric, serv-
ing to negate the monoglossic identity codes for women that inscribe them 
only in family-centric terms. Th e purpose of the heteroglossic function of 
language, like Hegel’s dialectical moment, is to provide an alternative to the 
essentialist, tacit identity construction that characterizes monoglossic dis-
course. One way the female characters in westerns indicate their dialectic 
identity is through the visual code of costume. Where settler women dress 
practically, for work, town women oft en dress to attract men or attention in 
general. Necklines, material, and accessories act as symbols that complete 
the visual code. In this way, the identities of town women are materially 
constructed as heteroglossic, a contrastive identity to the one of the settler 
woman. Th e contrast between settler and town identities is the basis of the 
dialectical moment when the family-oriented values of the settler are seen 
in opposition to the more urban, cosmopolitan values of the town woman. 
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Th at is not to say that the two are mutually exclusive, but that through dia-
lectic, identities emerge when the two are placed in contrast.22
In Th e Searchers, the women dress practically for frontier work; how-
ever, Laurie’s character oft en changes from a dress to pants and back again, 
not only for the sake of the work she’s doing, but also for the sake of her 
need to attract the attention of Martin. For instance, in the scene where 
the audience fi rst sees them together, Laurie has her hair up and is dressed 
monoglossically in a practical cotton dress with an apron. Later, when she’s 
brought her best horse for Martin to ride to follow aft er the male lead, she’s 
let her hair down and is dressed like a man in a button-down shirt, pants, 
and boots, as if she’s fi nished with her attempts to attract Martin, a seem-
ingly heteroglossic move for the character. In this she moves to attain male 
power by subverting and reducing female dress to the means of objectifying 
the male gaze. However, in the wedding sequence, her hair is up, and she 
is, of course, dressed in a white, silky material and white shoes. Th erefore, 
except for a special circumstance such as a trip to town, a funeral, or a wed-
ding, settler women dress, monoglossically, to work. Th is use of practical 
dress shows the woman as a male spectacle in that she is valued by the male 
as an integral part of their frontier survival, for without her hard work in 
traditional roles, the family unit would likely dissolve.
Th e town woman, however, isn’t as likely to have to work as the settler 
woman, and her dress, materials, and accessories drastically indicate this 
diff erence and help construct a heteroglossic identity. In Appaloosa, Mrs. 
French departs from the train dressed to the hilt in a striped, tight-fi tting, 
neck-high dress of a silky fabric, a hat, and gloves—as opposed to Shane’s 
Marian, who is seen going to town in a worn, loose cotton shirt and skirt, 
a jacket, and a ribbon in her hair. Add a parasol to Mrs. French’s outfi t 
and the picture is complete for an aft ernoon picnic with her beau. She is 
dressed heteroglossically as the unattainable, the proper woman, the high-
society woman, for the admiration of man and to antagonize the other, 
lesser women. Correspondingly, even the whore in Appaloosa dresses in 
fi ner fabrics than the settler woman, and her role as sexualized male spec-
tacle follows suit. She is dressed exotically in layers, with a low neckline 
and chest and waist emphasis to uphold the myth of the woman as sexual 
object. Both Mrs. French and the whore are also seen in their undergar-
ments (heteroglossic) at diff erent times in the fi lm. In Mrs. French’s case, 
it is depicted as ridicule for her behavior, but in the whore’s case, it is sexu-
alized as an intimate moment. 
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In My Darling Clementine (John Ford, 1946), set in 1882, the two main 
town woman characters are, again, a highbrow woman and a whore/enter-
tainer. Both women dressed as heteroglossic, which accommodates the 
pleasures of men. Th e town woman Clementine (Cathy Downs) arrives on 
a stagecoach dressed in expensive fabric, a hat, gloves, a shoulder throw, and 
carrying a small handbag. Chihuahua (Linda Darnell), the whore, wears her 
hair half up and half down and dresses in Spanish-style dresses of fi ne fabric, 
elaborate ruffl  es, and low necklines. In Th e Ox-Bow Incident, the character 
of Ma, though a town woman, dresses like a man to be a part of the hang-
ing posse. She obviously represents an antithesis to the myth of the woman 
as a sexual object, but the character of Rose follows the sexualized material 
code right down to the petticoat. It is clear that the myth of the town woman 
as a sexualized spectacle is reinforced in these heteroglossic material visual 
codes of the cinema.
An excellent example of the contrast in materiality between monoglos-
sic and heteroglossic identities is found in How the West Was Won (John 
Ford, Henry Hathaway, and George Marshall, 1962), a sprawling epic that 
chronicles three generations of the Prescott family in its trek westward from 
Pennsylvania to California. Th e main narrative of the fi lm focuses on the 
Prescott sisters, Eve (Carroll Baker) and Lily (Debbie Reynolds). Even their 
names suggest the kinds of ideological attitudes and values associated with 
each of them through the biblical resonances carried by their names. Eve, 
named aft er the fi rst woman in the Bible, dresses plainly and practically for 
life on the trail, her long hair worn down and oft en unbrushed. She longs 
for marriage and family and actively pursues Linus Rawlings (James Stuart), 
a mountain man whom the family encounters early in its travels. As such, 
Eve is coded visually as a monoglossic version of woman, bound by the 
constraints of an identity that is grounded in a patriarchal version of family. 
In contrast, Lily’s full name, Lilith, suggests the apocryphal Lilith, who in 
Hebrew folklore was Adam’s fi rst wife, and whose name is oft en associated 
with evil. Lily, though also dressed plainly, adds adornments like ribbons 
to her clothes and her hair, usually worn up. Lily longs for fi ne clothes and 
to go back east—she has no plans for family in her future. She is a singer 
who has already developed a reputation for her ability, and following that 
career will enable her to support herself without the necessity of being 
married. Like many men who came west in search of a kind of freedom 
and independence that was becoming increasingly less available as cities in 
the East grew larger, Lily is visually represented as a heteroglossic identity 
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challenging ideas about a woman who is able to be fi nancially and socially 
independent without a man.
Th e ideological diff erences between Eve and Lily manifest further in 
the divergent paths their lives take aft er their parents drown. Prior to the 
accident, there is a scene in which both daughters long for the East and fi ne 
clothes—they are on this journey only because it is what their father wanted, 
and as unmarried women they are obligated to follow their family. As such, 
both are divided about where their identities and their allegiances lie: with 
the settler values and family or with those of the town and independence, 
the dialectical choice being to maintain the values and lifestyle they have 
inherited or to negate it through an alternative. Before the accident, Eve is 
on the verge of choosing to negate her family heritage by going back east 
with her sister. Aft er the accident, however, Eve has a sudden change of 
heart. Linus Rawlings, whom Eve has been pursuing as a husband, returns 
to ask for her hand in marriage and to urge her to go back east with him to 
St. Louis, but she sees the accident as a divine sign that they should settle 
on the spot where her parents died. Although she is presented with an alter-
native, more urban existence, Eve chooses the essential, monoglossic code 
of family, raises two sons with her husband, and lives the remainder of her 
days on that same spot. Th erefore, though she is presented with a dialecti-
cal option, she is not transformed by it.
Eve’s sister, Lily, is heteroglossically grounded and much more deter-
mined from the start to fi nd a way to the city. Aft er her parents’ death, she 
sights a riverboat, and when we next see her, she is headlining a musical 
revue on board. In terms of the visual coding of identity, we see here a 
complete transformation of Lily: from a reluctant pioneer woman to a pro-
fessional singer. Replacing the plainer clothing she wore in the fi rst part of 
the movie, Lily now wears a brightly colored satin outfi t, about the size of a 
contemporary one-piece bathing suit. Her hair is carefully styled, and she 
wears jewelry to accent her costume. Th rough revealing more of her body 
Lily’s identity is much more highly sexualized; thus her ideological choice 
is represented visually as well as through her actions. Most important, the 
signifi cation of her clothing indicates that she is independent, free from 
the confi nes of traditional family. In her highly sexualized identity, it is not 
surprising that Lily is ardently pursued by two men, who can also be seen 
to represent ideological and dialectical positions. One of the men, Roger 
Morgan (Robert Preston), is a successful rancher who off ers Lily the mono-
glossic ideal of family and views her primarily as a breeding machine, rein-
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forced by numerous references to her “fi ne body,” and his comment that “For 
you, childbearing would come as easily as rolling off  a log.” Lily’s comment 
to him is “A woman likes to hear something a little more inviting.” Because 
Morgan’s off er does not appeal to her ideologically, Lily’s attention is caught 
by another man, Cleve Van Halen (Gregory Peck), a riverboat gambler. He 
is able to win Lily’s aff ections where Morgan failed because Cleve is more 
ideologically attuned to her values. Neither Cleve nor Lily is interested in 
family, because both view life as an adventure that family would only restrict. 
Near the end of the movie, Cleve has passed away aft er he and Lily “won and 
lost a few fortunes,” and Lily has a chance meeting with Zeb (Karl Malden), 
the older son of Eve. Zeb is starting his own family and invites Lily, some-
what ironically, to go west to California, an invitation that Lily accepts. Lily 
is older but still dressed in fi ne clothes, suggesting that even though she has 
agreed to become part of an extended family, her independent, heteroglos-
sic identity remains.
In the movies we have examined, although heteroglossic identities for 
women exist as dialectical points of contrast, the heteroglossic woman’s 
identity is overall shown to be transgressive because it goes against the 
grain of what is considered a traditional family and what the woman’s role 
is in that family. As such, Lily’s decision, like Debbie’s in Th e Searchers, is a 
return to the fold of family that allows her a chance to redeem her original 
transgression.
Th e Speculative Moment: X-Glossia, Character, and the 
Transformational Woman
Hegel’s dialectic third stage calls for elevation and transformation. Arguably, 
this transformation occurs more oft en in modern westerns—those produced 
aft er the 1970s. In these more modern westerns, the woman is most oft en 
elevated as x-glossic through place or landscape and is more oft en associated 
with being integral to nature or the natural way of things. Th e function of 
x-glossic discourse is to transform identities that are constructed outside of 
traditional binaries in which women are also transformed from male spec-
tacle to audience spectacle. In other words, the male gaze–centered cinematic 
code is subverted in one way or another. From the feminist point of view, 
this is a necessary destruction of the implicit and mythologized social roles 
of women, and in this way the represented identities of these women are x-
glossic—neither settler nor town woman nor combination of both, but a new 
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subject position, a new identity that transcends the either/or, settler/town 
binaries and exists outside them. Th e codes of language and material that 
helped to establish the dialectical identities of monoglossic and heteroglossic 
ideologies have been revised or transformed, following Hegel’s third stage 
of aufh eben, to such an extent that they are no longer recognizable as either, 
and may not even have a name. Mulvey, too, emphasizes the importance 
of challenging the code: “Cinematic codes create a gaze, a world, and an 
object, thereby producing an illusion cut to the measure of desire. It is these 
cinematic codes and their relationship to formative external structures that 
must be broken down before mainstream fi lm and the pleasure it provides 
can be challenged.23 In essence, these codes are challenged in the x-glossic 
dialectic. For example, when Sharon Stone makes her fi rst appearance in 
Th e Quick and the Dead (Sam Raimi, 1995), only her hair and facial features 
mark her as a woman—she is dressed like a man, she walks like a man, she 
talks like a man, she fi ghts like a man, and she says almost nothing—for all 
intents and purposes, she is coded as being a woman, but she is behaving 
like a man. Th e revision of the code causes a rupture in both the traditional 
settler/town binary and, more important, the male/female binary that forces 
the need for a new codifi cation for identity, the x-glossic.
Two Mules for Sister Sara (Donald Siegel, 1970), set in 1867, and Th e 
Quick and the Dead, set in 1878, both portray women in transformative 
material/costume in relation to the cinematic code of dressing women as 
the male spectacle. Sara (Shirley MacLaine) spends most of the fi lm hidden 
in a nun’s habit, which allows her to maintain her trickster character. At the 
end of the fi lm, Sara dresses like any well-to-do town woman, though a little 
more fl ashy and over the top, probably because of her whoring history and 
love for the dramatic. Ellen (Sharon Stone) spends most of the fi lm with 
her hair down, dressed in dark leather pants with chaps, a white, loosely 
buttoned-down shirt, a long, dark riding coat, a large black cowboy hat, and 
boots. In one sequence, Ellen wears a fi tting dress of fi ne fabric and hosiery 
for her dinner with the male lead. However, she remains true to her male-
like garb in the end. Th ese town women’s identities are identifi ed as x-glossic 
because they are not visually and materially coded as extensions of the male 
characters, nor are they the spectacle of the male gaze—they are something 
new. Th ese women use their identities, built upon language and dress, as 
narrative vehicles for their own purposes, not because they are the identi-
ties they actually inhabit. If settler women are monoglossically coded, and 
town women are heteroglossically coded, then Sara and Ellen are neither. 
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Instead, we can see their identities as transformative and situated outside 
the monoglossic/heteroglossic binary—they are something new.
For example, the fi rst distinct transformational characteristic of the x-
glossic female character is linguistically situated. In the opening of Two Mules 
for Sister Sara, the fi lm shows a monoglossic language predicament, with Sara 
crying for help, but quickly subverts and transforms this cinematic code to 
an x-glossic identity by giving Sara an equal footing in dialogue and banter 
with the male lead in terms of purposeful lines and the number of lines. 
Sara also speaks three diff erent languages (English, Spanish, and French), 
and rather than that complicated linguistic practice being seen as the trait 
of a trickster, as it was for Debbie in Th e Searchers, Sara oft en progresses the 
main narrative by translating for the male lead. At the same time, the male 
character’s motive is driven by Sara’s request for help when he saves her from 
sure rape in the opening scene, which is partial to the patriarchal motives 
of the cinematic code; however, Sara’s character utilizes the male motive to 
further her own intentions as the narrative progresses.
Analogous to the x-glossic dialectic of Two Mules for Sister Sara, Th e 
Quick and the Dead also subverts the language code for the female character 
of the western. Th ough the lead (Ellen) isn’t given a name beyond “Lady” 
until well into the movie, most of Ellen’s lines, like Sara’s, are signifi cant 
to the plot of the fi lm, not just to the narrative of the male characters, and 
they are equal in number to those of the men. In fact, the men oft en off er 
her unsolicited advice that furthers her motives, but her conversations are 
rarely about asking for help or direction. For instance, in an integral scene 
about halfway through the fi lm, a male character tells her to listen for the 
click before the clock chimes the hour, so she’ll draw her gun more quickly. 
She doesn’t reply but uses the information to her advantage. She also rarely 
responds to men in the fi lm with the answers they expect. In one of the 
opening sequences, a blind boy asks her if she’s interested in a variety of 
lotions and the like, and she replies, “Just shine my boots.” In that same 
sequence, a recently released murderer approaches her aggressively and 
says, “I need a woman.” She responds, unconcerned, “You need a bath.” 
Admittedly, though Ellen’s lead role is linguistically integral to the plot, as 
it should be, the other women in the fi lm uphold the cinematic code: the 
girl servant/rape victim whose lines further the male narrative as well as the 
female lead’s motive and narrative; one whore who speaks to show concern 
for a fallen gunslinger but whose lines are insignifi cant to the plot except to 
emphasize her role as a male spectator or admirer; and the extras: whores, 
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town women, and native women who only “speak” in murmurs or cheers 
at the gunfi ghts. Most of the women, except the lead and the girl victim, 
are linguistically ignored by their male counterparts as well as the audience. 
Even though many of the female extras in both fi lms are monoglossic or 
heteroglossic in their language signifi cance, both Ellen and Sara are viable 
lead female characters who have subverted the cinematic linguistic code 
established for female roles.
Another example that subverts the cinematic code for women in west-
erns on multiple levels is the recent Bandidas (Joachim Ronning and Espen 
Sandberg, 2006). Th is movie takes the female character as gunslinger por-
trayed in Th e Quick and the Dead and transforms her into a bank robber. 
Th e main characters, Sara (Salma Hayek) and Maria (Penelope Cruz), are 
paired ideologically. Th e setting is Mexico, and Maria is a farm girl living 
with her father. She dresses very plainly in what amounts to a peasant’s clothes. 
In contrast, Sara is the daughter of the governor of Mexico back home on a 
break from her education in Europe, and we fi rst see her dressed in expensive 
satin gowns. Here the material distinction between the two in terms of settler 
and town women identities is true to what we have seen in other fi lms, but 
with an added layer of social class. Both are wronged when a New York banker 
devises a scam to essentially steal Mexican land so a railroad can run through 
the small town. Maria’s father is shot when he refuses to sell his property for a 
peso, and Sara’s father is poisoned when he learns of the plan the banker has 
to steal land. Both women are displaced from their typical lives and meet, by 
coincidence, when they both decide, separately, to rob the same bank at the 
same time. Th ey team up and become infamous bank robbers through the 
course of the fi lm, ultimately seeking revenge on the banker from New York. 
In the speculative moment presented to them, they choose to transform their 
identities radically, though for diff erent reasons. Maria wants to rob banks to 
get money for the poor, like Robin Hood. Sara’s goal is more self-interested; 
she wants to raise enough money to return to Europe. During the movie, how-
ever, Sara comes to see Maria’s position, and they both enjoy the celebrity they 
have gained in the country, earning them the status of folk heroes.
Because the movie is set in Mexico, both women are initially “othered” 
because they are not Caucasian. Like Ellen in Th e Quick and the Dead, they 
are also transformed into a traditionally male role of bank robber. Unlike 
Ellen, though, the actresses who play Sara and Maria, Salma Hayek and 
Penelope Cruz, are acutely sexualized and spend a good portion of the 
movie arguing about who is a better kisser. Essentially, Bandidas is a wom-
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an’s version of Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (George Roy Hill, 1969) 
and other “buddy” movies that traditionally feature male leads. As female 
bank robbers, their characters represent both audience spectacle and male 
spectacle, further disrupting the cinematic codes for women in westerns by 
producing new, transformative identities for them to inhabit.
It is also important to examine the motivation of transformative female 
characters. It is not necessary for a female character to have a narrative 
motivated by distinctly female issues. Th e motivation for both Sara and 
Ellen and Maria and Sara is revenge, just like that of the typical western 
male lead; however, in all cases, the women have feminist agendas within 
the plot of revenge. In Sara’s case in Two Mules for Sister Sara, she is moti-
vated to return to her home and exact her revenge on the French invaders, 
but she also wants to protect her friends’ livelihoods at the whorehouse. In 
the end, she not only saves Mexico and her friends, but also gets the man. 
Sara’s character transforms the natural role of the nun into a cunning dis-
guise to save a business that is the direct social-value opposite—a brothel. 
Similarly, Ellen’s obvious narrative vehicle is personal revenge on the man 
who made her responsible for her father’s death. Ellen also avenges a young 
girl who was raped and left  unprotected by her own father and saves a man 
from his own past. Th erefore, all of the characters in the westerns in this 
section revise the mythologized female spectacle, embrace the traditional 
code of the male, and challenge that code by disrupting the dialectic, which 
results in a new dialectic identity, the x-glossic.
Transforming Identity Construction
In conclusion, we have argued that the identities constructed for women 
in westerns have a variety of ideological and dialectical positions, and that 
identities emerge as a result of the confrontations between dialectical points 
of view. Using Hegel’s dialectic as a means for examining identities in fi lm 
allows us to clearly see how characters’ roles are ideologically positioned in 
contrast to characters who negate or transform that ideology. Just as Hegel 
wanted his dialectic to be representative of an ongoing process, so, too, do 
audiences continually engage in constructing the identities presented to them 
in western fi lms. While the earlier westerns we examined have an ideologi-
cal tendency toward representing women’s identities in ways that reinforce 
traditional social roles in the cultural master narrative, movies from the 
1970s on demonstrate an increasing number of heteroglossic and x-glossic
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representations of women’s identities in this genre that challenge those 
traditional identities. As such, the expanding roles for women in westerns 
during this period are mirrors of the larger social changes occurring in the 
United States, and also of Hegel’s teleological view of dialectic: that it shapes 
not only individuals, but also societies through time.
Th ough the western genre is nowhere near as robust now as it was in 
the 1940s through the 1960s, the fact that westerns are still being made, and 
are being used as vehicles to represent women in alternative identities, is 
a sign of the genre’s continued power and hold over the collective cultural 
imagination and of the role it plays in shaping audiences’ ideological values 
regarding gender. It is our hope that the method of analysis employed here 
will be of use to others studying the structural and ideological dimension 
of identities in fi lm. With the western fi lm genre extending itself into space, 
“the fi nal frontier,” movies like Joss Whedon’s Serenity (2005) will also help 
to shape the future trails left  to blaze for establishing new, transformational 
codes of what it means to be a woman on the frontiers of identity.
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BE ATING A LIVE HORSE
Th e Elevation and Degradation of Horses in Westerns
Jennifer L. McMahon
Th e souls of horses mirror the souls of men more closely than men 
suppose.
—Cormac McCarthy, All the Pretty Horses
When one thinks of western fi lms, certain stock characters come to mind. 
Cowboys, Indians, gunslingers, and homesteaders are some of the obvious 
examples. However, there is a character that is as—perhaps even more—ele-
mental to the western: the horse. Horses are everywhere in westerns. Our 
heroes ride in—and out—on them. And yet, who thinks about them? In 
recent decades, increased scholarly attention has been paid to marginalized 
fi gures in literature and mainstream media. Studies on otherness have served 
to bring recognition to individuals and groups whose voices and value have 
been suppressed or distorted because of their misrepresentation, or lack of 
representation, in media of various sorts. However, little attention has been 
given to the role horses play in westerns.1 As Jane Tompkins notes, despite 
their exhaustive analysis of other elements of the genre, as far as most “crit-
ics [of the western] are concerned [horses] might as well not exist.”2 She 
agrees with Harold Hintz that horses are an “important ingredient of West-
ern movies,” arguing that horses are in fact “indispensable” to the western 
to the extent that they are on-screen constantly and “aff ect our reactions 
subliminally.”3 Th is chapter will further examine the representation of the 
horse in westerns, particularly how most westerns both exemplify and per-
petuate the confl icted relationship that Americans have with horses. While 
few animals possess the aesthetic allure for Americans that horses do, few 
are depicted as subordinate beings as frequently as horses. Whereas dogs 
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are trained, horses are broken. As oft en as horses lope gracefully across the 
screen, they are roped, tied, hobbled, yoked, curbed, whipped, or ridden 
until they drop. Existential philosophy off ers an explanation for the ambiva-
lence that humans display toward horses, namely, their simultaneous desire 
to elevate and subjugate these animals.
Prominent existentialists such as Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80), Martin 
Heidegger (1889–1976), and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) pay little 
attention to animals in their philosophic works; nonetheless, their existential 
theories can help explain the polarized relationship that humans have with 
horses. From an existential perspective, the ambivalence that humans dis-
play toward horses lies largely in the similarities that horses have to humans, 
the ontological insecurities that humans have, and the coping strategies that 
humans employ to assuage these insecurities. To the extent that humans 
see traits in horses that they themselves possess but dislike, horses become 
convenient objects upon which to transfer our own self-loathing and exact 
a psychologically satisfying dynamic of control. To the extent that horses 
manifest traits that humans seek to possess, they inspire both envy and 
admiration. Not only do we see these aspects of our relationship to horses 
in westerns, most westerns serve to reinforce our ambivalence.
Kindred Spirits: Th e Parallels between Horses and Humans
Before turning our attention to specifi c westerns, it is fi rst necessary to dis-
cuss the similarities that exist between humans and horses. Th is will establish 
the philosophic basis for the ambivalent treatment of horses that westerns 
exemplify and encourage. Obviously, humans are very diff erent from horses; 
however, they share some important attributes. One is anxiety. Horses are 
known for being skittish. Equine anxiety has obvious instinctual and evo-
lutionary roots.4 Horses are herbivores. As such, they are potential prey for 
other animals, not predators themselves. In the wild, horses are vulnerable 
to various environmental threats, including large carnivores, dangerous 
weather or terrain, and insuffi  cient forage or water. Th e primary defenses 
that horses have developed to facilitate their survival are hypersensitivity 
to stimuli, a powerful fl ight instinct, physical agility, and speed. Horses are, 
by nature, highly alert and easily startled, and these characteristics serve to 
preserve both individual animals and the species as a whole.
Th ough humans are not as fl eet of foot as horses, we, too, are hypersensi-
tive beings who are predisposed to fl ight. Sartre and Heidegger agree on this. 
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According to Heidegger, human being is characterized by existential anxiety, 
or “angst.”5 He argues that anxiety is our primary emotion, our “fundamental 
mode of being-in-the-world.” Sartre concurs. While we normally associate 
our anxiety with specifi c stressors, Sartre and Heidegger agree that anxiety 
is fundamentally about being. Heidegger indicates that humans are char-
acterized by their “care” for being, and argues that “the being about which 
[human being] is concerned . . . is always its own.”6 Existential psychologist 
R. D. Laing refers to this self-oriented anxiety as “ontological insecurity.”7 
Rather than being grounded in any specifi c external threat, ontological 
insecurity, or existential anxiety, is anchored in the awareness of personal 
vulnerability, our fragility. Arguably, to the extent that they are mortal, all 
living creatures are fragile; however, some are more so than others. Horses 
are hardy, but they lack the defensive arsenal of their predatory counter-
parts. Th e absence of large canines and sharp claws makes horses more sus-
ceptible than other animal species. Th ough their fl eetness aff ords them a 
means to escape predators, the lightness of bone that gives them speed also 
renders them fragile. As any number of westerns show, horses break legs 
fairly easily, and one misstep can mean death. Th ough we don’t shoot them 
if they break a leg, humans, too, are fragile. Th ough we are predators and 
occupy the topmost position on the food chain, our being is still tenuous. 
Our power lies in our wits, not in other natural defenses. Our existential 
anxiety is grounded in, and reminds us of, our vulnerability: our perennial 
susceptibility to physical injury and death. Our anxiety is primarily visceral, 
not refl exive. In short, it is something we know intuitively, but do not tend 
to think about formally.
While Heidegger distinguishes humans from other animals on the basis 
of their concern for being, his own theory of anxiety can be used to argue that 
humans are on a continuum that includes other animal species. According 
to Heidegger, all fear is grounded in anxiety. Fear is a second-order emotion 
predicated on angst.8 Only beings who are aware that they are vulnerable 
to injury or annihilation display fear. By this logic, any being that displays 
fear must possess an awareness of its own vulnerability. Horses clearly dis-
play fear. Th ey spook at shadows, bolt at thunder, and communicate their 
fear to others. Th ough horses don’t possess higher brain function suffi  cient 
to allow them to “know” that they are anxious or analyze their anxiety the 
way that we do, anxiety is nonetheless a trait that humans and horses share. 
Indeed, our large brain aff ords us the potential for such hyperanxiety that 
we give horses a run for their money.
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Just as humans share the trait of anxiety with horses, we also share the 
tendency to try to alleviate anxiety through escape. Th ough our fl ights tend 
to be more conceptual than actual, humans and horses are both predis-
posed to run. Whereas horses are literal escape artists, humans are fi gura-
tive ones. Th e existentialists have even coined terms to describe our evasive 
tendencies. Whether they refer to them as “bad faith,”9 “inauthenticity,”10 
or “philosophical suicide,”11 they agree that when humans encounter some-
thing that elicits anxiety, our “immediate behavior with respect to [anxiety] 
is fl ight.”12 Because many of the things that terrify humans are mental, we 
fl ee through psychological diversion and denial. Just as we avoid physical 
confrontation, we run from unwanted truths into comforting fi elds of lies. 
Rather than accept responsibility for behavior, individuals oft en attempt to 
escape responsibility by shift ing the blame to someone or something other 
than the self. For example, if caught surfi ng the Internet at work, a person 
might readily justify her action on the grounds that “everyone else is doing 
it,” rather than admit acting irresponsibly.
Th is example alludes to a third similarity between humans and horses. 
Th ey are both herd-bound. Like horses, humans are social animals. Both 
species exist in communities and exhibit social dependence.13 Like horses, 
humans like to stand with each other and feed at the trough together. 
Humans and horses need others beyond their infancy; they retain that 
dependence throughout their adult life. Sartre and Heidegger both describe 
humans as fundamentally social. Heidegger asserts that we are social beings 
before we have a self and that we derive comfort from our “being-with-
others.”14 While Sartre is alert to the potential that our relationships have 
to arouse discomfort, he too asserts that “being-for-others” is an essential 
aspect of human being, an aspect that is not only essential for physical sur-
vival, but also for proper psychological development and normal human 
function.15
In addition to wanting to be with others, we also want to be like them. 
Heidegger discusses how individuals try to be part of the “they,” and ago-
nize when they “diff e[r] from” from other members of their social group.16 
Arguably, this tendency to conform is what led earlier existentialist Frie-
drich Nietzsche to describe humans as “herd animal[s].”17 He saw that despite 
the rhetoric of individualism, humans, like horses, are more comfortable 
in groups. Both horses and humans are ontologically tied to others, and as 
a consequence, they fear estrangement from their peers. Th at fear inclines 
both species to acquiesce to authority and stick with the herd.
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Spurred by Desire: Th e Origins of Our Impulse to Dominate Horses
Of course, the fact that humans and horses share certain traits does not 
explain why humans have such an ambivalent relationship with equines, an 
ambivalence illustrated and reinforced by both classic and contemporary 
westerns. For that explanation we need to delve more deeply into the human 
psyche, our insecurities, and the way we manage anxiety. As mentioned pre-
viously, humans, like horses, are naturally anxious; however, unlike horses, 
humans actively refl ect on their anxiety and the causes of it. To the extent 
that many of the causes of anxiety are intractable aspects of the human con-
dition, refl ection merely compounds our anxiety rather than alleviates it. To 
the extent our anxiety is really about our being, it is irremediable, a terminal 
condition. Th is leads Sartre to describe human being as a “troubled longing” 
that has “no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state.”18 Th ough humans 
have no ready solutions for their existential troubles, they do have various 
means of consolation. Th ough we oft en feel disempowered by existence, we 
have developed psychologically satisfying ways to assert ourselves, assuage 
anxiety, and thereby increase our sense of agency and power.
Nietzsche is well known for his Will to Power. In his view, all beings 
are expressions of the Will to Power and the Will to Power is nothing other 
than life.19 By his account, all living things embody the Will to Power and 
desire to express that will. In addition, individuals experience frustration 
when their will is thwarted either by circumstance or confl ict with another 
will. Th e confl ict that arises between individual wills explains the animosity 
evident between animals, even social animals, like horses and humans, that 
are mutually dependent. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) dis-
cusses this dynamic, as evident in humans, in the famous “Lord and Bonds-
man” section of his Phenomenology of Spirit. To the extent that Nietzsche’s 
and Sartre’s later accounts of social relations rely heavily on Hegel’s work, 
these three fi gures can help us understand our desire to dominate others, 
horses in particular.
According to Hegel (and Sartre), human consciousness is not initially 
refl exive. Rather, it is thoroughly absorbed in experience. What prompts 
refl ection, and ultimately self-awareness, is the encounter with another con-
sciousness. Unfortunately, this initial encounter (and the others that follow) 
is not entirely pleasant. Encounters with others are problematic because the 
confrontation with another consciousness discloses to the individual the 
existence of another will, an “independent existence” whose wishes might 
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be contrary to his, and that might threaten or even kill him.20  As Hegel, 
Nietzsche, and Sartre agree, because of the intrinsic threat that others rep-
resent, social relationships are fraught with tension and confl ict. As much 
as we depend upon others, others can endanger us. Our relationship to 
others is further complicated by the fact that we seek to defi ne ourselves in 
opposition to them. Specifi cally, as much as we like to align ourselves with 
others, we also seek to prove ourselves independent of, superior to, them 
in order to placate the anxiety that they, and existence generally, generate. 
Hegel, Nietzsche, and Sartre agree that the desire to dominate is a natural 
impulse that arises out of our ontological insecurity.21 Sartre even suggests 
that individuals are naturally “sadis[tic]” because the domination of oth-
ers fosters a sense of physical and psychological security;22 however, as 
Nietzsche discusses at some length, in a situation of confl ict, not everyone 
can dominate. Rather, some individuals will be subordinates. Th e dynamic 
of domination causes the emergence of not only social hierarchies but also 
of resentment and “hostility” in the suppressed groups.23 Individuals who 
are subject to the control of others seek to fi nd ways to vent their frustration, 
express their power, and recoup their sense of ontological security. Th ough 
the philosophers mentioned discuss how this plays out only in human com-
munities, clearly, if individuals are unable to dominate members of their own 
species, they may attempt to dominate members of another. Th is is where 
horses come in. Whether a human or another animal, subjecting another 
being to the force of one’s will produces a sense of power and control. And 
size matters. Th e bigger the being is, the more substantial the return. Beating 
up someone smaller than you isn’t as satisfying as taking on someone your 
own size or bigger. Likewise, leading a puppy on a leash is not the same as 
leading a 1,200-pound stallion.
From an existential perspective, the psychological satisfaction humans 
get from hunting wild animals and owning domestic pets stems largely from 
the fact that both activities affi  rm the power of the individual by render-
ing—in the former case literally—an animal subject to human will. Th is also 
explains our fascination with animal training and obedience. We demand—
and delight in—animal obedience because their compliance feeds our hun-
ger for control. Th e bigger the animal one masters, the more satisfying is its 
subjection.24 To the extent that most horses are fi ve to ten times a person’s 
weight, compelling their compliance is deeply satisfying. Importantly, horses 
command human interest not only because they are large, but also because 
they are “volcanic force[s],” “dynamic material presence[s]” that impress 
Beating a Live Horse 335
us with their “sheer energy.”25 We desire to dominate horses not simply 
because of their size, but also because in subjecting them to our authority 
we “appropriat[e]” their power and thereby prove our own.26 As Tompkins 
asserts, horses are “colonized subjects.” Th ey “don’t start out as [our] pals; 
they have to be forced into it.” Westerns illustrate and emphasize this. In 
Hegelian fashion, westerns depict “a kingdom of force and confl ict where 
humans and animals vie for dominance and defi ne themselves by competing 
with each other.” More oft en than not, they show “horse[s] becom[ing] [our] 
servants.” Th e subjugation of horses is psychologically satisfying because “a 
man astride a horse illustrates the [satisfying] possibility of mastery of self, 
of others, of land, [and] of circumstance.”27 What Tompkins does not fully 
explain is why horses, more than any other animal, are the focal point of 
domination in westerns. Cattle are driven, but horses are broken. Horse-
breaking scenes are stock elements in westerns and bronc-riding remains 
one of the National Professional Rodeo Association’s most popular events. 
Th is special interest in breaking horses begs explanation.
Hippomania: Our Unique Fascination with Equines
Clearly, the simple desire to prove one’s power by breaking the will of another 
being explains why humans enjoy engaging in or observing acts of domi-
nation. Th e fact that individuals are not generally given social license to 
dominate other humans, or feel incapable of it, makes animals easy targets. 
Likewise, watching such acts on-screen provides vicarious satisfaction when 
real experience is unavailable or undesirable. Th e question is: Why are horses 
particularly appealing? Obviously, horses can do things for humans that other 
animals cannot. Th ey can work cattle and pull wagons. Th ey are faster and 
generally more tractable than oxen. A rider on horseback can cover more 
ground than a person on foot and is elevated from some of the dangers, such 
as snakes, to which the latter is exposed. Because of their various uses (and 
the fact that they submit to being put to those uses), horses were essential to 
the settling of the American West. Th e settling of the West literally rode on 
the back of the horse. Horses also served an important function historically 
for many Native American tribes. While commitment to realism explains 
the ubiquitous presence of horses in westerns, it doesn’t explain the special 
focus on their domination that is evident in them. Th is special interest issues 
from the fact that horses embody traits we both loathe and love.
Ironically, the traits we loathe in horses are the traits that we share with 
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them. To the extent that we would like to purge ourselves of these traits, 
we seek to discipline them out of horses. As discussed previously, humans 
and horses are anxious, herd-bound beings who are predisposed to fl ight. 
Th ough horses cannot, humans can refl ect on their being, and unfortunately, 
when we do, we do not always like what we see. Sartre argues that we usually 
don’t. In particular, we do not like the fact that we are anxious, dependent, 
and inclined to run. It’s not hard to see why we don’t like anxiety. Anxiety is 
uncomfortable. Worry and fear are not fun. Neither is dependence. Depen-
dence links one’s being to something that is beyond one’s will and control. 
Th is is anxiety provoking and therefore unpleasant. Th e tendency to run 
is distasteful because it smacks of weakness. Th e one who runs is the one 
whose will is weaker. Whether it is for natural or cultural reasons, we read 
a predisposition toward fl ight as an indication of cowardice.
Th e positive traits that horses possess also make them targets. As Tomp-
kins states, horses embody “all that is desirable and precious about living 
things . . . [including] the blamelessness and vulnerability of the body and 
its inborn desire for pleasure.”28 Horses symbolize even more than that. We 
love horses for many reasons. As Tompkins rightly notes, we love them for 
their innocence and purity and for the fact that they do not seem to suff er 
the way that we do. We also love them for their sheer beauty and remarkable 
athleticism. Horses are striking animals. Th eir fl uid elegance, elasticity of 
movement, and natural grace are captivating. Moreover, in a country where 
the national symbol could as easily be a horse as an eagle, horses embody 
other powerful ideals including freedom, grace, and community. To the 
extent that we aspire to these qualities, we admire horses for having them.
Unfortunately, as much as we admire and celebrate horses for their pos-
session of traits such as beauty, freedom, and grace, we also envy their pos-
session of these qualities. Part of our desire to subjugate them derives from 
our wish to “posse[ss]” what they have.29 As Sartre discusses, in seeking to 
dominate others, individuals strive to appropriate power and prove their own 
authority. Maintenance and validation of the individual subject is achieved 
through the objectifi cation or suppression of the Other. Th is is illustrated 
clearly in the treatment of horses in westerns. Horses are frequently shot to 
create a protective barrier to gunfi re and are traded for goods and services. 
Th ey are broken in order to confi rm the power of the individual on their 
back. Th eir feelings are not usually considered relevant. Th eir welfare tends 
to be considered only to the extent that it relates to their exchange value.
Th ough horses are commonly objectifi ed, it is interesting to note that 
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the horses that command the greatest interest and respect from us, and 
from characters in westerns, are those that retain their spirit and resist 
being reduced to objects. Th e rogues, not the nags, have enduring appeal. 
Th ese are the horses that serve as characters rather than as background in 
our beloved westerns. Existential theory also sheds light on why we love 
these horses. According to Sartre, what human consciousness really wants 
is not to reduce others to objects but to possess another consciousness as 
subject. While reducing someone to an object is empowering, we prefer to 
dominate others as subjects, not objects. We want to dominate “a freedom 
as freedom,” while simultaneously (and paradoxically) “demand[ing] that 
this freedom as freedom should no longer be free.”30 It is for this reason that 
Hegel asserts that the goal of the confl ict between individuals is domina-
tion, not death. Th ough death more eff ectively removes the threat posed by 
another, it denies the individual the psychological satisfaction that comes 
when another freedom willingly accepts and acknowledges the power of 
the self. To the extent that horses are powerful symbols of freedom, when 
we harness them or ride them and they accept that situation, we get exactly 
what we want—we control a freedom as freedom.
Westerns and Horses
As other essays in this collection examine, westerns have an enduring appeal 
in part because they serve the purpose of wish fulfi llment. Th ey satisfy our 
nostalgia for a less alienating, preindustrialized time, a time when we were 
closer to nature, when our labor produced tangible and worthwhile results, 
and when things were clearer—morally speaking. Of course, it’s not clear 
that this time ever actually existed, but we want it nonetheless. We ideal-
ize western heroes like Marshal Will Kane (High Noon, 1952) because they 
embody traits we seek to have. Th ey are loners who are unruffl  ed by dan-
ger and refuse to run regardless of the risk.31 While we aspire to be like the 
archetypal heroes of the classic western, the horses in westerns (and horses 
generally) exhibit qualities we are more likely to share. As mentioned previ-
ously, to the extent that they exhibit characteristics that we possess but also 
despise, horses are convenient objects upon which to transfer our own self-
loathing and enact a disciplinary regime designed to punish and transform.32 
As traditionally practiced and depicted in westerns, and oft en illustrated by 
the hero himself, the act of breaking penalizes horses for exhibiting their 
natural traits, and forces them into manifesting the traits we seek not only 
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in them but also in ourselves. Training transforms nature by reconditioning 
natural response. Natural equine responses, like running and bucking, are 
denied their effi  cacy and associated with a negative consequence. Unnatural 
reactions like internalizing aggression, and facing and approaching danger, 
are rewarded. Interestingly, this process is analogous to that discussed by 
philosopher Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish. Just as he asserts that 
human bodies are subject to control and reconditioning in and through the 
process of socialization, the bodies of horses are subjected to disciplinary 
techniques that force a compliance that is contrary to instinct. With both 
humans and horses, the ultimate goal of training is to produce “docile bod-
ies.”33 In subjecting horses to our control, we reenact the processes to which 
we ourselves were subject. In Hegelian terms, slave becomes master.
Th e horse-breaking scenes in All the Pretty Horses (2000) and Th e Horse 
Whisperer (1998) illustrate this “disciplinary model” clearly.34 In the former, 
the horses are herded into a corral. One by one they are separated from the 
comfort of the herd, caught, and bound tightly with ropes. To encourage 
quicker submission, their noses are hobbled to their hind legs so that their 
eff orts at resistance will actually use the horse’s own strength to command 
compliance. When they kick or run they yank their own nose. Th e harder 
they resist, the more punishing it is on their tender noses. In the novel that 
serves as the basis for the fi lm, McCarthy describes how the process demeans 
and terrifi es the colts. He says the colts look like “circus” animals “trussed up 
by children” and that the main character, John Grady Cole, “remorseless[ly] 
. . . rende[rs] . . . [the] fl uid collective selves [of the horses] into [a] condition 
of separate and helpless paralysis.” Denied any means of escape and “trail-
ing their hackamore ropes . . . [so as] not to tread upon them and snatch 
their sore noses,” the horses “stood waiting for they knew not what with 
the voice of the breaker still running in their brains like the voice of some 
god come to inhabit them.” Aft er the breaker fi nishes with the horses, their 
being is irrevocably altered: “Th e mustangs that had circled the potrero like 
marbles in a jar could hardly be said to exist . . . the animals whinnied . . . as 
if someone among their number were missing, or some thing.”35 Despite the 
fact that his methods demean the horses, Cole (Matt Damon) is described 
as the best horseman in the land.
A similar elevation of coercive methods is seen in the fi lm Th e Horse 
Whisperer. Aft er traditional round-pen techniques that bear an interest-
ing similarity to Jeremy Bentham’s (1748–1832) panopticon36 fail to com-
pel compliance, the main character, Tom Booker (Robert Redford), uses 
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a diff erent but equally forceful technique to break Pilgrim. He ultimately 
“lays” Pilgrim down, a euphemism used to describe when a person ropes 
the legs of a horse in such a way as to force it to the ground. To keep the 
horse prostrate, a person using this technique will either hog-tie the horse’s 
legs or sit on the animal’s neck to prevent it from getting back to its feet. 
Booker uses ropes to bring Pilgrim to the ground and sits on his neck to 
keep him there. Because it robs them of their one real defense, fl ight, lay-
ing a horse down is one of the most frightening things one can do to it. 
While Booker indicates that he is merely asking Pilgrim to choose whether 
he’ll let someone ride him, being forced to the ground and having some-
one sit on your head would certainly be coercive if were we talking about 
doing it to a human. Aft er all, though both the original novel and the fi lm 
version intentionally align the traumatized protagonist, Grace MacLean 
(Scarlett Johansson), with her traumatized horse, despite Grace’s initial 
resistance, Booker doesn’t take her to the mat to inspire her compliance. 
Again, though he employs coercive methods, Booker is championed as an 
exemplary horseman.37
To be fair, both All Th e Pretty Horses and Th e Horse Whisperer articulate 
the love we have for horses as much as they illustrate our tendency to try 
to dominate them. Th ey trade as much on their audience’s fascination with 
horses as the satisfaction associated with watching them get broke. Poignant 
scenes in which the protagonists speak to the horses and stroke them soft ly 
counterbalance the coercive training sequences. Similarly, multiple scenes 
focus exclusively on the beauty of the horse and the quiet communion pos-
sible between horse and rider. Films such as Hidalgo (2004), Th e Electric 
Horseman (1979), and the classic Lonely Are the Brave (1962), also glorify 
horses and celebrate our relationship with them.38 To the extent that the 
aforementioned fi lms foreground our interest in and aff ection for horses, 
they, more than most other westerns, demonstrate that our relations with 
horses are not based simply on the impulse to dominate. Instead, they allude 
to the possibility of a more productive bond. Th ese fi lms illustrate an impor-
tant fact: we have a profoundly positive connection to horses.
Th ough the traits we share with horses can compel a negative reaction, 
they can also serve as the basis for a positive empathic bond. Humans sense 
a powerful kinship with horses because of our common characteristics: our 
mutual sensitivity and similar subjection to social restraint. Like horses, we 
feel ourselves “saddled” with obligations, and oft en reduced to the status of 
an object. Our bosses “ride” us, and while normally fearful of consequence, 
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we occasionally fi nd ourselves “bucking authority”—“tossing our heads,” as 
it were. Similarly, while we like to think of ourselves as individuals, we oft en 
fi nd ourselves anxiously looking to others for validation and, more oft en 
than not, following the herd’s lead. Western fi lms both illustrate and capi-
talize on the kinship with horses that humans experience. Th ey utilize it by 
having horses serve as symbolic surrogates for their human counterparts, 
illustrating on-screen what humans feel they have lost, or hope to possess. 
Th is is nowhere more evident than in the classic Lonely Are the Brave. Th ough 
the fi lm is normally looked at as a requiem for the Old West, a fi lm focused 
on the death of cowboy culture, it also illustrates the poignant relationship 
that a person can have with a horse. Arguably, the protagonist in the fi lm, 
Jack Burns (Kirk Douglas), has no better friend than his horse, Whiskey. 
Th e fi lm “identifi [es]” the plight of the protagonist with that of his horse as 
they struggle to fi nd a place for themselves in a brave new world of high-
speed commerce.39 In the closing scene in which Jack and Whiskey are killed 
trying to cross a highway in the rain, horse and rider serve as a poignant 
symbol of the price of modernity.
In addition to illustrating the kinship humans have with horses, west-
ern fi lms also illustrate the delight that people can derive from their rela-
tionships with horses. Th ey depict the loyalty and camaraderie that can 
exist between humans and horses, a joy that comes not merely from tactile 
bonding and the pleasure of nonverbal communication but also from the 
mutual trust and friendship that can develop between an individual and a 
horse. Th ese traits are exemplifi ed in Hidalgo, a fi lm based on the life of leg-
endary horseman Frank T. Hopkins (1865–1951) and his horse, Hidalgo. In 
the fi lm, while Hopkins (Viggo Mortensen) rides Hidalgo and races him for 
prize money, rather than regard his horse as a subordinate, he sees Hidalgo 
as an equal, a partner. He talks to Hidalgo, expresses genuine concern over 
the horse’s welfare, and horse and rider display mutual respect and aff ec-
tion. Importantly, Hopkins also repeatedly refers to his horse as “brother.” 
Th e use of this familial term shows that Hopkins sees his horse not only as 
an equal, but also as intimately connected to himself, as a member of his 
immediate family. As the fi lm suggests, Hidalgo is Hopkins’s closest friend. 
And when Hopkins repeatedly tells his friend, “Let ’er buck,” he expresses 
his willingness to let his horse be a horse. Th is phrase also foreshadows the 
end of the fi lm, in which Hopkins releases Hidalgo back into the wild to 
run with a herd of mustangs he purchased and spared from extermination 
at the hands of the U.S. Army.
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Th ough its plot is predicated on less amiable relations to horses, Th e 
Electric Horseman concludes in a similar fashion to Hidalgo. In this fi lm, 
former rodeo champion Sonny Steele (Robert Redford) rescues the racehorse 
Rising Star from an exploitive situation in which the horse is being drugged 
so that he will be placid enough to parade on-stage alongside showgirls 
who are promoting breakfast cereal at Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas. Like 
Hopkins, Steele empathizes with the horse and detests his exploitation. To 
save the horse, Steele elects to release him into the wild. Th e closing scene 
in which the stallion lopes freely toward a group of mares contrasts sharply 
with the scene for which the fi lm is known: Steele atop the horse, both fi g-
ures draped in lights, man and horse reduced to an advertising gimmick. 
Th e endings of Hidalgo and Th e Electric Horseman command a powerful 
response in audiences. Like many other western fi lms, they allude to the 
duality of nature and culture and display a clear preference for the former. 
Audiences delight as bridles and saddles are removed and the horses are 
liberated. We thrill as the horses gallop into an open landscape, celebrating 
not merely their liberation, but also the way that release satisfi es our latent 
desire for freedom from constraint.
As thrilling as the endings of Hidalgo and Th e Electric Horseman may 
be, the open future they depict for these horses, or horses generally, is not 
realistic. Th e endings serve the purpose of human wish fulfi llment, not 
fact. While the liberation of horses on-screen serves as an apt symbol of 
our own desire for autonomy, there are now very few places in this country 
where horses can run wild, and even in those places, horses usually remain 
at the mercy of humans. In order to ensure suffi  cient grazing for cattle and 
adequate acreage for new home building, thousands of horses are rounded 
up every year off  public land by the Bureau of Land Management and put 
out for adoption or auction, with some animals going for slaughter.40 Th e 
situation for horses is very much as the ending of Hidalgo suggests. In the 
world today, horses exist at the will and whim of humans. Th ey are bought 
and sold, run and bred. Th ey live and die at our discretion. Horses don’t 
have any choice in this matter, but humans do. We can choose to relate to 
horses in a responsible manner or an exploitive one; however, we cannot 
just set them free. Our world is not one of fi ction, where ample space exists 
for all. Horses are beings that exist alongside us in the world, and humans, 
for the time being, control that world. Our actions exert tremendous infl u-
ence on the species that surround us, horses included. Th ough we can use 
our knowledge of horses against them in order to dominate them and satisfy 
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our own desire for control, we do not have to do so. Our empathic connec-
tion can inspire us to display greater sensitivity to horses.
We can return to Hegel and the existentialists for guidance. Just as Hegel 
describes the instinct to dominate that infl uences our relation to horses, he 
also denies that individuals can achieve their full potential in the context 
of unequal relations. Th is is what inspires Hegel to argue for the need to 
transcend one-sided relationships of domination to achieve relations of reci-
procity. According to Hegel, though others arouse discomfort, humans need 
others, and full human potentiality can be achieved only through mutuality. 
His dialectic encourages humans to go beyond their tendency to dominate 
one another and progress toward more egalitarian relationships. Th ough 
Hegel was not thinking of animal-human relations, arguably his ideas can 
be applied to them. Clearly, our humanity is measured not only by our 
treatment of other humans, but also by our treatment of other species and 
the environment. Likewise, our humanity evolves not only in conjunction 
with our human interactions, but also through our nonhuman ones. For 
the benefi t of other beings and our own, we should resist our inclination to 
dominate horses and seek greater mutuality with them, mutuality like that 
illustrated in Hidalgo.
Learning from Horses: Letting Go, Turning In, Hooking On
One might ask at this point what larger purpose seeking out and celebrating 
mutuality with horses serves. Aft er all, only a relatively small percentage of 
the U.S. population has concrete relations with horses. Th is is true; however, 
the confl icted relationship with horses that westerns tend to exemplify and 
promote is signifi cant because of what it says about humans generally, not 
merely those who work with horses. Rather than promote the acceptance 
of our nature, most westerns refl ect and reinforce our dissatisfaction with 
it, and they do so in part through their portrayal of horses. As Tompkins 
states, “Th e desire to curb the horse and make it submit to human require-
ments is as important to Westerns as [any] desire for merger or mutuality.”41 
Most westerns serve up lone heroes who embody our desire for absolute 
autonomy and fortify the ambivalent relationship we have with horses by 
celebrating their violent subjugation. However, because they foreground the 
deep aff ection we have for horses, westerns such as Hidalgo, All Th e Pretty 
Horses, Th e Electric Horseman, and Th e Horse Whisperer have the potential 
to inspire critical refl ection both on the ideals of horsemanship that most 
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westerns endorse and on our general attraction to these punitive techniques. 
As much as we have nostalgia for the world of the western, the treatment of 
horses that is characteristic of the genre reduces humans as much as it does 
horses. As this essay shows, the psychodynamics that infl uence our relation-
ship to horses exert an infl uence on other relationships as well.
Whether one rides horses for recreational or professional purposes, that 
activity presumes relations of power. Th is essay is not suggesting that people 
give up riding and hand over the reins to the horses, or that we deny ourselves 
the pleasure of observing or owning horses. Instead, it simply suggests that 
we consider the psychological basis for the ambivalent relationship Ameri-
cans have to these animals, a relationship that is depicted in and reinforced 
by most westerns. When it is subject to scrutiny, we can see that the nature 
of our relationship to horses oft en has more to do with our relationship to 
ourselves than it has to do with equines. Our relationships with horses are 
oft en dictated more by our own desires than by any recognition of theirs. 
Oft en we ride horses in order to prove something to ourselves. Even those 
who have never swung a leg over a horse delight in watching them be broken 
because not only does that act satisfy the desire to dominate, it also glorifi es 
the subjugation of instincts we regard as weak.
While the analysis off ered here holds particular signifi cance for those 
who work with horses, it is equally relevant to those who don’t. Obviously, 
for those who work with horses, the insights provided here might help 
individuals: (1) limit the transference of negative emotion in the course of 
training; (2) discourage the immature demand for control that oft en results 
in the inappropriate or disproportionate application of punitive techniques; 
and (3) encourage more empathic, productive, and nonviolent relations to 
horses. For those who don’t work with horses, the remarks provided here 
might infl uence greater critical refl ection upon our cultural attitude toward 
horses and more informed popular dialogue regarding public policy related 
to equine industries such as horse racing. However, there is another, even 
more compelling benefi t.
Ultimately, understanding the nature of our relationship to horses 
increases our understanding of ourselves.42 Th is yields an increased ability 
to determine both our own being and our being with others. As existen-
tialists like Sartre emphasize, humans have the freedom to determine their 
nature because we stand in a unique position with respect to our natural 
inclinations. While humans are nothing other than highly evolved animals 
who are subject to various sorts of impulses, unlike other animals, our 
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consciousness gives us the ability to decide whether we are going to act on 
those impulses or not. As Sartre indicates, consciousness aff ects a “break in 
being,” and that capacity to dissociate from experience is the foundation for 
freedom.43 It is what keeps human action from being completely determined 
by inclination. With this freedom in mind, we can look at the impulses and 
emotions discussed earlier in this essay, namely, the impulse to dominate, 
an impulse that is aggravated by our own self-loathing. Rather than act on 
this impulse, an impulse that infl uences numerous important relations, not 
merely those with horses, we can resist it and elect to act on other motives, 
motives perhaps grounded less in our own anxiety about what we are and 
more about what we hope to be.
While we are shaped by our evolutionary heritage, our hardwired 
responses, our primal fears and desires, we can choose how we react to that 
history. Th ough we cannot change the fact that we are anxious and social, we 
can choose not to let our anxieties compromise our relationships with other 
beings. Of course, this isn’t easy; however, it is easier if we learn to accept 
ourselves. Self-acceptance is critical because, as suggested here with horses, 
much of the ambivalence we display toward other beings is anchored in our 
own insecurity. Th ough existentialists like Sartre recognize that aspects of 
our being are troubling, at the same time he sees existence as “a perfect free 
gift .”44 In advocating authenticity, he encourages individuals to admit and 
accept the human condition. Th ough we don’t like everything about exis-
tence or everything about ourselves, we are “indebted” to our environment, 
and human by virtue of the traits we possess.45 Our anxious nature is what 
anchors our capacity for deep concern. Our fragility grounds our potential 
for profound existential appreciation. Our social nature serves as the foun-
dation for genuine empathy, community, and solidarity. We need to embrace 
the traits we possess and that horses mirror to us, rather than act on our 
visceral desire to expunge them. We can take our lead from horses.
In order to be ridden, horses have to get past their initial impulse to 
duck (more accurately, buck!) and run. What is amazing is that most of 
them “let go” of their primal fear, “turn in” to us, and let us ride them with-
out us having to use excessive force.46 We are in a similar situation to that 
of horses. We exist in a situation of constraint and we have to fi nd a way to 
deal with it productively. To function at an optimum level, we also have to 
get past some of our initial impulses. Ironically, it may be easier to ride an 
unbroken horse than it is to get most people past their ontological predilec-
tions. Perhaps we could learn from the colts in All the Pretty Horses. Th ere, 
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despite the severity of the methods used and their transformative eff ects, the 
horses somehow retain their grace. Th ey adapt to their condition, “hook on” 
to their new situation, and, as McCarthy puts it, move “with great elegance 
and seemliness.” Like the colts, the thoroughbred stallion that Cole trains 
retains his power and grace and even delights in being ridden. When Cole 
returns from prison, the stallion is “glad to see him,” and when they head 
out for a ride, the horse is so exuberant he “[can] fi nd no gait within his 
repertoire to suit the day.”47 We could take a lesson from these horses, and 
horses generally. Th ey adapt to their situation without surrendering their 
grace. When given the opportunity, they take delight in life. Th ey do not 
seem to exhibit the self-loathing or social anxiety that we do. If we would 
do more of the same, we would be better off . Th ough oft en cynical, Sartre 
alludes to this possibility. He uses the term grace to refer both to the state 
of the individual and to interpersonal relations that are characterized by 
“reciproc[ity]” rather than dominance.48 Th ough he asserts that grace is 
rare, it is an ideal that the authentic individual exemplifi es. It is an ideal that 
bears similarity to that described by Heidegger. Th ough Heidegger asserts 
that a “will to mastery” dominates most people, he says this will operates 
to the detriment of all living things.49 As a result, he urges individuals to 
lay down their desire to dominate, and instead to hasten to the “call . . . [of] 
conscience,” a call that reminds us of our connection to other beings and 
the environment.50 He urges us to “spare and husband” other beings, rather 
than subjugate them, and “to stay with [them]” in such a way as to “free 
[them to] their own presencing.”51
Th ough it depicts our tendency to dominate horses, All the Pretty Horses 
also illustrates an ideal of human-horse relations, an ideal of grace and 
mutuality to which we might aspire not merely with horses, but with other 
humans. At the end of the novel and at great personal risk, Cole rescues his 
horse Redbo. Th ough horse and rider have been separated for some time, 
Redbo recognizes Cole’s voice and whinnies to him from the darkness of 
the barn. Cole takes Redbo, along with Rawlins’s and Blevins’s horses, and 
heads back to the States.52 While riding Redbo, Cole realizes the depth of 
his connection to his horse. He “found he was breathing in rhythm with the 
horse as if some part of the horse were within him breathing and then he 
descended into some deeper collusion for which he had not even a name.” 
Cole fi nds profound solace in this collusion, and the intimate link between 
horse and rider is reinforced in the fi nal scene as Cole and Redbo move off  
into the darkening landscape, a world where Cole seems to feel at home only 
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with his horse, and where the shadow of horse and rider is like that “of a 
single being.”53 Unfortunately, rather than allow themselves this degree of 
connection with either another human or an animal, people oft en fl ee it. All 
too oft en, like horses on their fi rst experience in the round pen, we run the 
perimeter, our noses tipped to the outside, searching for a way out. From the 
existentialist perspective, life is a pen with no outside; there is no place to 
escape. While we can spend our lives running, we have another option. As 
a seasoned horseman might say, we can choose to let go, turn in, and hook 
on. If we would, more than our relations to horses would benefi t.
Notes
Th is essay is dedicated to all my pretty horses. You have tolerated my imperfection with 
immeasurable grace and good humor and have undoubtedly helped make me a better 
person. One couldn’t ask for better friends. I am also grateful to B. Steve Csaki, Ken 
Hada, Mark Walling, and Steve Pedersen for their thoughtful comments and helpful 
suggestions on an earlier draft  of this essay.
 Th e epigraph is taken from Cormac McCarthy, All the Pretty Horses (New York: 
Vintage International, 1992). 
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T here are few film and television genres that capture the hearts of audiences like the western. While not always 
true to the past, westerns are tied to, and 
expressive of, the history of the United States. 
As such, they serve to both reflect and inform 
the American psyche. Indeed, the western is 
arguably the most iconic and influential genre 
in American cinema. Through characters like 
Shane, William Munny, and Al Swearengen, 
western films and TV shows continue to 
captivate viewers.
The Philosophy of the Western features 
a variety of essays that consider the 
philosophical significance of westerns. From 
classic films such as Fort Apache (1948) and 
The Wild Bunch (1969) to contemporary 
films and TV shows such as 3:10 to Yuma 
(2007), No Country for Old Men (2007), and 
Deadwood (2004–2006), The Philosophy 
of the Western uses ancient and modern 
philosophical frameworks to analyze the 
underlying themes of the genre. Editors 
Jennifer L. McMahon and B. Steve Csaki 
have assembled a group of noted scholars to 
investigate questions of identity, ethics, 
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gender, animal rights, and other topics 
depicted in western narratives.
Drawing from philosophers as varied as 
Aristotle, Spinoza, William James, and Jean-
Paul Sartre, The Philosophy of the Western 
examines themes that are central to the genre: 
individual freedom versus community; the 
encroachment of industry and development 
on the natural world; and the epistemological 
and ethical implications of the classic “lone 
rider” of the West. The philosophies of John 
Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau figure prominently in discussions 
of human relationships and of the necessary 
conditions for social and political order in 
the West. The result is a wide-reaching study 
of fundamental questions about morality, 
identity, and social organization.
The Philosophy of the Western offers a detailed 
analysis of the origins and continuing 
influence of a quintessentially American form 
of art and entertainment.
Jennifer L. McMahon, associate professor 
and chair of the English and Languages 
Department at East Central University, is 
a contributor to The Philosophy of TV Noir, 
The Philosophy of Martin Scorsese, and The 
Philosophy of Science Fiction Film.
b. Steve CSaki was most recently a visiting 
professor at Centre College, where he taught 
courses in philosophy, the humanities, and 
Japanese.
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“The writing is accessible to nonspecialists  
and should be of interest to general  
readers who enjoy thinking about  
philosophy, film, or westerns.”
—karen d. hoffMan, 
Hood College
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